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PREFACE 
 
Political rivalry, antagonism and violence of one form or another has been part of the political 
history of Ethiopia; a country that endured successive imperial and feudal regimes followed 
by a military junta called the Dergue – meaning Committee – during which violence took its 
extreme manifestations. Extreme political violence was the modus oprandi of the military 
regime, and apparently, the 17 years of its rule can be characterized as the bloodiest regime, 
or at least one of such regimes in the country’s history. The fall of the Dergue regime opened 
a window of opportunity for social and political transformation. Many viewed this event as 
marking the end of atrocities and the beginning of a new social and political order, essentially 
of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. In deed, certain transitional measures can be 
considered as crucial steps in the right direction. The 1991 transitional period Charter 
declared democracy as a categorical imperative and provided for the respect and protection of 
fundamental human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its 
Successor, The FDRE constitution, devotes one-third of its provisions to human rights and 
establishes the formal institutions of rule of law, human rights and democratic governance; 
thus exhibiting the basic features of a democratic, law-abiding and human rights respecting 
system.  Within this broader setup, the Ethiopian transitional justice trials may be regarded as 
an effort to redress past violations while at the same time constitutive of a new political 
society.  
 
I started to attend some of these trials as a reporter for the Trial Observation and Information 
Project (TOIP), launched to gather and document information relating to these trials. At the 
time, I was a law student at Addis Ababa University; and my duty was to prepare and submit 
a summary of court proceedings together with my reflections. These early day engagements 
and familiarity with the trials, I think, have an impact in guiding me to this interdisciplinary 
study of the Ethiopian transitional justice trials.  
 
At the beginning of the proceedings, there was high expectation and enthusiasm both 
domestically and internationally about the constructive impacts of these trials. Because of the 
desire of too many people including diplomats and foreign journalists, prior registration and 
obtaining entry card was sometimes necessary to attend these trials, especially those 
involving top Dergue-WPE officials. However, as the trials dragged on, such expectation and 
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enthusiasm apparently declined and as our late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reportedly 
noted “the exercise became more and more irrelevant”.1 This is an acknowledgement that the 
delay of the proceedings was an obstacle to the achievement of the desired result(s).  A more 
drastic of the views was that the process was a reflection of victor’s justice, partial and 
inappropriate to solving deep-rooted social and political problems in Ethiopia with some 
questioning the very motivation of the government. Despite these, after protracted court 
proceedings, a huge number of Dergue officials and their affiliates were found guilty and 
convicted. Most of the top officials of the Dergue – WPE, including those sentenced to death, 
were recently released. A fundamental issue worth discussing is whether these trials had 
successfully addressed the past and served as a foundation of a new order. Have we departed 
from a culture of political mistrust, antagonism, polarization and violence? Have we built 
proper and functioning institutions of the rule of law and of justice? Has human dignity and 
worth become part of our social and political reality? Many would agree that Ethiopia has 
shown a tremendous economic achievement over the recent past. Has parallel transformation 
occurred with respect to the rule of law, democracy and human rights? A common 
observation may reveal improvements compared to the Dergue regime. Nevertheless, such 
comparison with a demonic regime ignores the overall transformative impact of transitional 
justice processes, leading to a new social and political identity. Thus, it is necessary to ask 
what do the trials mean for the Ethiopian public in terms of justice, truth (of knowing what 
happened and why), the rule of law, democracy, human rights, accommodation and tolerance 
in addressing political and other differences? This study is therefore a fraction of the broader 
intellectual endeavour of looking at the social, political and legal impact of these trials based 
on qualitative empirical research. By showing the complex and contested nature of 
transitional justice processes in Ethiopia, it calls for further research and intellectual debate in 
to how we, in Ethiopia, have dealt with our past, its success and challenges as well as what 
should be done to complement the process.    
 
 
                                                             
1 Interview by Kjetil Tronvoll with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 16 January 2002, in K., TRONVOL, C. 
SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.).2009. The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged 
(African Issues), James Currey, at 69.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is concerned with how societies in transition respond to past violation by 
focusing on how Ethiopia has dealt with gross violations committed during the repressive 
regime of a military junta called the Dergue – meaning Committee. It is widely believed that 
transitional justice processes play a significant transformative role in societies in transition. 
Based on a case study of the process and impact of prosecution of Dergue officials and their 
affiliates, this dissertation demonstrates that transitional criminal justice processes may not 
necessarily transform a society to a new social and political identity that essentially departs 
from a repressive past. The study discusses and analyzes the theory of transitional justice 
emphasizing the discourses on the meaning and significance of the main components of 
transitional justice – justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation – and relates these discourses 
to the Ethiopian experience. The study is qualitative, employing both primary data (primarily 
in-depth interview), and secondary data including literature (on Ethiopian history, law and 
politics), laws both national and international, court cases, and various reports including those 
of courts and the prosecution office. In the Ethiopian context, the arguments in support of 
prosecution resonate with the general theoretical arguments that it is necessary to render 
justice, establish rule of law, ensure accountability, serve as deterrence, and generally serve 
as a foundation for a new political and social identity. However, whether prosecution or 
prosecution alone was an appropriate response in the Ethiopian context is a contested issue. 
Secondly, the legal framework for prosecution and its implementation are also problematic. 
Thus, this study shows the problematic nature of transitional justice processes as carried out 
in Ethiopian social and political context in terms of both bringing closure to the past and 
playing a transformative role, and thereby showing the complex and contested nature of 
transitional justice itself. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study and Overview of State and Society in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia is an East African country inhabited by diverse linguistic, religious and cultural 
groups with a long history of existence and civilization - the pre-Axumite civilization and 
Axumite civilization, and afterwards.  It is considered as a cradle of humankind with the 
discovery of Lucy, otherwise known as Dinknesh in Amharic, meaning miracle or 
marvellous. Ethiopia is also the only African country never to have been formally colonized, 
and hence a symbol of independence and freedom. One may remember the Battle of Adwa 
where Ethiopia defeated Italy and sent a message to the rest European colonizers. This is a 
victory of the people of Ethiopia. So the story goes.  
 
There is also a different history. A dark side of history is that Ethiopian people endured 
centuries of oppression by their own rulers or leaders. The country and its people were ruled 
for a long period by Imperial regimes most of whom claimed legitimacy based on decent 
from King Solomon of Israel and Queen Sheba who gave birth to the first Ethiopian King - 
King Menelik I.
2
The population suffered under successive imperial regimes, which had 
absolute power. The last Emperor of Ethiopia, King Hailesilassie, cemented its absolute 
power with the adoption of the first written constitution in 1931, and the country and its 
people were under his control.
3
 The then existing oppressions gave rise to popular uprisings 
in mid 20
th
 Century against the imperial regime – including peasant revolts in Tigray, Gojjam 
and Bale.
4
 Student movements and other revolutionary sections of the society including the 
                                                             
2 This descent from King Solomon is enshrined in a text called Kebra Nagast, which means Glory of Kings. See, 
BUDGE, E.A. (trans.). 2000.The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Kebra Negast). Ontario: 
Cambridge. [Accessed on 6 June 2013]. Available from World Wide Web: 
<http://www.yorku.ca/inpar/kebra_budge.pdf >. In its preface Budge noted that this document “ has been held in 
peculiar honour in Abyssinia for several centuries, and throughout that country it has been, and still is, venerated 
by the people as containing the final proof of their descent from the Hebrew Patriarchs, and the kinship of their 
kings of the solomonic line with Christ, the son of God.”  The claim of  legitimacy by Ethiopian kings based on 
solomonic desecent and Christianity can also be noted from Zenebe Bashaw – see ZENEBE BASHAW. 2008.  
Governing the Public Sphere and State Formation in Ethiopia.  Yaundi: Nagoya University. [Accessed on 10 
June 2013]. Available from World Wide Web:< http://www.cadesria.org/IMG/pdf/Zeneb_Bashaw.pdf>, at 13 
3 BASHAW, Z,Above n 1 at 10. See also BAHIRU ZEWDE. 1991.  A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991. 
Oxford: James Curray, at 201. Bahiru noted that the King “came to be regarded as a permanent factor, as 
immutable as the mountains and the rivers of the country”.Pg.201 
4 BASHAW, Z,Above n 1 at 13 
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military had also been questioning the legitimacy of the imperial regime and calling for 
reform or change.
5
 Eventually, the last feudal regime of Emperor Haile-Sillassie ended 
through a coup in 1974 led by a military junta called the “Dergue”- meaning Committee. 
 
The Dergue, under the leadership of Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam, instituted a military 
regime that ruled the country based on an asserted socialist ideology until 1991.
6
 The 
seventeen years of the Dergue regime witnessed gross violation of human rights. Immediately 
upon gaining power, the Dergue commenced a period of violence with summary executions 
of about sixty high officials of the imperial regime and the secret killing of the Emperor and 
the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
7
  
 
As the Dergue took power, several political groups opposed it, and as a result, in 1976, the 
Dergue launched what was called the Red Terror Campaign to eliminate opposition political 
groups characterized as “counter revolutionaries”. This campaign took place for two years 
until 1978, resulting in killings, detention, torture and disappearances.
8
  According to one 
account, “thousands of people turned up dead in the streets of the capital and other cities in 
the following two years [meaning 1976-1978]”9. Although the Dergue was the main violator, 
some sources indicate that opposition political groups also resorted to violence.
10
 Apart from, 
or in addition to, the Red Terror campaign, other conditions had worsened the context of 
violations and human suffering.
11
  
 
                                                             
5 BASHAW, Z,Above n 2 at 13 
6 BAHRU ZEWDE. 2002. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991. 2nd edition. Oxford: James Currey. P. 229. 
See also TRONVOLL, K.  2009. A Quest for Justice or the Formation of Political Legitimacy? The Political 
Anatomy of the Red Terror Trials. In: K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian 
Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, at 1 
7 ZEWDE, B, Above n 6 at 238. See also Human Rights Watch:Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu Hailemariam. 
1991. [online]. [accessed on 14 Nov.2008]. Available from World Wide Web: 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/1991/29/ethiop5495.htm>. 
8 ZEWDE, B, Above n 6. See also DE WAL, A.  September 1991. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in 
Ethiopia (An African Watch Report). New York: Human Rights Watch. ; TRONVOLL. K.. Above n 5 at 1  
9Human Rights Watch:Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu Hailemariam. 1991. [online]. [Accessed on 14 Nov.2008]. 
Available from World Wide Web: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/1991/29/ethiop5495.htm>  
10 see BAHRU ZEWDE. 2009. The History of the Red Terror: Contexts and Consequences. In : K. TRONVOL, 
C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( 
African Issues),  James Currey, at 25. see also TAFESSE OLIKA. The Red Terror: Contextualizing Political 
Violence and Human Rights Abuse in Ethiopia During the Derg Regime. Unpublished. (copy on file with 
author), at 13. These sources indicate that the EPRP had waged what was then called the White Terror. 
11 These conditions include civil war, the 1984 famine, the resettlement program, and the villagization 
campaign.For a detailed discussion on these contexts of violation see DE WAL,A. Above n 7.  See also 
MATSUOKA, A.and SORENSON, J. 2001. Ghosts & Shadows: Construction of Identity and Community in an 
African Diaspora. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
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The overthrow of the dictatorial military regime in May 1991 opened a window of transition 
towards the rule of law, democracy and a rights-respecting system. In July 1991, a national 
conference of political parties, held in Addis Ababa, adopted a Charter for the Transitional 
Period and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), composed of different political 
groups.  At this point of transition, the question of dealing with past violations became 
crucial, and the TGE started to prepare to prosecute human rights violators during the Dergue 
regime.
12
   
 
In 1992, the TGE issued a law establishing a Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) with a 
mandate to conduct investigations and prosecutions against former Dergue officials as well as 
members of the military and security forces and their “auxiliaries”.13 The main transitional 
process of dealing with the past was therefore criminal prosecution before national courts, 
with the SPO playing a crucial role. The stated objectives of the Proclamation were bringing 
perpetrators to trial, recording of the history of past violation (establishing the truth) as well 
as educating the public and making them aware of the past and thereby preventing its 
recurrence.
14
 In 1997, the SPO charged 5,198 people, of whom 2,246 were already in 
detention, while 2,952 were charged in absentia (including the Dergue leader, Col. Mengistu 
Haile-Mariam).
15
 After a prolonged court proceeding, the trial process was concluded.  A 
document issued by the Special Prosecutors office, after the end of the trial process, provides 
detailed figures on the number of victims, witnesses and documentary evidence, suspects 
prosecuted, convicted or otherwise acquitted;
16
 of 16, 496 alleged victims, 12, 733 was 
established in court; 16, 107 witnesses were documented, of which 8047 testified before 
courts. The SPO submitted 15,214 pieces of documentary evidence; among the suspects, 
5119 were prosecuted and tried (some in absentia), of which 3583 were convicted and 
penalized while 1539 were acquitted. We note, from these figures, the scale of the process of 
administering justice during the transition. With the conclusion of the prosecution and trial 
process, however, there is a need to interrogate whether the transitional process of 
accountability has achieved its objectives.   
                                                             
12 TRONVOLL, K., Above n 6  
13 Proclamation for the establishment of the Office of Special Prosecutor, 1992:  Proclamation No. 22/1992, 
Federal Nagarit Gazette, 1st Year, No.18, August 8/1992. See Article 6 of the proclamation regarding SPO’s 
mandate. 
14 See Paragraph 5 of the Proclamation No.18/1992(Ibid). 
15Human Rights Watch, Above n 8  
16 see SPO Report. (January 2002 E.C). Dem Yazele Dose (Amharic word approximately to mean “A file 
containing blood”).  Addis Ababa: SPO. Chart number III. One may note that 16 496 were alleged victims of 
which 12 733 was established at court.  
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It has been contended that how a society decides to deal with its past has a major determining 
influence on whether that society will achieve long-term peace and stability
17
 as well as 
whether that society transforms into a democratic and rights-respecting polity. Thus, societies 
in transition need to make a careful decision in responding to past abuses. In this connection,  
Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights, formulated a ‘right 
to know,” a “right to justice,” and a “right to reparations” for victims and interpreted these 
rights as requiring states to adopt a variety of measures in order to expose the truth, combat 
impunity and guarantee the non-recurrence of violations.
18
 As will be shown, the right to 
know and the right to justice belong not only to victims and their relatives but also to the 
public. Reparation, which may form part of the right to justice, is a crucial component of a 
transitional process. In addition to these tripartite rights, a society has also to provide for a 
process of reconciliation. According to Sarkin, transitional mechanisms of dealing with past 
abuses should consider three essential goals: truth, justice and reconciliation,
19
 and this offer 
reconciliation as an additional element. These essential components of transitional justice - 
truth, justice, reparation, and reconciliation - form the basis of a theoretical framework for the 
discussion and analysis of the Ethiopian transitional process, as carried out in this present 
study. This study views these components as interrelated elements of transitional justice and 
stresses the need for comprehensive or holistic mechanisms in dealing with past violations. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
The Ethiopian transitional justice trials were undeniably landmark cases of dealing with 
former repressive regimes in the countries long history of political existence. Nevertheless, 
the transitional process of accountability adopted in Ethiopia was problematic for various 
reasons. A brief summary of these problems can be stated as follows.  First, the articulation 
of the history of violations is problematic because there are alternative narrations of history 
that not only the Dergue but also other actors committed human rights violations. The second 
problem is that the process did not bring to justice all persons involved in past abuses. The 
                                                             
17SARKIN, J. 2000. Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating 
Rwanda’s approach in the New Millenium of Using Community-based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the past. 
International Law Forum, p, 112 
18OLSON, LM. JUNE 2006. Provoking the Dragon on the Patio, Matters of Transitional Justice: Penal 
Repression Vs. Amnesties. International Review of the Red Cross, 88 ( 862) , p, 282   
19SARKIN, J, Above n 17 at 115. The theoretical discussions provide a detailed discussion as to the relationship 
between these elements. 
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criminal investigation and prosecution was directed against persons who committed 
violations by abusing “their position” in Dergue or affiliated organizations. Therefore, it did 
not cover all violations and all perpetrators. Whether such selective prosecution is justified 
and the extent to which it has satisfied the need for justice is questionable. Thirdly, whether 
prosecution reveals the truth (the whole truth) is equally questionable. This is so particularly 
in light of the exclusion of some groups from the process of the transition and the non-
existence of complementary mechanism to uncover the truth regarding the participation of 
those who were not prosecuted. Fourthly, the Ethiopian approach of emphasizing the 
punishment of perpetrators did not adequately address the demand for reparations. Fifthly, the 
Ethiopian approach ignored the need for reconciliation, which it has been argued, is crucial 
for the future of a society.
20
 There are still some sections of society, particularly opposition 
parties and the private media, calling for a comprehensive national reconciliation process as 
part of a solution to the numerous problems of the country. These problems raise the question 
whether the Ethiopian transitional justice process has effectively addressed the past and 
played a transformative role. 
 
1.3 The Thesis and Significance 
 
In light of the complex context of massive violations of human rights, the transitional process 
of accountability adopted in Ethiopia lacks comprehensiveness in articulating the history of 
violations and in formulating a policy and mechanism for rendering justice, uncovering the 
truth, and providing reparation while entirely excluding reconciliation. The present study 
undertakes a comprehensive doctrinal and empirical analysis of the model of transitional 
justice adopted in Ethiopia. By examining the focus and process of the criminal prosecution, 
it asserts that truth, justice and reconciliation require something more than selective 
prosecution. The criminal prosecution process has not transformed the society into a new 
social and political system. This study, by showing the strengths and weaknesses in the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process, aims at strengthening public discourse and initiate 
further research into how we in Ethiopia have dealt with our past. 
                                                             
20 MOBBEK, E. Transitional Justice in Post Conflict Socities – Approaches to Reconciliation. [Online]. 
Available from World Wide Web : < http://www.bmlv.pv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg12_psm-100.pdf>, 
at 262. He, for example, argues, “reconciliation is the ultimate objective in all post-conflict societies and post-
conflict reconstruction process”.  
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1.4 Research Issues 
 
This study examines whether the approach adopted in Ethiopia has been comprehensive 
enough or otherwise in uncovering the truth, rendering justice, providing reparation and 
promoting reconciliation, considered as fundamental elements of a transitional process. It 
investigates the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability in light of these elements. 
Thus, the study examines historical, legal and political issues related to transitional justice in 
general and the model adopted in Ethiopia in particular. 
 
The study addresses the following main questions. 
 
(a) What is the meaning and purpose of transitional justice? 
(b) What model of ‘transitional justice’ did Ethiopia adopt and why? 
(c) How was the history of violation articulated during the transition in Ethiopia? Was 
this problematic? 
(d) What is the connection between criminal prosecution and justice? Was justice done in 
the Ethiopian transition? 
(e) Is criminal prosecution compatible with the search for truth? Was the truth about the 
past established? 
(f) Is criminal prosecution compatible with reconciliation; was there any other process of 
reconciliation envisaged or initiated by the transition? 
(g) Was there a policy of reparations? 
(h) How does the Ethiopian model relate to the notion of transitional justice? 
 
1.5 The Theoretical Framework 
 
The concept of transitional justice and the diverse mechanisms of dealing with past violation 
are employed for the purposes of examining the Ethiopian model. The theoretical framework 
encompasses theories of justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation.  
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1.6 Methodology and Method 
 
This study adopts a contextual methodology by focusing on legal, historical and political 
aspects determining the transitional process of accountability in Ethiopia, using a 
combination of methods. I analyze relevant literature on human rights and humanitarian 
issues, justice, truth, reconciliation, reparation and transitional justice. I engage in an 
analytical study of relevant national and international laws. I critically examine the 
transitional justice models adopted in other countries, for example in South Africa, for the 
purposes of comparison. I also rely on extensive interviews with people of different 
background in Addis Ababa and Mekelle, among the places where most of the prosecutions 
were conducted.
21
 Interview is an appropriate method of data collection for this study as it 
uncovers people’s experiences, perspectives and textual descriptions about transitional justice 
processes in Ethiopian.  Interviewees are selected from various sections of the society 
including victims/ relatives, suspects/perpetrators, politicians (government and opposition), 
judges, human rights activists, lawyers, and the public. Forty people participated in the 
interview, with their prior written consent although almost all of them request to remain 
anonymous. Both purposive sampling and snowball sampling has been e used to select 
interviewees other than the general public, in respect of which random sampling has been 
employed. The respondents were given the code R followed by a number to keep their 
anonymity. Such representation while protecting confidentiality allows the reader to trace the 
a respondents views on the various issues of the transition. This author believes the subjects 
interviewed do provide an adequate representation of the society, as the overlapping nature of 
the responses suggest the reaching of saturation point, whereby an additional interview could 
not evoke significantly new responses. Most of these interviews were audio recorded, later 
transcribed and translated by the researcher.
22
 The responses of each respondent are closely 
                                                             
21 Interview questions were prepared, and then approved by my supervisor. In view of the time constraint, these 
interview questions were sent to the interviewees to make them aware of the issues ahead of time and facilitate 
the interview process. Addis Ababa  was chosen because it is a place where most top officials of the Dergue 
were tried. Mekelle is among the regional sate capitals where trials have been conducted and it is convenient for 
the researcher to consider it as the researcher works in Mekelle.   
22Cassette recordings are in possession of the author and can be submitted whenever required. Where audio 
records were not made, the author has to jot down the most relevant part of the responses. A summary of these 
responses is also with the author. The interviews were conducted in Amharic, the Federal Language of Ethiopia, 
and hence all translations are mine. However, the interviews with anonymous respondents R1 and R11 as well 
as the second round of interview with R2 were conducted in English, and thus the author has directly quoted 
them. 
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considered, and connections between different responses were analyzed to identify areas of 
convergence and divergence in light of specific components of the research questions. The 
categorization of the responses followed a closer examination and interpretation of all the 
responses, and such categorization is necessary for a logical analysis of the impact of 
transitional trial processes in Ethiopia.  This study also benefited from consulting official 
documents including government reports, court proceedings and decisions available in Addis 
Ababa and Mekelle.  
1.7 Impediments to the Research 
 
Limitation of resources has been the main constraint to this research. The first in this respect 
is access to official documents, as many government offices are not entirely cooperative. The 
second is there are very limited relevant books and journals at home library, which meant that 
I had to rely on electronically available materials. However, access to the internet is a chronic 
problem. The third and perhaps the most serious constraint was the lack of research funding, 
particularly in light of the geographical location where I live, Mekelle, and its distance from 
the capital, Addis Ababa, where most sources of information are found. Finally, it was very 
difficult to get the consent of people for an interview. Many people were not willing to talk 
about the past for various reasons. Some were simply afraid, considering it as a politically 
sensitive issue. This however may suggest social and political transformation is far from 
reality. Others claimed the lack of time. Even when consent was secured, some were not 
willing to be recorded, which resulted in the noting of essential points with a possibility that 
other points were missed. In addition, in most cases, the interview duration was too short 
(less than 45 minutes) in light of the broadness of the questions for discussion. These are 
apparently significant constraints. Nevertheless, the existence of overlapping views across the 
different sections of the society and the reaching of saturation point, as indicated earlier, 
shows there is adequate empirical data to consider the general impact of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process. 
1.8 Structure of the study 
 
This dissertation contains seven chapters, including this introductory chapter, which outlines 
the background of the study, statement of problem, significance of the study, and 
methodology as well as the research impediments. Chapter 2 interrogates the narration of 
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human rights violation in the Ethiopian transition. This chapter demonstrates that the 
transition’s (official) narration of the history of violation is problematic as it excludes other 
narrations of history. It begins by offering some background to the Ethiopian transition. Then, 
it asks how the transition presents the history of violation. The third section presents other 
narrations of history that contest the official version and considers the implications of such a 
selective historical narrative on the transitional process.  
 
The next two chapters offer a theoretical discussion of transitional justice. The third chapter 
provides a discussion on transitional justice in general. It addresses the meaning and history 
of transitional justice. It briefly discusses how some societies have responded to past 
violations and examines some general issues of transitional justice with a view to identify the 
crucial points that are relevant to the examination of the Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
The fourth chapter builds on the theoretical discussions in chapter three by closely examining 
the main components of transitional justice, which are considered as the foundations of a new 
post-transitional social and political system.  It thus presents and analyzes the controversies 
surrounding the meaning, significance, and mechanisms of achieving these main aspects of 
transitional justice by focusing on justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation. Considering 
the significance of these components, this chapter provides an overview of the place of these 
components in Ethiopian transition. These theoretical discussions in chapters 3 and 4 offer 
the key elements for the analysis of the Ethiopian transitional justice processes.  
 
Chapters five and six then present a critical examination of the Ethiopian transitional justice 
process. These chapters involve a critical examination of relevant laws, court cases, official 
documents, and primary data collected trough in-depth interviews. Chapter 5 investigates 
whether the conceptions of justice adopted in the Ethiopian transition and the mechanism 
devised is appropriate to deal with Ethiopia’s past. The investigation relates to both the 
framework and the outcome of the transitional justice process.  Chapter 6 deals with the place 
of truth in the Ethiopian transition, asking whether the truth has been established, and the 
implications that follow. This chapter also investigates, whether the process has contributed 
to the achievement of other goals foreseen by the transition or otherwise thought to be 
desirable including the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights, and reconciliation. 
The analytical chapters (chapter 5 and 6) demonstrate the controversies surrounding the legal 
framework, the implementation and the output of the Ethiopian transitional justice process, 
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and question the effectiveness of criminal prosecution in transforming Ethiopian society into 
a new social and political identity. 
 
The last concluding chapter provides a summary of the discussion presented in the thesis.   
 
CHAPTER TWO: INTERROGATING THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The understanding and analysis of a society’s response to past violations requires a 
consideration of how that society has formulated or articulated its past. In other words, the 
remembering and the articulation of the history of violation is an essential element of a 
transitional process of accountability because the manner of articulation greatly determines 
the responses thereto. As such this chapter discusses the significance of history, analyzes how 
the history of violation was articulated during the transition in Ethiopia, and considers 
whether such articulation was comprehensive enough – in other words, whether there were 
other constructions of history that dispute the articulation and presentation by the official 
transition process. These interrogations are important (1) to understand and analyze whether 
the transition had properly articulated the history of human rights violations and (2) to serve 
as a background for the other issues addressed subsequently in this study.  
 
This chapter has four sections. The first briefly discusses the significance of history to 
transitional processes. The second provides the background to the Ethiopian transition. 
Section 3 analyzes how past violations were articulated and presented during the transition. 
The final section discusses alternative constructions of history as a challenge to the 
articulation by the transition. In this chapter, the author argues that the transition’s 
articulation of past violations is problematic because it has adopted a narrow interpretation of 
violations during the Dergue regime by limiting them to violations committed by the Dergue 
itself and by excluding, or at least remaining silent about, the violations committed by 
opposing political groups. Thus, the main transitional justice process, i.e., criminal 
prosecution, focuses on such a narrowly construed narrative of past violation. 
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2.2 Why History? 
 
We might say how a society decides to deal with its past has a major determining influence 
on its future.
23
This implies that the proper construction of history is an essential element in 
responding to past violations. This is because a transitional process is meant to address what 
went wrong in the past which if left unaddressed limit a society’s transition to a better future. 
We might say that history is woven into daily life, yet even there it is complex and 
contested.
24
 Professor Jardanova asserts that the ‘the past shapes lives in complex ways’.25 It 
does so at individual, family, community and national level. History offers people the 
opportunity to know and learn from the past.  Our past partly determines our decisions and 
actions. Thus, apart from personal stories, collective memory and history at community and 
national levels play a crucial role in determining collective decisions and actions. 
 
However, whether members of a certain group can have the same understanding of what 
happened in the past is controversial.  It is argued that “there is frequently little consensus 
even among family members on the key stories and their interpretation, and there may not be 
a shared account about the nature and time of key events.”26 The argument goes on that just 
as in families, so in large groups, there can be little consensus on major events, their 
meanings and any actions they might imply.
27
These arguments suggest the difficulty of 
having a shared interpretation and presentation of the past at community or national level. 
This may result not simply from ignorance and subjective experiences but also because 
different interest groups may influence the interpretation of historical data and thus the 
construction of the past.  
 
Nevertheless, both the public (members of the society) and policy makers need to develop a 
more informed understanding of the past.
28
 David Crabtree argues that our view of history 
shapes the way we view the present, and therefore it dictates what answers we offer for 
                                                             
23 See SARKIN, J. 2000. Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating 
Rwanda’s approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the past. 
International Law Forum.  p.112  
24 JARDONOVA, L. 2008.  How History matters Now, History and Policy Website [online].  [Accesses on 5 
April 2010].  Available from World Wide Web: < http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-
80.html>      
25 JARDONOVA, L,  Above n 24 
26 JARDONOVA, L, Above n 24 
27 JARDONOVA, L, Above n 24 
28 JARDONOVA, L, Above n 24 
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existing problems.
29
Thus, a proper understanding of the past is a relevant issue to societies in 
transition including Ethiopia. 
  
The above arguments are more relevant and apply more critically to societies that have 
experienced violence and gross violations of human rights under authoritarian repressive 
regimes and in contexts of civil war. When societies emerge out of such experiences, the 
construction of what happened in the past, at least in its broadest sense, is an essential tool in 
determining policies, decisions and actions that follow. Our view of past violence has an 
effect on how we deal with it and thus affects the transitional process. Thus, it has a 
significant impact on the truth-telling process, justice, reparations and reconciliation 
processes.  
 
In transitional societies, there may not be a consensus about the reasons behind past 
violations, the perpetrators, the victims, the nature and extent of such violations. Individual 
experiences and emotions coupled with myth provide various presentations of what 
happened. The struggle for ‘history’ itself, and to articulate a public record of memories, may 
be understood as a critical aspect of transition. Therefore, in dealing with the past, a society 
should come up with the broadest construction that accommodates the various accounts of 
past violations and subject it to the transitional process of truth telling, justice, reparation and 
reconciliation. Thus, the next sections are devoted to the analysis of the construction of past 
violation during the Ethiopian transition.  
 
2.3  Background to the Transition 
 
Before analyzing how the history of violation was articulated, it is important to provide some 
general background on the Ethiopian transition. The popular revolution of 1960
th
 ended the 
last feudal regime of Emperor Haile-Sillasie, giving a military junta, called the Dergue, an 
opportunity to assume state power, which established the Provisional Military Administration 
Council (PMAC) otherwise known as the Dergue. In 1984, with the adoption of a new 
constitution, the State was given the name the Peoples Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia 
(PDRE) and the Dergue continued to rule in the name of Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) - 
                                                             
29 CRABTREE, D. NOV.1993. The Importance of History at the Website of Mckenzie Study Center, Institute of 
Gutenberg College [online]. [Accessed on 5 April 2010].  Available from the World Wide Web:< 
http://msc.gutenberg.edu/2001/02/the-importance-of-history/>  He further argues “if we refuse to listen to 
history, we will find ourselves fabricating a past that reinforces our understanding of current problems.” 
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‘an authoritarian and state-sponsored party’. Despite the change in nomenclature, the military 
regime, under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, ruled the country along a proclaimed 
socialist ideology for 17 years (1974-1991).
30
  
 
During this period, the country witnessed one of the worst forms of a repressive regime. The 
regime faced strong opposition and resistance from various political groups as well as the 
population. Apart from the civilian opposition and resistance, there were armed opposition 
against the Dergue that gave rise to a long period of internal armed conflict.  
 
A few general points about these political groups
31
 may be useful for an understanding of the 
central ideas in this and following sections. The first is that while most of these groups like 
TPLF and OLF were organized along ethnic lines, some of them like the EPRP were broad-
based ‘national’ groups in the sense that they were not organized along ethnic lines. This 
emanates from a difference on the characterization of the nature of oppression in Ethiopia – 
the national v class oppression. Secondly, while some of these groups or movements like 
Me’ison and EPRP were civilian, at least initially, others like the TPLF took up arms right 
from the beginning. Thirdly, most of these groups had their origin in the student movements 
that played a crucial role in ending the imperial regime. They also had differences in political 
thinking and strategic differences that persisted from their student movement days.  Finally, 
most of the political groups described themselves as Marxists. However, the EDU is different 
in this respect for it wanted to re-establish a monarchical system and thereby protect their 
interests. Despite the differences in their political goals and strategies, they all opposed the 
military regime except in situations where temporary and strategic alliances and shifts were 
made by some.
32
. 
                                                             
30 For more details see TRONVOLL, K.  2009. A Quest for Justice or the Formation of Political Legitimacy? 
The Political Anatomy of the Red Terror Trials. In: K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). 
The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey; BAHRU 
ZEWDE. 2002. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991. 2nd edition. Oxford: James Currey; DE WAL, A. 
September 1991. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia ( An African Watch Report). New York: 
Human Rights Watch.[Accessed on-----].Available from World Wide Web: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf  
31see KISSI, E. 2006.  Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia.  Lexington Books, p, 82. The 
principal political groups that opposed the Mengistu regime include the Eritrean Peoples Revolutionary Front 
(EPLF), the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the 
Oromo Peoples Liberation Front (OLF), the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the Afar Liberation Front 
(ALF), the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Me’ison), and the 
Sidama Liberation Movement. Pg. 82. The coalition of TPLF and other armed groups, at a later stage, gave birth 
to The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
32 The strategic alliance between Me’ison and Dergue against the EPRP might be one example. See TAFESSE 
OLIKA. The Red Terror: Contextualizing Political Violence and Human Rights Abuse in Ethiopia During the 
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The Dergue regime ended in 1991 because of armed struggle by a coalition of the armed 
opposition groups, mainly TPLF-EPRDF. Immediately before TPLF-EPRDF captured Addis 
Ababa, Col. Mengistu, on 21 May 1991 left the country first for Nairobi and then for Harare. 
The fall of the Dergue regime led to an era of transition towards democracy and respect for 
human rights through the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 
under the Charter for the Transitional Period.
33
The Charter underlined that the overthrow of 
the military dictatorship has presented the Ethiopian people with an opportunity to rebuild the 
country and restructure the state democratically, and that the demise of the Dergue marks the 
end of an era of subjugation and oppression and the beginning of a new chapter in Ethiopian 
history.
34
 It also provided for the dismantling of institutions of repression installed by the 
previous regime, and underlined the proclamation of a democratic order as a categorical 
imperative.
35
 Marking a departure from the culture of violence, the Charter incorporated 
human rights as an essential basis of the new government and provided for their respect and 
protection. The Charter also recognized the rights of people to self-determination. These 
rights and other fundamental principles are, latter, incorporated in the 1994 Constitution, 
which formally bears all the features of a democratic system, and were apparently very 
progressive developments.  
It is worth noting here the process of the adoption of the Transitional Charter. The EPRDF 
organized “a conference of most of the Ethiopian factions, to discuss the format ion of a 
transitional government.”36 The Charter was adopted at the 1991 July Conference in Addis 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Dergue Regime. [Unpublished]. (Copy on file with author).  Although the EPRP and Me’ison had originally 
similar hostility against the Dergue, there emerged a difference on the political role of the Dergue in their goal 
to seize power. Taffesse argues while Me’ison wanted to seize power by using the apparatus of the state from 
within, the EPRP wanted to capture power by toppling the regime militarily from out side. It is indicated that the 
EPRP condemned the Dergue as “fascist” and called for its immediate removal and formation of a “Provisional 
People’s Government” (PPG) ), while Me’ison believed that the Dergue had progressive sides to be exploited 
during the transitional period and offered it a qualified support and eventually decided to work with it. It is also 
suggested that they did not have social or ideological difference but one of strategy on how to seize power, as a 
result of which they became antagonistic and irreconcilable groups). 
33 Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia.  22nd July1991. Negarit Gazet, No.1.  
34 See Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia , Above n 33, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Charter. Paragraph 3 
refers to the need to end hostilities, the healing of wounds, and the establishment and maintenance of good 
neighbourliness and cooperation.  
35 Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33. paragraphs 4 and 5. Apart from the dismantlement of 
institutions of repression, the Charter does not provide for transitional processes of accountability. 
36Human Rights Watch/Africa. December 1994. Ethiopia: Reckoning Under the Law. 6 (11) [online]. [Accessed 
on 13 September 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:< 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/e/ethiopia/ethiopia94d.pdf>, at 11. See also ALEMANTE, G. SELASSIE. 
[year-unable to determine]. Ethiopia:Problems and Prospects for Democracy. William and Mary Bill of Rights 
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Ababa, which was meant to establish a legitimate, broad-based transitional government that 
could prepare the country for a smooth democratic transformation as agreed at the American-
brokered London Peace Conference.
37
 Various political groups participated in the Conference 
through their representatives.
38
 The Charter provided that “the peace loving and democratic 
forces present in Ethiopian society and having varied views, having met in a conference 
convened from July 1-5 in Addis Ababa, have discussed and approved the Charter laying 
down the rules governing the Transitional Government as well as setting down the principles 
of the transitional period.”39 It is notable that various and diverse political groups had 
participated in the conference and approved the Charter. Although the English version does 
not expressly mention representatives, the Amharic version clearly states that these different 
forces participated through their representatives.  
 
However, there remained criticisms that some significant political groups were deliberately 
excluded and weaker political parties were invited or even created overnight to participate in 
the conference
40
. It is also noted that “the EPRDF deliberately excluded opposition groups 
when developing the legal and institutional framework for the new government.”41 Some 
writers provide details of what they judge to be “major flaws in the transitional conference 
procedures” and the resulting EPRDF’s absolute control of “all the significant events that 
occurred during and after the transition.”42  
 
Nevertheless, the Charter was meant to serve as an interim constitution for the transitional 
period, and for its implementation, an 87-seat Council of Representatives was created 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Journal[online]. 1(2). [Accessed on 25 June 2013]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
<,http://scholarship.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1542&context=wmborj&sei>. P. 205 
37 COHEN, R.  and H. GOULBOURNE(eds.). 1991. Democracy and Socialism in Africa, Boulder, Sanfrancisco 
and Oxford: Boulder. cited in MERERA GUDINA. 2012. Ethiopia: A Transition Without 
Democractization.[online]. [Accessed on 15 February 2013]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www. 
oromopeoplescongress.org/docs/ethiopia-transition-without-democracy-Merera.pdf  
38 This can be inferred from paragraph 6 of Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33. 
39 Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33, Paragraph 6. 
40GUDINA,M, Above n 37 at 5 
41ALEMANTE G. SELASSIE. [year-unable to determine]. Ethiopia:Problems and Prospects for Democracy. 
William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal[online]. 1(2). [Accessed on 25 June 2013]. Available from the World 
Wide Web: <,http://scholarship.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1542&context=wmborj&sei>, at 205. 
According to G. SELASSIE, the COEDF (the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces) was one of the 
political groups excluded from the London Conference and subsequent transitional processes. He noted “ the 
COEDF is an umbrella organization comprising various parties including the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Party (EPRP), which had waged armed struggle against the Dergue for 17 years.” See, pp. 212 and 213. It is 
evident here that the EPRP existed at the time of the transition but excluded from participation in the transition. 
42 For details, see G. SELASSIE, Above n 41 at  218-22. 
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composed mainly of the representatives of the participating political groups.
43
 However, the 
Charter also allowed for the possibility for prominent persons to be members of Council of 
representatives.
44
 According to Article 9 of the Charter, this Council was the legislative organ 
during the transitional period, and it enacted different laws until a Constitution was adopted 
in 1994.
45
 As part of this process, the transitional government (TGE) established in 1992 a 
Special Prosecutor’s Office making criminal prosecution the main mechanism for the 
transitional process of accountability.   
 
 
2.3 History as Presented by the Transition 
 
We noted the definition of violations and perpetrators is a crucial aspect of attempts to 
address past violations. Although other mechanisms arguably existed,
46
 the main transitional 
mechanism of accountability chosen for the Ethiopian process was criminal prosecution 
before national courts. In this respect, it was important to define violations and perpetrators 
that were to be subjected to investigation and prosecution; it is this that I refer to as the 
articulation of history of violation by the transition. So, how was the history of violation 
articulated?  The answer to this question can be obtained from various sources including 
legislative documents, statements of officials, historical accounts, and the actual transitional 
process of accountability as it took place. 
 
The understanding of the transition’s articulation of history requires, first, a consideration of 
the predominant official articulation about past violations found in Proclamation Number 
                                                             
43 GUDINA,M, Above n 37 at 5. According to Gudina, the participating political groups were represented based 
on a pre-determined quota by EPRDF.   
44See Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33, Article 7.  
45 see Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33, Article 9. It provided that the Council of 
Representatives shall exercise legislative functions and oversee the work of the Council of Ministers. 
46 Such other processes included lustration, dismantling the military and secret services as well as the police 
force, institutional reforms. The dismantling of institutions of repression was specifically provided for by 
paragraph 5 of the preamble of the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia. The civil and political rights of 
former officials and military leaders and members of affiliate institutions were limited by law (see proclamation 
nos. 3/91, 23/92). Another transitional justice process is the restitution of property rights to those whose 
property had been confiscated by the Derg (see Proclamation no. 110/95, The Proclamation for the Review of 
Properties taken in Violation of the Relevant Proclamations; Directive No. 001/1996, A directive establishing 
the procedure for the restitution of properties). Although restitution might be seen as part of reparation, it is very 
limited to deprivations of property rights and cannot be a form of reparation for the massive civil and political 
rights committed during the Derg. In addition, its implementation was apparently limited even in case of 
deprivation of property rights.  
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22/1992.
47
 The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) about a year after its 
establishment issued this law. This proclamation established the Special Prosecutor’s Office 
(SPO), which was to play a central role in ensuring the process of accountability. As will be 
shown, in chapter 5, there was very little public debate and participation surrounding the 
enactment of the proclamation. As already, indicated, the transitional government was 
composed of a coalition of different political groups; its legislative organ (the Council of 
Representatives) was not composed of representative of the people but of the political groups. 
As such, there was no representative (indirect) participation in the law making process.  
 
The Proclamation set out its raison d’être as well as the mandates and responsibilities of the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office. The SPO was established even though there existed ordinary 
prosecutions offices and other law enforcement offices within the Ministry of Justice. In light 
of this, the justification for the establishment of a special organ may be questioned. However, 
in the face of the massive violations of human rights that took place over a long period, the 
establishment of a special organ to lead the accountability process was justified for 
expediting and accomplishing the task with the special attention and efficiency it required. 
The preamble of the proclamation provided the justification for the establishment of the SPO 
by asserting its necessity “to conduct prompt investigation and [prosecution]”48. The Special 
Prosecutor’s Office was, thus, given the mandate to promptly investigate and prosecute the 
massive human rights violations or offences committed over a period of years. While 
providing the terms of reference or scope of mandate of the SPO, the proclamation defined 
the perpetrators that fall under the investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction of the SPO. 
Again, by defining the perpetrators the proclamation provided an account of the ‘history’ that 
was to inform the process of transition. 
 
The most important parts of the proclamation articulating the history of violation are its 
preambles and the operative provision of article 6. Article 6 of the proclamation, which sets 
out the powers of the SPO, stated that; 
 
                                                             
47 One should also note the articulation of violation in the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Above n 33. 
Paragraph 3 of the Charter expressly provided, “the military dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the 
previous regimes....” 
48Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of Special Prosecutor. Proclamation No. 22/1992, Federal 
Nagarit Gazette, 1st Year, No.18, August 8/1992.  See paragraph 6 of the preamble of the proclamation.  
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The Office shall, in accordance with the law, have the power to conduct investigation 
and institute proceedings in respect of any person having committed or responsible for 
the commission of an offence by abusing his position in the party, the government or 
mass organization under the Dergue-WPE regime. 
 
From this provision, one can clearly see that the investigative and prosecutorial power of the 
SPO relates only to person who have committed human rights violations by abusing his 
position in the party meaning the WPE ( Workers Party of Ethiopia), the government (the 
Dergue) or mass organization under the Dergue. The above-mentioned and other provisions 
provide that the Dergue-WPE and affiliated mass organizations were involved in the massive 
violations that took place during the Dergue regime, and hence they are subject to criminal 
investigation and prosecution.  
 
An analysis of the preamble of the proclamation helps to understand some of the terms used 
under Article 6 as well as the narration of history of past violations and respective 
perpetrators. The proclamation provides, “the people of Ethiopia [were] deprived of their 
human and political rights and subjected to gross oppression under the yoke of the fascistic 
rules of the Dergue-WPE regime for... seventeen years”.49  Further, it was stated, “heinous 
and horrendous criminal acts which occupy special chapter in the history of the peoples of 
Ethiopia [were] perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia by officials, members and 
auxiliaries of the security and armed forces of the Dergue-WPE regime”.50 It was also 
stressed “officials and auxiliaries of the Dergue-WPE dictatorial regime...impoverished the 
economy of the country by plundering, illegally confiscating and destroying the property of 
the people as well as by misappropriating public and state property”.51 These statements in 
the preamble help us to understand the term “offence” under Article 6. Clearly, it referred to 
massive violation of human rights. Obviously, the actions of concern were the violations 
committed by the Dergue-WPE and its auxiliaries. Similarly, the proclamation asserted that 
 
 ...it is essential that higher officials of the WPE and members of the security and 
armed forces who have been detained at the time EPRDF assumed control of the 
                                                             
49 Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, above n 48, paragraph 1 of the 
preamble. 
50 Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, ibid, paragraph 2 of the 
preamble. 
51 Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, ibid, paragraph 3 of the 
preamble. 
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country and thereafter and who are suspected of having committed offences, as well 
as representatives of urban dwellers associations and peasant associations, and other 
persons who have associated with the commission of said offences, must be brought 
to trial.
52
  
 
This statement is, first, indicative of what mass organizations mean under article 6 - it refers 
to urban dwellers and peasant associations. Secondly, by providing a list of the category of 
persons to be brought to trial, it helps us to better understand the articulation of ‘perpetrators’ 
under article 6 and the investigative and prosecutorial mandate of the Special Prosecutor’s 
office. Citing the provisions of the proclamation, Tronvoll argues that the investigative 
mandate of the Special Prosecutions office relates “only [to] the atrocities committed by the 
vanquished”.53 The vanquished in this context refers to the Dergue and affiliate organizations. 
Apart from the definition of violations and violators, the proclamation stated that these 
violations were committed against the people of Ethiopia. From this, one can say the 
proclamation also defined the victims – it is the Ethiopian people as a whole, as a collective. 
Hence, it is clear that all aspects of Dergue’s violation were given equal importance 
irrespective of who the individual victims were. However, a question might arise as to what 
extent this collectiveness in the construction of victims has affected the transitional process 
framework. The emphasis on retribution rather than reparation, on collective output than 
individual-victim gains, as discussed in details in chapters five and six, is arguably the result 
of such construction of collective victimhood. 
 
Tronvoll also states that the investigation concentrated on violations committed during the 
red terror campaign, where Mengistu Haile-Mariam targeted the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) as the main enemy due to its “contra-revolutionary activity”.54  
However, apart from defining the perpetrators, no provision of the Proclamation expressly 
limits the investigation to violations committed during the Red Terror. Nor did the 
proclamation define EPRP as a victim or the only victim. In fact, different historical accounts 
tell that the Red Terror campaign took place between 1976 and 1978,
55
 and the Proclamation 
does not appear to limit investigation and prosecution to the violations committed during this 
relatively short period. Rather, the proclamation covered violations committed by the Dergue 
                                                             
52Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, ibid, paragraph 4 of the preamble 
53 TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30 at 90  
54 TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30 at 90  
55 See for example,  TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30; BAHRU ZEWDE, Above n 30 ; DE WAL, A,  Above n 30.  
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throughout its regime. This is clear from the preamble as well as Article 6 of the 
proclamation. However, Tronvoll is right in his assessment that the investigations targeted 
only violations committed by the Dergue and its affiliates. 
 
An interesting question is whether the position taken by the SPO proclamation in defining 
perpetrators took note of existing precedents. Charles Schaefer argues that the position taken 
by the SPO proclamation was partly influenced by the international community, especially by 
western governments, as evidenced from the following terms. 
 
... the 1990s were a period when jurists had the upper hand and international legal 
opinion weighed heavily in favour of retributive justice. In this new era of democracy, 
there was a simultaneous commitment to transparency and accountability in political 
as well as judicial affairs. New players, the TGE included, had to play by those rules 
to gain the West’s clientage and receive Bretton Woods’s financial support.56 
 
This highlights that although internal reasons might existed, the decision to prosecute was 
made at a time when the international community “was reinventing itself and setting up 
universal political / judicial standards to which all countries were theoretically held 
accountable”.57 This internationalist approach apparently took note of previous practices of 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and the Nuremberg trials leading to the 
outlawing and criminalization of Nazi Organizations including the SS.
58
 In a similar way, the 
                                                             
56CHARLES SCAEFFER, The Red Terror Trials Versus Traditions of Restorative Justice in Ethiopia, In K., 
TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice 
Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey,  at 70 
57CHARLES SCAEFFER, Above n 56 at 70.   Charles notes that the TGE had two options that met the 
internationalist’s criteria; “set up a truth commission or try the offenders in court; SA’s TRC, though perhaps in 
the planning stages, was unknown to the Ethiopian leaders; the logical conclusion is that only prosecution was a 
right choice.”  
58CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, the Legacy of Nuremberg, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 
Oxford University Press, 2006. Available at  
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC354/PSC354Readings/TomuschatLegacyNuremberg.pdf,  p. 12. It 
is interesting to note the Charter of the IMT also provided for the prosecution of groups or organizations. Thus, 
“six organizations - among them the leadership corps of the Nazi party, the Government (Cabinet) of the 
German Reich, the General Staff and High Command of the German Wehrmacht and the SS - were defendants 
at the Nuremberg trial. This extension of the scope ratione personae of the indictment brought with it 
considerable difficulties. Only four of them (the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SD and 
the SS) were found to be criminal. None of the texts governing the currently existing international criminal 
courts or tribunals has followed the Nuremberg example. It would be particularly difficult to accept states as 
defendants in criminal proceedings as well. Essentially, it would not be the state concerned but its people that 
would become the target of any punishment - over and beyond the consequences, which derive for a state from 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act. By definition, a trial against a state would be based on the 
assumption of collective criminal guilt - a notion implicitly rejected by the leaders of the four victorious Powers 
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SPO proclamation condemns the Derg, the WPE and affiliate institutions as criminal 
organizations. Sara Vaughan argues that the Ethiopian  prosecution process was designed “to 
recast the Ethiopian state’s former rulers as its new ‘outlaws’  and reassert the return to “a 
more legitimate period, during which, for instance, the country had been one of an elite group 
of original signatories to the Nuremberg Charter in the Wake of the Second World War.”59 
This idea of return to the normalcy again embodies the internationalist dimension in the SPO 
framework. Clearly, the SPO proclamation denounces the Derg and its affiliates for the 
massive human rights violations. However, in empowering the SPO, the law underlines 
individual criminal responsibility rather than a collective one. Nevertheless, as evident from 
the discussions in the subsequent sections and in chapter 5, whether such a stand-alone 
interpretation of violations and perpetrators was appropriate is a highly contested issue of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
 
The decision to hold the Dergue accountable was allegedly made even before the fall of the 
Dergue. It was noted that the TPLF/EPRDF had already decided prior to the fall of the 
Dergue that the Dergue/WPE officials should be made judicially accountable for their 
violations.
60
This statement by the highest official of the government also indicates the 
articulation of violation during the transition. Arguably, the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia formally adopted this stand in August 1992 through proclamation No. 22/1992.
61
 In 
fact, the proclamation refers to what it called “the historical mission of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)”62. This may be indicative of the extent to which 
EPRDF might have influenced the articulation and presentation of past violence during the 
transition. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
who opted in favour of a trial against the main war criminals who had not only launched a criminal war, but had 
also killed millions of their own citizens. On the other hand, to impose on a people sanctions, which suffocate it, 
denying it any opportunity to join the other nations, would not only be politically disastrous, as shown by the 
aftermath of the unfortunate Treaty of Versailles. It would at the same time amount to a blatant violation of the 
rights of the members of the succeeding generations who should bear no responsibility for the misdeeds 
committed by their fathers and forefathers.” See, CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT from pp. 12 
59SARAH VAUGHAN,2009, The Role of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER 
and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  
James Currey, at 59 
60  Statement of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi as reported by TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30 at 91  
61 TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30 at 93 
62 Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, Above n 48, paragraph 4 of the 
preamble: “...it is essential that higher officials of the WPE and members of the security and armed forces who 
have been detained at the time of the EPRDF assumed control of the country and thereafter...must be brought to 
trial”. This assertion implies the detention of former officials for violations preceded the enactment of the 
proclamation. 
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Another important element in understanding the articulation of past violence is to consider 
what actually happened before and after the enactment of the Proclamation. Immediately 
upon the fall of the Dergue and EPRDF’s control of the country, a lot of Dergue-WPE 
officials as well as military and security personnel were detained. As far as the government in 
control carried these out during the transition, they formed part of the official articulation of 
history. The fact that such officials were detained before the enactment of the proclamation 
was recognized by the Proclamation itself.
63
Clearly, the criminal justice processes that 
followed the enactment of the proclamation (detentions, investigations and prosecutions) 
were targeting the Dergue-WPE and affiliated organizations.  
 
Thus, legal instruments and official statements and actions were indicative of how the 
transition presented the history of violation. The official narrative was that the Dergue and its 
affiliates were the perpetrators of human rights violation during the seventeen years of its 
military rule. This appears to suggest that the Dergue and its affiliates were the only 
perpetrators. By so defining the perpetrators, it defines violations as only those committed by 
the Dergue. Thus, the investigative and prosecutorial mandate of the Special Prosecutor’s 
Office was directed against violations committed by the Dergue and its affiliates only. It is 
important to consider briefly whether historical accounts support this version of the official 
history of violation.  
 
We might first observe that the literature on the Ethiopian revolution and its consequences as 
well as human rights literature and reports do indeed provide detailed descriptions and 
analyses indicating massive violations of human rights committed by the Dergue throughout 
its rule. 
 
The Ethiopian historian, Professor Bahru Zewde, while comparing the Ethiopian revolution 
with the French and Russian revolution that gave birth to Napoleon and Stalin respectively, 
stated, “... the Ethiopian [revolution] delivered the country to the murderous regime of 
Mengistu Hayla-maryam”.64 Noting the beginnings of the mass killings, Zewde asserted that 
“on 24 November 1975 the [Dergue] announced to a shocked national and international 
audience that it had shot its chairman, Aman Andom, and executed some sixty people it had 
                                                             
63Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of the Special Prosecutions, Above n 48, paragraph 4 of the 
preamble 
64 ZEWDE,B, Above n 30 at 229 
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held in detention, most of them dignitaries and high functionaries of the imperial 
regime.”65Soon after, the Dergue apparently killed the Emperor and the Patriarch of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
66
 Certain sources indicate these executions were part of the Red 
Terror, although most accounts limit the period of the Red Terror to the years between 1976 
and 1978.
67
 However, that these mass executions amounted to gross violation of human rights 
is beyond doubt. 
 
After eliminating the Emperor and highest officials of the imperial regime, the Dergue 
directed its violence against opposition political groups that it considered enemies of the 
revolution and the nation.  The campaign to eliminate opposition political groups, officially 
dubbed as the Red Terror, took place in the capital as well as throughout the main cities 
between 1976 and 1978.  The Red Terror signified an extreme political violence involving 
killings, detention, torture, and disappearances. Historical accounts indicate that the Red 
Terror was originally directed against opposition groups that raised urban resistance to the 
Dergue in Addis Ababa and in other main cities. The Red Terror campaign in Addis Ababa 
was the most severe and led to summary executions, detention, torture and disappearance of 
many people, mostly the young and the educated. The exact number of victims is not known. 
According to one account, a minimum of 10, 000 people were killed in Addis Ababa alone.
68
  
 
While the killings and detentions were most numerous and most publicized in Addis Ababa, 
the campaign was also conducted throughout the country.
69
 Many people mostly the young 
severely suffered in different places including Gonder, Bahir Dar, Jimma, Tigray, Debre 
Markos, Dessie, Kombolcha, Harerghe, Sidamo, Bale, Shewa (Chebo & Gurage), Gojjam.
70
 
In some cases, people were rounded-up and shot in market places.
71
 The overall human cost 
                                                             
65 ZEWDE,B, Above n 30 at 238 
66 Human Rights Watch,, Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu Hailemariam [online]. [Accesssed on 14 November 
2008]. Available from World Wide Web: < http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/11/29/ethiop5495.htm > 
67See  the Victims of Red-Terror Memorial Website at World Wide 
Web:http://www.ethiopians.com/qey_Shibir.htm  
68 DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 110. See also MATSUOKA, A and  SORENSON, J. 2001. Ghosts and Shadows: 
Construction of Identity and Community in an African Diaspora. Toronto:University of Toronto.  The latter 
source estimate the death as a result of red terror to be 5, 000. The number of those who escaped death but 
subject to detention, torture and disappearances was numerous.  
69  DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 108  
70 For details see  DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 108. Among these, the Red Terror in Tigray was claimed as the 
worst next to that in Addis Ababa. The situation was aggravated by the existence of different armed opposition 
movements because people suspected of supporting any of these movements were targeted. 
71DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 108.  For more details see Above n 30 at 109  
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of the Red Terror remains unknown as De Wal clearly observed “nobody knows how many 
people were killed, imprisoned, or forced to flee abroad on account of the Red Terror.”72  
 
Another historical account states, “the Dergue organized throughout much of the country a 
deliberate terror to sustain its rule, a large scale system of summary executions, torture, and 
disappearances. Thousands perished and many thousands more suffered physical abuse from 
state-sponsored violence.”73  
 
Dr. Yacob also observed, “the atrocities perpetrated by the Dergue, especially against the 
youth, drenched the country in a bloodbath to an extent heretofore unknown in Ethiopian 
history.”74 Edward Kissi for his part indicates that “Dergue issued hundreds of orders” and 
“directives” to state agents and revolutionary cadres to kill”.75 Nevertheless, the numbers 
killed can be counted not in the hundreds but in the thousands. 
 
De Wal expressed the severity of the violations in the following terms: 
 
History offers few examples of revolutions that have devoured their own children 
with such viciousness and so much cruelty. It can be estimated that, out of ten 
civilians who had actively worked for a radical transformation of Ethiopia, only one 
escaped arrest, imprisonment, torture, execution or assassination. The revolution 
swallowed the whole of the young generation of Ethiopian intellectuals, which are 
literates.
76
  
 
Matsuoka and Sorenson assert, “[a]lmost a whole generation of young, urban, educated 
Ethiopians was wiped out” during the Red Terror.”77 In addition, the Red Terror also affected 
other sections of the society. It included the killings of merchants in Addis Ababa as well as 
                                                             
72 DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 110. We may note “a minimum of 10, 000 were killed in Addis Ababa alone in 
1977, and probably a comparable number in the provinces in 1977 and 1978.”  Moreover, “a large number were 
detained, and subjected to appalling prison conditions and torture.” p.110 
73 JAMES C.N. PAUL, Human Rights and the Structure of Security forces in Constitutional Orders, The  Case 
of Ethiopia, 3 WM.and marry Bill Rts J. 1.244 (1994), cited in YACOB HAILE-MARIAM, The Quest for 
Justice and Reconciliation: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 
International and Comparative law Review, 667 (1998-1999), at 677  
74YACOB HAILE-MARIAM. (1998-1999). The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, International and Comparative Law Review, p. 
676  
75 KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119 
76 DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 111   
77MATSUOKA, A and  SORENSON, J, Above n 68 at 33. For detailed account of these violations see at 33 -34. 
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in the provinces for the alleged commission of what was called economic sabotage during the 
red terror and the preceding years.
78
The red terror measures also targeted peasants and 
uneducated towns people.
79
 
 
It may be appropriate to ask what makes the Red Terror quite different from other pasts of 
violence in Ethiopian history. John Abbinik, while arguing that indiscriminate violence and 
terror against the population were not new in Ethiopian history, noted, “[t]he Red Terror, due 
to its ideological content and unscrupulous nature, marked a new level of performance, going 
way beyond [previous] practices”.80 Arguably, the Red Terror “accurately reflects the way in 
which excessive violence was used to terrify the population and eliminate dissent”.81 The Red 
Terror was classified as “one of the most systematic uses of mass murder by the state ever 
witnessed in Africa”.82 Tafesse Olika, an Ethiopian historian, has similarly noted that:  
 
the Dergue’s red terror was an officially sanctioned execution of citizens in [broad] 
day light. It was an indication of total reigning of the rule of the jungle in the country 
under military regime. Arbitrariness in decisions and unmitigated use of violence 
became the modus oprandi of the military regime. There was no part of the country 
and no section of the population that had not been affected by it....
83
  
 
We may say that a culture of severe form of political violence had emerged characterizing the 
whole period of Mengistu’s regime.  It is noted, “the Red Terror led the Dergue directly to an 
addiction to rule by terror.”84 In the same way, Zewde stated that the Red Terror “signifies 
the climax of a cult of political violence and had impacted the political orientation of the 
country.”85 He described the impact as “united by the shedding of blood, members of the 
[Dergue] realized that there was no going back”.86 Thus, different accounts provide that the 
                                                             
78DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 105-107 and 111 
79DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 111. See also MATSUOKA, A and SORENSON, J, Above n 68 at 33. They state 
that the massacres also took place in rural areas. 
80 ABBINK, J.  1995. The Impact of Violence: The Ethiopian ‘Red Terror’ as a Social Phenomenon, Leiden: 
African Studies Centre [Online]. [Accessed on ----]. Available from World Wide 
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cult of political violence continued throughout the Dergue’s regime and caused massive 
violation of human rights.  
 
The idea of the cult of political violence implies that the violations committed by the Dergue 
did not stop with the end of the Red Terror period. This leads us to the consideration of other 
contexts of massive violations. Historical accounts indicate that the understanding of massive 
human rights violations by the Dergue requires consideration of contexts outside of the 
narrow period of the Red Terror campaign. These contexts of massive violation of human 
rights, among others, relate to; (1) civil war or “counter-insurgency warfare” (or internal 
armed conflict), (2) famine, (3) resettlement programs, and (4) villagization campaigns.   
 
One crucial context in understanding the post-Red Terror violation is to consider Dergue’s 
engagement in internal armed conflict or what was called “counter-insurgency warfare” 
against different rebel groups on various fronts. Edward Kissi observed, “after 
eliminating...the EPRP, the Dergue next turned its attention to the ethno political 
groups.”87Dergue’s counter–insurgency campaign resulted in violent and abusive acts. These 
included (1) repeated military offensive, involving abuses against civilians, including 
indiscriminate aerial bombardment (2) the bombing of market places, (3) military offensive 
against harvest and cattle, (4) forcible relocation of civilians, (5) the imposition of strict bans 
on movements etc.
88
The counter-insurgency operations targeted not only rebel groups but 
also any one who was ethnically related to the rebels groups.
89
  
 
Several accounts indicate that civilians were the target of Dergue’s military actions. The main 
distinguishing character of the war was “its indiscriminate violence against civilians by the 
Ethiopian army and air force.”90 Similarly, it is noted, “the army deliberately killed and 
wounded tens of thousands of civilians, and the air force bombed civilians and civilian 
                                                             
87 KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119. We should keep in mind that the Red Terror and the counter insurgency warfare 
overlapped in some places. The Dergue was engaged in warfare with several rebel forces on various fronts. 
These rebel fronts included the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 
and the Sidama Liberation Front in the South East and South. In the north, the Dergue was fighting the Tigray 
Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), which later became EPRDF, and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front 
(EPLF). The Dergue was also fighting in the Western and South Western fronts with the EPRP (which latter 
came into conflict with the EPRDF) in Western Gojjam, and OLF in Western Wollega. These were some of the 
armed opposition groups against which the Dergue shifted its attention after crushing the urban opposition. 
88 KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119. For more details see at 11- 13. 
89 KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119. Kissi observes, “...the Dergue attempted to transform its persecution of political 
groups [including the rebels groups] into mass murder of people on the basis of their biological affinity with 
members of ethno-political opposition groups”. p, 119 
90 DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 3   
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targets”.91  Moreover, various sources suggested that as the TPLF-EPRDF strengthen its 
military attack and scored victories; “the government continued to fight the war with total 
disregard for the rights of civilians, and the army and air force engaged in reprisal killings of 
civilians”.92 A typical example in this regard was the aerial bombardment and destruction of 
the market town of Hauzein, in Northern Tigray, which has been characterized as a deliberate 
killing of which thousands of innocent men, women and children.
93
 Moreover, prisoners of 
war were also victims of Dergue’s action.94 
 
Other accounts of massive violation by the Dergue relate to the famine of 1984, one of the 
most severe famines to have occurred in the country’s recent history. The famine could be 
attributed to a number of factors including bad government economic policies and political 
instability. This is clearly noted in the following terms: 
 
The beginnings of 1983-6 drought and resultant famine can be traced to the 
intermittent food crises of the previous decade, combined with the political chaos that 
reigned between 1976 and 1978, and the Derg’s attempt to implement its socialist 
development strategy despite adverse conditions.
95
  
 
Some emphasize on the bad policies of the Derg. Thus, it was observed, “the famine resulted 
from [Derg’s] efforts to implement its revolutionary policies despite being ill-equipped to 
make these work, especially in the face of strong international opposition.”96However, what 
is worth noting here is the allegation that it resulted from government’s deliberate actions as 
part of counter-insurgency strategy.
97
According to this view, the famine was an artificial 
creation, which could have been prevented/mitigated had the Dergue refrained or 
                                                             
91  DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at  p.3 
92DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 14  
93DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 257. There are also detailed accounts of the atrocities committed by the counter 
insurgency military campaign. 
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discontinued the measures that caused the famine.
98
 It can be understood that government 
counter-insurgency measures contributed to the famine that claimed the lives of many.
99
 
There are also accounts that the Dergue utilized humanitarian relief as a weapon of war.
100
  
 
The Dergue’s resettlement program, arguably, had resulted in human rights violations. The 
resettlement plan was officially launched immediately after the disclosure of the famine of 
1984 by the media, and it was presented as a “famine relief measure.”101 According to 
Ramhato, “Resettlement under the Derg had multiple objectives: it was meant to promote 
food security, to relieve the population pressure of the vulnerable areas, and to bring about 
the environmental rehabilitation of these same areas. In the end, none of these objectives 
were achieved and yet the cost in human lives and resources was immense.”102 This is 
indicative of the human rights violations related to the resettlement program. The more 
critical view is that the resettlement program was a counter-insurgency measure. Thus, Kissi 
notes, “the Dergue’s poorly-planned and hastily implemented resettlement program, from 
October 1984 to February 1986, was intended as a counter-insurgency strategy to intimidate 
and isolate potential peasant recruits of the TPLF and EPLF”.103 The resettlement programs 
were even considered as concentration camps.
104
Despite its expressed or hidden purposes, the 
implementation of the resettlement program had resulted in human rights violations including 
the loss of life.
105
  
 
                                                             
98DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 133. In the words of De Wal, “had the artificial famine creating actions not 
continued, major famine could have been averted” 
99DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 176. [13-176]. It is noted, forced relocation, which itself was viewed as a 
counter-insurgency strategy in east and south, was an additional factor for famine in southern 
provinces.According to De Wal the famine killed in excess of 400,000 people and “ most of these deaths can be 
attributed, not to the weather, but to the government’s gross violations of human rights.” See at 13. 
100
KISSI, E, Above n 31 at  128. See also DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 11, see also at 10, 11 &156 of same.   
101DE WAL, A,  Above n 30 at 211 
102 DESSALEGN RAHMATO, Resettlement in Ethiopia, The Tragedy of Population Relocation in the 1980s 
[Online]. Available at http://www.fssethiopia.org/publicationfile/discussion%20paper%20no%2011.pdf, at 5 
and 6. According to RAHMATO, “in the period 1984-1986, the Derg resettled some 600,000 people, most of 
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Ethiopia. In this same period, some 33,000 settlers lost their lives due to disease, hunger and exhaustion. An 
untold number of families were destroyed, and, for many years after, a number of NGOs were still engaged in 
attempting to reunite thousands of children who had been separated from their parents at the time of settler 
relocation.”  
103KISSI, E, Above  n 31 at 128 
104EDMOND J. KELLER, Above n 95  
105DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 14. These violations include “ the violent and arbitrary manner in which resettlers 
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loss of life see DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at  227; See also at 14. At least, 50,000 people are estimated to have 
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41 
 
Another point of consideration is the villagization program, which the Dergue began to 
implement in late 1984. Again, despite the stated objective by the government, historical 
accounts claim that the villagization program was used as a strategy to deal with 
insurgency.
106
 The villagization programme was as problematic as the resettlement program 
and involved massive human rights abuses.
107
The implementation of the program involved 
coercion and violence, especially in war zones.
108
 
 
In general, the sources discussed above support the official articulation of past violence by 
the transition. Clearly, the Derg had committed gross and systematic violations of human 
rights throughout its entire rule by utilizing all state machineries and affiliated institutions in 
eliminating dissent as well as indiscriminate attack against innocent people. These accounts 
provide the justificatory basis for the transition’s articulation and presentation of the Derg 
and affiliated institutions as perpetrators of human rights during the 17-year military rule of 
Mengistu Haile-mariam. Accordingly, the transitional process of accountability focused on 
violations committed by officials and military personnel of the Derg and affiliated 
institutions. Finally, although some sources indicate the prosecution emphasised on violations 
committed against the EPRP, the transitional process generally depicts the Ethiopian people 
as victims of Dergue’s acts of violations.  
 
To conclude, in light of the numerous historical accounts available, the massive violations 
committed by the Dergue can neither be denied nor justified. Thus, the approach that sought 
to subject members of Dergue-WPE to the transitional process of accountability in order to 
depart from a culture of violence and human rights violations is understandable. However, 
the question remains: was the articulation of history of past violence and human rights 
violation complete? Was the history presented the whole history? In other words, were not 
other actors involved in violations during the Dergue era? Is the presentation of history as 
stated in proclamation number 22/1992 or elsewhere open to question? These questions are 
addressed in the following section. 
                                                             
106DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 231. See also at 14  
107EDMOND J. KELLER, Above n 95. See also DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at 14.   
108 DE WAL, A, Above n 30 at  14. For more see DE WAL,A, Above n 30 at 232. For example, there are 
accounts that the villagization in Hararge, where the OLF was based, was implemented by force and with 
massive violation of human rights, which involved killing (sometimes mass execution), burning of houses and 
crops, killing or confiscation of cattle, mutilation, rape, torture etc. The villagization and resettlement program 
in Gojjam also led to large-scale violation of human rights during the 1989-91. For this see DE WAL, A, Above 
n 30 at 15 
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2.4 Other Histories and Implications 
 
In this section, I explore and present various sources that provide other telling of the history 
of violence and human rights violations committed during the period of the Dergue’s military 
regime-between 1974 and 1991. These accounts, while not rejecting Dergue’s responsibility 
(rather, affirming it), also asserted that other actors did use violence and committed human 
rights violations. These accounts relate to (1) the violations committed by the different 
opposition political groups in advancing their political goal and (2) the violations committed 
by individuals in pursuing their own exclusive interests. 
 
Although not extensively recounted, historical accounts indicate that, different opposition 
groups committed human rights violations in the course of their violent opposition to the 
Dergue as well as violent confrontation among themselves. 
 
 Although there was no significant ideological difference, the various political groups and the 
Dergue were fighting each other for controlling state power.
109
 Such conflicts created the 
context for human rights violations. The first clashes, leading to massive violations, 
apparently took place between the Dergue and the civilian urban opposition political groups, 
particularly the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP). It is claimed that although 
EPRP, like Me’ison, shared Dergue’s rhetoric of socialist revolution, it raised strong 
opposition to the Dergue and “battled the regime for State control”.110 Arguably, the EPRP 
was the most radical and ideologically communist of the opposition groups that sought to 
integrate the ethnic-based opposition to the Dergue in to a broader-based “class struggle” 
against the military regime.
111
 This apparently brought the EPRP into conflict not only with 
the Dergue but also with ethnic-based opposition groups- mainly the Tigray Peoples 
Liberation Front (TPLF). Thousands of EPRP leaders and followers perished in the party’s 
ideological and power struggles with the Dergue and the TPLF.
112
 Saving the EPRP-TPLF 
conflict for a later discussion, many accounts present the EPRP as the primary victim of 
Dergue’s Red Terror.   
                                                             
109As indicated earlier, both the Dergue and opposition groups had a socialist orientation. 
110MATSUOKA, A and  SORENSON, J, Above n 68 at 33 
111KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 82 
112KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 82 
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However, as noted earlier, a full understanding of the history of violence and human rights 
violations requires consideration of the whole context - a context beyond what is commonly 
referred to as the Red Terror. It is contended that in studying the Red Terror, it is also 
important to put the ‘White Terror’ into context.113 The White Terror refers to an urban-
armed opposition campaign launched by the EPRP. This campaign targeted members of the 
Dergue and their supporters (or people believed to be supporters).  In this respect, one author 
asserted that “...not only the regime’s [Dergue’s] security forces, revolutionary squads 
(Abiyot teibeka), cadres, and special death squads, but also the squads of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Army (EPRA), EPRP’s military wing, hunted and killed people “in 
defence of the revolution”.114 This is an indication of the involvement of EPRP in past 
violations. Thus, it is observed that the “white terror also caused the liquidation of the most 
educated citizens of the country.”115 Personal experiences and observations of people are 
indicative of the extent of violations committed by the EPRP. One such personal testimony 
asserted that the EPRP was involved in: 
 
Killing whole families, hanging children in schoolyards, gunning down husbands 
waiting in cars for their wives and fathers dropping their kids at school, assassinating 
young members of a family and dumping the bodies in front of the house, so as to 
shock and brutalize the rest of the family.
116
       
 
This statement and other accounts suggest that like the Red Terror, the White Terror led to 
violations of human rights. According to one account, EPRP killed 1319 people thought of 
Dergue members or supporters in Addis Ababa within few months.
117
 Both terror campaigns 
– the red terror and the white terror - resulted in human rights violations.118 Zewde asserted 
that “the labels ‘white terror’ and ‘red terror’ are clearly subjective, and they are intended to 
                                                             
113OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 13 
114OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 13 
115OLIKA, T,Above n 32 at 13 
116OLIKA, T,Above n 32 at 13  
117 A preliminary objection presented against SPO charges, SPO file No.62/85 (copy with the author). 
Accordingly, these happened as of September 1976, and arguably, the killings stopped because of the red terror  
118OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 13, He observed this as “under the name of red terror and white terror, people were 
just slaughtered.” 
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condemn one form of terror and justify another.
119
 Despite the differences in the identity of 
the campaigners and victims as well as impact, the red terror-white terror concepts by 
themselves suggest the use of political violence that had huge human rights implications. 
Both were forms of terror and violence launched by political groups against each other. 
However, the questions who started the violence and when did it start remain controversial. A 
historian puts the controversy in the following words; 
 
“there is far from unanimity as to when the terror started, just as the issue who started 
it is contentious. In this respect, history has become as much a battle ground as the 
political violence itself”.120  
 
In addition, the issue as to responsibility is one that is contested. In this respect, it has been 
noted, “no independent research has been done on the question who really was responsible 
for the ‘genocide’ and human rights violations committed during those days”.121 Toggia 
generally observed that “the political development of the 1970s signifies the intense power 
struggle within the derg, against the derg and among the other Marxist-oriented parties, 
mainly to configure the revolutionary transformation of a traditional semi-feudal society into 
a socialist one.”122 They had become irreconcilable political groups though they shared 
socialist political ideology. Thus, “the uncompromising bloody power struggles steered all 
the political antagonists to their own decimation and demise.”123Arguably, this is one of the 
issues that the Ethiopian transitional justice process might be expected to address. A 
consideration of the available literature provides different and some times conflicting 
accounts that can be formulated into three categories: (1) Dergue’s action as a response to 
violence, (2) Red Terror as the cause for violence, and (3) Dergue’s action as an intervention 
in a conflict among the civilian opposition. 
                                                             
119BAHRU ZEWDE. 2009. The History of the Red Terror: Contexts and Consequences. In : K., TRONVOL, C. 
SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged( 
African Issues),  James Currey, at 25 
120ZEWDE,B, Above n 119 at 24 
121OLIKA, T, Above n 32 at 14 
122PIETRO TOGGIA, The Revolutionary Endgame of Political Power: The Genealogy of ‘Red Terror’ in 
Ethiopia, Research Article, African Identities, Vol. 10, No. 3, August 2012, 265–280, Routledge.[Online]. 
Available at the World Wide Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14725843.2012.715455, at 
266.  It is noted “In this respect, each one of the Ethiopian Marxist groups mapped the so-called ‘correct mass 
line’, exclusively based on its own political party programme. Hence, with sectarian assertions for political and 
organisational leadership of the revolution, the power struggle was further intensified. Nonetheless, the political 
declarations of these organisations fundamentally reassured the people that the struggle was for the 
emancipation of the oppressed classes of Ethiopia.” 
123PIETRO TOGGIA, Above n 122 at 266 
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(a) Dergue’s action as a response to violence.  
One view relating to who started the violence holds that  it was the EPRP’s political violence 
(or white terror) that led to red terror as a Dergue response. The narration presented by 
Me’ison leaders or members clearly present the EPRP as the culprit who inaugurated the 
armed combat [tinqnq] in 1976.
124
 This was evidenced by “... the strident declarations of the 
EPRP in early September [of 1976] and the intimidating tactics (taraba buden) it had begun 
to use even earlier”.125The central idea is that “it was the EPRP’s terrorist policies that 
encouraged the new phase of PMAC repression”.126 This view is supported by Olika who 
asserts, “the red terror was the Dergue’s response to the EPRP’s urban guerrilla warfare that 
was unleashed with its assassination attempt on Mengistu, the First Secretary of the Derg, in 
late September 1976”.127  Hence, Dergue’s Red Terror was a counter response to EPRP’s 
White Terror.  
 
(b) Dergue’s action as the cause of violence 
According to some sources, the central cause for the violence that erupted in 1976 was 
Dergue’s campaign of the Red Terror. This view presents the White Terror as a self-defence 
against the red terror. This apparently is EPRP’s version of the story.  Zewde states that 
‘EPRP historians are at pains to argue that the EPRP only reacted to the preparations being 
made by the Dergue and its POMOA [Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs] 
allies in late August 1976 for a war of annihilation against the EPRP.”128 In support of their 
version, EPRP members refer to the violent nature of the Dergue even before the Declaration 
of the Red Terror.
129According to EPRP, its “resort to armed struggle in September 1976 was 
a counter-offensive”.130 Therefore, these accounts indicate that Dergue’s violence and 
                                                             
124ZEWDE,B, Above n 119 at p.25 
125ZEWDE,B,  Above n 119 at 25. Citing different sources, Zewde argues, “this sentiment is echoed in some of 
the works on the Ethiopian revolution” 
126ZEWDE,B, Above n 119.  
127OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 14 
128ZEWDE,B, Above n 119 at 25. In this respect, it is claimed that “the campaign was officially launched on 11, 
Septmeber, when the EPRP was accused in the media of various acts of counter-revolution and economic 
sabotage” 
129OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 14. Taffesse presents EPRP’s assertion that “the Dergue’s extra judicial killings 
predated the declaration of the red terror”. It was also indicated that ‘the EPRP present[ed] the summary 
execution of the former government officials [meaning officials of the imperial regime] in December 1974 as 
evidence that the Dergue’s terrorist actions and violations of human rights had been in process since 1974’ 
130OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 14 
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repression existed even before the declaration of the Red Terror, and that rather than the 
cause for Dergue’s repression, EPRP’s action was an act of self-defence. 
 
(c) Dergue’s action as an intervention. 
The third version was that the terrors originally resulted from the conflict between EPRP and 
Me’ison - two civilian urban opposition groups at the time. It was asserted that “the waves of 
‘white vs. red terror’ that engulfed the country were started by EPRP and Ma’ison against 
each other and the Dergue joined in on behalf of the latter”.131 As Toggia observed: 
 
The EPRP, on one hand, vehemently opposed the military derg as a ‘fascist regime’, 
calling for its unconditional and immediate replacement with the Provisional People’s 
Government since September 1974. On the other hand, Me’isone temporarily allied 
with the derg through its ‘critical support’ policy for about 16 months (mid-April 
1976–mid-August 1977), striving to outlast its military rule with the formation of a 
national democratic people’s government.132 
 
There was apparently irreconcilable differences between EPRP and Meison in their approach 
towards the Dergue, which ultimately led to conflict among them. This is apparently a pro-
Dergue version of the story;
133
 because it constructs the EPRP and Me’ison responsible for 
creating the violence, and the Dergue came in only to defend the Me’ison, which at the time, 
as indicated earlier, created a strategic alliance with the Dergue. There is yet another version 
that presented the Me’ison as the cause of the Red Terror.134 
 
These different accounts of the history of the Ethiopian revolution and the terrors and killings 
that followed are marred by accusations and counter-accusations among the different political 
groups active at the time. Clearly, there is no controversy as to the Dergue’s violent actions 
during the Red Terror. However, historical accounts indicate that (1) other political groups 
                                                             
131OLIKA, T, Above n 32 at 15 
132PIETRO TOGGIA, Above n 122 at 266  
133OLIKA, T, Above n 32 at 15 
134 See OLIKA,T, Above n 32 at 15. As suggested by Olika, Me’ison is responsible on the “grounds that its 
choice of collusion course with the Dergue furnished the latter with a quasi-legitimacy and ideological support 
to consolidate its power and counter the civilian opposition violently including Me’ison itself”. Me’ison was 
“also accused for having caused the failures of a coalition with other smaller political groups while it was 
yearning for primus inter pares (to be a powerful among “equals”). This coalition, known as EMALDH (Union 
of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninst Organization), was subsequently disintegrated and some of its members (Echat, 
for example) opted for micro-nationalism while others (Wez and Malerid) were co-opted in to the Derg regime.”  
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were involved in violations while opposing the Dergue or fighting each other and (2) the 
context of human rights violations should be understood as extending beyond the very narrow 
period of the Red Terror.  
   
Clearly, the various political groups resorted to violence to achieve political objectives of 
their own. Thus, “resorting to calculated violent and armed action in the name of class 
struggle became the rationale and modus operandi among all Ethiopian leftist movements of 
the time.”135This is true of the EPRP, which intended to create a socialist state in Ethiopia 
under the leadership of the proletarian party (EPRP), and denounced what it called the 
“imperialist (pro-American) ideological orientation of the Dergue and favoured the arming of 
peasants and workers to take over State power”.136 It also claimed that the military were 
incompetent to guide socialist revolutions.
137EPRP newsletters characterized Dergue’s 
revolution as a fascist one having no resemblance with a socialist revolution, and thus,  EPRP 
launched “revolutionary violence against the Dergue and its supporters”.138 
 
Historical accounts also indicate that EPRP’s violence was directed not only against the 
Dergue but also against intellectuals and opposition political groups. It is claimed that 
former-student revolutionaries who were or appeared allied with (supported) the Dergue were 
targeted by the EPRP. The relationship between Me’ison and EPRP developed in to a violent 
one such that Professor Bahir notes, “the two organizations have clearly aligned themselves 
on opposite camps in the revolutionary process and were girding themselves up for the duel 
that killed them both.”139An EPRP newsletter described pro-Dergue intellectuals as 
reactionaries, betrayers of the student movement and pro-American, and thus marked them 
for eradication.
140
  
 
There are ample indications that EPRP and other opposition political groups resorted to 
violence against each other and supporters. One such example of violence was between EPRP 
and TPLF. After its failed urban resistance (opposition) to the Dergue, the EPRP attempted to 
                                                             
135PIETRO TOGGIA, Above n 122 at 268 
136KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 82 
137KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 84 
138KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 82. It urged all Ethiopians to “do away with pests” ( a reference to the Dergue and 
EPRP’s ideological enemies) and “erase the dust of Ethiopia’s history through [a] national democratic 
revolution [as] China..., Albania..., Vietnam...,Cambodia and Laos have done.” 
139BAHRU ZEWDE, The Quest for Socialist Utopia, The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 1960 – 1974, Addis 
Ababa University, James Currey, 2014, at 258 
140KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 92 
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establish and launch a rural armed movement from Tigray. This brought EPRP, like the EDU, 
in conflict with TPLF, both of which had a Marxist orientation, but differed on what was 
called the “national question”.141  This difference led to violence. It was noted, “the leaders 
and supporters of the EPRP labelled members of the TPLF as tebaboch (narrow nationalists)  
and pass[ed] death sentences on them”.142 There is evidence that the EPRP used violence 
against the peasants if they refused to co-operate and prevented them from going to town 
markets believing that they might betray them to the Dergue.
143
 It is also noted, “the TPLF in 
turn labelled the leaders and supporters of EPRP as Adisochu Neftengoch (the new 
chauvinists) and marked them for annihilation”.144Thus, eliminating the opponent 
characterized the political relationship between the EPRP and TPLF in 1976 and 1977.
145
 
Moreover, the animosity between the TPLF and EPRP, arguably, still exists as reflected in 
different ways.
146
 Historical accounts also indicate a clash between the TPLF and EDU that 
affected not only members of the groups themselves but also their supporters. Some of the 
recent publications provide a detailed account of how TPLF decimated armed groups in the 
north that, although fought the Dergue, it considered its strategic enemies.
147
  
 
The struggle and conflict between EPRP and Me’ison also led to killings and human rights 
violations. While the EPRP argued that the military could not implement socialism and called 
for the establishment of a Provisional civilian government, Me’ison sought an alliance with 
the Dergue viewing it as the only organized group that could control the state in the power 
vacuum left by the emperor’s fall.148 This and other differences seem to have triggered 
violence between the two civilian opposition groups. EPRP has been accused of carrying out 
                                                             
141
MATSUOKA, A and  SORENSON, J, Above n 68 at 36  
142KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119 
143YOUNG, J. 1997. Peasant Revolution in Ethiopi: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991. 
Cambridge University Press, at 105 -. Young also provides details relating to the reasons that led to the TPLF-
EPRP armed clash and final defeat of the EPRP. 
144KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119 
145KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 119 
146For more details, see TRONVOLL, K, Above n 30. These political groups consider themselves as 
antagonistic and irreconcilable political groups; It is not unusual to hear comments from some political figures 
still calling for the establishment of People’s Provisional Government(PPG) as a national solution; and the 
TPLF-EPRDF leaders accuse them for being undemocratic (not believe in elections) and of remnants of EPRP. 
One may see the difficulty this poses on questions of reconciliation. Or, it may even raise the need for 
reconciliation. 
147See GEBRU ASRAT, LUALAWINET ENA DEMOCRACY BE ITYOPIA, 2007 E.C, Addis Ababa 
(Amharic Version). It can roughly be translated as SOVEREIGNITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA, 
2014). This book was written by one of the founders and former member of the top leadership of TPLF. 
148MATSUOKA, A and  SORENSON, J, Above n 68 at 33 
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“death sentences on Me’ison members who cooperated with the Dergue labelling them as 
‘bootlickers’ and ‘banda intellectuals’ (meaning collaborators and quislings)”.149   
 
On the other hand, by giving support and cooperating with the Dergue, the Me’ison had 
contributed to the elimination of the EPRP and its supporters. In other words, “Me’ison 
cadres were given permission [by the Dergue] to kill suspected opponents of the regime 
[EPRP] on sight, and the EPRP was decimated.”150  However, the alliance between the 
Dergue and Me’ison did not last, and Me’ison was attacked and its leaders killed following 
the attempted coup of 1977.
151
  
 
The above historical accounts indicate that, apart from the massive violations committed by 
the Dergue, there is considerable evidence to indicate that other political groups also engaged 
in such violation of human rights. One position strongly asserted that “accusations and 
counter-accusations aside, the Dergue, EPRP, and Ma’ison each made, whatever the degree, 
its contributions to the ‘dirty war’ that consumed one productive generation of the Ethiopian 
people.”152  What is the implication of this?  Does this mean only EPRP and Me’ison were 
wrongdoers? Does it mean all other opposition groups including the armed once were clean?  
 
Some sources also indicated the involvement of various rebel groups in abuses, especially 
relating to the treatment of POWs;
 153
and some of these of groups had bad human rights 
records.
154
 The most radical account of the role of opposition and rebel was that all 
opposition political groups had contributed to massive violation of human rights. In this 
regard, Edward Kissi unequivocally states that “... [all] armed groups which opposed and 
eventually overthrow the Dergue, killed deliberately, indiscriminately and ruthlessly as the 
Dergue did.”155[emphasis added].  Irrespective of the degree of involvement, and perhaps 
without neglecting the accounts about the good human rights performance of some 
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rebels,
156
historical accounts implicate armed opposition groups in the violation of human 
rights and humanitarian law.   
 
The above discussion demonstrates that the context of violation by opposition political 
groups go beyond what is commonly referred to red terror vs. white terror. The war (or armed 
clashes) fought on various fronts between the rebels groups against the Dergue and 
sometimes among themselves were considered as defining the context of violation. It is 
noted, “hundreds of the dead in Ethiopia did not fall at the hands of the Dergue alone, but 
also from that of political groups which opposed the Dergue”.157 Nevertheless, the violation 
of human rights was not solely limited to the taking of life. Generally, we see from the above 
that the different political groups have used violence not only against the Derg but also 
against each other, which ultimately claimed the lives of their leaders, members, supporters 
and innocent civilians. 
 
There is yet another aspect to the history of violence in this period. The climate of political 
violence among the different political groups had given individuals the opportunity to attack 
and eliminate their personal (private) enemies. We should also note that the terror and 
killings in Addis Ababa in “1976 and 1977 stemmed from settlement of private scores which 
had nothing to do with the revolution”.158 Such self-interest motivated killings were not 
limited to Addis Ababa but took place in the provinces too.
159
 
 
I do not intend to make a judgment as to the responsibility of each of the actors during the 
1970s and 1980s. Nor, is it suggested here that the different groups had equal or comparable 
responsibility. Rather, the argument is, first, that historical accounts provide different 
constructions of the history of violation. These accounts tell us there were various 
perpetrators and victims - with the possibility that a certain group was a perpetrator and a 
victim at the same time. Secondly, I argue that, in light of the different historical accounts, 
the history of violation articulated and presented in the transition is problematic. The problem 
with the articulation of history by the transition is not that it constructs the Dergue as a 
human rights violator; that the Dergue was engaged in massive violation of human rights by 
                                                             
156See DE Wal, A, Above n 30. According to this source although allegations existed, TPLF and EPLF were 
generally praised for respecting human rights; and arguably, this won them public support in their struggle to 
end the military regime. 
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using the state apparatus is beyond doubt. Clearly, there is no debate “over state involvement 
or whether the central government deliberately planned and directed the killing [and other 
human rights violations]”.160As Kissi clearly noted, many Ethiopians may not dispute this.161  
Moreover, there is no dispute that the violations cannot be justified by any reason and thus 
ought to be subjected to a transitional process of accountability. It is clearly through 
accountability that we end impunity and prevent the recurrence of similar violations in the 
future, and there by transform the society in to a new path-the path to democratic and rights 
upholding system. 
 
The problem however lies in constructing a history that excludes, or at least remains silent 
about, other actors who were allegedly involved in human rights violations irrespective of the 
degree of such commissions. Clearly, we can only know the extent of their involvement if 
they were subjected to investigation and accountability processes. It appears improper to rule 
out from the outset that their involvement was insignificant or minimal without conducting 
proper investigation. The protection of human rights requires accountability with respect to 
all violations.  
 
We have seen above that there are versions of history that reveal that different political 
groups were involved in human rights violations while fighting the Dergue or each other. 
Irrespective of who was on the offensive or defensive, and who had just cause or not for the 
armed conflict, there were (still are) allegations that opposition political groups were 
involved in human rights violations. This version of the history of violence and human rights 
violation was not taken into consideration in the formulation of the transitional process. The 
law establishing the SPO empowered the latter to conduct investigation and prosecution in 
relation to human rights violations committed by the Dergue and its associates. By so doing, 
the law excluded (seemingly deliberately but at least through silence) the opposition political 
groups from the transitional process of accountability. Thus, the transition’s articulation of 
the history of past violations was not comprehensive enough,
162
 and the main mechanism of 
accountability, i.e., criminal prosecution, was directed against the Dergue only. The 
transition’s construction of history presents the Dergue as the only perpetrator of human 
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161KISSI, E, Above n 31 at 110   
162There is an on-going debate whether such selective prosecution was appropriate. As extensively discussed in 
chapter five, some members of the Ethiopian society consider the exclusion of other political parties, especially 
the EPRP, as partial and unacceptable.  
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rights violation; and portrays opposition political groups like “the EPRP and Me’ison as 
victims only and not as perpetrators too”.163However, it has been shown based on historical 
accounts that this articulation of history is questionable and controversial. This conclusion is 
compatible with and provides supportive evidence for the assertion that “in all cases of 
transition from a repressive regime to a non-authoritarian system, the interpretation of history 
has been an important and disputed subject”.164The history of violation as presented by the 
Ethiopian transition was particularly problematic in light of the complex context of 
violations. 
 
As Alexander De Wal notes “there is no impartial history of Ethiopia; every presentation of 
historical facts is laden with modern day political implications”.165 What are the implications 
of this inadequacy of the transitional process?  
 
Although, the implications of such problematic articulation will be discussed in the following 
chapters, it is useful to state certain points now. First, we might question the appropriateness 
or legitimacy of the transitional process because it did not cover all violations and all 
perpetrators. The exclusion of some political groups from the transitional process of 
accountability is the subject of debate in Ethiopia.
166
 Transitional process of accountability 
should be non-discriminatory in the sense that “all parties be treated justly irrespective of the 
side they come from.”167In other words, the definition of violations and perpetrators should 
be provided in a politically neutral way. It is true that the different groups were opposing and 
fighting a repressive regime. Again, it is true that without the determination and sacrifice of 
these groups Ethiopians would have remained under the repressive regime at least for a 
longer time. Nevertheless, so far as the objective is to address past violations, the reason why 
some groups were excluded from the process remains a question. Can just cause exclude one 
from liability? The South African experience tells us that all parties be treated in the same 
way. The African National Congress (ANC) had ‘just cause’ in fighting apartheid. 
Nevertheless, this ‘just cause’ did not release ANC from investigation and the process of 
accountability. As already indicated, South Africa opted for a process of truth and 
reconciliation by adopting a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a mandate to 
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investigate violence and human rights violations during Apartheid. Moreover, the 
investigative mandate was comprehensive; the Commission investigated violations not only 
by the previous government but also of the different freedom groups such as the ANC, PAC 
[Pan-African Congress], and AWP [Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging or Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement].
168
 The Commission investigated and came up with a finding that these liberation 
movements were partly involved in the long and complex history of violations during 
Apartheid.
169
 Ethiopia had a similar experience in the sense that we had complex and 
“overlapping conflicts” which resulted in massive violations of human rights over a long 
period.  In light of this, the exclusion of opposition political groups from the transitional 
process gives rise to questions regarding the extent to which the Ethiopian process adequately 
addressed its history of violence and violations. 
 
The second implication is that the narrow construction of violations and perpetrators may 
compromise the stated objectives/purposes of the transitional process of accountability. These 
objectives - fighting impunity, rendering justice and establishing the truth about the past – 
cannot fully be achieved if some categories of actors, like the EPRP, are excluded from the 
process of accountability. It may even lead to contrary interpretations of the process, 
including the perception of victor’s justice and partiality, which undermines both the 
rendering of justice and the establishment of truth. As will be discussed in chapter five and 
six, some respondents noted that there could not be justice and truth while being partial at the 
same time. 
 
Thirdly and finally, these defects may even hinder the full transition to democracy, rule of 
law, and human rights respecting system.  This is because the building of trust and 
confidence to transform a divided society requires a comprehensive depiction of past 
violations and the responses thereto. As far as this is not done, building trust and confidence, 
and healing past wounds would be difficult thereby hindering the possibility for a full 
transition. It is a common observation in Ethiopia to see currently active political groups 
accusing each other of unsettled accounts for their participation in the human rights violations 
of the 1970s and 1980s.There appears to be obvious mistrust and a lack of confidence 
between the different political groups giving rise to tensions and confrontations, sometimes 
                                                             
168WILLEMIEN DU PLESSIS, The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: ‘The Truth Set You 
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involving violence.
170
 Arguably, this mistrust and lack of confidence is partly the result of the 
problems in the articulation of our history and the responses thereof. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The fall of the military regime of Mengistu Haile-mariam had created an opportunity for a 
transition from a repressive regime to democracy, the rule of law, and a human rights 
respecting system. The need to address past violations led to the creation of a new law 
enforcement organ with the special mandate to investigate and prosecute human rights 
violations committed by the Dergue and its affiliate institutions. The terms of reference for 
the Special Prosecution Office are a manifestation of the transitions articulation of past 
abuses. The official narration of history was clear. The perpetrator was the Dergue, and thus 
only violations committed by the same were subjected to the transitional process. However, it 
is shown that there are other alternative accounts of past violations and their perpetrators, 
which were ignored by the transition. The inadequacy of the transition’s articulation is not 
that it depicts the Dergue as a perpetrator; rather it is that it excludes others from the 
definition and thereby from the transitional process of accountability. This problem has, as 
will be shown in chapters five and six, implication on the legitimacy of the process as well as 
its effectiveness in bringing about a full transition to democracy, rule of law and human rights 
respecting system. 
 
The next chapter presents a critical examination of the meaning and significance as well as 
the main issues of transitional justice, which provide the key elements for the analysis of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
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CHAPTER THREE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN GENERAL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a general discussion of transitional justice. It attempts to explain the 
meaning and historical development of transitional justice. In addition, some experiences 
across the world are touched upon to show how different societies have dealt with past 
violations/violence. The objective here is to introduce the meaning and historical evolution of 
the concept of transitional justice, its goals or main components as well as to highlight the 
practical varieties of transitional justice processes in responding to past violations. This 
chapter also provides a more general theoretical discussion of transitional justice processes 
including the levels of, and parties to, transitional justice, the issue of how to frame 
transitional processes as well as questions of legitimacy. A more focused analytical 
discussion of the main components of transitional justice (justice, truth, reparation, and 
reconciliation) will follow in the next chapter.  
 
This chapter has three sections. The first section briefly deals with the meaning and 
objectives of transitional justice. The second section considers transitional justice from an 
historical perspective and discusses various experiences of transitional justice processes. The 
last section deals with a general theoretical discussion of some common issues in transitional 
justice processes including the levels, parties to, framework and legitimacy of these 
processes.  
 
3.2 The Meaning and Objectives of Transitional Justice 
 
At the time of transition from repression and violence towards democracy, the rule of law and 
peace, societies need to deal with their past. Arguably, the manner of dealing with the past 
will affect a society’s transition to sustainable peace and stability as well as rule of law and 
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democracy.
171
 In order to promote justice, peace and reconciliation, government officials and 
non-government advocates are likely to consider both judicial and non-judicial responses to 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
172
 
Transitional justice generally refers to these diverse processes and mechanisms of responding 
to past abuses.   
 
The concept of transition and transitional justice is not without contestations.  However, the 
term has been used to “… refer to the various processes accompanying political transition by 
societies emerging from a period of violence that aim to deal with the serious human rights 
violations committed during the conflict or to achieve national reconciliation.”173However, 
achieving reconciliation is not the only purpose of transitional justice. The United Nations 
uses the term transitional justice in a broader sense as comprising: 
 
“ the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, reparations, truth seeking, institutional reforms, 
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.”174 
 
Thus, transitional justice is a notion that comprises different responses to past abuses. These 
responses may have various goals/objectives. It is indeed commented that “ a state may have 
a number of objectives in responding to past abuses: to punish perpetrators, establish the 
truth, repair or address damages, pay respect to victims, and prevent further abuses.”175  
Again, “there may be other aims as well, such as promoting national reconciliation and 
reducing conflict over the past, or highlighting the new government’s concern for human 
                                                             
171SARKIN, J. 2000. Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating 
Rwanda’s approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-Based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the 
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another.” See Guillermo O’ Donnel and Philippe C. Schmitte, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule; Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies 6(1998). 
172OLSON, LM. June 2006.  Provoking the Dragon on the Patio, Matters of Transitional Justice: Penal 
Repression Vs. Amnesties. International Review of the Red Cross, 88(862),  at 276 
173 ELIZABETH,SG. June 2006. Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law and Transitional Justice: 
Lessons to be learnt from the Latin American Experience. International Review of the Red Cross, 88 (862), at  
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rights and therefore gaining the favour of the international community.”176 However, certain 
goals/objectives are more common than others in many discussions of transitional justice. 
These goals of transitional justice may include justice, truth, reparation, reconciliation, or a 
combination of these. 
 
Transitional justice is assumed to address certain needs/ rights in relation to past abuses. 
Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights, formulated a “right 
to know,” a “right to justice,” and a “right to reparations” for victims and interpreted these 
rights as requiring states to adopt a variety of measures in order to expose the truth, combat 
impunity and guarantee the non-recurrence of violations.
177
 As will be shown, the right to 
know and the right to justice belong not only to victims (relatives) but also to the public. In 
addition to these tripartite rights, transitional justice has to address the need for reconciliation. 
According to Sarkin, transitional justice has to take three goals in to consideration: truth, 
justice and reconciliation.
178
 These rights (needs) are complementary to each other.  
 
The objectives of transitional measures vary depending on the particular situation of each 
society/state.  However, there are certain generally well-known objectives. These objectives 
include punishing perpetrators, establishing the truth, repairing or addressing the damage 
caused, paying respect to victims, preventing further abuses, promoting national 
reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past, highlighting new commitment to human 
rights and gaining support from international community, establish the rule of law and so 
on.
179
 Among these, four objectives are prominent: Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Reconciliation. These objectives are also considered as components of transitional justice, 
and are sometimes expressed in terms of rights to be fulfilled by transitional processes. These 
components are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. For the moment, it suffices to 
keep in mind that transitional justice refers to various processes of dealing with the past with 
various objectives/goals of which some are more common. It is worth stressing that this study 
considers the different components as forming part of a broader transitional justice process 
rather than as separate and competing claims where one may be compelled to choose one 
goal or mechanism over the other. We should note that justice in transitional societies 
involves “a plurality of complementary ways of reaching continued stability, peace and 
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reconciliation.”180 In this sense, reconciliation is the culmination or outcome of the proper 
conduct of truth, justice and reparation processes.  This will be elaborated on in the next 
chapter.  The next section provides a brief discussion of the historical development and 
global experiences of transitional justice in theory and practice. 
 
3.3 Transitional Justice: Historical Development and Practices 
 
Transitional justice has increasingly become a mechanism of addressing past violence and 
violation of human rights. This general trend is termed as a “revolution in accountability” or 
as a “justice cascade”.181 Existing studies show an “unprecedented spike in state efforts to 
address past human rights abuses both domestically and internationally since the mid-
1980s”.182 Teitel traces the history of modern transitional justice to WWI, and presents a 
three-phase genealogy of transitional justice – the post-WWII phase (the international, ending 
with the beginning of the Cold War), the post-Cold War Phase (associated with a wave of 
democratic transitions and modernization), and steady state phase (the normalized law of 
violence at the end of the 20
th
 Century).
183
 However, some studies on transitional justice trace 
its history to Ancient Greece, although the ancient forms of transitional justice might be 
different from the current understanding.
184
 
 
This section discusses some cases of transitional justice mechanisms adopted by various 
societies in transition over a period. Although I do not attempt a comprehensive historical 
study of transitional justice, a brief discussion of historical events helps us gain a clearer 
insight into the concept and dynamics of transitional processes. The discussion is offered in 
two sub-sections- (a) Ancient cases of Transitional Justice and (b) Recent cases of 
transitional justice.   
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It is important to state two things at the outset. First, some writings on the history of 
transitional justice suggest that it may take place not only in the context of a transition 
towards democracy. It is clear that democracy is just one form of political rule. In the modern 
era, we have witnessed three forms of political rule, namely, democracy, totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism.
185
Therefore, a regime change may result in a transition from one form to 
another. A regime change is also possible without a change in the form of political rule.  So, 
historically transitional processes did take place in the context of various forms of regime 
change.
186
 Second, a regime change may occur because of internal factors (endogenous) or 
external factors (exogenous) and the transitional process may also be initiated and 
implemented internally (endogenous) or externally (exogenous). Thus, the historical 
discussion covers all forms of regime change as well as all forms of transitional process 
although the focus of my research is the endogenous regime change and with it the 
endogenous transitional process. 
 
3.3.1 Ancient cases of Transitional Justice 
 
A brief consideration of ancient cases of transitional justice may be useful in understanding 
its origin as well as how ancient societies have responded to the past in either restoring a 
democratic system or a monarchy in transitional periods.  
 
Literature on the history of transitional justice suggests that ancient Greece had some form of 
transitional justice characterized as “democratic transitional justice.”187 Twice in its long 
history, the Athenian democracy was over thrown through coups resulting in the 
establishment of oligarchic regimes. The Athenian transitional justice measures were thus 
twice undergone in the restoration of democracy (although truncated at first), and these 
included retributive measures as well as legislative reforms.
188
 It may be useful to note that 
although retribution was the dominant form of justice, it was carried out in the interest of the 
collective and without retroactive application of law.
189
 The second restoration occurred 
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through negotiation, and hence the transitional justice measure was the result of compromise, 
impliedly emphasizing amnesty for reconciliation purposes.
190
 Therefore, what was intended 
in the second restoration was more of reconciliation with little desire for collective 
retribution, while at the same time undertaking constitutional and legal reforms. 
 
One may say that the main features of transitional justice did exist in the context of the 
restoration of democracy and the subsequent measures. We had “the wrongdoers, victims, 
resisters, neutrals and beneficiaries from wrongdoing.”191 Despite obvious differences, the 
Athenians had taken a number of measures to deal with past regimes that more or less 
resembles contemporary practices. 
                              
Although contemporary understandings associate transitional justice measures to the 
transition to democracy (successor democratic regime), historical events suggest that it 
existed even in cases where the successor regime is undemocratic. It has been shown that 
“transitional justice in the restoration of monarchy had occurred several times in history”192, 
including the English Restoration of 1660 and the Restoration of the French Monarchy in 
1814 and 1815. These Restorations followed the fall of the monarchy by a revolution that 
created a regime holding power for a very short period. In France, transitional justice 
processes took place twice in the restoration of Monarchy.
193
  
 
The most interesting thing about the English and French Restorations is not the specific 
substantive and procedural matters. Their importance lies in exemplifying cases of 
transitional justice where the successor regime is not necessarily a democratic one. Here we 
have only a regime change but not towards democracy. Democracy was not the goal of the 
transition. The transition was meant to restore a monarchy. Thus, the English and French 
experience tells us that transitional justice may take place when there is a regime change even 
if the subsequent regime is not a democratic one.  
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3.3.2 Recent Cases of Transitional Justice 
 
The modern development of the notion of transitional justice is associated with the events of 
the twentieth century leading towards democracy or at least within the context of a transition 
to democracy. These developments occurred in different parts of the world with some 
similarities among these developments in terms of either time or the events leading to their 
occurrence. These include (a) Western Europe and Japan, (b) Southern Europe, (c) Latin 
America, (d) Eastern Europe, and (e) Africa. I briefly present some important aspects of 
transitional justice in these different parts of the world, which enables us to understand how 
different societies have addressed their pasts. 
 
Western Europe and Japan 
 
The modern history of transitional justice is associated with the events of the twentieth 
century leading towards democracy. According to Jon Elster, this history starts in 1945 with 
the defeat of the axis power, namely, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
194
 While tracing the history 
of transitional justice to WWI, Teitel notes that the first phase of the genealogy of transitional 
justice begins in 1945.
195
  It has emerged with vast and complex criminal prosecutions and 
other measures against former regimes of these countries. It is noted that, in Germany, the 
trials against Nazi officials begun immediately after the end of the war, and was conducted at 
both international and national tribunals.
196
 In addition, a “vast purge process 
(denazification)” as well as other measures including legislative ones were undertaken to 
compensate the victims of the Nazi regime.
197
 More or less similar proceedings were 
conducted with respect to Mussolini’s regime and against Japanese officials.198 Transitions in 
these countries were imposed by foreign nations, and are characterized as the Second wave of 
democratization.
199
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These processes might be seen as transitional justice measures. There is, obviously, an 
element of justice embodied in international criminal law. The post WWII developments may 
demonstrate “the triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of international law”.200 
However, it appears difficult to assimilate these early cases to more recent understanding of 
transitional justice. The Nazi officials were tried for committing war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity in the context of the Second World War, essentially with respect to 
the situations of an international armed conflict. They were not tried mainly for what they did 
internally, meaning within the boundaries of their nation/state.
201
 It is also clear that the 
framework for their prosecution was laid down by the victorious powers (or by the 
“international community”), and there is no indication of an internal demand for or 
participation in bringing former regimes of these countries to justice. It is not an endogenous 
process because both the regime change and the transitional process that followed were 
brought about by external powers. Above all, these transitional justice processes were shaped 
by the post-war period conditions and were limited; nonetheless, they have significant 
contribution for the development of human rights norms and ensuring accountability.
202
 
 
Southern Europe 
 
The modern history of transitional justice is also associated with the events in Southern 
Europe. After the transitions following WWII, the other set of democratic transitions 
occurred in mid-1970
th
 following the end of dictatorial regimes in Portugal, Greece, and 
Spain.
203
 While the opposition in Portugal and Greece imposed the transitional processes, the 
one in Spain was led by the elites of the old regime (particularly by King Juan Carlos) 
following the death of General Franco.
204
 There are similarities and variations regarding the 
measures taken following these transitions. In the post 1974 coup, a mix of purges and 
counter-purges, jail, exile, nationalization and compensation took place in Portugal.
205
 After 
the fall of the military regime in Greek in 1974, the new regime had taken ‘dejuntafication’ 
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measures; purged people associated with the military regime, and instituted criminal 
proceedings.
206
  
 
The Spanish transition had a peculiar feature “involving a deliberate and consensual decision 
to abstain from transitional justice [not to address the past].”207 Even if some measures of 
lustration seem to have taken place, it was only temporary. The decision to not address the 
past was summarized as follows: 
 
In July 1976, the government declared a partial amnesty that freed approximately four 
hundred political prisoners. Next, [t]he Amnesty Law of October 1977, one of the first 
political measures approved by the new democratic government with the support of 
parliamentary majority, achieved two things. First, most political prisoners were 
released, including persons accused of blood crimes. Second a ‘full stop’ was 
approved to prevent the trial of members of the outgoing regime.”   
 
The law also allowed government employees to regain their posts and benefits and led to the 
closing up of the archives of the secrete police.
208
 So, one can see the far-reaching 
consequence of the amnesty laws. 
 
It is worth noting that the Spanish amnesty law is very different from other later amnesties 
like the Chilean amnesty law of 1978. While the latter is a ‘self amnesty’ by the outgoing 
military regime and has been challenged and finally reversed, the Spanish amnesty law was 
passed by an incoming regime and remained in force. As some have suggested,“ the best way 
to move forward [in the Spanish case] is to bury the past, that digging up such horrific details 
and pointing out the guilty will only bring more pain and further divide a country.”209 It 
suggests the possibility that “a society [can] build a democratic future on a foundation of 
blind, denied, or forgotten history.”210 It can be argued, “the [Spanish] law was part of a 
broader transitional pact, which also included the legalization of the Communist Party and the 
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consensual adoption of a new constitution.”211 This is a general non-remembering of the past, 
and perhaps seems to have led to an inclusive political system, and a consensus on the 
reconstruction of a better future. This point may be relevant to the Ethiopian transitional 
justice process, where as will be shown partial remembering was adopted. It might be argued 
that non-remembering is better than partial and selective remembering. 
 
Nevertheless, because amnesties encourage impunity, it is considered as a refutation of 
justice, and only a handful of scholars defend it as acceptable in a restricted and qualified 
way and when the public supports such.
212
 Even in such cases, it is argued that other 
complimentary measures be used to ‘address the rights of victims’, which in most cases is 
missing, and thus giving rise to the rejection of amnesties by supporters of transitional 
justice.
213
 There has a growing social movement that challenges the amnesty law of 1977, and 
there is a need to break decades of silence.
214
 A Spanish judge was suspended in May 2010 
by Spain’s General Judicial Committee and investigated (though discontinued) for trying to 
investigate past abuses on grounds of exceeding his power by bypassing the Amnesty law of 
1977.
215
 These recent developments demonstrate that the debate about past atrocities 
continues, and that past atrocities are not forgotten, even if they were desired to be so. 
 
Latin America 
 
Latin American countries experienced transitions in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Uruguay. In most of these countries, various transitional measures were taken against 
former regimes. These measures ranged from criminal trials, to the establishment of 
institutions for uncovering the truth about the past violations to compensation to victims. In 
Argentina, after the fall of the military regime and the election of President Raul Alfonsin, 
criminal prosecutions were initially adopted. The Argentine military leaders were prosecuted, 
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convicted and punished for the crimes they committed during the ‘dirty war’ of the 1970th 
and 80
th
.
216
 The granting of pardon or amnesty was introduced at a later stage due to 
persistent opposition to the process from the army and other groups. 
217
  In addition, a ten 
member National Commission on the Disappeared (often referred to by its acronym in 
Spanish, CONADEP) was established through a presidential decree to uncover the truth 
regarding the disappeared.
218
 
 
In some cases, like Chile, there were amnesties providing immunity from prosecution. In 
Chile, in 1978, General Pinochet then president of Chile instituted an amnesty law, which 
barred prosecution for almost all human rights crimes that had occurred since the coup of 
September 1973.
219
 Confronted with this, an eight member National Commission on Truth 
and Reconciliation was established through a presidential decree by the elected president 
Patricio Aylwin.
220
 In 1992, law established a compensation policy.
221
 In contrast to the 
Argentine case, Chile has moved progressively towards prosecution, initially through a 
restrictive interpretation of the amnesty law based on what is called the Aylwin doctrine, and 
finally with the overturn of the amnesty law by the Chilean Supreme Court in 1999.
222
  
Differently, there was a deliberate exclusion of transitional justice in Uruguay.
223
 As noted by 
Lewis, “the people of Uruguay voted in a referendum to maintain an amnesty law designed to 
protect their armed forces from prosecution.”224 The following statement may summarize the 
transitional justice processes in Latin American Countries: 
 
The transitions were mostly negotiated by outgoing military regimes, which tried, 
often successfully, to ensure immunity for themselves. Some of the new democracies 
established truth commissions that would identify the victims, usually without naming 
the wrongdoers. Some countries undertook compensation to victims based on the 
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information produced by these commissions. In several countries the situation is still 
fluid, and amnesties may well be overturned or circumvented.
225
 
 
Eastern Europe 
 
The transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe begun in the late 1980
th
 following the fall of 
communism: 
 
 “in the spring of 1989, Round Table Talks and subsequent elections in Poland 
triggered a domino process of transition to (more or less) democratic regime. In 
chronological order, the transitions took place in Poland, Hungary, East Germany 
(GDR), Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria”226   
 
These transitions were generally referred to as post-communist transitions in Europe, and 
witnessed some form of transition to democracy.
227
 These transitional justice processes are 
characterized as post-Cold War transitional justice.
228
  These post-communist transitions 
adopted criminal trials as a response to past abuses; however, these trials were very limited. 
The case of East Germany is different in the sense that the regime change in question came 
because of unification. Nevertheless, various transitional process measures were taken to deal 
with what happened in East Germany. In this respect, Timothy Garton Ash observed that 
“Germany has had trials and purges and truth commissions and has systematically opened the 
secret police files to each and every individual who wants to know what was done to him or 
her-or what he or she did to others.”229 One can see a combination of measures adopted in 
post unification Germany. 
 
In Eastern Europe, post communist transitional measures of varying magnitude were adopted, 
including purges and reparation/restitution.
230
 There were also cases of amnesty, for example 
in the case of Poland.
231
  Of interest here is that in post communist Eastern Europe, we 
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witness reparations and purges as the main method of dealing with the past, with more 
amnesties and less prosecutions. Whether reparation and purges effectively addressed the past 
in these societies remains a question with no clear answer. 
 
Africa 
 
African countries also undertook transitional justice processes following regime changes; 
Rhodesia (1979), South Africa (1994), and Ethiopia (1991) are significant examples. 
According to Jon Elster, in both Rhodesia and South Africa, “white economic elite remained 
after transition, which was largely shaped to safeguard their interests.”232 The Rhodesians 
(Zimbabwean) just ignored the issue of dealing with past violations and injustices except for 
the adoption of some framework for voluntary redistribution of land.
233
 Like Spain and 
Uruguay, Rhodesia has deliberately refrained from undertaking transitional justice process.
234
 
Truth commission were established in Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
235
 In Rwanda, we clearly see 
both supranational and national transitional processes. Rwanda also exhibits a unique process 
of combining informal/traditional processes, the gacaca courts, with the formal criminal 
processes-international and national.
236
 Sierra Leone combines criminal prosecutions and 
truth commissions.
237
 
 
A little more could be usefully said about the South African transitional measures. South 
Africa established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with its past. In fact, the 
Commission itself was established because of negotiation that aimed at ending violence and 
creating a democratic system [negotiated transition].
238
 The South African mechanism has its 
unique features because it aimed at establishing the truth about the past and serving as a 
mechanism for reconciliation. For this purpose, it also offered an amnesty for alleged 
perpetrators as an incentive to appear before the Commission and tell the truth. According to 
Hayner, “only in South Africa has a truth commission been given amnesty granting 
powers.”239The crimes to be subjected to the process before the Commission were those 
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committed between 1960 and 1993.
240
 The processes and conditions for granting amnesty are 
summarized as follows:  
 
Amnesty (immunity to criminal and civil proceedings) would be granted to applicants 
who could show that their actions had been (i) motivated by political goals rather than 
malice or desire for gain, and (ii) proportional to the occasion that triggered them.” 
The applicant would also have to provide full information about the crime, including 
evidence about the chain of command.
241
 
 
Through the process of amnesty-for-truth deal and the inclusion of reparation and 
reconciliation, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered a unique 
forum for dealing with the past. As Hayner observed the full discloser of the truth and the 
proof of the political motivation of the crimes are cumulative conditions for the granting of 
amnesty.
242
 If granted, amnesty exonerates the individual from criminal and civil liability in 
respect of the acts applied for.
243
 
 
However, the existence of truth commission or proceedings before it never prevented 
prosecutions. Clearly, “prosecutions for past atrocities continued even as the commission was 
under way.”244 Nevertheless, in some cases, there was some tension between the work of the 
commission and that of the prosecution office as some of the prosecuted/named for 
prosecution applied for amnesty according to the commission’s procedure. 
 
Generally, the various experiences discussed in this section demonstrate that societies may 
adopt various processes of transitional justice in responding to their past. These choices might 
depend on the prevailing social, economic, political and other factors. Amnesty laws are one 
such challenge. In the Ethiopian context, although the Dergue did not issue new amnesty 
laws; the issue of amnesty or pardon was an important issue raised by some defendants 
during the prosecution process. The idea of non-remembering is also relevant to Ethiopia as 
the SPO establishment proclamation appears to contain partial or selective remembering as 
discussed in chapter two. The truth and reconciliation processes of South Africa are 
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indicative of the significance of truth and reconciliation to societies in transition including 
Ethiopia. It demonstrates that the idea of justice may not be limited to criminal prosecution 
alone. The various experiences also suggest that the existence of some transitional justice 
process does not necessarily imply transition to a democratic and a rights-respecting system. 
They also show issues of responding to the past never die away. The Spanish case is a 
significant example. To conclude, these experiences provide the key issues for the 
consideration of the Ethiopian transitional justice process, which is criminal prosecution.  
 
3.4 Some General Issues of Transitional Justice Processes 
 
As indicated earlier, transitional justice is a generic name that refers to the various policies 
and measures adopted by societies in transition in confronting past abuses. It may take the 
form of criminal prosecution, truth and reconciliation, purges, lustration, compensation, 
restitution or any other form. While the different components of transitional justice will be 
discussed in the next chapter, it is useful to deal with some general issues related to 
transitional processes. Thus, this section deals with the levels and parties to transitional 
justice, the manner and challenges of making transitional justice decisions and the legitimacy 
of transitional processes. A consideration of these issues is essential for an evaluation of the 
transitional justice process in Ethiopia, which follows in the subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.4.1 Levels of Transitional Justice 
 
Transitional justice usually refers to measures and processes adopted at the national-state 
level, and thus most of the transitional processes adopted so far have operated at the 
national/domestic state level.  This notwithstanding, some authors have identified four levels 
of transitional justice: supranational institutions, nation-states, corporate actors, and 
individuals.
245
  We now, thus, briefly discuss these levels of transitional justice because this 
might help to understand the policy options available in post conflict or post-authoritarian 
situations to deal with the past violations.   
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Examples of supranational institutions include the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, the 
International War Crimes Tribunal for the Far East, and the International Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda and for the Former Yugoslavia.
246
 There have also been numerous ad hoc 
international tribunals established by the United Nations since 1990
th
.  The permanent 
International Criminal Court has also started operation dealing with certain crimes that may 
be prosecuted after situations of regime change/transition. However, criminal prosecutions 
before international tribunals are very limited
247
. Nonetheless, we may ask whether this 
tendency will change through the establishment and operation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). 
 
Transitional justice may also take place at the corporate level. The word corporate does not 
necessarily refer solely to business or economic organizations.  It may refer also to non-state 
entities including political institutions (parties), religious institutions, economic entities, 
political associations and municipalities.
248
 Sometimes, these institutions can be subjects of 
transitional justice as they might have participated in past crimes or benefited from violent 
pasts.
249
 In some cases corporate actors were dealt with because of the benefit, they derived 
from the past regime for example by taking possession of property confiscated from other 
individuals or institutions.
250
 They may also be considered as “dispensers of justice.” 251 
There were cases where corporate actors and private firms have taken some measures against 
their members or employees for their participation in or collaboration with past regime.
252
 
 
Transitional justice may also take place at an individual level. This is referred to as “private 
justice” exercised by individuals against others.253 It can take the form of extralegal killing, 
deliberate and public humiliation, and social ostracism.
254
 However, a question might arise as 
to the appropriateness of some of these private processes. On the one hand, individual level 
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reconciliation may also be considered as private justice.  A question can also be raised as to 
the relationship between  private justice and legal justice. It is suggested that private justice 
may be seen as “a substitute for, or pre-emption of, legal justice.”255  Moreover, “legal 
actions may conversely be shaped by the perceived need to pre-empt or prevent private 
justice.”256  However, one can question whether legal justice totally prevents private justice. 
What if victims feel legal justice is not sufficient?  
 
At this point, one should also consider a very important element in dealing with the past at an 
individual level – that of forgiveness. Some have defined forgiveness “as a negation or 
abandonment of vengeance.”257 Forgiveness prevents or minimizes private justice, and 
benefits all – the aggrieved, wrongdoers and the society as a whole.258 Whatever role 
forgiveness has as a transitional process, it has to take place at an individual level because 
only victims have the natural right to forgive and perpetrators to request it. The question that 
may be asked here is what policy measures at a national level would promote forgiveness. 
 
We might also consider another level of transitional justice, which stands between the state 
and the individual level; we might regard this as justice at the community or local level. 
These are measures taken at community or local levels, which are neither, state measures, 
because they do not fit in the formal state structure, nor an individual action because of the 
collective nature of the measures. These are also different from so-called corporate or 
municipality level processes. The Gacaca courts of Rwanda may serve as a good example, in 
respect of which few points can be stated.  The Gacaca courts had their roots in Rwandan 
tradition of settling disputes and later reinvented as a distinct quasi-judicial institutions of 
dealing with Rwanda’s violent past. The following observation highlights the rationale and 
the uniqueness of these Rwandan courts:  
 
[The gacaca courts comprise] a system of community courts 
nationwide...launched as a direct response to the logistical and other 
challenges of bringing to justice some 120,000 individuals accused of 
genocide and held in prolonged detention. Based on traditional practices of 
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communal reconciliation, the gacaca hearings were officially instituted as an 
elaborate and sustained exercise of transitional justice in local settings with 
grass-root participation. As such, gacaca represents a mainstay of the 
Rwandan approach to transitional justice: gacaca falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Rwandan government, the gacaca hearings took place in local Rwandan 
communities and the SNJG comprises exclusively Rwandan staff.
259
   
 
The mandates of the gacaca, apart from achieving justice, extend to the promotion of 
reconciliation and national unity, and were supervised by the National Service of Gacaca 
Courts (SNJG).
260
These courts were separate from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the formal courts of Rwanda. Thus, Rwandan transitional justice context 
demonstrates the co-existence of different levels of transitional process. 
 
Although the above discussion is helpful to understand transitional justice in a broader sense, 
I confine myself to transitional justice processes adopted at the state level. The other levels of 
transitional justice may be regarded relevant as far as they have connection with the 
framework of transitional justice measures adopted by states. The notion of private justice 
and community or local level justice processes are relevant to the Ethiopian context because, 
as will be shown, they are seen as either affecting the formulation of the transitional process 
or as a complimentary [or even a substitute] process for the formal transitional processes. As 
shown in chapter five, the initiation of trial process was seen as preventive of private justice 
or individualized acts of revenge against former leaders.  
3.4.2 Parties to Transitional Justice Processes 
 
It is clear that transitional justice does not exist or operate in a vacuum.  It can operate within 
a society affected by past violence. Clearly, members of that society initiate, operate or 
become accountable to it. Transitional justice intends to address these members of the society 
in one way or another. So, it becomes essential to identify those persons involved in the 
transitional justice process. Two groups appear most frequently: wrongdoers/perpetrators and 
victims. However, some members of the society may not fall into either of these categories - 
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for example, neutrals (bystanders). Generally, the comprehension of the measures and results 
of transitional justice requires the identification of those involved in the process.
261
  
 
The work of Jon Elster provides a comprehensive and useful framework on this point, which 
this author adopted for the purpose of this present study. Jon Elster identifies eight categories 
of persons as parties to transitional justice, which are termed as agents of transitional 
justice.
262
 Accordingly, all members of the society may fall in to one or more of these 
categories. It is also possible for an overlap of these agents in the sense that an individual 
may fall in more than one category, leading to the identification of eleven different role 
combinations.
263
  
 
The relevance of such classification of persons involved in the transitional process needs to 
be understood in all its complexity. The relevance lays in the extent to which these various 
groups shape the transitional process as well as the extent to which their demands are 
properly addressed.  It is likely that they have various complex competing and sometime 
conflicting demands/interests giving rise to complex moral, legal and political issues. The 
demands of perpetrators or resisters, on the one hand, and that of victims may be contrary. 
Even when two groups have legitimate interests, it may be not possible to satisfy these 
demands. Arguably, measures that are responsive to victim’s demand may prevent the 
attainment of overall societal objectives. It is, thus, argued, “fulfilling victims’ claims, 
however morally justified, threatens the political transition.”264This is not an argument that 
one should not address victims’ demands; it is an argument instead that one has to balance the 
various demands within a society when adopting a transitional measure. Therefore, one way 
of analyzing a transitional justice process involves the examination of how it defined and 
addressed the different members of the society. Thus, the understanding of the persons 
involved in the transitional process might be useful for the study of a transitional process in a 
particular society. This study emphasizes on two most frequently discussed parties, namely 
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wrongdoers/perpetrators and victims, and examines whether the Ethiopian transitional justice 
framework has provided a proper definition thereof.
265
 
3.4.3 Manner and Challenges of Framing Transitional Justice Processes 
 
When societies emerge out of conflict or from the rule of an authoritarian regime, they face 
enormous social, economic, legal and political problems. A crucial point here is how these 
problems might be formulated and confronted. In responding to past violations, the society 
should address questions of importance to the collective as well as its individual members. 
The understanding of whether and how a society has framed and responded to these questions 
is essential.
266
 However, these processes are very challenging in light of the different agents 
forwarding various and complex needs to new regimes.  A discussion of these challenges is 
useful to the understanding and evaluation of the Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
 
It is suggested that most societies in transition face “conflicting perceptions, demands, hopes, 
and fears concerning justice, truth, national reconciliation, and the building of more stable 
democracies.”267  It is clear such perceptions guide many decisions relating to the questions 
of dealing with past abuses.
268
 However challenging it may be, the new regime has to make 
crucial decisions, and whether the decisions are legitimate in answering various demands 
should be considered in each context. In so doing, there needs to be a general framework for 
answering the various questions that arise.  
 
The first fundamental and decisive question is whether a society has to address its violent 
past.
269
 This relates to the decisions “whether there should be investigations, prosecutions, 
amnesties, or pardons for particular individuals or crimes.”270 What needs a decision first is 
not on the choice of modalities. Rather, the first issue is whether one has to deal with the past. 
The issues regarding mechanisms depend on this first judgement. 
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From an historical point of view, there are many instances where societies have decided not 
to deal with the past (refraining from opening up wounds) for different reasons. Such was 
experienced in Spain, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and former Soviet Union.
271
 The reasons for 
this may be as follows: 
 
 In some, the abstention was endogenous and consensual while in others it is 
attributed to self-amnesty. Still in others, it was out of fear of how former military 
regimes might react to prosecution. Still in others, it is due to the lack of any 
organized demand for justice.
272
 
 
It is, however, important to stress two things. The first is that the existence of amnesty does 
not in itself mean that the society has let the matter be once and for all. The Chilean 
experience is a clear example of how societies may eventually ignore the amnesty law to give 
themselves an opportunity to come to terms with their past as their fears of past regimes 
subside. Secondly, an amnesty may be granted as a mechanism of dealing with the past as in 
South Africa where it served as an incentive to uncover the truth and promote reconciliation.  
 
If a society decides to deal with past wrongdoing, it has to address various subsequent 
questions. These include what is to be achieved by confronting the past and how this is to be 
achieved. The goals may include justice, truth, reparation, reconciliation or a combination of 
these. These goals may lead to either the institution of criminal proceedings or the 
establishment of truth finding institutions or both. It is also noted, “several successor regimes 
have confronted demands that the new regimes adopt ‘lustration’ or screening laws providing 
non criminal sanctions....”273 A society may also have to decide “whether to permit civil suits 
against alleged violators of rights, including torturers and murderers.”274 There are strong and 
persuasive arguments and counter-arguments in addressing these relatively general issues.
275
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Questions that are more specific follow depending on the answers given to the preliminary 
questions above. For example, an essential decision is required regarding “what and who 
shall [constitute] wrongdoing and wrongdoers.”276 A specific example is the need to 
determine the severity of the crime to be prosecuted, which in itself raises a number of 
questions in light of international law, policy constraints, resources and justice.
277
  
 
A further question that arises in dealing with the past is the scope of wrongdoing and the 
wrongdoers to be subjected to the transitional justice process. In certain societies, both the 
former regime and its oppositions might have possibly committed violence/crime. In this 
respect, the main question is whether the transitional justice process should address all those 
who were involved in past violations. In this respect, it is noted that the “delicate question is 
whether retribution [or truth finding or reparation] shall be one-sided or even-sided - whether 
acts of wrongdoing shall include only crimes committed by agents of or collaborators with 
the former regime, or whether crimes committed by the opposition and its supporters to the 
regime should also be covered.”278 The question of one-sidedness or even-sidedness cannot 
be confined to prosecution or punitive measures alone, and relates to all measures of 
transitional justice including truth finding and reparation.  
 
As long as the purpose of transitional justice is to deal with the past, it is logical and 
appropriate for the process to be all-inclusive. It would appear difficult to support distinctions 
being made between categories of wrongdoers.
279
 The South African experience provides 
useful lessons. In South Africa, both the former regime and the opposition were subject to the 
same process of transitional justice. In other words, the law setting up the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission dealt with members of the opposition or liberation 
movements and of the state security “in an entirely symmetrical manner.”280  Reportedly, 
Bishop Desmond Tutu “threatened to resign from the Commission unless the African 
National Congress formally acknowledged that it, too, was responsible for human rights 
abuses.”281 It is further asserted, “the hearings on Winnie Mandela’s activities made it clear 
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that the Commission did more than play lip service to this principle.”282 In the run up to the 
release of the Commission’s report, the ANC was disappointed with the draft report and tried 
unsuccessfully to get a court order against its publication.
283
 The fact that the ANC was 
fighting the apartheid regime did not exclude it from the Commission’s investigation and 
publication of its involvement in past crimes. Similar approaches were taken in Argentina’s 
criminal proceedings and Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.284 The mandate of 
the Chilean Commission directed it to investigate “disappearances after arrest, executions, 
and torture leading to death committed by government agents or people in their service, as 
well as kidnappings and attempts on life of persons carried out by private citizens for political 
reason.”285 So, the question of even-handedness or otherwise in the transitional process is a 
crucial one. This question arises regardless of whether a society is aiming at criminal 
prosecution, truth finding, purges, reparations, reconciliation or a combination thereof.  
 
Purges and compensation measures involve further specific questions. For example, in the 
case of compensation, it is crucial to identify the loss or suffering that is compensable. In 
other words, there is a need to decide first what forms of suffering constitute victimhood.
286
 
There are also questions regarding the point of departure in terms off setting the time in 
compensating past wrongdoing and the mode of compensation.
287
  The new regime has to 
make decisions, among others, regarding “whom to try, sanction, and compensate; and how 
to try, sanction, and compensate.”288Generally, if new regimes make a decision to confront 
the past, they face consequent substantive and procedural issues. These issues of substantive 
and procedural nature range from laying down the general framework of transitional 
processes to the actual operation of the framework in individual cases. Generally, societies in 
transition need to address multiple and complex questions in responding (or even not 
responding) to past violations. 
 
These discussions are useful for the analytical part of this study because the transitional 
justice process of Ethiopia can be examined in light of the manner of adopting the processes. 
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The perception of the incoming regime, public participation, the proper determination of 
wrongdoers and victims, the idea of one-sidedness or even-sidedness, and timeframe are 
essential points of evaluation of the Ethiopian transitional justice process, as will be 
undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.4.4 Legitimacy of Transitional Justice Processes 
 
Legitimacy is a crucial question in transitional justice processes. Legitimacy relates to the 
legal, moral or political legitimacy of the decision makers and the decision making process. 
The central question is on what grounds are transitional justice measures to be justified? This 
relates to the democratic nature of the transitional framework, and to the question, how this 
might be established. This point is obviously relevant to the Ethiopian context. 
 
One very important perspective is to consider political legitimacy. The question of building a 
nation after the fall of the former regime raises a central question as to the legitimacy of the 
subsequent regime and its institutions and laws. Some writers have tried to address the issue 
in light of creation of a viable nation-state. A viable nation-state is “one to which all citizens 
subscribe.”289 According to Weber, “the creation of modern nation-state, as all states, 
involved the establishment of the legitimacy of the rule and of the rulers.”290  The nature of 
legitimacy is such that both the rulers and the ruled must accept the bonds of authority that tie 
one group to the other. In the absence of such bonds and acceptance, no form of rule or law 
can work effectively. Modern analysts, like Jurgen Habermas, emphasize that such bonds 
must be grounded in a widespread common consensus that depends, in the last instance, on 
the ability of both the governed and the governors to engage in sustained dialogue and 
communication about that consensus, and other contemporary analysts have pointed to the 
massive challenges involved in establishing such legitimacy.
291
In countries where some 
groups seek to exercise control over other persons and resources, what is crucial for the group 
might appear “to be less a matter of securing political legitimacy and more one of 
establishing the rule of force.”292 Nevertheless, questions of legitimacy are critical in modern 
day political organization. This is also true of societies in transition and transitional justice 
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processes. Thus, there must be a widespread common consensus regarding the rulers and the 
rules. The new regime and the transitional process must obtain a widespread acceptance.  
 
As indicated earlier, a transitional society has to make fundamental decisions regarding 
numerous issues including the setting-out of a general framework of transitional justice 
processes. In addition, transitional justice process must be participatory and all-inclusive in 
terms of decision-making. More over, transitional justice measures appear to derive their 
legitimacy from the will of the people. Although the classical Athenian form of (direct) 
democracy is not feasible in contemporary societies, there are mechanisms for the expression 
of the will of the people. The members of the society can express their will through their 
elected representatives, in the common form of representative democracy, which prevails in 
present times. 
 
Thus, in some cases, an elected body particularly the parliament makes the decisions 
regarding transitional justice measures. In the Spanish transition of 1976-78, the granting of 
amnesty (the decision not to open up the past) followed a deliberation with the approval of a 
parliamentary majority.
293
Such decisions have their own legitimacy in popular sovereignty 
(the will of the people) although amnesty laws are increasingly becoming less defensible in 
the eyes of international criminal law. The institution of full democracy is the basis for the 
legitimacy of transitional justice processes. The transitional measures in Argentina - 
including trial and truth commission – took place after the election of a new president.294  
 
 In some cases, like, in the first restoration of Athenian democracy, we can have what is 
called truncated democracy with very limited participation. Whether such limited public 
participation legitimizes the process is not clear. In some cases, the transitional justice 
process is itself the product of negotiation between the outgoing regime and the incoming 
regime. Examples include South Africa and Chile. In such cases, transitional justice 
processes are either limited or excluded by the negotiation itself leaving little or no room for 
the successor regime. Here one may question the legitimacy of the negotiation itself. It is not 
clear whether the participation of different parties in the negotiation may legitimize the 
process. In South Africa, whilst the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established by 
Parliament, the general framework itself was constrained by the negotiation. Therefore, what 
                                                             
293 see ELSTER, J, Above n 184 at 61 and 116 
294 HAYNER, PB, Above n 175 at 33 
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legitimizes the transitional justice process in negotiated transitions is not clear. In certain 
cases, full democracy may not be established or restored immediately so that an intermediary 
successor regime might be instituted before the realisation of full democracy. The Athenian 
case of truncated democracy is one example. In some cases, various political groups or 
parties might create an intermediary regime through negotiation, composed of these different 
political parties. Whether this latter case can be assimilated to truncated democracy is not 
clear. Nevertheless, what legitimizes the actions of the intermediary successor regime is 
problematic. As indicated in the preceding chapters, the Ethiopian transitional justice 
framework was designed by the transitional government, and the legitimacy of the process is 
the subject of controversy. As the intermediary regime that formulated the transitional justice 
process in Ethiopia was not an elected one, the issue of legitimacy is relevant to the Ethiopian 
case, and hence this study will be analyzing the issue of legitimacy in the Ethiopian context.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Transitional justice, we understood, is a post-conflict or post-repression mechanism of 
addressing past violence and violation of human rights and creating a better future. Although 
its broader history is independent of a particular form of transition, its contemporary 
understanding relates to democratic transitions. An overview of its broader history reveals 
that different societies have adopted various mechanisms of dealing with their past ranging 
from criminal prosecution, to truth and reconciliation processes to amnesty. Transition justice 
processes may operate at different levels (supranational, national, corporate, and individual 
levels). Although this study focuses on national transitional justice process adopted in 
Ethiopia, it touches upon private justice and local justice in their relation to the formal 
transitional justice process. There are various parties to transitional justice, and the proper 
understanding of these parties/agents is crucial in the effectiveness of the process. Among 
these actors, this study will in subsequent chapters analyze whether the Ethiopian transitional 
justice process has properly defined the two most important parties, i.e., 
wrongdoers/perpetrators and victims. The framing of transitional justice process poses a 
number of challenging issues including:- (1) whether to address the past, (2) what should be 
the goal (objective), (3) what modality of transitional justice be adopted to achieve the 
objective(s), and (4) the scope of past abuse to be addressed as well as the definition of 
perpetrators and victims (as already mentioned). The latter part raises the issue of one-
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sidedness or even-sidedness. In addition, the issue of legitimacy of transitional justice – 
reflected through public participation – is discussed. This discussion is essential to the 
analysis of the Ethiopian transitional justice process in the subsequent chapters.  However, 
before dwelling on the Ethiopian transitional justice process, it is useful to first elaborate on 
the main components of transitional justice, and whether they are incorporated as a 
goal/objective in the Ethiopian transition. Therefore, the next chapter deals with four main 
elements, namely justice, truth, reparation, and reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERSTANDING THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined previously, this study tries to evaluate the Ethiopian transitional process in light 
of the components of transitional justice by particularly focusing on justice, truth, reparation 
and reconciliation. It considers these components as interconnected elements of transitional 
justice.  For example, a broader understanding of justice may include all the other elements. 
On the other hand, reconciliation could be considered as a culmination of all the other 
objectives. With this understanding, this chapter provides a more detailed discussion of these 
main components in terms of their meaning, significance, relationship and the mechanisms of 
achieving them. These components are, arguably, essential pre-requisites for a successful 
transition. Obviously, this study will examine whether the Ethiopian transition has 
incorporated these components into the transitional process, and the extent to which any of 
them have been achieved, and the implications thereof. 
 
This chapter has four sections. The first deals with justice as a goal of transitional process of 
accountability. It covers the controversies surrounding the meaning of justice as well as its 
different forms, and the factors affecting particular conceptions of justice. It also considers 
the mechanisms of rendering justice, with an emphasis on criminal prosecution, in light of the 
modality adopted in the Ethiopian transition. The second section discusses truth as an 
objective of transitional justice. Although truth can be considered as part of justice, a closer 
consideration of its meaning, significance as well as the mechanisms of securing it is useful 
for consequent discussions. The third section deals with reparation while the last section 
discusses reconciliation. In each, the Ethiopian framework is examined to show whether these 
components were incorporated or not. The discussion in this chapter is aimed at setting out 
the key issues that form the basis for the critical analysis of the Ethiopian transition. 
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4.2 Justice 
 
Justice is as an essential right that a society has to satisfy during transition. According to 
Louis Joinet, the right to justice is recognized under international law, and belongs not only 
to individual victims but also to the public.
295
 International and domestic human rights laws 
require states to provide remedies in cases of human rights violations. Irrespective of whether 
there is a legal right to justice, the significance of justice to societies emerging out of 
repressive regimes would appear to be unquestionable. Justice might be significant for the 
establishment of rule of law, prevention of similar crimes, and promotion of human rights.
296
 
However, the meaning of, and the mechanism for delivering, justice remain contested issues. 
The following discussion briefly presents these controversies and the factors affecting certain 
conceptions of justice. 
 
4.2.1 The concept of Justice and Factors affecting conceptions of Justice 
 
The question ‘what is justice’ has been the subject of intellectual debate from ancient times to 
the present day. Aristotelian conception of justice relates to the taking of what is due to 
oneself.
297
 This notion of justice might include various forms of justice including distributive, 
compensatory, retributive and restorative justice.
298
 
 
There are various approaches to the question of ‘what is justice’. For example, there are 
distinctions between consequentialist and deontological theories of justice. Utilitarianism, for 
example, offers, “a consequentialist theory of justice, insofar as it assumes that the most just 
outcome or procedure is whatever results in the greatest happiness of the greatest number”.299  
                                                             
295 OLSOM, LM, Above n 171, at 282 
296 See for example TIETEL, RG. 2000. Transitional Justice. Oxford and Newyork: Oxford University Press;  
DIANE F. ORENTLICHER. 1991. Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, Yale Law Review, Vol. 100,: HAYNER,PB. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State 
Terror and Atrocity. London:Routlege; HANNAH TSADIK. 2007.  Prosecuting the Past...Affecting the Future, 
A Sida Minor Field Study of the Ethiopian Tansitional Justice Trials, Department of Peace- and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, Summer 2007 
297 JONES, WA. Reparations, Restitution, and Transitional Justice. Vanderbilt University, at 3 [Online].  
298 See JONES, WA  Above n 297 at 2.  See also JOST, JT and KAY, AC. Social Justice, History, Theory, and 
Research, (Chapter 30), at 1127-1128. [Online]. Available from the World Wide Web:  
http://www.psych.nyu.edu/jost/Social%20Justice_%20History,%20Theory,%20&%20Research.pdf  
299 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298, at 1128. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are cited as the main 
proponents of the utility theory. 
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Utilitarian conceptions of justice apply the “principles of aggregating and maximizing net 
benefits minus costs...”300 However; utilitarian conception of justice has been subject to 
criticism for its failure to admit individual differences.
301
 
 
The deontological approach holds that “ determinations of right and wrong depend not only 
on the consequences of human action but also on other considerations, including transcendent 
justice principles...
302
 Immanuel Kant, for example, argues that  a “categorical imperative 
exists to act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should be a universal law”.303 The idea is that there are “universal principles of justice”. 
However, this notion could be rejected on the ground that the same principles do not 
necessarily apply in culturally differing societies.
304
 Thus, there is a debate on whether justice 
is subjective or objective. Apart from the utilitarian-deontological divide, various other 
notions of justice avail. And none of them is without criticism.  
 
One notion that has been present from the earliest consideration of justice is the idea of 
distributive justice, which relates to the question of fair, proper, just distribution of 
resources.
305
This notion of distributive or social justice questions entrenched social, 
economic, and political systems and thereby demands institutional reform.
306
 
 
Procedural justice is another notion of justice developed because of the recognition that 
“justice considerations pertain not merely to the allocation of resources but also to the 
methods or procedures by which decisions are made at work, in political, in the family, 
etc”.307 The process of resolving disputes should be “fair and satisfying in themselves”308, 
                                                             
300THOMAS N. 2005. The Problem of Global Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs .  33 ( 2). Yale Law 
School: Blackwell Publishing, Inc, at 5. [Online]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/globaljustice.pdf. Nigel also provides a discussion on “cosmopolitan 
and political conceptions” of justice. 
301THOMAS N, Above n 300 at 5 
302JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1128. Kant and Rawls are proponents of this approach. 
303Immanuel Kant, critique of Pure reason, ed. and Transl. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1948, cited in JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1128. 
304JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at  1128 
305JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1127. Aristotle is among the earliest philosophers to deal with the 
question. Various theories of distributive justice were developed since then including the Marxian-socialist and 
liberal-progressive (utilitarianism and deontological) theories. The notions of distributive justice and social 
justice were sometimes used interchangeably (see, p. 1140) 
306 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1129 
307 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1149  
308 WALKER, LIN, and THIBAUT.1979, Cited in JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1149 
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and involves two main procedural characteristics – process control and decision control.309 
Some works provide models of procedural justice elaborating what makes a procedure fair.
310
   
 
Another notion is Interactional (or Informal) justice. One might say, “society does not consist 
merely of the law or the state: it has also a more informal aspect, composed of cultural 
institutions, conventions, moral rules and moral sanctions. In order for a society to be fully 
just, it must be just in its informal as well as its formal aspect”.311 In such sense, justice 
relates to the informal interpersonal relationship.
312
 
 
Another notion of justice is retributive justice that relates to the question what happens in 
case of acts of injustice. It addresses the issue of “how people who have intentionally 
committed, morally wrong actions that either directly or indirectly harm others, should be 
punished for their misdeeds.”313 Punishment is generally justified on two grounds – the 
utilitarian perspective and the deserts perspective.
314
  Retributive or punitive justice typically 
involves criminal prosecution and trials. Eirin Mobbek suggests that prosecution is usually 
associated with western conception of justice where punishment appears to be decisive.
315
 
Hence, prosecution is perceived as punitive or retributive.  Whatever the justifications and 
goals of punishment may be, most critics of prosecution do not exclude it from the forms of 
justice, and rather the argument is that it is not the only form of justice.  
 
Restorative justice is yet another conception of justice. Restorative justice could be 
understood as a substitute for conventional approaches of dealing with crime through 
                                                             
309 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1149. A process control refers to how much people are allowed to 
present evidence on their behalf before the decision is made, while decision control refers to whether individuals 
have any say in the actual rendering of the decision. 
310
 STEVEN L. BLADER and TOM R. TYLER, A four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the 
Meaning of a “Fair” Process.  Newyork University. [online]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.psy.tcu.edu/justice.pdf  
311 FRANKENA(1962,p.2) cited by JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1142 
312 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1142 
313 Carlsmith and Darley, 2008 cited by JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1144 
314 see for details JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1144. “Bentham(19622/1843) argued that 
punishment to be justified, must serve some utilitarian purpose; that is, it must benefit society overall – making 
social life better or happier in some important ways.” On the other hand, Kant “argued that punishment was fair 
insofar as people deserve to be punished for immoral behaviour; punishment ‘balances the scales’”. “From a just 
deserts perspective such as this, the worse the perpetrator’s actions, the harsher the punishment.”  As Kant 
noted, punishment “should be pronounced over all criminals in proportion to their wickedness (as Cited in 
Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002, p.397) 
315 MOBBEK,E. Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies - Approaches to Reconciliation. [Online]. 
Available from the World Wide Web: < http://www.bmlv.pv.at/pdf-
pool/publikationen/10_wg12_psm_100.pdf> , at 261. However, there are demands for prosecution in non-
western world ( the developing world) including  South Africa, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone  
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punishment.
316
 This seems to present restorative justice as a new development. However, 
ancient societies had ideas and practices of restorative justice, and the notion was rather 
reintroduced into the contemporary criminal justice debates in the 1970
th
.
317
 We can 
understand restorative justice as a process for addressing wrongs by bringing “ together an 
offender, his or her victims, and their respective families and friends to discuss the aftermath 
of an incident, and the steps that can be taken to repair the harm an offender has 
done”.318Although there is no consensus as to the definition of restorative justice319 , it 
remains as one conception of justice. 
 
More relevant to our present discussion, Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio identifies five 
different forms of justice in relation to transition, namely, deterrent justice, compensatory 
justice, rehabilitative justice, justice as an affirmation of human dignity, and justice as 
exoneration.
320
 Although these forms of justice may arguably be categorized under any of the 
above-discussed conceptions of justice, it is useful to consider what each of these conceptions 
mean. Deterrent justice aims at discouraging potential violators by presenting the past as a 
lesson.
321
 Hence, doing justice in this sense is a warning against potential future perpetrators. 
The mechanism of achieving this – through prosecution or truth commissions - is another 
question.  Compensatory justice demands that victims be compensated and those who benefit 
under the former repressive regime contribute to compensation and restitution 
programs.
322
Obviously, the objective of this form of justice is to compensate victims. 
However, during transition, the demand on the part of victims may be broader than material 
                                                             
316 JOST, JT and KAY, AC, Above n 298 at 1145. The definition of restorative justice is not precise, and the 
mechanism of securing them varies (p. 1145). (Wenzel,Okimoto, Feather, and Platow, 2008,p.376 as cited by 
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317 THEO GAVRIELIDS. 2007. Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: Addressing the Discrepancy, 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Publication Series No.52, Helsinki. [Online]. Available 
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320 CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO, ‘Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted’; cited in KADER 
ASMAL. 2000.Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in Perspective, The Modern 
Law Review, Blackwell Publishing, 63 (1), p. 12 
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compensation or restitution; and hence we have a more general notion of reparatory justice. 
Rehabilitative justice tries to cure the affected character and disposition of both victims and 
perpetrators
323
  Rehabilitative justice aims at healing victims’ wounds and correcting the 
character of both victims and perpetrators. It has a restorative dimension. Justice as an 
affirmation of human dignity stresses on the sameness of humanity and that all human beings 
have equal dignity.
324
 This affirmation of equality in dignity is also essential for social 
reconstruction. Finally, justice as exoneration corrects past records relating to false 
accusations.
325
Justice requires the reputation and integrity of the innocent be maintained, and 
if people were wrongly accused, one shall declare their innocence or exonerate them. We 
may infer the significance of truth from this form of justice. The existence of these different 
forms of justice suggest the possibility for the establishment of diverse mechanisms of 
dealing with the past including the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions and 
the adoption of criminal prosecution.  
 
Two important questions therefore should be addressed in relation to the question of justice. 
The first is what factors lead to the adoption of a certain conception of justice? The second 
relates to whether transitional justice processes can be evaluated in light of the decision-
makers and decision-making process. We now turn to these issues.  
 
What factors affect the formulation of a certain conception of justice? The formulation of a 
particular conception of justice during transition may depend on the subjective conceptions of 
the decision makers. We might note that “[i]n deciding how to deal with wrongdoers and 
victims from the earlier regime, the leaders of the incoming regime are often influenced by 
their ideas about what is required by justice.”326 The conception of justice of the successor 
regime is likely to dictate the policy choices and subsequent actions of the transitional 
process.  
 
Therefore, in order to analyze cases of transitional justice, it is important to understand the 
conception of justice of the decision makers.
327
 Certain key features like impartiality and 
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universality might help to identify some general notions of justice.
328
 However, this 
explanation seems to be relevant to cases where the former regime has been totally replaced 
by a new regime, wherein the former leaders have no say on the transitional process. 
However, many transitions result from negotiations between opposing factions that lead to 
the ending of conflict situations. 
 
In case of negotiated transitions, different groups may hold different conceptions of justice. 
In such situations, each of the parties usually presents themselves as struggling for justice.
329
 
Thus, there is no room for one side to impose its conception of justice, and if peace shall 
return, some negotiation over justice is necessary.  We may note, “in post conflict situations 
the question of how to see that justice is done is itself usually a matter of political negotiation 
and compromise as, almost by definition, different sides have different conceptions of what 
would constitute a just outcome, even if they share an understanding of just principles.”330  
Thus, in post conflict situations or processes leading to end the conflict through peace 
settlement, we have different subjective conceptions of justice held by different groups 
participating in the formulation of transitional justice policies. Hence, there is a difficulty of 
formulating a notion of and a mechanism of guarantying justice that is satisfactory or suitable 
to the various groups.
331
  In any case, however challenging it may be and however differing 
the bargaining powers of the parties are, we can only have a negotiated justice where no one 
party imposes its conception on the other or others.  
 
Subjective conceptions of justice may emanate from reason, self-interest and emotion.
332
  
Exactly which of these factors may lead the subject to adopt a particular conception of 
justice, however, is often difficult to determine with any certainty. An important point 
relevant to transitional justice is to see the relationship between the subjective conception of 
justice and actual behaviour. The question here is whether a certain conception of justice will 
lead the agent to a certain course of action, in other words whether behaviour is the result of 
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the conception of justice held. The complexity of this relationship is clear from the following 
statement. 
 
“---we find that subjective conceptions of justice matter little for actual behaviour. 
They may be mere “Sunday beliefs” that command subjective assent without inducing 
action to bring about a just state of affairs. In other cases, we may find that the desire 
to see justice done provides the main explanation of the agent’s behaviour. In still 
other cases, we may find that justice coexists with other causally efficacious 
motivations, such as emotions or self-interest, so that the action that is finally taken 
owes something to each other.”333 
 
Thus, a transitional justice process might result not only from the desire to see justice done 
(reason-based conception of justice) but also from emotion and self-interest.
334
 Emotion and 
self-interest are crucial not only in determining a certain conception of justice but also in 
determining a certain course of action at times in conflict with the subjectively held 
conception of justice. These driving forces of behaviour could be referred to as the 
“tracheotomy of motivations”.335These three motivations may influence the entire decisions 
and outcomes of a transitional justice process.  
 
It is argued that most societies have a “normative hierarchy of motivations that induce meta-
motivations over first-order motivations.”336 In light of this hierarchy, actors driven by the 
least ranked motive are likely to present themselves as acting on higher motivations.
337
  
Nevertheless, they desire and act based on their actual motives/intentions.
338
 Hence, a person 
who is motivated by self-interest may not want to be seen or judged as such.
339
 However, 
such action is not compatible with deontological view of justice as attaining individual 
                                                             
333 ELSTER, J, Above n 326 at 81 
334 For details on the relationship between emotions and justice, see JOSEPH DE RIVERA. 1989. Introduction: 
Emotions and Justice. Social Justice Research, 3 (4). [online].[Accessed on 30 September 2013]. A vailable 
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benefit under the pretence of justice is a violation of the categorical imperative.
340
 Clearly, 
the justifications forwarded by leaders in formulating transitional processes may not 
necessarily be the real motivation of their actions. There could be hidden motives. In 
addition, various mechanisms can be employed to meet the different motivations at the same 
time.
341
 We might note, “in transitional justice, an emotionally based desire for revenge may 
in one sense be stronger than the desire to carry out impartial justice.”342 This suggests the 
difficulty of formulating justice processes based on reason, especially in chaotic times.
343
  
However, actors who act under the influence of other motivations may appreciate reason for 
its rank in the hierarchy of motivations and desire to present it as on their part.
344
   As Seneca 
said, “Reason wishes the decision that it gives to be just; anger wishes to have the decision 
which it has given seem the just decision.”345 However, some scholars note that emotion and 
empathy are important basis of justice.
346
  
 
 The formulation of a transitional justice process may also be influenced by other desires 
including the desire of new leaders to demonstrate that “We are not like them.”347 Here, the 
leaders have a motivation based on self-interest to present themselves as different from 
former leaders. However, the incoming leaders do not declare this as a basis for their action; 
rather they claim to be serving justice. The incoming leaders might choose to deal with past 
lawlessness in a lawful manner, and distance themselves from similar lawless practices.
348
As 
a result, the motive to punish or vengefulness may be limited by the desire to be (appear to 
be) different from past leaders.
349
A particular example is one where former leaders have 
committed some clear wrongs in respect of which the law does not provide punishment.  
Hence, it is difficult to punish the wrongdoers without adopting retroactive laws, which in 
itself would amount to the acceptance of past lawlessness.
350
This constraint is the result of 
the principle of legality and non-retroactivity of penal laws. There is no crime or punishment 
without specific penal law to that effect, and penal laws may not be applied retroactively.  
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The foregoing paragraphs clearly show that the conception of justice and the motivations of 
action of the actors (mainly the new regime) are useful to understand and evaluate the 
formulation and implementation of transition justice processes. These points are relevant to 
this study because the conception of justice and the real motivations for adopting criminal 
prosecution is a contested issue in Ethiopian transition. The later chapters on analysis of the 
Ethiopian transition partly reveal the contestations regarding the real motivations of 
Ethiopian government in formulating and implementing transitional justice process.  
 
Finally, justice may be conceptualized as a continuum, taking different forms-legal justice, 
administrative justice and political justice - with pure legal justice and pure political justice at 
the opposite side of the spectrum while administrative justice takes a swinging middle 
position.
351
 These concepts might be useful to understand and evaluate particular transitional 
justice processes.  
 
A pure political justice occurs when the executive organ of the new regime alone gives a final 
decision on who the wrongdoers are and their fate.
352
This may take different forms including 
those actions that bypass, ignore or undermine court decisions, as well as replacing judges for 
political reasons, and conducting show trials.
353
Political interference with the law or courts 
may amount to pure political justice. This form of justice lacks procedural fairness. Political 
justice is a characteristic feature of authoritarian regimes. As observed by Mobbek, “an 
authoritarian regime is always reflected in its judicial system and by its judiciary.”354 
 
 Pure legal justice is associated with court proceedings. Pure legal justice assumes the 
existence of an impartial and independent judicial system, which acts according to the 
requirements of due processes of law. A pure legal justice has four characteristic features – 
clarity of laws, freedom of courts from intervention (judicial independence), impartiality, and 
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due process.
355
The extent to which these requirements can be fulfilled, especially in 
transitional societies is questionable. A well functioning judicial system may not be available 
in transitional societies because of past violations or culture of violence with impunity. In 
such societies, the judicial system “may have been entirely corrupt, encouraging or 
supportive of human rights abuse conducted by government agents, or simply close to non-
existent.”356 In such context, it is unlikely to have a pure legal justice. Violation of these 
requirements may occur in any society as stated below: 
 
In law-abiding societies “during normal times,” violations of [these] criteria...are rare. 
In societies where the rule of law is poorly established or in exceptional 
circumstances, violations happen more frequently.
357
  
 
Clearly, the possibility of violation of the requirements of pure legal justice is higher in 
transitional societies as these are exceptional circumstances. In certain cases, violations of 
these requirements may be inevitable and tolerable.
358
  Political justice takes the place of 
legal justice if many violations occur or if they are fundamental and decisive.
359
 However, an 
important question that follows is how to distinguish between violations that are ‘tolerable’ 
and those that lead to political justice. An essential indicator in this respect is whether the 
outcome of court proceedings can be predicted with full certainty or not.
360
  
 
Administrative justice usually refers to the purging or lustration of officials of the former 
regime. Although often used interchangeably, purge and lustration have some difference. 
Lustration is the removal of “persons from public employment based on their affiliation with 
the prior regime.”361 Purge refers to the removal of persons from the army and security forces 
for committing human rights violations.
362
 However, there is little difference in the sense that 
both relate to removal of persons associated with the former regime; both are punitive or 
retributive in their nature. These administrative measures may be closer to political justice or 
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legal justice depending on different factors, including the presence or absence of appeal.
363
 
The absence of procedural safeguards to administrative measures may amount to political 
justice. This seems to be the common practice. One may criticize lustration measures for 
violating the requirements of due process.
364
 It is important to keep in mind that borderline 
cases exist.  
 
The idea of justice as a continuum, briefly discussed above, helps to understand and evaluate 
the decisions made throughout transitional justice process. The ideas of political justice and 
legal justice are particularly relevant to this study because it helps to evaluate the various 
decisions made in the Ethiopian transitional justice process including the determination of 
who the perpetrators are. As will be shown, in chapters 5 and 6, almost each decision in the 
criminal justice process remains questioned for its pure political instrumentality.   
 
Generally, we may note that whilst the concept of justice is controversial, societies in 
transition need nevertheless to articulate some conception of justice as well as mechanisms of 
achieving it in dealing with past violations. Clearly, the conceptions of justice and justice 
motivations of the actors have important role in the formulation and implementation of 
transitional justice processes. It is useful to note that the concept of justice relates to other 
components of transitional justice processes. A broader concept of justice might include truth 
and reparation, and it is an essential component of reconciliation processes. Considering a 
broader notion of justice, one may question whether it can be achieved by adopting one 
mechanism of transitional justice alone; does justice instead require the adoption of a 
combination of methods and processes.  These issues are the subject of controversy, with 
increasing understanding of the need for a holistic strategy. 
 
4.2.3 Mechanisms of Rendering Justice: Criminal Prosecutions 
 
This sub-section discusses criminal prosecution as a mechanism of ensuring justice. It 
discusses the significance of prosecution, whether a duty to prosecute exists under 
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international law, and some debates as to the appropriateness of prosecution as a mechanism 
of transitional justice. This discussion is relevant to the analysis of the Ethiopian process as 
prosecution is the main mechanism adopted to deal with the past. 
 
The dominant understanding of transitional justice relates to the investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of perpetrators of past abuses.
365
 Criminal prosecutions were employed, both 
at national and international level, not only to satisfy the right (need for) justice but also to 
ensure the rule of law and accountability, prevent the recurrence of similar events, promote 
reconciliation, disclose the truth about the past, and promote peace and democracy.    
 
As Hayner asserts “the rule of law stands above political decisions; the essence of the rule of 
law, a cornerstone of democracy, is that no person is exempt from the law.”366 This suggests 
that the rule of law shall be at the centre of transitional processes, and hence that 
accountability shall be ensured according to the law. Other political considerations should not 
override the rule of law. Obviously, societies emerging out of repression were denied the rule 
of law, and hence the need for the rule of law is more pressing. We might also argue that the 
rule of law is a basis for building a democratic society that departs from the past. The rule of 
law also ensures accountability and helps to fight impunity that reigned in the past. Hence, 
we may argue that societies in transition should uphold the rule of law and deal with their 
past according to the law, which implies the prosecution of violators. Moreover, this might 
imply that no reason or process shall negate the rule of law whether the objective in doing so 
is to promote peace, reconciliation or any other objective. In this sense, justice relates to the 
apprehension and lawful prosecution of past offenders. 
 
In providing the case for prosecution, Professor Orentlicher notes its effectiveness in 
deterring similar future violations.
367
 Orentlicher asserts, “the fulcrum of the case for criminal 
punishment is that it is the most effective insurance against future repression.”368 However, 
whether punishment is always effective in deterring future violations or crimes is 
questionable. Nevertheless, we might argue that punitive method is superior to non-punitive 
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one in preventing future violations.
369
 Criminal prosecution may achieve this purpose by 
exposing the truth about past violations and reproaching them as well as educating the public 
not to participate in similar crimes and inspiring societies to reassess their fundamental values 
and assert the basic principles of the rule of law and human dignity.
370
 This suggests that the 
discovery of the truth and the punishment of perpetrators may deter future violations through 
education and by serving as a warning. Criminal prosecutions and trials might also lead 
society to break from cycles of violence by reaffirming respect for the rule of law and human 
dignity. Thus, the argument in support of prosecution depends upon the desirable 
consequences of the process. The implication is that the failure to prosecute has negative 
consequences, and these should be avoided. In this respect, it is noted that:  
 
Above all, however, the case for prosecutions turns on the consequences of failing to 
punish atrocious crimes committed by a prior regime on a sweeping scale. If law is 
unavailable to punish widespread brutality of the recent past, what lesson can be 
offered for the future?
371
 
 
This suggests that failure to prosecute has negative consequences or “harmful effects” in the 
sense that it would perpetuate a history of impunity and violence especially in the context of 
massive violations, and that such a tendency is not acceptable.
372
  Hence, “the new political 
arrangement in the post conflict society...can be legitimized by disallowing impunity and 
adhering to rule of law principles.”373Ruti G. Tietel presents such arguments for criminal 
justice as follows: 
 
The leading arguments for punishment in periods of political flux is consequentialist 
and forward looking: It is contended that, in societies with evil legacies moving out of 
repressive rule, successor trials play a significant foundational role in laying the basis 
of a new liberal order.
374
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Thus in transitional societies, punishment has a transformative role, as noted:  
 
Since societies emerging from wide-scale abuses and violence are often characterized 
by weak institutions...,prosecutions are necessary to build both public confidence in 
and the institutional capacity of rule of law and the judicial branch.
375
 
 
This emphasises that prosecution is essential for creating and building capable, reliable and 
reputable institutions of the rule of law and the justice system in which the public could trust. 
Therefore, such measures are part of an effort to create a system that departs from the past. In 
addition, prosecution might also be an essential instrument of transformation to a democratic 
system.
376
 While the rule of law is essential to building democracy, amnesty is an antithesis 
of democracy.
377
 Thus: 
 
Amnesty may not enable stability, and a stable democracy cannot be built on a weak 
foundation...A government that begins its term by rejecting the rule of law and 
accountability undermines its own claims to legitimacy.
378
 
 
The arguments for prosecutions highlight its multiple desirable outcomes. Professor Diane 
Orentlicher strongly argues that offenders should be prosecuted because international law 
requires so and also it best protects rights and values; this calls for the government to 
prosecute even if it might face some risks for doing so including the risk of military 
dissatisfaction.
379
 Similarly, Cherif Bassiouni condemns “any process which would allow 
political considerations [that] prevents full-scale prosecutions”.380 This position suggests that 
only through prosecution can we stop impunity, and political or other considerations are mere 
covers for the continuation of the practice of impunity. This suggests the need for full-scale 
prosecution. However, as will be shown, full-scale prosecution is in itself problematic.  
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Looking at these arguments, a question that arises is what the general trend in transitional 
societies is. Put differently, is prosecution a general trend. Donna Pankhurst, although critical 
of criminal prosecution, favouring instead truth and reconciliation processes, acknowledges 
the tendency towards criminal prosecution.
381
 Pankhurst noted that: 
 
Increasingly, war crimes, serious abuses of human rights and crimes against 
international humanitarian laws are thought to require some sort of punishment for 
justice to be seen to be done at the end of a conflict, and in order for peace to hold, 
whether or not reconciliation of any sort takes place. International human rights 
organizations tend to adopt this position on justice.
382
 
 
This arguably holds true in societies emerging out of repressive regime. Criminal prosecution 
is seen as a useful method of dealing with the past. Thus, “the use of transitional justice trials 
is not an isolated or marginal practice, but a common one occurring in the bulk of transitional 
justice countries [referred to as “justice cascade”]”.383 However, a question might arise 
whether such prosecutions were conducted as a matter of choice by the society concerned or 
whether they were obliged to conduct it. This issue should be seen in the context of 
international law. Therefore, the more specific question relevant here is whether there is a 
duty to prosecute under international law. 
 
An understanding of the extent to which there is a duty to prosecute under international law, 
if any, is essential because such a duty would affect the scope of non-prosecutorial options 
available to states or societies.
384
 Hence, I will briefly discuss the duty of states under 
international law to prosecute.  
 
(i) Duty to prosecute under International Humanitarian law 
 
As a matter of general consideration, numerous treaties impose on state parties an obligation 
to prosecute or extradite persons suspected of committing certain types of crimes; and such 
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obligation is termed in Latin as aut dedere aut judicare.
385
 It is clearly observed, “there are 
over 60 multilateral treaties combining extradition and prosecution as alternative courses of 
action in order to bring suspects to justice.”386 It has been observed, “a common feature of the 
different treaties embodying the obligation to extradite or prosecute is that they impose upon 
states an obligation to ensure the prosecution of the offender either by extraditing the 
individual to a state that will exercise criminal jurisdiction or by enabling their own judicial 
authorities to prosecute.”387  Such an obligation also exists under customary international law. 
 
In international humanitarian law, the duty to prosecute exists both in treaties and in 
customary international humanitarian law.
388
 The provisions of the four Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I impose on state parties a general duty to repress all acts that 
contravene the provisions of IHL.
389
  The Geneva Conventions clearly state that “ each High 
Contacting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 
provisions of the present Conventions other than the grave breaches...”390.  Although this 
provision requires states to adopt any measure they think appropriate to discharge their 
obligation, it does not prescribe criminal prosecution.  
 
Nevertheless, grave breaches of these conventions and Additional Protocol I would give rise 
to the duty to prosecute.
391
  Thus, clearly, the treaty obligation “aut dedere aut judicare 
relates only to those war crimes that constitute ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I.”392 Antonio Cassesse underlines that “ the obligation of states to 
prosecute and punish persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
through their respective national jurisdictions arises out of their treaty obligations, most 
notably those under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.” 393 Hence, the Conventions and the 
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Protocol have identified these grave breaches among other breaches and imposed a duty on 
states either to prosecute or to extradite suspects. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
give rise to universal jurisdiction in the sense that any state may apprehend and prosecute any 
person so suspected irrespective of territorial or nationality/personality links. Indeed, 
international human rights organizations are keen to remind states of their obligations under 
the Geneva Conventions in this connection, especially in the context of transition.
394
 In 
addition to the four Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, it could be argued that 
other IHL treaties also impose similar obligations.
395
  
 
A crucial issue arises whether states have the duty to prosecute duty under customary 
international humanitarian law. While the existence of the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
under treaties is recognized, there are disagreements on whether such an obligation exists 
under customary international law.
396
  This debate relates to the two elements of customary 
international law, i.e. state practice and opinion juris.  Thus, Cassese notes: 
 
While it is doubtful, in the absence of clear state practice and opinio juris, that states 
have a duty under customary international law to enforce international humanitarian 
law through criminal jurisdiction, states have jurisdiction to prosecute in the absence 
of a treaty pursuant to principles such as the universality principle and the passive 
personality principle. The principles on suppression of war crimes in the 1949 Geneva 
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Conventions are said to be 'declaratory of the obligations of belligerents under 
customary international law to take measures for the punishment of war crimes 
committed by all persons, including members of a belligerent's own armed forces.
397
  
 
In addition, customary international humanitarian law extends the definition of war crimes to 
encompass other serious violations of IHL in both international and non-international armed 
conflict including serious breaches of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions.
398
 
Hence, Olsen argues: 
 
The extension of war crimes to cover acts in non-international armed conflicts is of 
great significance, as nowadays most conflicts are internal, and transitional 
governments or transitional democracies, if associated with armed conflict at all, were 
usually brought about by non-international armed conflict.
399
 
 
The above points show that international humanitarian law imposes a duty on states to 
prosecute war crimes. The duty to prosecute or extradite also exists under the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court.
400
 For our purpose, it suffices to note, as a 
matter of treaty obligation or customary international humanitarian law, states have a duty to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over war crimes.
401
  
 
(ii) Duty to Prosecute under International Human Rights Law 
 
International Human Rights Law aims at protecting human beings by setting out the rights 
and freedoms to which all human beings are entitled. It at the same time imposes obligations 
on states. However, these obligations are usually framed in a general manner, for example, 
they provide that states have the duty to respect and ensure the rights recognized therein. The 
basic issue may be what consequences follow if there are violations. In such cases, the law 
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provides that states have the duty to provide appropriate remedies without specifying what 
these remedies might be. This might depend on a number of factors relative to each state.
402
  
 
Our concern here is whether states have a duty to prosecute violations of human rights. Some 
writers refer to general principles of international human rights law and the Nuremberg Trials 
in addition to existing treaties to establish the duty to prosecute human rights 
violations.
403
However, the scope of such a duty is uncertain.
404
 Orentlicher noted that: 
 
The most explicit obligations to punish human rights crimes that are likely to be 
relevant to societies emerging from dictatorship are established by the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘Genocide Convention’) 
and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (‘Torture Convention’).405 
 
We might also find some other treaties that incorporate the duty to prosecute or 
extradite.
406
At this juncture, it is useful to note that Ethiopia is a party to the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and that the crime of Genocide 
was incorporated into the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957, which was the basis for prosecuting 
the Dergue leaders and members.
407
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Apart from the foregoing subject-specific conventions, general human rights treaties do not 
provide specific duty either to prosecute or to extradite violators of human rights. This is 
clearly noted as follows:  
 
The more comprehensive human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) do not explicitly require states parties to prosecute 
violators of rights protected in the treaties.
408
 
 
Hence, these general human rights treaties, although state the duty to provide remedy for 
violations, lack clarity whether there is a specific duty to prosecute or extradite violators.
409
 
Nevertheless, such a duty is implied through interpretation.
410
 Ratner, thus, notes: 
 
What constitutes an effective or adequate remedy has been subject to interpretation by 
human rights courts and commissions and, despite the absence of a ‘black-letter’ 
obligation to prosecute, these bodies have proclaimed such a principle.
411
 
 
Despite the absence of an explicit duty to prosecute human rights violations, human rights 
courts and commissions including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European 
Human Rights Court, and the UN Committee on Human Rights infer the existence of such 
duty.
412
  We might say that the “...bodies that monitor compliance with several human rights 
treaties that are textually silent about punishment have made clear that investigation and 
prosecution play a necessary part in the States Parties’ fulfilment of certain duties under the 
conventions.”413 One may say these are authoritative interpretations on the duty to prosecute 
violators, for example, the UN Human Rights Commission has emphasized the “duty to 
investigate and prosecute torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial execution.” 414  
 
The Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights adopts a similar position: 
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Impunity arises from a failure of States to meet their obligations to investigate violations, 
to take appropriate measures in respect of perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, 
by ensuring that they are prosecuted, tried and punished...
415
 
 
This shows that states have, among other things, the duty to investigate, try and punish 
human rights violators. According to Louis Joinet, the right to justice is among the three 
rights to which victims of human rights are entitled.
416
  Generally, the duty to prosecute 
violations of human rights exists both explicitly in some treaties and through interpretation of 
the general obligation of states enshrined in other international human rights treaties. 
 
Hence, it would appear to be so that there exists a duty to prosecute or extradite perpetrators 
of international humanitarian and human rights law. However, whether and to what extent 
this duty constrains the choices available to a society in determining its preferred mechanism 
of responding to past violations is open to question. The foregoing discussion is relevant to 
this study because, as will be shown in chapter five, the duty to prosecute under international 
law forms part of the debate about the appropriateness of prosecution process in the Ethiopian 
transition. 
 
Notwithstanding its apparent prevalence, criminal prosecution as a mechanism for dealing 
with past abuses is not without substantial criticism. Some hold that the notion of 
reconciliation is a sine qua non for democracy and insist that criminal prosecution is an 
obstacle to reconciliation.
417
. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether reconciliation 
can be possible without some form of criminal punishment. One argument against 
prosecution is that “…to leave the past alone is the best way to avoid upsetting a delicate 
process of transition or to avoid a return to past dictatorship [and reopening the victims old 
wounds].”418This is a warning that societies in transition should forget the past and focus on 
the future. It argues against efforts to address the past, whether through prosecution or other 
mechanisms, for fear that any such effort may be counter-productive. Hence, this view would 
                                                             
415 LOUIS JOINET, “Questions of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Cvil and 
Political)”, Revised Final Report Pursuant to SubCommission Decision 1996/119, U.N. SubCommission on 
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favour amnesty laws exonerating perpetrators. However, this view on amnesty, or more 
accurately blanket amnesty, has increasingly lost favour in legal thinking.
419
 Politically, it is 
difficult to conceive of a stable and new future without efforts to properly understand and 
deal with the past. There is no guarantee that the past will not return to haunt despite efforts 
of forgetting. However, the argument does highlight the difficulty of prosecuting past 
violations considering practical challenges facing a society. Should one insist on prosecution 
even if local circumstances do not warrant such process?
420
 
 
In his examination of the South African transition, Kader Asmal presents opposing arguments 
such as nai’vete’ v real politik, and asserts instead that a third way exists supporting the 
South African case.
421
  The responses to past violations, arguably, should be based on a 
consideration of the facts on the ground, which Kader terms as realpolitik or pragmatism.
422
  
Those who insist on prosecutions at all cost are accused of being penal law/criminal trial 
fundamentalists
423
 Hence, Asmal notes that “ ...given the complexity of justice in transitional 
situations, the simplifications insisted up on by penal law fundamentalists are helpful neither 
to South Africa, nor to transitions elsewhere.” 424 
 
Kader’s criticism of criminal trial is based on its punitive or retributive nature.425 However, 
apart from retribution, prosecution may also serve other objectives like deterrence. 
Nevertheless, the punitive aspect of criminal trials is thought to prevent the creation of 
conditions for peace, stability and reconciliation. One of the objections against trials is that “ 
the political situation may be such that trials are not a possibility - it may destabilize the 
peace agreement or obstruct the transition to democracy.”426 However, a response to this 
argument might be that sustainable peace and democracy, and even reconciliation, should be 
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based on justice and accountability, which includes some degree of retributive justice.
427
 
Accordingly, criminal trials should not be seen as a freestanding response to the past but as 
part of a holistic strategy. 
 
The argument for criminal prosecution becomes more problematic however, where many 
people were involved in past violence. One criticism against trials is that “local judicial 
systems are not able to handle the potentially vast number of cases and hence only a few 
cases will be heard and the process will seem arbitrary and unfair.”428  Rwanda is cited as an 
example that tried to deal with nearly all perpetrators through criminal prosecution/justice, 
which compounded the problems rather than solve them.
429
  However, the problem can be 
avoided by adopting a combination of methods of transitional justice whereby some key 
violators can be prosecuted – signifying impunity no longer reigns - while others may be 
dealt with through other processes.
430
 Hence, it is not essential to bring all violators to one 
justice process.
431
 This point is particularly relevant to the analysis of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process, as the intention was to prosecute all members of the Dergue or its 
affiliates involved in past violations.
432
 Whether this was achieved in light of the capacity of 
Ethiopian institutions of justice (including courts) and whether it was even desirable is 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
 
In her discussion of the challenges faced by criminal prosecution in a transition from conflict 
to peace, Pankhurst observes that: 
 
Where relatively few individuals are cast as being responsible for war crimes, and 
there is a clear victor who has unchallenged power to determine the process of justice 
and who is also able to act as self-appointed judges, it is possible to have a narrowly 
focused process of prosecution, such as the Nuremberg trials after the Second World 
War.
433
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Some key implications follow. First, the idea of narrowly focused process of prosecution 
might also apply to societies emerging out of authoritarian and repressive regime. Second, a 
narrowly focused process of prosecution is possible if there is a victorious party and if few 
people are considered as violators; the difficulty, or even impossibility, of prosecution if too 
many people were involved in violations is clear.  Thirdly, it implies that the existence of a 
victorious party is a condition for criminal prosecution implying that in cases of negotiated 
transitions it would be difficult or impossible to have prosecution. In other words, negotiated 
transitions would give former leaders an opportunity to join the new regime and this may 
compromise the possibility of prosecuting past violations.
434
 Fourthly, the victorious party 
who also acts as a self-appointed judge decides the justice process. This would result in what 
is commonly called victor’s justice giving rise to controversies regarding the need for 
reconstructing a society and establishing a new system that departs from the past. 
 
Another problem related to criminal prosecution is the inability or difficulty to deal with too 
many violators. In conflict situations or repressive regimes, usually many people are involved 
in war crimes or other violations.
435
 Is it possible therefore to prosecute all people so 
involved? There are resource constraints and other technical problems. Even if such problems 
are addressed, wholesale prosecution may give rise to other undesirable consequences. In 
cases of full-scale prosecution, it may be “difficult to avoid prosecution being seen as 
vengeance, even if full prosecution of all parties is attempted.”436 This perception of 
vengeance is likely to affect society’s transition to a better future. Although retributive and 
punitive justice is associated with vengeance, the perception of retribution may be prevented 
by conducting trials properly.
437
 The judicial process is even conceived as reducing the 
“chances of vigilante justice and a spiral of vengeance and violence...by transferring 
individual’s desire for revenge to the state or official bodies”.438 When it comes to the 
Ethiopian transition, as will be shown in the next chapters, wholesale prosecution of Dergue 
members or their affiliates were attempted while members of other political groups were 
excluded; and as will be shown, this has given rise to different perceptions of the judicial and 
prosecution process. 
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Another problem associated with criminal processes is the difficulty of achieving 
reconciliation: 
 
Even if the logistical problems of prosecuting thousands, or even millions, of people 
could be overcome, there are still difficult issues of judgement to be made about the 
type of punishment appropriate where reconciliation is hoped for.
439
 
 
This view highlights the problems that we need to be aware of between prosecution and 
reconciliation. This in itself does not necessarily mean that criminal prosecution is 
incompatible with reconciliation. It rather suggests the difficulty of ensuring reconciliation 
while at the same time punishing violators. However, one may say, “an ability to reconcile 
seems to require some degree of forgetting, as well as forgiveness, which is not compatible 
with long, drawn-out prosecutions which keep alive the issues which contributed to the 
conflict in the first place.”440 The counter argument could be although forgiveness is 
necessary for reconciliation, genuine reconciliation cannot be founded on a blind past; it 
rather requires the proper understanding of the past and it is possible to forgive without 
forgetting the past. However, the argument can be that reconciliation is incompatible with 
prosecution, particularly where it is a prolonged one. We might generally say that a 
combination of transitional justice processes is essential to enable reconciliation; prosecution 
alone is not a good solution.
441
 Prosecution may contribute to reconciliation if complemented 
by other transitional justice processes. 
 
Some writers, therefore, warn against wholesale prosecution, which may lead to undesirable 
results or such perceptions, contrary to the declared objective of doing justice. This is clear 
from the following statement: 
 
The stakes become high in criminal prosecutions; a process, which is set up to met out 
justice but which ends being partial or incomplete or being seen in that way for many 
reasons is often regarded as having made the situation worse. New cycles of 
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resentment are likely to be triggered where there has been a history of violence 
followed by impunity and vengeance...
442
 
 
This is a warning that even the perception of partiality or incompleteness of criminal 
prosecution would negatively affect the whole purpose of transitional process of 
accountability and even may turn things from bad to worse. This is particularly problematic 
in societies with a ‘history of violence and impunity’. One may also argue that criminal 
prosecution, if adopted, must overcome such perception by addressing the reasons that give 
rise to these perceptions. This point is relevant to the Ethiopian case as the process is subject 
to criticism for its partiality and incompleteness as elaborated in the subsequent chapters. 
However, as discussed earlier, whether wholesale prosecution is possible is a difficult issue in 
itself. 
 
Wholesale prosecutions might be problematic in both their operation and results as noted 
below. 
Mass prosecutions are not only seen as costly and time-consuming, but also counter 
productive in terms of reconciliation and peace if too many old wounds are reopened 
on both or all sides.
443
 
 
It is clear that prosecuting many people would require the mobilization of huge resources and 
time, with implications on resources. Moreover, it may be detrimental to reconciliation 
efforts and peace building. The challenges of mobilization of resources for prosecution and 
the issue of compatibility of prosecution with reconciliation are important aspect of the 
analysis of the Ethiopian transitional justice process.
444
 
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that proponents of criminal prosecution base their 
argument on its multiple outcomes, general practice, and recognition under international law. 
They also reject other processes that exclude prosecution; amnesty, or more accurately 
blanket amnesty is rejected. On the other hand, opponents argue against the prescription of 
prosecution as a panacea for transitional societies, and assert that transitional processes of 
justice must consider the circumstances surrounding each case. Thus, they argue in favour of 
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a third way.
445
 However, even proponents of prosecution concede the need for an 
accommodation of local needs.
446
  Nevertheless, amnesty or blanket amnesty is losing its 
acceptance even by some opponents of prosecution, who propose a third way. It is noted that: 
 
While there is no place for unconditional amnesty in the contemporary international 
legal order an intermediate solution such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
with power to grant amnesty after investigation, of the South African kind, may 
contribute to the achievement of peace and justice in a society in transition more 
effectively than mandatory prosecution.
447
 
 
This is a proposal for a third way to justice and peace, and suggests justice is better served 
through truth and reconciliation rather than prosecution. It also rejects wholesale amnesty, but 
seems to accept amnesty granted on condition of its contribution to truth and reconciliation.  
 
Although different mechanisms of rendering justice are proposed, the appropriateness of each 
has to be measured in light of the context in which it is adopted. In analyzing how a society 
has addressed questions of justice during transition, one has to raise the following specific 
questions in each case. 
1. What and whose conception of justice is formulated and how and why is it 
formulated? 
2. What institutional mechanisms are in place to translate it to reality? Are they 
appropriate in that particular circumstance? 
3. How is the process seen by members of the society in terms of addressing past 
violations and creating a new future? 
 
Before concluding the present discussion, certain points might be outlined as relevant 
regarding what the Ethiopian transition says about justice. As discussed earlier, the main 
transitional mechanism of accountability adopted in Ethiopia was criminal prosecution. The 
legal foundation for this was Proclamation No.22/1992. This proclamation, apart from 
establishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor, specifically provides the objectives of the 
criminal prosecution. Paragraph 4 of the preamble of the proclamation states that individuals 
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suspected of committing human rights violation and other crimes “must be brought to trial.”  
The implication is that, the perpetrators of past crimes shall be tried and punished. Hence, 
justice is one component of the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability.  
 
However, the question remains as to the conception of justice that is incorporated into the 
proclamation. Apart from stating the general objectives of the criminal process, the 
proclamation does not provide any explicit definition of justice. However, it would appear 
that the Ethiopian transition emphasises punitive /retributive justice. The proclamation also 
refers to deterrence implying the presence of a conception of deterrent justice. It also 
underlines the importance of recording the history of past violations – truth – and this may be 
taken as historical justice. A closer examination of the issues of justice in the Ethiopian 
transitions will be undertaken in the next chapter 
 
In concluding this sub-section, it is clear that justice has been recognized as one essential goal 
of transitional societies in general and Ethiopian transition in particular. Arguably, there is a 
right to justice, which belongs not only to victims/relatives but also to the public. However, 
the concept of justice itself is very controversial and is affected by different factors. We also 
noted that there are different forms of justice including deterrent justice, compensatory 
justice, rehabilitative justice, justice as an affirmation of dignity, and justice as exoneration. 
There is no one single mechanism of rendering justice; the rendering of justice by criminal 
justice process is one among the different process and appear to have multiple advantages. 
However, criminal justice processes face significant criticism.  
 
4.3 Truth 
 
Among the basic objectives or goals of transitional justice mechanisms is the establishment 
of the truth. The truth about the past is thought to have significance for societies in transition 
for various reasons. The truth is considered as part of justice in its broadest sense, and one 
may view truth as reparatory as well as a condition for reconciliation. Truth is about knowing 
and officially acknowledgment of past human rights abuses.
448
 This element of transitional 
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justice may be referred to as ‘historical justice’.449 We might say that victims or relatives and 
the society in general have the right to know the truth about the past. In this section, an 
attempt is made to explain the meaning and significance of truth, the various mechanisms of 
searching for truth as well as whether it has emerged as a legal right. This will serve as a 
basis for evaluating whether truth has been incorporated into the Ethiopian transitional justice 
and to enquire whether in the public perception this aim has been perceived to be achieved in 
Ethiopia. 
 
4.3.1 The Meaning of Truth 
 
Various disciplines address the question ‘what is of truth’.450Nevertheless, this concept 
remains a subject of theoretical controversies. After arguing that truth is a social matter in the 
context of the right to truth in transitional justice, Yasmin Naqvi suggests, “[a] commonly 
accepted definition of truth is the agreement of the mind with reality.”451 According to 
William James, “true ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.”452  
This means “...truth is measured by way of evidence.’453 According to Aristotelian thought, 
truth is the correspondence between the proposition and the reality of which the proposition is 
made.
454
There are various philosophical and religious conceptions of truth. 
 
An important issue arises whether truth can be objectively established (and even if this is ever 
possible) or whether it is always a subjective narration. On the one hand, there are arguments 
that truth cannot exist outside of power relations. Michel Foucault noted, “truth is not outside 
power, or lacking in power...”455 This point indicates not only that truth is very much 
subjective, but also underlines the relationship between power and truth. It implies that the 
truth is what the speaker (of power) says so. Others however stress that truth relates to 
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something objective.
456
 The notion of objectivity of truth can be observed from the following 
assertions: 
 
Truth and falsity is the relationship between proposition and events. [It] is not reality 
itself, it is not the property of events, things, phenomena; it is the property of 
propositions. Events, things take place, exist and propositions tell something about 
them that may be true or false; The truth of propositions can be decided on the basis 
of a comparison with reality.’457   
 
This suggests that the truth can objectively be established by comparing the proposition with 
reality, although such comparison may be difficult or even impossible in some cases, for 
example, in relation to past events. The objective nature of truth is more emphatically stated 
in the following terms: 
 
Truth is objective in the sense that it expresses reality, that it has a content 
independent of the cognizing subject; this is a content of our knowledge, which does 
not depend on the subject. The recognition of objective truth is closely connected with 
the reflection theory on the reflective capacity of reality, and with the view that man is 
capable of perceiving the truth; these capacities practically materialize in objective 
truth.
458
  
 
It is further noted that “objectivity is so much a part of truth that there exist no truth at all 
without it; namely ‘truth’ that does not contain the objective element is no truth, it may be 
perhaps the opposite, i.e. falsity”.459  Nevertheless, the importance of the subjective element 
is recognized as “...the subjective element, the subject whose consciousness reflects reality, 
also plays a part in truth; we could not speak of truth without them, we could only speak of 
reality which is neither true nor false.”460 
 
The objectivity of truth is a contested subject. In the context of transitional societies, it may 
be difficult or impossible to talk of the truth of the past because the truth is textual. Jacques 
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Derrida argues “...there is nothing outside the text; all is textual play with no connection with 
original truth.”461Yasmin Naqvi argues that Derrida’s thinking would lead us to the 
conclusion that truth or the right to truth relates to the “... official statement about what 
happened; which may or may not accord with what did actually happen but still requires on 
the part of the state the duty to disclose something.”462 Such official statements need not be 
restricted to so-called western notions of writing but cover varities of history-tellings.
463
 
What is important to note here is the non-objectivity of truth. The subjectivity of 
interpretation of the past and determination of truth can also be derived from the assertion 
that “history is exploring historical truths of the past out of a present interest.”464 
 
Postmodernist thinkers, who view truth as “ the construct of the political and economic forces 
that command the majority of power within the societal web”, contest the objectivity of 
truth.
465
 Michel Foucault argued that “truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of restraint”.466 Thus, truth is to be conceptualized as “system of 
ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements.”467 What is the implication of such thinking to the search for truth in transitional 
societies? Given that postmodernist thinking may be characterized by its apparent 
abandonment of truth, a criticism that has been made is that postmodernist thinking would 
lead to “...extreme relativism that ...leaves the door open to fascist or racist views of history, 
with no way of saying these ideas are false.”468   
 
From the discussion above, we note that the meaning and nature of truth is indeed 
controversial. In transitional justice, the concern relates to statements about what happened. 
For some commentators, a statement about what happened can be true if it can be objectively 
proved (or verified by evidence) and thus yielding truth. For others, it is somehow subjective. 
For others, it is simply a social construct in the sense that the truth is what the speaker (of 
power) states to be true. In transitional contexts, truth-telling processes should be broad 
enough to allow the expression of the widest possible narration of history. The postmodernist 
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account about truth and power may be critical and relevant in the context of the 
‘propositions’ that set out a public truth or memory where the whole process of ‘truth-telling’ 
(voices and silences) is controlled by one group. Given the complexity of the concept of 
truth, it is difficult to adopt a particular position. Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis of 
the Ethiopian transitional justice process, this study uses the commonly accepted definition of 
truth - the correspondence between a proposition and reality. The proposition is nevertheless 
not about the here and present but it is about the past. Thus, truth in transitional societies 
relates to the investigation and discovery of what happened in the past, more specifically to 
the identification of past violations and the circumstances that led to such violations. This 
may call for an impartial and comprehensive mechanism of searching for and establishing the 
truth. However, this search for and discovery of the truth is generally necessitated out of 
present need to settle the past and build a better future, and this is the subject of the following 
sub-section. 
 
4.3.2 The significance of truth to transitional societies 
 
Truth, even ‘legal truth’, is thought of as having significance to individual victims/their 
families as well as to the society as a whole. Some writers argue that this significance of truth 
has led to the emergence of the ‘right to truth’ under international law.469 It is noted, “the 
right to truth has emerged as a legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, 
and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victims or to their families 
or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human 
rights.”470 The recognition and enforcement of this right is an essential component of 
transitional justice. Although whether such a legal right to truth exists is controversial, the 
significance of truth to transitional societies is beyond doubt such that many transitional 
justice processes have incorporated the quest for truth as their declared objective. Thus, it is 
important to briefly discuss the significance of truth to societies in transition. 
 
Alice H. Henkin clearly stated the importance of truth: 
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Successor governments have an obligation to investigate and establish the facts so that 
the truth be known and be made part of the nation’s history. There must be both 
knowledge and acknowledgement: the events need to be officially recognized and 
publicly revealed. Truth telling... responds to the demand of justice for the victims 
and facilitate national reconciliation.
471
 
 
Yasmin Naqvi notes, “[t]he right to truth would intermesh strategically with the broader 
objectives of international criminal law”.472 First, truth may help to reinstate or sustain peace 
because the exposure of the truth might enable societies to avert the occurrence of similar 
situations.
473
 This is arguably true of the truth to be derived from national criminal processes 
or other national mechanisms set up to search for and establish the truth. Secondly, truth may 
facilitate the process of reconciliation because divided societies can re-establish their 
relationship if they know the truth.
474
 The Chilean National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation affirmed that “only upon a foundation of truth will it be possible to meet the 
basic demands of justice and create the necessary conditions for achieving true national 
reconciliation”.475 We might say that “reconciliation as a goal cannot be imposed, and thus it 
must be built.”476 However, reconciliation requires victims’ knowledge of the past and 
acknowledgment particularly on the part of the wrongdoer.
477
 Thus, truth might be seen as an 
essential element for reconciliation.
478
 Nevertheless, the relationship between truth and peace, 
or truth and reconciliation, remains controversial because some argue that investigating and 
establishing the truth may open past wounds and lead to further conflicts rather than to peace 
and reconciliation.
479
 
 
Thirdly, the truth can contribute to ending impunity because accountability can be ensured 
only if the truth about who committed past crimes is known.
480
 However, the relationship 
between truth and accountability is not always clear especially in case of criminal 
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accountability (justice). Some writers, preferring truth over justice and drawing from Chilean 
and South African experience, argue, “truth reports should replace trials”.481However, one 
may also argue that there was a parallel procedure of prosecution in South Africa.
482
 
 
Fourthly, truth can also facilitate the “[reconstruction] of national identities because it unifies 
countries through dialogue about shared history.”483  It is argued, for example, that the 
establishment of the truth has significantly contributed to the reconstruction of German 
Unity.
484
 One may argue that truth can contribute to ‘the settling down of a historical record 
because the truth of what happened can be debated openly and vigorously in court, adding 
credibility to the evidence accepted in criminal judgment.’485  The exposure of the truth about 
past crimes might be considered as a form of reparatory justice for victims.
486
 Finally, the 
right to truth might help victims and the public to access public documents, which were kept 
secret.
487
This access would help to know the truth contained in these documents. 
 
This multifaceted significance of truth, arguably, has led the UN Commission on Human 
Rights to recognize the right to truth. The Commission adopted Resolution 2005/66, which 
‘recognizes the importance of respecting and ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute 
to ending impunity and to promote and protect human rights.’488This right to truth is 
unequivocally stated in the work of Louis Joinet, an independent expert on impunity 
appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights.
489
 In the 1997 final report, Joinet noted: 
 
Every people have the inalienable right to know the truth about past events and about 
circumstances and reasons, which led, through the consistent pattern of gross 
violations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes. Full and effective 
exercise of the right to the truth is essential to avoid any recurrence of such acts in the 
future.
490
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This right belongs to the individual victim and his /her family as well as the society in 
general.
491
 Moreover, it clearly calls for full and effective exercise of the right to truth, which 
would help prevent the recurrence of similar violations in the future. The corollary of the 
latter is a “duty to remember” on the part of the State: “to be forearmed against the 
perversions of history that go under the name of revisionism or negotiationism, for the history 
of its oppression is part of a people’s national heritage and as such must be preserved.”492 
Professor Diane Orentlincher, appointed by the Commission, has updated the principles 
contained in Mr. Louis Joinet’s report.493 The Updated principles on impunity incorporated 
the inalienable right to know the truth and guarantees to give effect to the right to know.  
 
The abovementioned UN resolution and reports of experts not only recognize the right to the 
truth but they also provide the various components of the right. However, the legal status of 
such instruments and reports can be contested in that they are not in themselves legally 
binding instruments. Nevertheless, they reflect the emergence of the concept as well as the 
general acceptance of the significance of truth or the right to truth by the international 
community. The international legal status of truth may have relevance to domestic/national 
transitional processes. However, this study will not dwell on whether truth has emerged as a 
legal right or not, because establishing the truth is set as one of the explicit goals of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process.
494
 What is more important here is to appreciate the 
significance of truth to transitional societies. Once we appreciate this significance, we may 
ask how the ‘truth’ can thus be appropriately established. 
 
4.3.3 Mechanisms of Establishing Truth 
 
Considering that truth is an essential component of transitional justice processes, the issue is 
how a society might achieve this objective; in other words, what institutional mechanisms 
should be put in place to discover the truth. From a comparative perspective, there are two 
main mechanisms. The first is through the establishment of truth commissions or truth and 
reconciliation commissions. Numerous such commissions have been established in different 
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countries with a mandate to discover the truth, including the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Mobbek noted, “the demand for truth and truth-telling after 
conflict has grown and the international community has sought to strengthen the emphasis on 
truth commissions.”495 The assumption here is that truth commissions as their name implies 
are best suited to search for and establish the truth. Nevertheless, one might say that truth is a 
complex subject, the complexity of which was recognized by few truth commissions making 
its discovery very problematic.
496
 Clearly, difficulties persist in searching for and establishing 
truth through truth commissions. However, the complexity of truth creates similar if not 
worse problems in other mechanisms of establishing the truth. 
 
The other mechanism for the establishment of truth is through criminal proceedings. Truth in 
this case is usually referred to as judicial or legal truth, as it is the result of a legal proceeding 
and pronounced upon by courts. However, the transitional process itself may predetermine 
legal and judicial truth. As discussed in chapter 2, the Ethiopian transitional process provides 
a general depiction of the ‘truth’ of perpetrator/victim. This narrative is the basis for the 
prosecution process, and this process was expected to establish the truth within the 
parameters of the transitional narratives of past violations. 
 
A question may be raised whether the above mechanisms will lead to the discovery of truth or 
of the nature and extent of the truths about the past that can be so discovered. The 
comparative advantage of the two mechanisms can also be a critical issue. However, as the 
mechanism established in Ethiopia was the judicial/legal process, more emphasis will be 
given to the latter. Hence, the following sub-section deals with the suitability of judicial 
processes as a means to discover the truth. 
 
4.3.4 Judicial or Legal Truth 
 
The term judicial truth or legal truth is used in this work to refer to the process of establishing 
the truth about past violence and atrocities through criminal proceedings. This sub-section 
addresses the issue whether criminal proceedings are suitable mechanisms for establishing 
the truth. 
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Tibor asserts, “the establishment of the truth is the most important goal of criminal 
procedure”.497  Clearly, the ultimate decisions of court as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused is preceded by the search for and determination of the truth about the alleged crime 
and the circumstances surrounding it.  The ‘right to truth’ may contribute to the attainment of 
the objectives of criminal law, including those of restoring and maintaining peace, facilitating 
reconciliation processes, contributing to the eradication of impunity, reconstructing identities 
and setting down a historical record.
498
 In addition, we may say “...the right to truth underlies 
the very process of criminal indictment by ensuring proper investigation of crimes and 
transparency as well as by requiring public access to official documents.”499 
 
Obviously, there are different types of criminal procedures that may be adopted in trying to 
establish such truth. At least two procedural systems are well known; namely the inquisitorial 
and the adversarial systems.
500
 Because of its emphasis on the investigation and 
establishment of the truth, the inquisitorial system may allow improper methods of searching 
for evidence.
501
 Although contemporary human rights laws does not permit certain processes 
of discovering the truth (e.g., the use of torture), in the inquisitorial system establishing the 
truth is not left to the parties to the dispute. Rather, the judge or jury has an active role in the 
collection of evidence and the determination of the truth. On the other hand, the adversarial 
system requires the parties to establish the truth with the judge acting as a neutral arbiter. 
Because of this passive role of judges, whether pure adversarial system is tasked with the 
search for and the establishment of the truth remains questionable.
502
 A more critical question 
may be whether the criminal process, whether inquisitorial or adversarial, will in fact lead to 
truth or the whole truth. This issue is more critical in the context of the establishment of the 
truth of not just one crime but that of mass atrocities and violations committed in a relatively 
distant period. Hence, truth as a by-product of a criminal process, contained in court 
judgements and sentences, can be contested based on the procedural restrictions that are 
placed on the search for and establishment of the truth. After a judicial process, a perpetrator 
may be acquitted for lack of adequate evidence, and the implied judicial truth is that the 
perpetrator has not committed the crimes concerned. However, the truth could be different if 
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other non-penal processes were employed where the perpetrator has the incentive to reveal 
the truth rather than conceal it for fear of punishment. This was the thinking behind the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation process wherein perpetrators were granted amnesty upon 
disclosure of the truth about past crimes.
503
 
 
The issue of whether court judgements tell the truth may be “a question of the adequate 
reflection of reality in the mind.”504  However, the key problem is one of proof.505 Prof. Tibor 
states, “...the question of how the truth of some propositions is proved, verified in criminal 
procedure is the central problem of criminal procedure, or a part of it at least.”506This 
problem relating to evidence is, as will be shown in chapter 5, a critical problem in the 
Ethiopian transition. 
 
Courts have a duty to establish the truth according to the procedures and conditions 
prescribed by the law.
507
 There is a general expectation that courts will know the truth and 
that any conviction will be based on such truth.
508
 However, controversies persist on the 
nature of the truth to be established.
509
 Are courts expected to establish an objective truth?  
 
One argument is that courts are expected to render judgements on the basis of “maximum 
probability”.510 According to Vishinsky, one should not expect courts “to solve the problem 
on the basis of absolute truth, but only from the aspect of the possible greatest probability of 
the facts submitted to judicial evaluation (or, more correctly, from the aspects of 
certainty).”511  What courts decide is not necessarily based on objective truth; but it is the 
closet to objective truth. This view highlights the problematic aspect of judicial mechanisms 
as instruments of searching for the truth. In other words, it shows the difficulty for courts to 
reach at objective truth. 
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It is true that the law provides mechanisms and standards of proof in judicial proceedings. 
The standard of proof in civil proceedings is the preponderance of evidence - who among the 
parties has more evidence to convince the court. In criminal proceedings, the standard of 
proof is stricter in the sense that what is required is ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. The 
term proof beyond reasonable doubt suggests that it is not necessary to reach at objective 
truth. Therefore, whether a well functioning judicial system establishes the truth about the 
past is contestable.  
 
As indicated earlier, the stringent procedural safeguards associated with judicial processes 
and the emphasis on punishment might limit the discovery and exposure of the truth by 
courts. Generally, the connection between judicial processes and truth is problematic. In this 
respect, Yasmin Naqvi notes that: 
 
Criminal processes, whether at national or international level, are primarily about 
meting out justice for alleged wrongs committed by individuals. The process entered 
into, at least from a common law perspective, is not so much about finding the truth as 
it is offering evidence that proves guilt or innocence - evidence that is contested, put 
into question, or interpreted in different ways to win a case.
512
  
 
The same problem may also arise in Civil Law systems. One might say, “the investigative 
method of civil law systems is arguably more concerned about finding the truth, but the end 
result is the same; the case is won or lost by convincing or failing to convince a judge or jury 
of guilt or innocence.”513  Therefore, there is a problem whether courts can reach at the truth 
not only as part of dispute settlement but also even when they are mandated to search for it. 
The problem is more critical when what is sought relates to grave violations committed as 
part of a political reality.  
 
The foregoing discussion clearly shows that truth is an essential element of transitional 
justice process. However, the concept of truth and the mechanisms of establishing the truth 
remain the subject of controversy. The insights and contestations considered in the discussion 
above will serve as a basis for the examination of truth as a by-product of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process. This study addresses, in subsequent chapters, the questions (1) 
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what concept of truth is incorporated in the Ethiopian transitional justice process and (2) 
whether and to what extent the truth has been established through the resulting court 
proceedings. 
 
4.4 Reparations 
 
Reparation in transitional societies is aimed at rectifying past wrongs and hence is seen as 
part of reparatory justice
514
 - an aspect of transitional justice processes. This section briefly 
discusses the meaning and significance of reparations in transitional societies.  This element 
of transitional justice was not specifically set as an objective of the Ethiopian transitional 
process. Hence, the purpose here is to have a general understanding of this missing element 
and to consider what implications may follow from such omission. 
 
Various writings on transitional justice view reparation as an essential component of 
transitional processes; the central idea of reparation is that victims of human rights violation 
or their families/relatives have some form of claim for compensation against successor 
regimes.
 515
 So, reparation in this sense is not a claim laid against individual perpetrators; it is 
rather a claim against the government (society) for wrongs done by the former regime. 
Reparation, therefore, is very much related to the notion of justice, giving rise to the notion of 
‘reparatory justice’. 
 
However, a number of critical issues arise in relation to reparation. What is the exact meaning 
of reparation? What is the purpose and function of reparation?  What is the moral or legal 
basis of reparation? Who has the right to reparation, who is entitled to reparation? Who is the 
duty bearer?  What is the nature of reparation - material, moral or symbolic? What is the 
general practice?  . 
 
In transitional periods, the notion of reparation is used in a more general way to represent 
various forms of remedying past violations. Tietel notes that the term ‘reparatory justice’ 
“illustrates its multiple dimensions, comprehending numerous diverse forms: reparations, 
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damages, remedies, redress, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, tribute.”516  Hence, 
reparation may take different forms, and is broader than simply the payment of monetary 
compensation. According to Dr. Lutz Oette, reparation may be conceptualized as a right that 
“encompasses the right to an effective remedy, including courts and non-judicial 
mechanisms, and the right to substantive reparation, including individual and collective forms 
of reparation.”517 A variety of forms of reparations, and mechanisms of dealing with them as 
well as the individual and collective aspect of reparations are therefore possible. Reparation 
generally may take either material or symbolic forms.
518
Material reparations consist of 
rehabilitation, restitution, and compensation.
519
 On the other hand, symbolic reparations 
usually encompass a variety of measures including formal state apology, adopting 
commemoration days, building monuments and conducting proper funeral services.
520
  
 
There are various historical and ancient accounts including Biblical accounts,
521
 of the 
historical development and role of reparatory justice. Biblical reparation relates to redress in 
the sense of restoring ones dignity incorporating something beyond material compensation.
522
  
This ancient form of reparatory justice is evident in consequent instance right through 
history.
523
  The point here is not that the Biblical account is the source of current 
understanding; rather the principle of reparation has a long history and role.  
 
In its secular sense, the evolution of reparations under international law traces back to the end 
of the First World War through the Versailles peace agreement, wherein a duty of reparations 
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was imposed on Germany for its “total war guilt”.524  The concept of reparations was further 
developed at the end of the Second World War, giving rise to claims against Germany by 
victims and survivors of German executions.
525
  In the post World War II experience, the 
notion of reparation has significantly changed to include reparations for victims of violations 
of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.
526
   
 
What does the practice tell us about reparation? Reparation has become a common form of 
addressing past violations irrespective of contextual differences. Clearly, “in contemporary 
times, most transitional regimes - whether following war, military dictatorships, or 
communism - have undertaken some form of reparatory justice, [and reparation] is widely 
prevalent, despite divergent legal cultures.”527  Apart from other forms of reparation, material 
reparations were tried and adopted  in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Malawi, South Africa, 
Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile by establishing different models  for financing reparations 
programs.
528
 Hence, we see that reparation, including material reparation, has been used to 
address past violations. 
 
In most of the countries abovementioned, reparation programs were part of truth and 
reconciliation processes, while in some it resulted from judicial processes.
529
 In some other 
countries, we have dual institutions; an example is Sierra Leone where a special tribunal for 
war crimes and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission tasked with recommending a serious 
of measures, including reparation, was set up.
530
 Hence, the right to reparation may be 
addressed by adopting both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.
531
 
 
One issue in relation to reparation is whether successor regimes have an obligation to redress 
past wrongs. We may note that ‘the threshold dilemma confronted by successor regimes in 
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transitional periods is whether new regimes are obligated to redress victims of state 
wrongs”.532  Tietel asserts that states have an explicit obligation under international law to 
repair.
533
 The obligation of states can be inferred from various international agreements 
including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.
534
 The general obligations of states under 
these instruments are interpreted to give rise to the duty to provide reparations. More 
specifically, “states are legally obligated to provide adequate reparations to individuals for 
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture.”535 Here, the duty to repair is 
restricted to gross violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. We might say that the right to reparations is clearly established under the widely 
accepted international human rights instruments.
536
  Apart from the UDHR and ICCPR, these 
instruments include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (art. 6), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 14) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(art. 39).
537
 Moreover, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and 
customary international law are cited as bases of a legal right to reparations impliedly 
imposing an obligation on states.
538
 Some writers discuss reparation in terms of rights, which 
of course impliedly impose obligations on states.
539
  Dr. Lutz Oette notes, “the right to 
reparations for victims of serious violations of human rights and gross violations of 
international humanitarian law is by now firmly established under international law.”540  No 
doubt, the right to reparations and duty to provide reparations do apply in transitional 
societies.
541
 While, arguably, there is a duty to provide reparations under international law, 
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the question of reparations is not entirely a legal one; rather it is both a legal and moral 
issue.
542
 
 
Nevertheless, in light of specific constraints – for example resource constraints - a question 
arises whether states in transition should comply with international law:  
 
While, under international law, gross violations of human rights and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law give rise to a right to reparation for victims, 
implying a duty on the State to make reparations, implementing this right and 
corresponding duty is in essence a matter of domestic law and policy. In this respect, 
national Governments possess a good deal of discretion and flexibility.
543
 
 
Tietel is wary of the applicability of such obligation under national laws and suggests that the 
issue is more complicated; “raising conflicts between the back-ward looking purposes of 
compensating victims of past state abuses and the state’s forward-looking political 
interests.”544  This suggests the difficulty of making decisions, in light of financial/resource 
limitations, on whether state/public resources be spent to repair victims or to rebuild the 
society.  This has led to the perception that “reparations are a luxury that only affluent 
countries can afford; too expensive for most countries emerging from authoritarian regimes 
or conflicts.”545 Financial, political and logistical matters may hinder any meaningful 
reparation so that it is better to allocate limited resources to other goals or objectives of 
transitional justice process.
546
 Thus is the dilemma transitional societies may face in 
determining whether to provide reparation:   
 
Financing reparations often competes with other legitimate state-building goals, such 
as providing basic services, establishing accountable and transparent public bodies, 
and ensuring the physical safety of citizens.
547
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Hence, there is a debate on the allocation of resource. Moreover, a government’s capacity to 
design and carry out a reparations policy is more limited where the socio-economic 
development of the society is low while the victims or potential claimants are many.
548
 The 
question of reparation also raises the “prospective/retrospective, individual/collective 
dilemmas characterizing transitional periods.”549  Nevertheless, the difficulty in formulating 
reparation programs should not be taken as impossibility.
550
 Reparation is, arguably, the only 
direct benefit to victims and there is a legal obligation to provide reparation.
551
 Thus, the 
suggestion is that, in both ordinary and transitional times, “reparatory justice is always in 
some sense backward looking, as it implies rectification of past wrongs.”552  Therefore, states 
should allocate some part of their resources to satisfy victims claim for reparation as a means 
of correcting the past.  
 
In times of transition, the forward-looking processes or development alone should not be 
considered as an alternative to reparation.
553
  Hence, we might observe: 
 
Development is an important factor in establishing sustainable economies, but it is 
also an entitlement that citizens receive because they are citizens, and not victims. In 
this process, the link between benefits and abuses is weakened and redress is 
undermined. Hence, it is imperative that reparations programs preserve the integrity 
of the link between a violation of rights and redress by the state.
554
 
 
The importance of reparations as a retrospective measure to remedy victims for past 
violations is clear. However, this process of rectifying the past has also positive effects in 
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creating the foundations for a better future.
555It is suggested, “transitional reparatory 
measures mediate repair of victims and communities, past and present, laying a basis for 
redistributive policies associated with radical upheaval.”556 It is also noted that “transitional 
reparatory justice reconciles the apparent dilemma in the extraordinary context of balancing 
corrective aims, transitional reparatory justice mediates individual and collective liability, 
shaping the political identity of the liberalizing state.”557   
 
Thus, we see reparations, as a form of justice for victims, can promote transition to 
democracy. In this respect, it is noted, “justice for victims can contribute to establishing the 
foundations of an inclusive and democratic state.”558 Reparation may, by righting past 
wrongs, contribute to the efforts to build a better future. As clearly noted, “in the wake of 
systemic political violence, atrocity and gross violations of human rights, reparation is a 
transitional instrument that acknowledges the offenses of the past and provides a basis for 
building a new future.”559  Hence, it ‘...both compensates and promises.’560 Reparation 
therefore rectifies past wrongs; it compensates/restores victims while serving, at the same 
time, as a foundation for a better future. This future begins with an acknowledgement of the 
past, and this in itself demonstrates a departure from the past and a promise that similar 
wrongs will not occur again.  
 
Reparation thus serves as a form of restorative justice. As Eric Doxtader notes: 
 
Reparations may serve the ends of restorative justice...; [because] the concern is for 
the question of how material and symbolic compensation can work to acknowledge 
the wounds of the past, restore human dignity and create platforms for collective 
(re)integration and nation building.’561  
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Reparation can therefore serve to promote national consensus and unity. In its restorative 
sense, reparation can contribute to “the process of transforming a divided society into one 
that has the capacity to build a sense of common good and collective unity.”562 This implies 
the contribution of reparation to reconciliation. We may note, “a restorative model of 
reparation may heal better than its legal counterpart to the degree it offers victims a chance to 
express publicly the experience of their suffering and their perceptions about how it is best 
redressed in relation to the present.”563 Reparation, it is also argued, may prevent resort to 
retribution.
564
   
 
Due to the many interrelated benefits identified above, a reparations policy, it could be 
argued should be part of a transitional justice process. However, in light of massive violations 
and resource constraints as well as other tasks such as nation building or development, 
providing a reparation policy may be difficult. Again, we might stress, “the level of difficulty 
is not a legitimate excuse of governments to avoid their legal and moral obligation to provide 
redress to victims.”565  The process has to face the challenges of “confronting the hidden and 
often contentious truth of history; reparation depends on reaching agreements about what 
harm has been done and how it is best redressed.”566 As already indicated, a society in 
transition has to make decisions on various issues related to reparations. 
 
Generally, we can understand that reparation is intertwined with other objectives of 
transitional justice. It is part of the general conception of justice, and related to truth as well 
as reconciliation. Some may argue that true reconciliation comes with reparation.
567
 
Considering the inter-relationship between the different elements of transitional justice, some 
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argue that a stand-alone reparations program with no links to other components of transitional 
justice would likely fail:
568
  
 
Victims may perceive monetary compensation without parallel efforts to document 
the truth or prosecute offenders as insincere or worse, the payment of blood money. 
Conversely, truth-telling processes without reparations can also seem insincere to 
victims.
569
  
 
Clearly, there is a need to link reparations to other transitional justice processes. Reparations 
might be successful if seen as a component of a broader or holistic justice process.
570
  Hence, 
reparations programs need to be “externally coherent, i.e. part of a holistic justice 
strategy.”571 Therefore, in addressing past violations, societies may need to devise appropriate 
reparations plan with an understanding of reparations as part of a comprehensive or holistic 
policy of justice. In the Ethiopian context, the SPO proclamation did not contain any 
provision on reparations. The closet measure that the transitional government adopted was 
the restitution of property rights to those who were arbitrarily deprived of their property by 
the Dergue.
572
 These measures of restitution were endorsed by separate legal instruments and 
arguably form part of reparations. Nevertheless, they are very much restricted to specific 
violations of property rights and the scope of their implementation is questionable. Thus, the 
transitional justice framework in Ethiopia contains no clear and adequate policy for victims’ 
reparation.
573
The reasons for the lack of reparatory programs and the implications thereof 
will be addressed in the analytical chapters on the Ethiopian transition. 
 
4.5 Reconciliation 
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Reconciliation has come to be recognized as an essential component of transitional justice 
processes. It has become an integral part of discussions in search of solutions during 
transition. The conviction is that reconciliation is the ultimate solution to cycles of violence 
and repression, instability and social disintegration.
574
 Hence, all processes of transitional 
justice be it prosecution, truth-telling/recording, reparations or institutional reforms are meant 
to promote reconciliation. This section provides a brief discussion on some of the issues 
surrounding reconciliation including the meaning and significance of reconciliation, and its 
relationship to other components of transitional justice and the processes and mechanisms for 
achieving reconciliation. As reconciliation is such a broad concept, this section only attempts 
to present some of the key points and issues. 
 
4.5.1 The Meaning and significance of Reconciliation 
 
What is the meaning of reconciliation? Some writers have warned against any general 
definition of reconciliation or the proposition of a formula for achieving it.
575
 These warnings 
are meant to allow for contextual meanings and processes of reconciliation.  Although the 
contextual meaning may matter in consideration of specific process of reconciliation, some 
general understanding about its possible meaning (s) or its attributes are nevertheless 
important. 
 
The term ‘to reconcile’ has diverse meanings giving rise to various features of reconciliation 
used in different and unique contexts.
576
 These include; (1) to be friendly with (someone) 
after estrangement or re-establish friendly relations between (two or more people), (2) to 
settle (a quarrel), (3) to make (oneself or another) no longer opposed to something, (4) to 
cause to acquiesce in something unpleasant, and (5) to make (two apparently conflicting 
things) compatible or consistent with each other.
577
  However, all of them seem to relate to 
reconciliation at an individual level.
578
 In its social and political dimension, reconciliation 
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takes a different meaning and feature.
579
 For Donna Pankhurst, reconciliation has different 
meanings depending on whether we are talking about it from an individual or political/social 
sense.   
 
Apart from the above linguistic definition, some writers have provided conceptual definitions 
of reconciliation. Reconciliation has been defined differently “as acknowledgement and 
repentance from perpetrators, and forgiveness from the victims, as non-lethal co-existence, as 
democratic decision-making and reintegration, and as encompassing four concepts namely, 
truth, mercy, peace and justice.”580 Nevertheless, these definitions are unclear and include 
concepts, which are hard to define. 
 
Kimberly Theidon asserts that “reconciliation is multidimensional; the individual with him or 
herself, members of the community with one another, between communities or states; 
between the individual and his or her gods, and between civil society sectors and the state.”581 
Thus, Theidon distinguishes between vertical and horizontal reconciliation.
582
We might ask, 
what is the logical relation between Pankhurst’s classification and that of Theidon? However, 
a distinction is made between national reconciliation and individual reconciliation. We might 
say, “national reconciliation is achieved when societal and political processes function and 
develop without reverting to previous patterns or the framework of the conflict.”583 On the 
other hand, individual reconciliation “is the ability of each human being to conduct their lives 
in a similar manner as prior to the conflict without fear or hate.”584 This distinction may have 
important implications on the goals and mechanisms of achieving reconciliation. Apparently, 
reconciliation in transitional societies has two important and interrelated aspects. First, it 
relates to reconciliation between the various (often-conflicting) sectors of the population in 
terms of the past conflict. Secondly, it relates to reconciliation of the present with the past as 
a means of enabling a consensual future. 
 
The mechanisms of achieving reconciliation at an individual level may be different from that 
of national reconciliation and vice versa. In this respect, Pankhurst noted that: 
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What is required psychologically for an individual to recover from trauma and be 
reconciled with the past need bear no resemblance to what might be required for a 
society to do so, even though it is not uncommon for people to expect that individuals 
and society as a whole should all be able to achieve reconciliation ( some sort) 
through the same set of centralized process.
585
 
 
The process for political reconciliation might be different from that of individual 
reconciliation although the latter can possibly be expected of the former processes.  In this 
respect, a relevant question is whether political reconciliation can be achieved with out 
achieving individual reconciliation or vice versa. Is there a conflict between the two? Indeed, 
some argue that not only is this possible, but also argue, “national reconciliation may come at 
the expense of reconciliation at the individual level.”586 The implication is that political 
reconciliation processes may be promoted without healing individuals’ traumas.587 However, 
one may question the long-term effect of such processes in the absence of other mechanisms.  
Arguably, individual reconciliation can take place without national reconciliation.
588
 
 
Diverse forms of conflicts may require distinct types and methods of reconciliation.
589
 On the 
one hand, “[a]t individual and interpersonal levels, reconciliation may require the healing of 
deep psychological and emotional wounds.”590 On the other hand, “[p]olitical reconciliation 
demands a different focus, one that involves less forgiveness than a desire and opportunity 
for sustained and meaningful interaction.”591  Hence, different transitional justice methods 
may uphold different forms of reconciliations. We should also note that some transitional 
justice processes might advance primarily one form of reconciliation over others.
592
  
 
Thus, we see, uncertainties remain regarding the relationship between justice and 
reconciliation. Often, reconciliation is considered as irreconcilable with justice.
593
 Although 
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the preceding section partly addressed this issue of compatibility, it is useful to provide 
certain points highlighting the nexus between the two.  
 
Charles Villa Vicencio argues that there is a natural correlation between justice and 
reconciliation.
594
  He asserts that: 
 
It is unrealistic to ask victims and survivors of gross violations of human rights to 
reconcile in the absence of justice. It is at the same time necessary to broaden the 
understanding of justice to include realistic options for the building of civic trust, the 
promotion of a human rights culture and the pursuit of economic transformation.
595
 
 
Hence, the argument is that justice is a necessary precondition for reconciliation. In other 
words, reconciliation without justice cannot be expected. However, a broader understanding 
of justice is not only compatible with but also a precondition for reconciliation. A 
reconciliation process may consider “justice as an essential ingredient to any settlement, 
while recognizing that there are different ways of achieving and understanding justice.”596  
This is an argument for a comprehensive or holistic notion of justice.
597
  
 
However, a further question arises as to whether a more specific notion of justice, for 
example criminal justice, is compatible with reconciliation. The issue is more broadly 
summarised as follows: 
 
The justice versus reconciliation, justice versus peace, justice versus truth debates all 
emphasise that justice is retributive and reconciliation is restorative and that there is a 
trade-off.
598
 
 
The debate about justice versus reconciliation assumes that justice is retributive, involving 
criminal proceedings intended to establish individual guilt and impose punishment, and thus 
such a notion of justice will not lead to reconciliation or other desirable goals.
599
 However, it 
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may be argued that even this notion of criminal justice may contribute to reconciliation rather 
than hinder it, especially in light of the complementary nature of transitional justice 
processes.
600
 A freestanding retributive justice, like other processes, may not help in 
promoting reconciliation. Hence, the point here is that criminal justice, perhaps retributive 
justice, is compatible with and encourage reconciliation if it is considered with and 
implemented alongside other transitional justice processes. Therefore, the context may be 
what matters most. 
 
In this connection, it is important to consider the connection between truth and reconciliation 
commissions, or truth commissions, and reconciliation. Are such commissions better suited to 
promote reconciliation? There might be “an underlying assumption that truth commissions 
are a path to reconciliation and peace for all post-conflict societies, and that they are to be 
preferred to other institutional justice mechanisms.”601 Although such commissions, some 
with reconciliation attached to their nomenclature, have some advantages as a means to 
achieve reconciliation, they also have limitations and their success is contextual, and they 
cannot be prescribed for all societies in transition.
602
  Hence, what is emphasised is the 
importance of adopting various mechanisms and processes that would ultimately lead to 
reconciliation. 
 
As already discussed, reconciliation is an essential component if not the ultimate objective, of 
transitional justice processes. Both individual and national reconciliation may be crucial. The 
importance of national or political reconciliation is underlined as follows: 
 
In societies emerging from violent conflict, political reconciliation is not a romantic 
or utopian ideal; it is often the only realistic alternative to enduring and escalating 
violence, and a vital means of building a society based on the rule of law and social 
reconstruction.
603
  
 
This stresses the significance of political reconciliation in ending violence or cycles of 
violence and building a better society. Nevertheless, a question arises whether political 
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reconciliation, without individual reconciliation, would achieve that purpose.  Societies in 
transition face difficult questions in formulating reconciliation level and processes. 
 
However, reconciliation as a worthwhile goal is also questionable. According to some 
writers, people may consider “reconciliation or restoration as meaningless.”604 As clearly 
noted: 
 
[Some people may] have no tangible memory of peace - nothing to restore or return; 
for many, the reality of suffering is too raw to contemplate the possibility of 
reconciliation; while others simply resolve never to reconcile.
605
   
 
As indicated earlier, individual reconciliation helps each individual to pursue his /her lives in 
a similar manner before the conflict or repressive regime free of fear or hate, which implies 
restoring life to some previous normal situation. In this sense, reconciliation may restore 
normalcy. Would such be possible if societies endured successive cycles of conflict and 
repression?  How far can one go back and remember the good old days, which the living 
members of society never experienced? In such contexts, reconciliation may only be pursued 
not as restoring but as creating new social relationship. Hence, the second aspect of 
reconciliation – reconciliation of the present with the past as a means of enabling a 
consensual future – appears more appropriate. The other difficulty is the freshness of 
suffering in peoples’ minds making reconciliation at least difficult if not impossible. Hence, a 
question arises as to whether some time has to pass or other processes be taken for 
reconciliation to be effected. These all seem to highlight the challenges for reconciliation 
without entirely discrediting reconciliation per se. Nevertheless, there might be situations 
where people decide not to reconcile, not to forgive perpetrators, and this may hinder 
effective reconciliation.  
 
Reconciliation is usually premised on an acknowledgement and repentance on the part of 
perpetrators, and readiness to forgive on the part of victims or society. Reconciliation cannot 
occur, even if perpetrators acknowledge and repent, unless there is forgiveness. Some may 
reject forgiveness. The former President of Peru is reported to have stated “ El Peru will 
never forgive, will never forget, and will never pardon that which it has suffered and that 
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which it has lived.”606 Theidon seems to argue that such a rejection of reconciliation on the 
part of the political elite while the local population is ready is unreasonable.
607
 Sometimes 
even those (‘victims and survivors’) who believe in the possibility of reconciliation usually 
assert that justice must precede reconciliation.
608
  
 
A question thus arises regarding the role of forgiveness in reconciliation processes. We might 
say that “forgiveness has entered the political domain where there is a need to ameliorate 
historical injustices, overcome political scandals, and facilitate democratic transition.”609 
Here, we are concerned with the role of forgiveness in transitional societies and in its relation 
with reconciliation. Opinions on the role of forgiveness vary.  
 
It is important, first, to consider the meaning or definition of forgiveness. Although various 
meanings are suggested, forgiveness can be defined “as a negation or abandonment of 
vengeance.”610 Similarly, forgiveness is seen as “the overcoming of feelings of revenge, 
moral hatred, indignation or some other feelings that are related to anger.”611 These notions of 
forgiveness relate to the victims’ behaviour to abstain from something, and are characterized 
as a unilateral understanding of forgiveness.
612
 Most writers uphold a bilateral notion of 
forgiveness, according to which certain acts of the perpetrator are a precondition for the 
victims’ forgiveness.613 Although this bilateral conception may be problematic614, it stresses 
the conditionality of forgiveness. 
 
It is, however, noted that forgiveness is not always essential to reconciliation.
615
 This 
argument rests on the distinction between individual reconciliation and political 
reconciliation, and suggests that political reconciliation is possible without 
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forgiveness.
616
What is important is the desire and opportunity for sustained and meaningful 
interaction. By indicating the problems of forgiveness in transitional societies, some accounts 
provide the possibility of reconciliation without forgiveness.
617
 Others note the limitations of 
forgiveness. Although forgiveness is considered as instrumental in securing the whole truth, 
this result may not be achieved. In this respect, we might note that “forgiveness is often 
presented as the price people ought to pay for revelations of truth, and the ambition to create 
a single, complete, common truth from all accounts is rarely hoped for let alone achieved.”618 
Arguably, the South African TRC has come closest to achieve this ambitious aim.
619
 Still, 
whether forgiveness or conditional forgiveness, through the acts of disclosure and 
acknowledgement by the wrongdoer, may contribute to a complete narration of the past is 
contestable. Nevertheless, the importance of forgiveness can be understood from the 
observation that “certainly the absence of some process of public truth-telling is a major 
inhibition to reconciliation, and therefore at least to long-term or positive peace...”620 Thus, 
the argument is that as truth telling is essential for reconciliation, impliedly forgiveness is 
important for some sort of truth telling.  
 
However, irrespective of the above questioning of forgiveness, the widely held opinion is that 
forgiveness is an important element for reconciliation. Reconciliation may depend on the 
disclosure of truth and forgiveness to perpetrators. It is asserted that “forgiveness helps to 
overcome inter human alienation and repair fractured human relations.”621 This assertion 
seems to relate to individual reconciliation. Moreover, it is suggested that “in the macro 
political context, forgiveness is championed as a means to peace and national reconciliation 
in the aftermath of political conflicts.”622 Thus, the importance of forgiveness in promoting 
both individual and national or political reconciliation is clear. 
 
Forgiveness may benefit all, as David and Choi argue: 
 
Forgiveness benefits victims, perpetrators, and divided societies; it can end cycles of 
violence, help victims and re-establish their identity, redeem wrongdoers as persons 
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worthy of forgiveness, renew civil relationships between victims and perpetrators, and 
allow bystanders to realize their own roles in the past.
623
  
 
The above assertion points to the multiple significance of forgiveness for various members of 
society. Moreover, it may “help societies to overcome though not forget, the past and thus 
make possible progress to the future.”624 These benefits of forgiveness arguably form the 
bedrock of reconciliation. 
 
Arguments in support of forgiveness as a component of reconciliation are abundant. It is 
suggested “...the South African political transition endorsed the principle of ‘no future 
without forgiveness.’”625 Similarly, based on the experiences of local communities in Peru, 
Theidon asserts that, “apology, the administration of justice, and dialogues are very important 
steps in the reconstruction of co-existence - what villagers mean when they refer to 
reconciliation.”626 Here, it is possible to see the relevance of not only forgiveness but also of 
justice, reaffirming earlier arguments. Dialogue plays a crucial role in promoting 
reconciliation processes. 
 
Another important set of issues in relation to forgiveness include who has the right to forgive 
- the state or victims,  and what policies can be devised to promote forgiveness and 
reconciliation? These questions are beyond the scope of this present study. However, it is 
essential to note that forgiveness or reconciliation should not be imposed on victims, rather it 
should be built.  
 
Although the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was praised for its 
achievements, it has not escaped strong criticisms. For example, the process has been 
criticized for “deploying reconciliation in a top-down direction, leaving scant space to speak 
about the sentiments of retribution and vengeance that characterized the local level; the gap 
between national and local processes was notable.”627  As Wilson argues, “political and 
religious elites appropriated the term reconciliation as a meta narrative for reconstructing the 
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nation-state and their hegemony following the apartheid regime.”628 Based on the experiences 
in South Africa and Namibia, Donna Pankhurst argues, “reconciliation was forced on the 
poor [or victims] and has brought few, if any, benefits; or they are being forced into 
forgiveness, as part of reconciliation, against their will.”629 These criticisms remind us that 
appropriate policies of reconciliation or forgiveness are necessary; otherwise, it will be 
counterproductive. One essential point in this respect is the need to adopt a holistic process of 
dealing with the past, processes that would ensure justice, truth telling, reparations and 
institutional reform that together will lead to reconciliation and a better future. 
 
Another important reminder is that “...reconciliation does not provide an immediate or quick 
solution to the problems facing the nation, and involves a willingness to work together with 
one’s enemies and adversaries in the common pursuit of a solution that is not yet in hand.”630 
Thus, there is a need to understand reconciliation as both a process and an end. In this 
connection, Villa-Vicencio reminds us “reconciliation holds the beginning of civic trust, 
willingness to talk, a capacity to listen and a readiness to take cautious risks.”631 We should 
also be noted that reconciliation requires the fulfilment of diverse needs through diverse 
mechanisms. Arguably, therefore, reconciliation can rarely result from one particular 
mechanism of transitional justice.
632
 Thus, as Mobbek suggests a holistic approach, a mixture 
of diverse mechanisms of justice, “will have a greater probability of achieving the rather 
large objective of reconciliation, at both the national and individual levels.”633 
 
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note that reconciliation was not explicitly 
made part of the Ethiopian transitional justice processes. As will be elaborated in the 
following chapters, the Ethiopian transitional processes did not incorporated reconciliation as 
one of its goals. Hence, in light of the significance of reconciliation, the implication of this 
exclusion of reconciliation indeed appears to be enormous in today’s political life in Ethiopia 
as manifested in mutual suspicion and mistrust, unwillingness to work together or to talk to 
each other, the polarization of politics, and the prevalence of political extremism. This is the 
subject of the analysis of the Ethiopian transitional justice processes in the next chapter. 
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Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has presented a discussion on the main components of transitional justice 
including their meaning, significance and mechanism of achieving them. Justice, we 
observed, is a controversial subject matter, and more so in the context of transitional periods. 
A broader understanding of justice is suggested, with the implication that societies in 
transition may adopt a variety of mechanism to realize it. An interesting issue in formulating 
a certain conception of justice and justice process relates to the notion of justice motivations. 
An enquiry into these motivations may help to evaluate whether transitional justice processes, 
including the Ethiopian one, are motivated by reason, emotion or self-interest. The idea of 
political-legal justice may also be useful in understanding and explaining certain transitional 
justice processes. Criminal prosecutions as a process of achieving justice has given rise to 
important debates. These discussions and debates are relevant for the analysis of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process. Based on the foregoing discussion, this study addresses 
two important questions: (1) what conception of justice and justice process was adopted in 
Ethiopia? And (2) was justice done? These questions and their implications are addressed in 
the next chapter (Chapter 5).  
 
The main issues and debates related to truth were also considered, particularly on the 
meaning, significance and processes of establishing the truth as well as the suitability of 
criminal justice process to the search for and discovery of the truth. Based on this discussion, 
this study raises the questions (1) what does the Ethiopian transitional justice framework say 
about truth?, and (2) was the truth established?. These issues of truth in the Ethiopian context 
are  addressed under chapter 6 together with the implications thereof. 
 
While reparation may be considered as part of justice, this chapter provided a separate 
discussion on the meaning, significance, and the challenges to effective reparations program. 
This study raises two questions regarding the Ethiopian transition: (1) whether there was a 
policy of reparation?, and (2) What are the implications of the decision taken?. However, an 
overview of the Ethiopian transitional framework reveals the absence of adequate policy for 
reparations, and hence the discussion on reparation is incorporated into the analytical 
discussion on justice. The last section of this chapter addressed the issue of reconciliation as 
the ultimate objective of transitional justice processes. In view of this, the question of 
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reconciliation in the Ethiopian context is analyzed in the subsequent chapters. As already 
noted, the Ethiopian transitional justice process did not incorporate a policy of reconciliation, 
and hence the main questions are (1) whether reconciliation should have been pursued?, and 
(2) what is the implication of its absence from the transitional process? 
 
By way of conclusion to this chapter, it is worth repeating that this study considers the 
foregoing four elements as interrelated components of transitional justice process. Thus, it is 
difficult, even undesirable to pick each one of them and discuss separately. The analytical 
part of this study, therefore, treats them jointly. The discussion on justice also deals with the 
question of truth, reparation and reconciliation together with the implications that follow. 
Nevertheless, for purpose of clarity and better presentation of data and analysis, the 
subsequent chapters examine justice and truth independently because these two components 
are specifically incorporated into the Ethiopian transitional justice process. To this analysis 
we now turn. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: INTERROGATING JUSTICE IN THE ETHIOPIAN 
TRANSITION  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates whether the Ethiopian transitional modality of dealing with the past 
was properly designed to serve the interest of justice and whether it was in fact successful in 
actually rendering it. The inquiry focuses on both the beginning and the end. It does not 
discuss in detail the processes involved in between unless such becomes relevant for the 
analysis of the framework or actualization of the objective of the process. This chapter has 
two sections. The first deals with the framework. This begins with a brief analysis of the legal 
framework adopted in Ethiopia, then presents a brief description of the trials, and ultimately 
interrogates the legal framework. The second section addresses whether the transitional 
process has achieved its objective of rendering justice.  
5.2 The Legal Framework and the Trial 
 
This section has three sub-sections; the first presents the transitional framework as contained 
in the SPO establishment proclamation while the second provides an overview of the 
Ethiopian trial processes, serving as a background for the last section that analyzes the 
appropriateness of prosecution based on the available data. 
 
5.2.1 Understanding the Legal Framework 
 
This sub-section discusses the legal framework for addressing the issue of justice in the 
transitional process in Ethiopia. As already discussed, the SPO was the central institution for 
supervising processes of accountability in Ethiopia. Thus, we now turn to examine the SPO 
establishment proclamation in detail. 
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After describing the violations and wrongs committed by the Dergue in its first three 
paragraphs, the preamble of the Proclamation asserts the need to bring the perpetrators of the 
previously mentioned violations to justice as follows: 
 
...in view of the fact that the historical mission of the Ethiopian people’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been accomplished, it is essential that 
higher officials of the WPE and members of the security forces and armed forces who 
have been detained at the time of the EPRDF assumed control of the country and 
thereafter and who are suspected of having committed offences, as well as 
representatives of urban dwellers and peasant associations, and other persons who 
have associated with the commission of said offences, must be brought to trial.
634
 
 
Clearly, bringing suspects to trial was deemed necessary. That was quite simply the main 
objective of the proclamation.
635
 In this connection, paragraph six of the preamble and Article 
6 of the proclamation set out the central task of the SPO in the transitional process: 
 
...it is necessary to provide for the establishment of  a Special Public Prosecutor’s 
Office that shall conduct prompt investigation and bring detainees as well as those 
persons who are responsible for having committed offences and are at large with in 
and with out the country
636
 
 
We might say it is the necessity of bringing suspects to justice that led to the establishment of 
the SPO under the operative provisions of the proclamation.
637
 It is also worth noting that this 
essential institution was accountable to the highest executive body of the transitional 
government – the Prime Minister.638  
 
                                                             
634 Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of Special Prosecutor. Proclamation No. 22/1992, Federal 
Nagarit Gazette, 1st Year, No.18, August 8/1992; Paragraph 4.  It is worth noting here that the proclamation 
talks of the “historic mission of EPRDF”. Thus, we might ask the extent to which the transitional process was 
shaped by EPRDF’s perception of justice and construction of the past. 
635As noted in chapter four, criminal prosecution is one mechanism of rendering justice, and is often associated 
with the notion of retributive justice, with its emphasis on punishment. This suggests that the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process adopted a retributive notion of justice. However, this does not necessarily point to a 
motivation of revenge or vengeance as prosecution and trial may also serve other purposes including deterrence. 
Whether the adoption of this notion of justice was appropriate will be addressed in the next section. 
636 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; Paragraph 6 
637 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; see Article 2, sub article 1 
638 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; see Article 2, sub article 2   
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As already noted, the legal mandate of the SPO to bring suspects to courts is specifically 
provided under the proclamation.
639
 Thus, an understanding of the types of crimes/offences 
that fall under the mandate of the SPO is important. Although there are descriptions of the 
types and severity of crimes committed by the Dergue in the preamble, the investigative and 
prosecutorial mandate of the SPO extends to any crime. In other words, there is no limitation 
on the type and degree of offences. 
 
Clearly, the SPO was established as an ad hoc institution rather than a permanent one. Article 
4 of the proclamation states that ‘the term of the Office shall terminate up on accomplishment 
of its task’.640 From this, it is clear that the Office was not established as a permanent 
institution. The permanent organ of prosecution is the Office of Prosecution within the 
Ministry of Justice. Thus, the SPO is an ad hoc institution for investigation and prosecution 
of crimes committed by specific group of persons within a defined context. However, the 
office was also tasked with establishing and recording the truth of the past by the preamble of 
the proclamation, which provides that: 
 
...It is in the interest of a just historical obligation to record for posterity the brutal 
offences...perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia...
641
 
 
An obvious question that arises is when exactly might we determine that these tasks have 
been accomplished? 
 
Another important aspect of the legal framework is the qualifications for and the procedures 
of appointment provided under article 5 and article 3 respectively. The qualifications for 
appointment are particularly interesting as the proclamation stated that; 
 
Any Ethiopian citizen who: 
(1) is faithful to the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia; 
(2) is either trained in law or has acquired broad legal skill through experience and 
capable of rendering proper decision based on law; 
                                                             
639 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634. Article 6 states “the Office shall, in accordance with the law, have 
the power to conduct investigation and institute proceedings in respect of any person having committed or 
responsible for the commission of an offence by abusing his position in the party, the government or mass 
organization under the Derg-WPE regime.” 
640 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; Article 4  
641 Ibid, paragraph 5 of the preamble 
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(3) has distinguished himself by his diligence, integrity and good conduct and has not, 
in any way, participated in the offences to be prosecuted by the Special Public 
Prosecutors; and 
(4) was not a member of the WPE or of the security force ;may be appointed as a 
Special Public Prosecutor.
642
 
 
It is worth noting that these criteria are cumulative in the sense that one has to fulfil all of 
them to qualify. These criteria may be categorized into positive conditions and negative 
conditions. The positive conditions are those qualities that a candidate should posses and 
include faithfulness to the Charter, legal competence, diligence, integrity and good conduct. 
A person cannot be appointed without such qualities. The negative conditions are those the 
candidate should not possess, and this includes participation in the offences falling under the 
mandate of the SPO and membership in the WPE or security force. Thus, participation in the 
specified offences and/or membership in the WPE or the security force would automatically 
exclude a candidate from appointment. Such exclusion seems to be justified by the need to 
avoid a conflict of interest, i.e. one who possesses the negative qualities may compromise the 
whole process. However, one may also question whether the exclusion from appointment 
relates only to membership in the WPE or security force alone.
643
 Although these criteria are 
formally meant to ensure impartiality of the SPO, the institution’s impartiality was 
questioned from the perspective of the moral fitness of its personnel or its actual 
operation.
644
The institution was criticised for advancing the vindictive ends of one party to a 
previous conflict against the vanquished rather than advancing the desirable goals of the 
nation.
645
 There are other similar perceptions.
646
 
 
                                                             
642 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; Article 5 
643The description of violators under the preamble and article 6 of the proclamation refer not only to WPE and 
security forces but also to armed forces and mass organizations like urban dwellers association and peasant 
associations. Hence, a former member of the armed forces was not eligible for the post of SPO.  However, the 
issue remains open as to whether a member of mass organization may also be excluded simply because of his or 
her membership. It would appear difficult to argue in support of the exclusion of all members of mass 
organization, as this was the practice of the day; and the best one can argue for is the exclusion of leaders of 
such organizations. 
644This was a preliminary objection presented against SPO charges,13/04/1990 E.C, SPO File No.62/85 (Copy 
with the author) 
645 Ibid 
646Anonymous R36. Interview with the author on 15 January 2013. The respondent was a lawyer for two 
accused persons, who refused to be interviewed by this author for fear of what may happen to them if the 
information gets in to the hand of the current government. This lawyer of the accused persons related to this 
author that his clients were of the same opinion, and they see the whole process as a drama done against them. 
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The legal framework also addresses the issue of the applicable laws in the case at hand. In 
principle, it provides for the ‘applicability of existing laws’ as stated below.  
 
Laws concerning criminal investigation and instituting criminal proceedings as well 
as laws applicable to ordinary prosecutors shall also apply to the activities 
undertaken by the Office
647
. 
 
The ordinary criminal laws and criminal procedure laws applicable at the time were those 
adopted in the 1960
th
 when the codification and modernization of the Ethiopian Laws were 
undertaken during the imperial regime of Haile-Sillassie. These laws were found mainly in 
the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code of the country. Although the penal code has 
recently been revised, the investigation and prosecution was intended to be carried out 
according to the 1957 penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, the latter was yet not 
revised or amended.  
 
The applicability of existing laws implies there was no need for new or special laws to deal 
with past violations in Ethiopia. One challenge of justice during transitions is arguably the 
dilemma confronted in the face of insufficiency of existing legal rules on the one hand, and 
the non-retroactive application of criminal laws on the other. The Ethiopian transitional 
system of accountability seems to have evaded this dilemma due to the existence of relatively 
comprehensive and sufficient laws.  
 
However, the proclamation also provides for the non-applicability of some existing laws. 
Certain time limits provided in the ordinary laws were declared inapplicable.
648
The other 
exception to the principle of applicability of existing laws relates to habeas corpus.
649
 
                                                             
647 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; Sub Article 1 of Article 7  
648Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; sub Article 2 of Article 7. The law states that “Notwithstanding the 
provisions of sub-Article (1) of this Article, the provisions concerning limitation of criminal action and the time 
limit concerning the submission of charges, evidence and pleading to charges shall not be applicable to 
proceedings instituted by the Office.” The first excluded time limit was period of limitation. This non-
applicability of the period of limitation was enshrined in the FDRE Constitution, adopted later in 1994. 
However, the Constitutional exclusion of a period of limitation, under Article 28, was rather restricted to ‘crimes 
against humanity’. It States “Criminal liability of persons who commit crimes against humanity, so defined by 
international agreements ratified by Ethiopia and by other laws of Ethiopia, such as genocide, summary 
executions, forcible disappearances or torture shall not be barred by statute of limitation.” In spite of the 
inability to firmly establish the relation between the SPO proclamation and the FDRE constitution, it is clear to 
the author that the proclamation excludes the applicability of the period of limitation with respect to offenses 
committed by the specified persons irrespective of the nature or degree of the offence. The other time-limiting 
laws excluded from applicability are those laws setting out time limits for the submission of charges, evidence 
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To sum up, the SPO proclamation generally sets out that the transitional process of criminal 
accountability will proceed according to existing laws. No new or special laws were required. 
The investigation and trial were to proceed according to existing substantive and procedural 
laws. However,  it  at the same time excluded the applicability of some existing laws, 
particularly those relating to the period of limitation, time limits for charges, evidence and 
pleading to charges, and habeas corpus. We might also observe that the proclamation covers 
other issues.
650
   
 
5.2.2 An Overview of the Ethiopian Transitional Justice Trials 
 
This study aims at assessing the social, legal and political impact of the Ethiopian transitional 
justice processes by focusing on the framework as well as the end-results. Thus, the 
assessment of whether the trials were conducted according to accepted norms of international 
law falls outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it would be useful to provide an 
overview of the trial process, to this I now turn. 
 
As noted in the previous discussions, the SPO was tasked with investigation and prosecution 
of the crimes committed by members of the Dergue and affiliate institutions. The work of the 
SPO involves the search for information, collecting and compiling of documents and other 
evidence, preparing and submitting charges and arguments, and so many other technical 
tasks. Although the SPO was legally established in 1992, it started its operation in 1993, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and pleading to charges. Such time limits are normally intended to ensure speedy trial. However, the complexity 
of the matter at hand might have tempted the exclusion of these laws.  We have thus two competing interests - 
the complexity of the matter requiring more time on the one hand and the need for speedy trial on the other. 
However, in the absence of any other regulation, the question of the implications of such exclusions on the 
overall process, and particularly on the need for speedy trial may be raised. 
649 Proclamation No. 22/1992, Above n 634; sub-Article 3 of Article 7. It provides that “The provisions of 
habeas corpus under Article 117 of the Civil Procedure Code shall not apply to persons detained prior to the 
coming into force of this proclamation for a period of six month starting from the effective date of this 
proclamation in matters under the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor as indicated in Article 6 hereof.” 
650These other issues include (1) decisions of the Special Public Prosecutors under Article 8, (2) transfer of cases 
if the case falls outside of SPO jurisdiction under Article 9, (3) delegation of power to ordinary prosecutors in 
case of need under Article 10, (4) miscellaneous provisions under Article 11, and (5) inconsistencies with other 
laws, i.e. laws inconsistent with the proclamation are not applicable, provided under Article 1. I have not 
elaborated on these issues as they are not centrally relevant to the objective of my research. However, I consider 
them as appropriate when dealing with the specific themes of my analysis below. 
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as Sara Vaughan noted, various governments assisted the SPO and its works following a July 
1993 request by the Ethiopian government for assistance.
651
  
 
By the time, the SPO started operating; many suspects had already been in detention for 
almost two years without charge.
652
 As noted already, the SPO proclamation did suspend 
habeas corpus provisions for six months and this time was running out. As a result, the SPO 
“spent the first six months of 1993 responding to more than 1, 200 habeas corpus writs and 
determining the legitimacy of ongoing detention.”653 
 
Another important work of the SPO in its early stage of operation involved the collection and 
analysis of evidence, including documents available in the archives of the Derg 
government.
654
 As, Sara Vaughan observed, the SPO adopted some strategy for 
accomplishing its task: 
 
The SPO’s strategy for investigation and charging suspects classified the type of 
crime and the position held by the suspect at the time of the Red Terror into three 
categories, thereby arranging and ranking the investigations for prosecution 
accordingly. Group one comprised the policy and decision makers; group two was 
made up of the field commanders, military and civilian; and group three consisted of 
the actual alleged perpetrators of many of the crimes.
655
 
 
Nevertheless, the prosecutorial strategy of the SPO was the subject of controversy, as will be 
seen from people’s perceptions.  
 
                                                             
651SARAH VAUGHAN,2009, The Role of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER 
and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  
James Currey, at 53. Sara noted that three areas of assistance were identified, namely, computerization, 
infrastructure and technical assistance. SPO donors include: the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), the Danish International Development Adminstration (DANIDA), the government of France, the 
International Commission of Jurists – Danish Section, the governments of the Netherlands and Norway, the 
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), the UN Development Program, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Many organizations also supported 
the work of the SPO. See SARAH VAUGHAN, at 53 and 54. 
652SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 52  
653SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 52 
654SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 55. Sara noted “by mid-1994, 309,778 pages of relevant government 
documents had been collected, under a process which became an urgent and high-security operation”. 
655SARAH VAUGHAN, Above 651 at 54 
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The trial of the first category of ‘high officials’ opened in December 1994, with 46 
defendants, and a further 24 individuals including former president Col. Mengistu 
Hailemariam charged in absentia.
656
 This trial was first held in Addis Ababa at First Criminal 
Bench of the Central High Court and then at the First Criminal Bench of the  Federal High 
Court following a change in the form of the state from unitary to a federal one.
657
 
 
The pre-trial proceedings took a lot of time involving the responses from defence lawyers and 
court rulings. These involved frequent adjournments, and as a result, the hearing of SPO 
witnesses in the main trial begun only by mid 1996.
658
  It was noted, “more than five 
thousand additional defendants were charged in early 1997, over two thousand of them in 
prison, and nearly three thousand others in absentia.”659 According to one source, in 1997, 
the SPO charged 5,198 people, of whom 2,246 were already in detention, while 2,952 were 
charged in absentia (including the Dergue leader, Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam).
660
 
 
It is important to note that investigations and trials were also conducted in the regions. The 
following observation could give us a general picture of the regional processes.  
 
About 2, 258 of the defendants were charged in the regional supreme courts by 
delegation from the federal high court. Thus, 202 defendants were charged in Tigray 
region, 508 defendants in Amhara region, 421 in Southern People’s region, 198 
defendants in Harai region and 174 defendants in Somali region....All the Red Terror 
cases in the regional supreme courts began in 1998 at the capital city of each 
region.
661
 
 
 It would be important to give a highlight of the charges brought against the defendants. As 
already noted, the SPO proclamation calls for the application of existing laws, and hence all 
charges were based on national laws of Ethiopia. The defendants were charged individually 
                                                             
656SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 56 
657FRODE ELGESEM and GIRMACHEW ALEMU ANEME, 2009, The Rights of the Accused: A Human 
Rights Appraisal, In, K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror 
Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, at 37  
658SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 56  
659SARAH VAUGHAN, Above n 651 at 56 
660Human Rights Watch:Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu Hailemariam. 1991. [online]. [Accessed on 14 Nov.2008]. 
Available from World Wide Web: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/1991/29/ethiop5495.htm  
661FRODE ELGESEM and GIRMACHEW ALEMU ANEME, at 37. It was noted, “data on these regional 
proceedings are apparently in adequate; and also unidentified numbers of defendants were also brought before 
the Oromia Supreme Court.”  
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and collectively for various and complex crimes.
662
 These include public provocation and 
preparation to commit genocide, Genocide, unlawful detention, and abuse of power. The 
charge on genocide  include murder; bodily harm, serious injury to physical and mental 
health; placement under conditions calculated to result in death or disappearance; and in the 
alternative aggravated homicide and grave and wilful injury.
663
  
 
In the main trials, “the defendants were collectively and independently charged with 209 
counts of genocide, aggravated homicide, grave and wilful injury, abuse of power and 
unlawful detention in violation of the 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code.”664  
 
The defendants denied of the commission of the said crimes and presented preliminary and 
substantive objections to the charges. According to a document issued by the Federal High 
Court, these arguments in the main trial included that: the court has no jurisdiction and 
legitimacy to try them; they acted in defence of the revolution, national unity, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the nation; the crime of genocide does not cover political groups, or 
the killing or elimination of political groups cannot constitute the crime of genocide etc.
665
 
 
The final verdict of the Federal High Court in the main trial was thus rendered almost 13 
years after the start of the proceedings.
666
  The following observation provides an overview of 
the findings of the court in the main trial involving the high officials, or policy and decision 
makers. 
  
First, the court found all except one defendant guilty of genocide. Second, the court 
found all but nine defendants guilty of aggravated homicide. Third, the court found all 
but one defendant guilty of public incitement to commit genocide. Fourth, the court 
found all but one defendant guilty of unlawful arrest and detention. One defendant, 
                                                             
662FRODE ELGESEM and G.A. ANEME, Above n 661 at 39 
663For details on this, see FRODE ELGESEM and G.A. ANEME, Above n 661 at 39-41 
664K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, 2009, Concluding the Main Red Terror Trial: Special 
Prosecutor v. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, 
(eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey , at 137 
665Special Prosecutor v. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al., First Division Criminal Bench, Verdict, File No. 
1/87, 12 December 2006. 
666There is no doubt that the examination of the charges as well as the arguments and evidence presented by 
both parties requires a considerable time. However, as will be discussed there was apparently undue delays 
having negative effects. 
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however, was set free by the court as he was found to have defended his case against 
all charges. The verdict of the court was passed by a majority vote of two to one.
667
 
 
After the verdict, a sentencing process was initiated and both the SPO and the defendants 
presented their arguments regarding sentencing. After considering the aggravating and 
extenuating circumstances presented by the parties, in January 2007, the court passed 
sentencing by a majority of two to one, imposing imprisonment as the main punishment.
668
  
 
The following observation summarizes the courts sentencing. 
 
After rejecting the death penalty, the court imposed rigorous life imprisonment 
on 48 defendants, 25 years of rigorous imprisonment on two defendants and 
23 years of rigorous imprisonment on five defendants. The court ruled that the 
sentence was not applicable for those defendants who were already sentenced 
to death in other federal or regional courts for other crimes. The court also 
ruled that the defendants imprisoned for life may not participate in elections 
and permanently barred from holding any public office, while the defendants 
sentenced to 25 and 23 years of rigorous imprisonment are barred from 
participation in elections and from holding public office for five years from 
the date of their release.
669
   
 
Thus, in the main trial, “a total of fifty-five top officials of the Derg – WPE government were 
convicted and sentenced, [of which] twenty-two of the top officials – including Colonel 
Mengistu  Hailemariam, the military leader of the Derg and former Ethiopian head of state 
1977-91 – were convicted in absentia.670  
 
The verdict and the sentencing was an issue of controversy. The debate about the sentencing 
is clear from the following observation. 
 
                                                             
667K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 137 and 138. For an analysis of the 
dissenting opinion, see pp. 138-140. 
668See K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Ibid at 141-142. The court rejected death penalty 
arguing that extenuating circumstances existed and that the aim of punishment is reform rather than revenge.  
669K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME ,Ibid  at 142 
670K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Ibid at 136 
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The Ethiopian Federal High Court sentenced Mengistu and his accomplices to life 
imprisonment. The verdict and sentencing were supposed to close one chapter in 
Ethiopia’s horrendous and turbulent past. By evading capital punishment, however, 
the court’s decision sparked angry reactions since others accused of who were of 
lower political stature had previously been handed the death penalty.
671
  
 
Thus, it was apparent that the prosecution would lodge an appeal. On the side of the 
defendants too, there was dissatisfaction with the verdict as well as the sentencing. 
 
An appeal was lodged against the verdict and sentencing by both sides to the Federal 
Supreme Court. The SPO’s appeal requests the appellate court to impose the death penalty on 
the defendants. It forwards three arguments. First, there was no extenuating circumstance as 
opposed to the High Court’s findings. Secondly, the fact that the defendants committed 
concurrent crimes in their highest official capacity should be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance. Finally, the SPO argued that the defendants are senior party and government 
officials that made the decisions and plans for the commission of crimes, it is inappropriate to 
sentence them to a lesser penalty than low-ranking officials and commanders.
672
 
 
At the same time, the defendants in the main trial also lodged their appeal against the Federal 
High Court’s verdict and sentencing. The defendants’ main arguments included; SPO’s 
evidence did not establish that the defendants committed crimes; and the conviction by the 
Federal High Court was collective punishment solely based on their membership of the Derg. 
They also argued that their conviction for the crime of genocide was wrong because the 
killing or elimination of members of a political group did not constitute the crime of 
genocide.
673
  
 
The Federal Supreme Court rendered its decision on both parties’ appeals on 26 May 2008.674 
The Federal Supreme Court rejected the appeal by the defendants against the Federal High 
                                                             
671K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, 2009, The ‘Red Terror’ Trials: The Context of 
Transitional Justice in Ethiopia, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian 
Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, at 1 
672K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 143 
673K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 143-144 
674Kje K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 144 
 
 
154 
 
Court’s verdict and sentencing.675 It rather accepted the SPO’s arguments for the imposition 
of the death penalty, and thus imposed death penalty on 18 respondents.
676
 
 
The main transitional justice trial presents one example of the many transitional justice trials 
conducted in Addis Ababa and in the regions capital cities. As noted in Chapter one, a 
document issued by the Special Prosecutors office, after the end of the trial process, provides 
a summary of figures about these proceedings including on the number of victims, witnesses 
and documentary evidence, suspects prosecuted, convicted or otherwise acquitted.  
Accordingly, of 16, 496 alleged victims, 12, 733 was established in court; 16, 107 witnesses 
were documented, of which 8047 testified before courts. The SPO submitted 15,214 pieces of 
documentary evidence; among the suspects, 5119 were prosecuted and tried (some in 
absentia), of which 3583 were convicted and penalized while 1539 were acquitted.
677
   
 
An important issue that arise in relation to the transitional justice trials in Ethiopia is the 
rights of the defendants. In this respect, there were serious complaints about the violations of 
the rights of the defendants. One study reveals that the Ethiopian transitional justice trials 
involved serious violations of defendants’ rights. 678  These breaches related to the right to be 
brought promptly before a court and trial within a reasonable time or to release; the right to 
be tried without undue delay; the right to hearing before an adjudicating court (especially 
continuous hearing and an uninterrupted presence of all parties including the judges); the 
right to counsel (especially after the establishment of the public defender’s office); and the 
issue of capital punishment.
679
 Apparently, the trial process involved unreasonable delay 
impinging on the rights of the accused. Clearly, “the delays can be attributed to both the 
general handling by the SPO of the Red Terror Trials, the lack of capacity of the Ethiopian 
judiciary and the inefficiency of the criminal procedure.”680 The issue of delay had effect not 
                                                             
675For more details see K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 144-145 
676 For more details see K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, Above n 664 at 145-149 
677See SPO Report. (January 2002 E.C). Dem Yazele Dose (Amharic word approximately to mean “A file 
containing blood”).  Addis Ababa: SPO. Chart number III. One may note that 16 496 were alleged victims of 
which 12 733 was established at court.  
678FRODE ELGESEM and G.A ANEME, Above n 661at 45-50. We should note that no death penalty was 
carried out. In fact, many of those sentenced to death get the sentence commuted to life imprisonment and 
ultimately released following conditional release upon completion of two-third of their sentence. 
679FRODE ELGESEM and G.A. ANEME, Ibid, at 45-50. We should note that no death penalty was carried out. 
In fact, many of those sentenced to death get the sentence commuted to life imprisonment and ultimately 
released following conditional release upon completion of two-third of their sentence. 
680FRODE ELGESEM and G.A,Ibid,  at 44. For more details, see pp.44-47. As will be seen from the empirical 
data, the dual nature of the SPO mandate is also one reason for the delay. 
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only on the rights of the accused, but, as will be shown, also affected people’s perception on 
the overall societal impact of the trial process.  
 
To conclude, the above descriptions provide an overview of the Ethiopian transitional trials. 
It involved enormously huge and complicated processes of investigation, prosecution, trials, 
verdict and sentencing. It is thus becomes necessary to consider their social and political 
impact. This involves examination of the appropriateness of the transitional justice 
framework as well as its ultimate results based on empirical data. 
 
5.2.3 Interrogating the Legal Framework 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability was 
legally introduced through the establishment of the Special Public Prosecutors Office in 1992 
by Proclamation No. 22/1922.  It is critical therefore to evaluate whether the legal framework 
was appropriately designed. The present author has endeavoured to accomplish this task by 
analysing the data collected through interviews. The responses of each respondent are closely 
considered, categorized, and connections between different responses were analyzed to 
identify areas of convergence and divergence in light of specific themes relevant to the legal 
framework. These themes relate to the following questions.   
 Was prosecution the appropriate model to deal with Ethiopia’s past?  Or differently 
put, was prosecution an appropriate choice? 
 How was the prosecution model designed - was there public participation? 
 Was the process all-inclusive in addressing all violations, perpetrators and victims? 
 What conception of Justice was adopted, and more importantly was it appropriate?681 
 
In what follows, I will present the available data, with due care to incorporate the views of 
the different stakeholders in all themes of analysis.  
 
5.2.1 On the modality adopted 
 
                                                             
681 This question is addressed in relation to the other questions, and hence is not given a separate discussion. 
This is because, this author believes, it cannot be separated from the other issues. 
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It is clear that the modality of transitional justice adopted in Ethiopia was criminal 
prosecution against those who committed violations in the past. This research inquired 
whether prosecution was the appropriate choice in dealing with the past. Respondents were 
asked the question: was prosecution an appropriate remedy to past violations. For purposes 
of analysis, the responses were categorized into three categories; (1) the pro-prosecution and 
trial perspective, (2) the pro-truth and reconciliation perspective, and (3) the mixed 
perspective. Exemplary opinions from each category are presented below. 
 
The Pro-prosecution and trial perspective 
 
According to this view, criminal prosecution and trial was an appropriate response to past 
violations committed in Ethiopia. Respondents in this category, with some differences in 
expression and perspective, forward more or less similar arguments in support of prosecution. 
They also reject other transitional justice processes. Exemplary views are presented and 
analyzed below. 
 
A former Special Public Prosecutor, after explaining the violations/crimes committed by the 
Dergue, stated that;  
 
After the coming of a new government (change of government), it was necessary 
to address the issues of justice in the country just like other issues because justice 
had been denied for a long time and the need for justice was upfront and cannot be 
overlooked. Justice was really a priority area.  Therefore, the fact that the 
transitional government had recognized the absence of justice during the Dergue 
regime and that the perpetrators had not been brought to courts, and its conviction 
to address the issue of justice, perhaps giving more priority to it, by establishing 
appropriate institutions is a very justified measure. It was a matter of urgency to 
address such a long overdue issue. So, it was appropriate to investigate these 
matters and bring perpetrators to justice.
682
  
 
                                                             
682Anonymous R3.2012. Interview with the author on 12 December 2012. Addis Ababa. [Cassette recording in 
possession of author]. This former SPO nevertheless commented that the lack of adequate reparation can be 
considered as one weakness of the framework. 
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These arguments are consistent with the theoretical justification forwarded by proponents of 
prosecution as discussed in chapter 4. Prosecution was justified in light of the violent past and 
the denial of justice; as a repressive regime, the Dergue committed crimes with impunity, and 
hence the new system has to put an end to impunity and uphold rule of law.
683
Considering the 
extensive violations discussed in chapter two and the absence of accountability, justice may 
be a critical issue that requires to be addressed after a change of government. However, the 
above opinion emphasises on the need for retributive justice. However, this notion of justice 
is criticised, particularly by the second category of respondents. Although the above view 
commends the government for what it did, this same appraisal suggests the extent to which 
the incoming government has influenced the framing of the process. It also suggests the real 
motivations in formulating transitional justice processes discussed in chapter four. The 
government, arguably, was motivated by the desire to see justice; it was not driven by 
emotion or self-interest.
684
  
 
Another former SPO, beginning with a critique of bad experiences of transition in Ethiopia, 
argued in favour of prosecution and trial in the following manner: 
 
We had a bad experience of transition in this country
685
....When we see the 
transition of the 1991 and what followed, we can see two departures. First,... the 
government had honoured its promise of bringing Derg officials to justice. 
Second, they were tried in an independent and impartial manner. When we 
consider these two things and the current release of the convicts unlike what they 
themselves did to the officials of the imperial regime, we can witness a better 
experience not only to Ethiopia but to Africa as a whole. It is a departure from the 
past and a new experience; it was a country where the incoming government used 
to exterminate former officials; now we have a better experience.
686
 
 
                                                             
683 This respondent also admitted that other political groups committed crimes, which will be discussed under 
inclusiveness of the framework. 
684 However, as will be shown, this position was contested by respondents in the second category. 
685 This bad experience relates to the history of Ethiopian leaders violently dealing with former leaders. A recent 
history of this is shown in chapter two, where the Dergue extra judicially killed the last Emperor Haile Sillassie 
and sixty high officials of the Imperial regime. History also shows how the various emperors or kings dealt with 
previous emperors at their wish. 
686Anonymous R6 . Interview with the author, December 2012. Addis Ababa. This former SPO, even argued, 
other options are inconsistent with the legal solution. This argument is not convincing in light of the discussion 
made under chapter 4, particularly in light of the idea of holistic approach to transitional justice. 
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Here, the case for prosecution rests on two things. First, what the incoming government did 
during the transition is a departure from previous bad experiences where the fate of former 
leaders was placed in the hands of new leaders. From chapter two, we understand how the 
Dergue extra judicially eliminated Emperor HaileSillassie and his high officials. This is an 
experience of political justice, where the leaders do whatever they want against those 
believed to be criminals or perpetrators. Although such comparisons are important, one may 
question whether issues of transitional justice are issues of governments or leaders alone.
687
 
Secondly, the view asserts the impartiality and independence of the prosecution and trial 
process. This implies that the elements of legal justice were satisfied. This again might 
suggest a departure from previous experiences of political justice.  
 
The argument in support of prosecution also depends on its role in preventing revenge or 
private justice.
688
 This view reaffirms the appropriateness of criminal prosecution underlining 
that it had prevented possible revenge for past violence. It implies the relation between the 
lack of accountability and revenge, in the sense that individual justice would have been 
pursued in the absence of prosecution. However, two questions arise.  First, could not other 
processes of accountability prevent revenge? Secondly, and more importantly, such an 
argument assumes prosecution of all perpetrators, which does not fall under the scope of 
prosecutions within the framework or the practice of the actual prosecution processes. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to note that the above opinion goes hand in hand with the pro-
prosecution arguments discussed in chapter 4, which present ‘harmful effects” of non- 
prosecution as a justification for prosecution. 
 
A Special Advisor to the Prime Minister forwarded a similar argument by explaining the 
appropriateness of prosecution and inappropriateness of truth and reconciliation in light of the 
nature of transition in Ethiopia. 
 
It is important to ask when truth and reconciliation works. Truth and 
reconciliation works when two groups confrontationally face each other and you 
want to avoid further causalities. There are times when truth and reconciliation 
                                                             
687This issue is addressed in the sub-section dealing with the manner of designing the framework. 
688Anonymous R6, Above n 686. This former SPO noted, “The Ethiopian transitional justice model of dealing 
with the past through judicial process was very appropriate. It had prevented revenge. If the matter was handled 
through truth and reconciliation, it could have led to revenge even if the perpetrators publicly admit or 
acknowledge their crime.” 
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works. It is not any time. We have passed that time; the Dergue regime was over. 
So when the issue of how to handle the case arose, it was decided that it should be 
according to the law; we never take anything outside of the law. Dergue was 
operating outside of the law; it dismantled the parliament; it dismantled the law; it 
killed people without the law; the Dergue was a system without law. Thus, it was 
necessary to handle the case according to the law in order to establish rule of law. 
That is the reason we choose the legal way of handling the matter.
689
 
 
This suggests the general point that mechanisms of dealing with the past are context 
dependent, and in the Ethiopian context, prosecution, rather than truth and reconciliation was 
the appropriate solution. The view is that truth and reconciliation applies in case of negotiated 
transition. The Ethiopian transition resulted from the victory by the incoming government 
and the defeat of the Dergue, and hence there was no room for negotiation. Hence, in 
deciding how to deal with the past, it is clear that the incoming government decided it should 
be according to the law. In light of the fact that the Dergue dismantled the legal system and 
installed a system without law, one may appreciate the significance of prosecution to 
establish a new system founded on the rule of law. It sends a message that the new system is 
a departure from the past. This opinion supports the pro-prosecution arguments discussed in 
chapter four. However, the question is whether the rule of law is the only objective of 
transitional justice processes. Moreover, some of the expressions used by this senior 
government official – “we never take anything outside the law”, “that is why we choose the 
legal way of handling the matter” -  show not only that the decision to prosecute was made by 
the government but also the unwillingness to adopt other alternatives that may promote other 
objectives. 
 
In his opinion, the special advisor was also mindful of the importance of reconciliation but 
rather preferred the legal process as a solution. 
 
We do not know how much reconciliation has succeeded in South Africa.... I am 
accepting the argument that reconciliation prevents the creation of further 
conflicts within society. However, there is nothing like the rule of law. The law is 
the foundation of a society that has no alternative. There was a time when, 
                                                             
689Anonymous R4. Interview with the author on 14 December 2012. Addis Ababa 
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regarding the conflict in Somalia among the different clans, I was thinking of 
bringing the different clans together through truth and reconciliation; but not all 
efforts you make outside of the law may succeed.
690
 
 
This view recognizes the importance of reconciliation to peace and stability, an affirmation of 
the discussions made earlier. Nevertheless,here, we should note three interrelated points. 
First, although reconciliation was thought to be a good solution to Somalia, it was discredited 
as a solution in the Ethiopian context; however, if reconciliation prevents future conflicts, 
would not this be true for Ethiopia? Secondly, although the importance of reconciliation is 
admitted, the view is that no efforts including reconciliation outside the law may succeed. 
This highlights the problematic relationship between prosecution and reconciliation, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  However, reconciliation may not necessarily negate the rule of law. 
As discussed earlier, justice and reconciliation should not be seen as a trade-off. In other 
words, a society may adopt a transitional justice process that would advance reconciliation 
without forgoing justice or the rule of law. One may think of complementary mechanisms of 
promoting justice, rule of law, truth, and reconciliation. Finally, the above respondent is 
suspicious of the success of reconciliation in South Africa. Although drawing experiences 
and questioning the South African process of reconciliation is appropriate, it is difficult to 
dismiss reconciliation entirely for the same reason the respondent raised earlier, i.e. all 
processes are context dependent. The argument that it did not succeed in South Africa does 
not warrant failure anywhere.  
 
Another respondent, a brother of a victim of red terror, opined that the legal way of handling 
the matter was appropriate.
691He pointed out that “it was difficult or not good for the 
government to pursue other options; the government had no other option except to detain and 
prosecute the perpetrators.”692 It is interesting to note that although he did not himself believe 
in retribution or revenge, he thought the legal process was generally the appropriate solution. 
                                                             
690Anonymous R4, Above n 689. The argument goes on saying  “Apartheid had a philosophical ground; It was 
preached even by citing reference from the Bible; I do not know whether reconciliation had succeeded.” 
691Anonymous R38. Interview with the author on 13 November 2012. Mekelle. [Cassette recording in 
possession of author]. This family of a victim commented “prosecution and trial should be meant to educate the 
public and not to serve as revenge. He stated that he did not follow the proceedings in Mekelle, where his 
brother was killed, because he did not believe in revenge, which implies that the purpose of prosecution was 
revenge. Though this may negate prosecution as his preferred choice, he nonetheless supports prosecution as a 
general solution to past violation. He also commented “what do I get from it; My brother was killed. Do I get 
any thing from the prosecution?” 
692Anonymous R38, ibid 
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Asked whether a truth and reconciliation process was possible or desirable, he replied as 
follows: 
 
Reconciliation was impossible because people were angry at the time. Things settled 
down because of the detention of the perpetrators. If reconciliation efforts were 
undertaken, it would give the impression that the new regime was not better than or 
even the supporter of the former leaders. It was not acceptable. If you say let us bring 
the matter to negotiation, no one negotiates with his brother’s killers.693 
 
This is a victim /relative’s view of the Ethiopian framework. It generally views prosecution 
as a proper modality of dealing with past violators while truth and reconciliation or other 
processes were rejected based on two grounds. The first is the implication for the new 
government in the sense that pursuing prosecution was a matter of legitimacy. As opposed to 
the first respondent, the opinion here suggest one motivation in the Ethiopian transition was 
the incoming government’s self-interest to present itself as different from the out going 
government. The second emphasises that victims were not ready to accept reconciliation or 
other processes, and thus highlights reconciliation cannot be imposed. This victim’s family 
supports at least some aspects of the process (the detention of the perpetrators) for its 
instrumentality in avoiding vengeance (revenge) or legitimacy of the new regime.
694
He 
further noted: 
 
It would have been better if...some compensation have been paid. However, the 
Dergue members did not have money to pay compensation. I would have liked if the 
new government could have paid some compensation.
695
 
 
This highlights the importance of payment of compensation to victims or relatives. Some 
respondents in this category and third category share this idea.
696
 However, a senior 
government official and a former Supreme Court judge do not accept the idea of 
                                                             
693Anonymous R38, ibid 
694Anonymous R38, Ibid. He noted, “the detention of the top leaders at the time was appropriate because in the 
absence of such, people would have killed each other, and it was not good for the regime for it could have gave 
the impression that the new regime was just like the Derg regime.” 
695Anonymous R38,ibid. Although of little relevance, I should indicate that this respondent also acknowledges 
the importance of acknowledgement of crime by perpetrators once the legal process was over.  
696Anonymous R6, Above n 686; Interview with Anonymous R20 
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compensation.
697
While noting the existence of legal framework to claim compensation from 
individual perpetrators, direct claim from the government was apparently problematic, as 
suggested below:  
 
Such kind of compensation framework was not in place at all. The question whether 
the transitional government should accept the crimes of the old regime entails 
considering resource capabilities and above all compromising principles. Primarily, 
the new government had to make an armed struggle protesting existing human rights 
violations, took arms to fight, and in most cases being victim itself of the gross rights 
violations. In all these and other reasons, therefore, the possibility of such 
compensation framework remains questioned.
698
 
 
We shall consider two arguments that question the issue of reparation or compensation. The 
first is the question of resource limitations, which makes compensation difficult. However, as 
argued under chapter 4, “the level of difficulty is not a legitimate excuse of governments to 
avoid their legal and moral obligation to provide redress to victims.”699 Thus, difficulty 
should not be taken as impossibility. Secondly, the above view argues that the new regime in 
Ethiopia cannot be held responsible for violations committed by the former regime. The 
discussion under chapter 4, again, contests such assertion because successor regimes have an 
obligation to provide remedy for violations committed by previous regimes. This is important 
not only to redress wrongs but also to move forward. Thus, the arguments against 
compensation or reparation are apparently not acceptable. 
 
Although the significance of reparation or compensation was acknowledged, the arguments 
against a reparation or compensation policy were also based on the difficulty of setting the 
time of departure for compensable wrongs and whether compensation is the primary 
component of the Ethiopian conception of justice.
700
 It is true that violence and violations of 
                                                             
697Anonymous R4, Above n 689;  and Anonymous R2. Interview with the author on 13 December 2012. Addis 
Ababa.[cassette recording in possession of author]. 
698Anonymous R2, Above n 697. 
699 DOXTADER, Above n 531 at 27 
700Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  He further noted “To say that justice is really served, we need to acknowledge 
the fact that civil reparation and civil remedy are indispensable, which in our context is doubtful to say the least. 
The country of ours holds a long history of oppression, repression and crimes against humanity. It is not only 
victims of the red terror who have scary memories of our past. It goes further back to periods of the kings and 
old empires, where countless crimes of many forms had been committed....That is why addressing the issue [of 
reparation] becomes a more complex one. In fact such things would have been easy to address in an 
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rights have a long history in Ethiopia. However, if the significance of reparation is 
acknowledged, the problem of determining which wrongs are compensable is a question that 
relates to the difficulty of reparation programs and this difficulty, it can be argued, cannot be 
an excuse to neglect a legal and moral obligation. The point that reparation works in 
individualistic western societies and smooth transitions is difficult to defend in light of the 
discussion under chapter 3 and 4. Reparation has significance to post-conflict and post-
authoritarian societies whether the transitions occur through negotiation or force. The 
question whether compensation is a primary component of justice in Ethiopia might have 
important point. However, the counter argument that it is a component of justice is not denied 
and that is why the victims above preferred the incorporation of some reparation program not 
as a substitute but as a complimentary remedy. We should recall, as discussed under chapter 
4, that reparation is the most direct benefit to victims of past crimes. Reparation should 
neither be seen nor implemented as blood money. It is a form of acknowledgment of past 
wrongs and an expression of the commitment not to repeat the past. A former SPO 
prosecutor, who supports the prosecution process nonetheless criticised the Ethiopian 
transitional framework as “obviously defective” for its failure to address questions of 
reparation.
701
This is a problem of incomprehensiveness in addressing issues of transitional 
justice.  
 
Nevertheless, one should note that the incoming government instituted mechanisms of 
restitution as an important component of reparatory justice or transitional justice in general, 
however limited the implementation might be.
702
Separate laws were adopted later in 1995 
and 1996 allowing victims to reclaim properties they were arbitrarily deprived of.
703
As 
discussed in chapter 4, the reclaiming of property rights or restitution is a key component of 
reparation for victims, and hence can be taken as an important element of the Ethiopian 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
individualistic society and in cases where basically smooth power transition is possible.”  He further noted that “ 
the concept of justice in the country is fundamental....What kind of concept of justice is held by the general 
public. Ours is quite a different case. In our case victims are often much worried about bringing perpetrators to 
justice than receiving a compensation. The issue of compensation is commonly relegated to a secondary 
agenda.”  
701Anonymous R3, Above n 682.  
702K. TRONVOLL, C. SCHAEFER, AND G.A. ANEME, 2009, The ‘Red Terror’ Trials: The Context of 
Transitional Justice in Ethiopia, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian 
Red Terror Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, p. 9 
703See Proclamation No.110/95; the Proclamation for the Review of Properties Taken In violation of the 
Relevant Proclamations; Directive No. 001/96, A directive establishing the procedure of restitution of properties 
as per proclamation 110/95. 
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transitional justice process. Nevertheless, they are restricted to violation of property rights 
alone and a comprehensive reparatory program is lacking.  
 
An elderly woman who lost her husband and son due to Dergue’s Red Terror noted the 
appropriateness of the process as follows: 
 
The Dergue massacred the people, and the prosecutions focus on Dergue members 
that massacred the people was an appropriate procedure. However, even those that 
supported the Dergue should have been prosecuted.
704
 
 
Clearly, this suggests that actors other than perpetrators should have also been held 
accountable. However, looking at the challenges of prosecution, one could question if this is 
possible or even desirable. Nevertheless, holding them accountable through other processes 
might be possible. It is important to note that the above victims’ family also notes the 
significance of some reconciliation process although it was thought that this should come at 
the end of the judicial process; as noted below: 
 
Reconciliation has been one of the essential values in the culture of our people. We 
lived this way for long. However, reconciliation was not possible while the judicial 
process was underway because the perpetrators were not acknowledging their 
wrongdoings. Once the judicial process was over and the perpetrators were convicted 
and acknowledge their wrongdoing, I think it is proper to reconcile. I think this was 
done through elders.
705
  
 
While this view clearly highlights the importance of reconciliation, there is no evidence 
whether such reconciliation did take place. This is confirmed neither by other victims nor by 
officials. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the significance of reconciliation from the perspective 
of a victim’s family 
 
Similarly, some residents in both Mekelle and Addis Ababa support the view that the 
prosecution and the judicial process was the appropriate mechanism of dealing with the 
                                                             
704Anonymous R8. Interview with the author on 15 October 2013. Addis Ababa. [cassette recording in 
possession of author]  
705Anonymous R8, Ibid.  
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past.
706
Moreover, three of the four judges/former judges and a former Dergue Cadre
707
 
interviewed have aired more or less similar opinions. However, apart from stating 
prosecution was appropriate, most of them gave little or no explanation. I think it could be 
sufficient to present the view of a former Supreme Court vice president: 
 
The protection of human rights is a matter that has gained international recognition. 
Thus, it is not an issue of our country alone; human rights are matters that all 
countries consider as their own agenda. It is not only protecting human rights, each 
state has an obligation to address human rights violations if they are committed. I 
think, our country has followed a similar route.
 708
 
 
The interesting point here is the appeal to international human rights law grounding the 
support for prosecution. This arguably relates to the duty to prosecute imposed by 
international law, as discussed in chapter four. Thus, prosecution was seen not only as a 
matter of choice but also as a matter of discharging the duty of the state under international 
human rights law. 
 
Some have underlined the inappropriateness of truth and reconciliation on the ground that the 
context in Ethiopia did not support it.
709
It was contended the context in South Africa was 
different from the one in Ethiopia in terms of their history, manner of transition, nature of 
party in power, and availability of evidence.
710
 Thus, the appropriateness of prosecution, and 
the inappropriateness of truth and reconciliation, to the Ethiopian context was 
reiterated.
711
The ordinary, judicial and ordinary way of dealing with violations was seen as 
the appropriate mechanism of dealing with the past. Apart from the victorious-vanquished 
debate, the availability of evidence was also presented as a reason, with the implication that 
                                                             
706 Few examples here include Anonymous R13, R17, R18, R32 and R 33. 
707Anonymous R9.  Interview with the author on 9 November 2012. Addis Ababa.  This respondent was a 
Dergue Cadre in Mekelle during the red terror. He was nevertheless not prosecuted because, according to him, 
he was not involved in violations, and even related to the author that he was not informed of any of the red terror 
mass killing plans or their execution, and that he became aware of the crimes committed as any member of the 
society.  
708 Anonymous R2, Above n 697 
709 Anonymous R2, ibid. He commented, “in thinking about a solution, the context is essential; I do not think, a 
copy and paste of a solution of one country works for another” 
710 Anonymous R2, ibid 
711 Anonymous R2, ibid. This was noted as “When I think in retrospect, rather than the truth and reconciliation, 
following the judicial, ordinary and well known path does not seem problematic to me. Was it possible to adopt 
truth and reconciliation in our context at the time? I doubt that. It is necessary to look at the political conditions 
at the time. On the one hand, we have the victorious force, and on the other we have the vanquished...There was 
evidence, and other things were available. Thus, pursuing the official, judicial path was appropriate.” 
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truth and reconciliation may be pursued when there is a problem of evidence. It is clear that 
the above views are compatible with the official narration as noted by the Special advisor to 
the PM.  
 
Generally, the above views underline that prosecution was an appropriate mechanism of 
dealing with the past. Despite their different personal backgrounds, all of them endorse 
prosecution as an appropriate mechanism of dealing with past violations. Nevertheless, points 
of divergence among these respondents on the implication and outcome of the process 
remain. However, the adequacy of prosecution might be questionable. Let us turn to the pro-
Truth and Reconciliation arguments. 
 
The pro-Truth and Reconciliation process perspective 
 
This perspective rejects the prosecution and trial process, in favour of others particularly the 
truth and reconciliation process to deal with past crimes. Once again, more representative 
responses are presented below with due care not to ignore possible variations within this 
category. 
 
A lawyer with an international prosecution processes rejected the Ethiopian prosecution and 
judicial process for its actual failure to address the past:  
 
The trials were isolated. They were held in very isolated quarters, the attendants of 
the trial were very few people; actually, towards the end, there was no audience at 
all. So, it was badly organized. The attempt was really more of revenge than 
bringing about reconciliation. So, the purpose was just to punish those wrong 
doers rather than teaching the people of what had happened, and exorcise the 
demon of the red terror. The Concentration or the emphasis was on more of 
revenge than reconciliation.
712
  
 
Here, the prosecution process is criticized for its emphasis on punishment or revenge rather 
than reconciliation and the education of the people. The above opinion is in line with the idea 
presented by opponents of prosecution including Kader Asmal [discussed in chapter four). 
                                                             
712Anonymous R11.  Interview with the author on 16 December 2012. Addis Ababa. [cassette recording in 
possession of author] 
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This view considers reconciliation and public education as important elements of transitional 
justice processes. As already discussed in chapter 4, retributive justice might, coupled with 
other processes, even contribute to reconciliation. The problem arises when retribution is seen 
as the sole purpose of criminal proceedings. As discussed in chapter 4, the perception of 
prosecutions as vengeance may affect the outcome of the transitional process. Another 
criticism that was made of the actual process was the lack of proper organization of the trials 
and the absence of public attendance of the trials. Interestingly, respondents from the first and 
third category also recognized these deficiencies.
713
 In the absence of proper organization and 
public attendance, a question arises whether the process would educate the public about the 
past and its effect on future behaviour. This also questions whether victims’ needs - for 
example the need for justice and truth – could possibly be satisfied. Moreover, the process is 
criticized for the lack of rehabilitation – perpetrators and even victims. The implication of 
this view is that the prosecution process did not result in effective transition. 
  
This point is reiterated as follows: 
 
The attempt or concentration was really more on punishment than reconciliation or 
even rehabilitation of the wrongdoers. I do not believe that the devil of the red terror 
has been exorcised really. I do not think the trials have really cleansed the people 
from the red terror guilt. ...It has not contributed anything whatsoever to the 
reconciliation of the people.
714
 
 
This is a strong indictment of the prosecution process as it was operated and implemented in 
reality. The above view also reveals certain preferences including reconciliation, educating 
the people and rehabilitation. The significance of reconciliation is highlighted by citing the 
consequences of the lack of it: 
 
                                                             
713Anonymous R10. Interview with the author on 16 December 2012. Addis Ababa. [Cassette recording in 
possession of author]. Anonymous R31. Interview with the author on 17 December 2012. Addis Ababa. R31 
“the lack of prosecutorial strategy on the part of the SPO creating problems even for victims to attend 
proceedings.”  R10 indicated, “the public lost interest in the proceedings as time goes by, ultimately making the 
trial a forum only for the judges, the SPO and the defendants.”  He stated even victims or relatives lost interest 
in the proceedings. 
714Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
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The ethnic hatred that is developing within the country is frightening; especially for a 
person who has witnessed what happened in Rwanda. It really terrorizes me what is 
happening. That is the consequence of [the lack of] any reconciliation. 
715
 
 
This view is wary of the negative effects of lack of reconciliation in Ethiopia – ethnic hatred. 
This opinion is shared by a former SPO, who commented, “the Government far from 
promoting reconciliation is escalating division and polarization within the society”. 716 In 
other words, reconciliation would have prevented such hatred, which may lead to future 
conflicts. This is noted as follows: 
 
...the opposition parties time and again ask [for there to be] reconciliation between the 
different factions, and of course there were several people killed during the EPRDF 
reign. There were many requests for all round reconciliation within the country with 
the victims of the red terror, between perpetrators of these crimes and victims if they 
are alive or their relatives; and conflict has been going on for a long time in Ethiopia 
now. So, it is a society which is living in conflict to this day because of lack of 
reconciliation, because no effort has been made on reconciliation.
717
 
 
This view highlights the importance of reconciliation in the Ethiopian context – reconciliation 
both at individual and political or social level. Second, the lack of reconciliation has led to the 
continuation of conflicts in the society. This suggests that the transitional process – 
prosecution - has not stopped conflicts within the society. Thirdly, as discussed in chapter 4, 
prosecution is considered as having a strong deterrence effect. The above view suggests, in 
the Ethiopian context, prosecution has not served as deterrence because the incoming 
government continued to commit similar violations.
718
We should also note the view that the 
opposition’s call for reconciliation, or all round reconciliation was ignored by the 
government, which might suggest the government’s motive was punishing perpetrators or as 
implied earlier to perpetuate division among the society.  
 
                                                             
715Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
716Anonymous R3, Above n 682. This respondent thinks that some reconciliation processes would be 
undertaken after the legal process was completed. 
717Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
718 However, the violations were of lesser degree. Some respondents in the first and third category believe that 
similar violations have continued to be committed. These respondents include Anonymous R3, R10 and R 20. 
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Proponents of the prosecution process dismissed political reconciliation as an impossible 
aspiration, clearly noted in the following questioning: 
 
Who are the parties to a dispute/who is in animosity with whom? Who is to reconcile?  
If one group says I can violate people’s right, and the other (the governing party) says 
I will not allow violation of peoples’ right, how can reconciliation be possible?719 
 
This is a rejection of political reconciliation on the assumption that opposition parties want to 
continue the culture of violence and the government is defending rights, and hence there is no 
room for reconciliation.
720
 However, the possibility of individual level or community level 
reconciliation is accepted in the following terms: 
 
If we talk of apology and forgiveness, rather than among political groups, apology 
and forgiveness shall be directed to the people; and reconciliation shall be seen from 
that perspective.
721
 
 
This clearly suggests the possibility of individual reconciliation without political 
reconciliation. As discussed in chapter 4, whether individual reconciliation takes place 
without political reconciliation or vice versa is contestable. However, it is interesting to see 
other proponents of prosecution that criticize the government’s rejection of the need for 
reconciliation. Thus, a former SPO prosecutor stated: 
 
I understand reconciliation in a different way than the government’s version of 
simplifying and trivializing the concept. The Dergue regime had created a big 
polarization within the society, within nations and nationalities. This has escalated 
even after this government.... The society has been absolutely polarized. Hence, one 
would want to take complementary measures to rectify this polarization and establish 
some sort of consensus.
722
 
 
                                                             
719Anonymous R5. Interview with the author on 18 December 2012. Addis Ababa  
720 Nevertheless, this perception about the opposition in itself shows the continuation of deep-rooted hatred and 
mistrust among the main political players. 
721Anonymous R5, Ibid. 
722Anonymous R3, Above n 682 
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The interesting point here is although the respondent supports prosecution, he also believes in 
the need for and possibility of reconciliation. The existence of polarization within society 
makes reconciliation necessary. However, reconciliation is seen not as a substitute for 
prosecution, but as a complementary measure.
723
 It emphasises the point that reconciliation 
requires some form of justice, as discussed in chapter 4. A victim who primarily supports 
prosecution supports this idea of reconciliation at the end of the judicial process.
724
This is a 
reflection of the idea of holistic approach to transitional justice. 
 
A victim of the red terror and former Minister rejected the prosecution process as 
inappropriate solution: 
 
In Ethiopia, the Derg killed a generation. As I said, very few people received 
judgement. The majority were not even questioned. Do we not have a murderer Derg 
member who was not detained even for a day? ...  Those whose hands were involved 
in these crimes from the top to the bottom were not touched at all; may be 0.1% of 
them might have appeared before courts, for different reasons.  You cannot try a 
system by imprisoning ...few people. In the first place, it is not justice to imprison 20 
persons especially in the absence of their leader [a reference to Col. Mengistu Haile-
Mariam]. For a generation lost, detaining, punishing, hanging and killing just 20 
people was not a solution. One generation was lost, close to a million; I do not think 
punishing 20 people for the lose of a million of a generation is the solution.
725
 
 
Here, the rejection of the prosecution process was based on its limitation in prosecuting very 
few violators; the majority of perpetrators (99.9%) were not brought to justice. However, 
some respondents from the first category contest this arguing to the contrary that the SPO 
prosecuted too many people.
726
 A respondent from the third category has also opined, 
“looking at the numbers prosecuted, one would not say it is too few: but compared to the 
                                                             
723Anonymous R3, Above n 682.  R3commented that such processes were expected at the end of the prosecution 
process. 
724Anonymous R8, Above n 704. Unlike the SPO, however, she stated such reconciliation did take place through 
elders. 
725Anonymous R39. Interview with the author on 12 December 2012. Addis Ababa. [Cassette recording in 
possession of author] . One should note that the maximum sentence was death penalty but never implemented; 
so there was no hanging and killing of convicts. 
726Anonymous R31, A, Above n 713; Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  Both argue the absence of selectiveness 
had led to delays. 
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number of prosecution, one may say few were convicted.”727Nevertheless, it is important to 
note how a victim’s perception is different. An effective transition may require some level of 
satisfying victim’s needs. The dissatisfaction of the victim with the prosecution process raises 
a question about whether effective transition is possible at all.  Again, the points above about 
the number of prosecutions and convictions may demonstrate the problematic aspect of 
wholesale prosecution – whether it is possible and desirable – discussed under chapter 4. 
 
Arguably, another problem with the prosecution process was that “...the Dergue destroyed 
evidence relating to red terror ... before 1983 E.C[before its fall].’728  The implication is that 
the destruction of documentary evidence by the Dergue had constrained the prosecution 
process. However, a former Supreme Court judge has refuted this argument.
729
Hence, the 
argument is that there was sufficient evidence to show that the state and Dergue members 
committed crimes, which reaffirms prosecution was a proper process of addressing the past. 
However, there existed certain limitations regarding evidence although not clearly attributed 
to deliberate destruction of evidence by Dergue members. There might be sufficient evidence 
regarding the crimes committed by the top leaders (or big fish). However, in light of the 
enormity of violations, the above view may impliedly tell us that some violators, if not many, 
went free.   
 
Rejecting the prosecution process, the respondent commented: 
 
...the establishment of the SPO was from the beginning unfair; the office should not 
have been established; because it was not the appropriate solution. Can you solve 
                                                             
727Anonymous R10, Above n 713.  
728Anonymous R39, Above n 725.  According to this respondent, these destructions of evidence occurred 
following the attempted coup in 1983 E.C 
729Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  He noted “I do not know how much of the documentary evidence was 
destroyed, and how much is left. A lot of evidence exists. If this is what is left, we can imagine what the whole 
evidence would be. A document recently published by the SPO includes lots of evidence collected from the 
Palace. If the Dergue members did not destroy this evidence, I do not understand which evidence they 
destroyed. Any way, if they have destroyed, they have not destroyed it all because the magnitude of the crime 
was so big that it was not possible to destroy all.... In any case, I would not think there was problem of evidence; 
rather, there was overwhelming evidence. These people or the regime was even declaring their acts of killings in 
newspapers and through radio and television...So, I do not think there was a lack of evidence because the 
government, that had a policy of committing crimes, could not possibly destroy all evidence. It may be difficult 
to find evidence in respect of each crime committed in every kebele [Amharic word for the lowest 
administrative level – locality]. I would not say there was lack of evidence to show that the big fish committed 
genocide or other serious crimes.”  
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Ethiopian political problem by establishing a certain institution that works for a 
limited time? You cannot solve.
730
 
 
The central point here is that Ethiopia’s problem is a political problem, which can hardly be 
solved through prosecution. This would normally lead to other alternative (s), which the 
above respondent would have preferred: 
  
The red terror issue is an issue that concerns Ethiopia as a nation. It is a national issue. 
It cannot be solved by putting few officials in prison. The problem is social. Social 
solution should be sought. Red terror is a tiny manifestation of Ethiopian politics. The 
bigger manifestation is how did the political forces called Dergue came to power? 
Who authorized it? Who opposed it? Who supported it? These are the problems.... 
Why did Ethiopian people keep silent while this was happening? What was the 
international community doing? There was silence.Thus, for this social and 
international problem, the solution cannot be to imprison few Dergue officials 
especially in the absence of their leader. As the problem was a social one, the solution 
should be a social one.
731
  
 
Clearly, the main problem identified here is how a repressive regime came about. 
Accordingly, the Ethiopian people and the international community were also responsible for 
letting the Dergue exercise state power. The people might be accused for supporting the 
regime or being silent. Hence, prosecuting some officials of the Dergue cannot be a solution 
according to this view, especially in the absence of Mengistu Haile-Mariam. Hence: 
 
The solution is to prevent the coming to power of any dictatorial regime 
(government).... The problem was how the Dergue did come to power. Who permitted 
it? The solution is to close that road; closing the possibility for coming to power using 
weapons or force. It is eliminating dictatorship; it is building a system; the lack of a 
system had created problems; if the case was one of few killings, it is a killing outside 
of the court, and it could have been dealt with accordingly; now, the problem is one of 
dictatorship regime or system, thus this road needs to be closed.
732
  
                                                             
730Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
731Anonymous R39, Ibid 
732Anonymous R39, Ibid 
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This underlines the systemic and political nature of the problem, and the need for other 
transitional processes. It argues a social problem cannot be solved through trial. Improving 
political culture, creating the culture of dialogue, listening to each other, understanding  and 
accommodating political differences, getting rid of the thinking that I shall alone rule, and 
creating a new system are thought as proper solutions not to repeat the past.
733
It is further 
stresses that ‘unless we do these...the past will come again.’734One crucial point 
abovementioned is the responsibility of the people – for, at least, keeping silent when the 
military took state power. According to Elster’s agents of transitional justice, they might be 
characterized at least as bystanders. In this respect, a senior government official opined that: 
 
There is a saying that each people gets the kind of government it deserves. I am 
not sure whether this applies to Ethiopia.  The people might have contributed in 
terms of supporting the Dergue because of excitement about the proclamation of 
land for the tiller; but Ethiopian people did not bring Dergue to power. One could 
not blame the people for supporting the military because it brought feudalism 
down; the motto was even ‘Ethiopia first without bloodshed’. Before the Dergue 
begun to kill, it looks like what is called the Prague Spring; for almost two months 
people were free to write what they want; there were festivities around Arat Killo. 
The real Dergue emerged later; It was later that people came to know that the 
Dergue was such a demon.
735
 
 
As opposed to the previous view, the argument here is that the people cannot be responsible 
for what happened in the past. The problem lies with the Dergue, and hence, the 
establishment of rule of law is necessary to avoid the recurrence of similar events.
736
Thus, the 
respondent further emphasises the significance of ensuring the rule of law, through 
prosecution process, that could prevent the military or dictators from coming to power.
737
 
                                                             
733Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
734Anonymous R39,ibid. 
735Anonymous R4, Above n 689.  A document published by the SPO in 2002 provides that although the 
Ethiopian people welcomed the overthrow of the imperial regime, they never supported the military’s taking 
control of state power. See “Dem Yazel Dose”, published by SPO, January 2002 E.C,  Far-East Trading, 
Pvt.Ltd, Addis Ababa 
736Anonymous R4, Ibid  
737Anonymous R4, ibid.  He stated “A coup does not happen in England and the US because there is a rule of 
law even if that rule of law may have many problems within it. You do not expect the military to take over 
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However, other respondents, in addition to arguing in favour of improved political culture 
and dialogue, further emphasised that a truth and reconciliation process was preferable as a 
solution to prosecution.  
 
The solution was to adopt a path similar to the one in South Africa. They said let us 
forgive each other.... Thus, in our case, without saying this and that, let every one tell 
what he did. Just to be in the opposition cannot show innocence. Everyone’s hand was 
involved in the killings perhaps with difference in degree. So, let everyone come 
forward and tell what he did; and let it be registered clearly. Let one begin to do so; 
let us all begin to do so; including me if there is something I did. [a truth and 
reconciliation process] serve as a forum where by every one of us promise to each 
other that the past will not be repeated again.
738
 
 
Interestingly, although this respondent is a victim of red terror, he underlines the importance 
of truth-telling and recording, forgiveness and all round commitment not to repeat the past as 
the best way of dealing with the past.  The point is that past violations cannot be attributed to 
one group; every one was involved with varying degree. This point also suggests the 
partiality of the prosecution process. Hence: 
  
The solution should have been a political solution; we should not have followed the 
prosecution process; we should have pursued the truth and reconciliation way like 
South Africa.
739
 
 
Considering the magnitude of violations committed and the deep-rooted social and political 
rifts that might have resulted, truth and reconciliation is thought as the best mechanism of 
rectifying past wrongs and building a new social and political system that departs from the 
past. The implication is that the prosecution process has failed to serve these two purposes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
government power. The army is subordinated to civilian government. So, it is necessary to have rule of law; 
guaranteed rule of law is necessary.” 
738Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
739Anonymous R39, ibid. Some of the accused have argued along this line in their preliminary objection to the 
charges of the SPO. See a preliminary objection presented against SPO charges December 1990 E.C,SPO file 
No.62/85 (copy with the author). The argument is that one cannot put a revolution on trial.  
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In this connection, a resident in Mekelle claims that many people view the whole process as 
motivated by revenge and not justice in the following terms: 
 
Do you think this process was designed to do justice? Do the people believe this 
government was doing justice? I do not think so.  It was rather revenge against the 
Dergue for what it did. People see it as revenge. In the past, new leaders used to kill 
or imprison former leaders. It is the same this time around except that the current 
leaders do it in the name of law or justice. People do not see it as a justice process but 
as revenge.
740
 
 
This clearly questions the government’s motivation of action, and suggests that the public 
view the process as not appropriate to deal with the past. The prosecution process had even 
led to the detention of people for many years without bringing them to a court of law, and this 
is not justice at all.
741Reflecting on what would have been better; he opined that “may be 
some reconciliation was important because people are still divided because there was no 
reconciliation”.742 
 
A resident in Addis Ababa similarly noted the significance of reconciliation as a best way of 
dealing with the past. 
 
The Dergue has killed thousands of the youth and the educated. It killed not only 
members of opposition political groups. It also killed many of its own members. 
Other parties also killed the Dergue and the Maison and their supporters. Even 
members of a family killed each other.It was a time of madness. Although most of 
these were committed in Addis Ababa, there were killings, torture in other parts of the 
country. Is it possible to prosecute all perpetrators? Therefore, for me, reconciliation 
was better to bring people together, forgive each other, and let their children learn 
from this and live in peace.
743
 
 
                                                             
740Anonymous R24. Interview with the author on 12 January 2012.  Mekelle [cassette recording in possession of 
author]  
741Anonymous R24, Ibid.  According to this respondent, some members of the Dergue were detained in Desie 
town, in Amhara regional state, for more than ten years without being taken to any court, and some of them died 
in prison, and the rest were final released after becoming too old. 
742Anonymous R24, Ibid  
743Anonymous R15. 2013. Interview with the author, Addis Ababa, August 2013.  
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Other residents and respondents in the second category had more or less similar opinion.
744
 
An example is the view of a respondent who underlined the need for justice but commented 
on the process adopted in Ethiopia in comparison with the South African process. 
 
Normally, in such situation one would want justice to be done and to bring 
perpetrators of some crimes to justice.... Strangely enough at that time,...we had two 
quite different views of all human rights organizations and all the major European 
powers and the United States. If you remember it was about the same time, 1991 that 
in South Africa, the Apartheid regime was dismantled and there was more or less 
similar situation. There were terrible atrocities committed in South Africa. I was at 
that time the Head of [a domestic non-governmental organization], and I found it 
strange that almost all Western governments and human rights organizations insisted 
on justice in Ethiopia while they were insisting on reconciliation in South Africa. 
Therefore,, I did not subscribe to their views, I was against.
745
 
 
This view generally recognizes the need for justice in light past atrocities committed in 
Ethiopia. However, the criticism and rejection of the prosecution process emanates from the 
unevenness of the international community in influencing national processes of 
accountability. One may however ask, apart from the issue of double standard, the extent to 
which the international community may influence national processes. For the above 
respondent, as opposed to the views in the first category, there was a similar situation in both 
Ethiopia and South Africa, and hence requiring similar transitional processes of 
accountability. 
 
 The criminal prosecution was also viewed as vindictive and a reflection of the racial bias of 
the international community, and hence unacceptable:  
 
I was against this so-called justice, which is vindictive. I insisted on the other hand 
why would not be it possible to view the Ethiopian situation in the same way as the 
South African situation. Why would not we have peace and reconciliation 
commission established here? I am sure the crimes committed in Ethiopia would not 
                                                             
744It is needless to present these views, as they do not substantially add to this study. 
745Anonymous R1.  Interview with the author on 17 December 2012.  Addis Ababa. [cassette recording in 
possession of author] 
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be worse than the crimes committed in South Africa for decades. Therefore, I saw that 
as a racial bias and I still believe it was a racial bias because the perpetrators of crime 
in South Africa were whites and so they wanted each white to be saved from the 
sword of justice. But, whereas here, it was Africans against Africans, so they wanted, 
insisted on justice, and I was against it.
746
 
 
This opinion highlights, first, the vindictiveness of the prosecution process, and hence the 
adoption of such conception of justice was not proper. As discussed in chapter 4, such a 
perception of transitional justice processes is counter-productive. Secondly, it underlines that 
the situations in Ethiopia and South Africa were similar requiring similar solution. As 
discussed earlier, such a view is contested by respondents in the first category.
747
Thirdly, it 
accuses the international community for influencing the national framework and having no 
objective standard; even worse, the accusation is that it is racially driven. These latter points 
might question the extent to which local voices and needs were articulated or neglected. 
These contestations would normally point to other processes, and hence peace and 
reconciliation was considered as a better option.  
 
The actions of the Ethiopian government might also serve as a ground for rejecting the 
prosecution or the judicial process, as noted below: 
 
On the part of the government too, there were problems; the regime in Ethiopia that is 
EPRDF.  What it considered violation or crimes against humanity is only from the 
side of EPRP. EPRP was equally guilty of committing crimes. They exonerated EPRP 
and in fact, some EPRP members... joined the government of the Woyane.  So it 
became farcical. It was only what the Dergue and the Maison committed that [was] 
considered as crimes and so the whole thing as far as I am concerned was not right 
from the beginning.
748
 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, transitional justice processes should be even-sided and address all 
perpetrators irrespective of their political affiliation. The above rejection of the prosecution 
process emanates from the narrow definition of wrongdoers in the framework, the view being 
                                                             
746Anonymous R1, Above n 745. 
747Examples include Anonymous R2, Above n 697 and R4, Above n 689. 
748Anonymous R1, Above n 745. 
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that the central problem with the prosecution lies in its partiality. This demonstrates the 
importance of even-sidedness in determining crimes or perpetrators that should be subjected 
to transitional justice process, an issue discussed in chapter 3. Clearly, the above view 
suggests that the incumbent exonerated EPRP from prosecution.
749
  
 
Briefly, the second category rejects prosecution as an appropriate remedy to past violations in 
Ethiopia based on its scope, actual operation and consequences. We also noted that they 
emphasis that truth and reconciliation, or peace and reconciliation was the proper mechanism 
of dealing with Ethiopia’s past, which is rejected by some respondents in the first category. 
Some reflection on these views is offered at the end of this sub-section. We now turn to the 
mixed perspective. 
 
The Mixed Perspective 
 
The mixed perspective favours a combination of both prosecution and reconciliation as the 
appropriate way of dealing with the past. The mixed perspective arises from the doubt 
whether full-scale prosecution is either possible or desirable in addressing past violations, and 
hence suggests a combination of mechanisms. This is clear from the following view, which 
while recognizing past violation and the need for accountability, questions whether 
prosecution across the board was a good choice. 
 
The stand taken on accountability was proper. However, these acts were committed 
over 17 years. There were many actors involved in these acts, perhaps in different 
capacities...Some made policy decisions, creating ideas and convincing others to act 
accordingly; and others at the bottom had implemented specific measures; so there 
were many steps. As the violations were state sponsored and committed by using state 
structures, so many people were involved. In addition, what the government did was 
to bring to judicial process all people in mass, in their thousands, that were allegedly 
participating in one way or another in the violations committed over the 17 years of 
the Dergue regime. Moreover, there were situations where individuals were arrested 
                                                             
749 This issue is analyzed in more detail in the sub-section dealing with inclusiveness of the process. Some 
respondents from the first category responded to this view by saying the emphasis was on state machinery, and 
that the crimes committed by EPRP or other political groups were very limited. 
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for similarity of names. In such a situation, was wholesale prosecution the appropriate 
choice?
 750
 
 
This view questions not prosecution per se but wholesale prosecution. The question arises 
due to the magnitude and number of participants. Is the judicial process capable of dealing 
with such magnitude of crime and huge numbers of alleged perpetrators? As discussed in 
chapter 4, it might not be possible or even desirable to prosecute all perpetrators. Other 
problems that might arise from the actual operation of prosecution process were highlighted 
including unjustified detention, the effects on speedy trial, and the institutional capacity of 
justice organs. These problems give rise to the following questioning: 
 
Was not it easier and appropriate to select and bring those who were involved in a 
clear and consistent pattern of violation to justice?  And was not it appropriate to deal 
with the rest through other mechanisms of justice by creating conditions for the 
perpetrators to publicly acknowledge their crimes, to apologize either through mass 
media or by appearing at places where they committed crimes and then clearly 
express their remorse?
 751
 
 
This questioning suggests a preference for a combination of prosecution, and truth and 
reconciliation processes or the need for complementary mechanisms of dealing with the past. 
The inadequacy of wholesale prosecution in Ethiopia was identified as follows:  
 
The process turned out to be boring, the public felt hopeless and lost interest; 
witnesses and victims or their relatives were fed up of attending courts; and I do not 
think, after 10 or so years, many people attended the proceedings when the court 
passed judgement. In the beginning, it was considered such a big miracle that there 
were too many people, victims’ families, and foreign media so that one needs 
[entrance card] to attend the proceedings. After a year or two, journalists and people 
slowly begun not showing up, and only victims or relatives were attending.  After 5 or 
6 years, it was just a proceeding between the SPO, the judges and the accused with no 
                                                             
750Anonymous R10, Above n 713. One former high court judge, the second respondent in this category – R20, 
and one respondent from the first category – R31 ( a supreme Court judge) , stated similarly that some people 
were detained for 8 to 12 years because of mistaken identity. 
751Anonymous R10, Above n 713. 
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victims’ families because some of them lost hope, others died, and others were fed up 
of the process.
752
 
 
Clearly, these negative effects attributed to wholesale prosecution relate to the problem of 
delay, which is also recognized by the first two categories of respondents.
753
Hence, according 
to the above third category respondent, “... that type of course of action [wholesale 
prosecution] was not a much needed choice”.754 This together with the above comments 
about wholesale prosecution suggests the need for a combination of processes. However, the 
idea of ‘wholesale prosecution’ used here is different from that discussed in chapter 4. In this 
context, it refers to prosecution of all Dergue members while the theoretical discussion 
related to prosecution of all perpetrators irrespective of their political affiliation (which was 
not the case in Ethiopia). Nevertheless, such distinction would not have affected the contents 
of the above response. 
 
Another respondent expressed more or less similar views. In light of the history of the 
country, the prosecution process was thought to be acceptable:  
 
At the time, it was the winning/victorious force that came to power. This force could 
have done whatever it wanted. It was good that this force thought about calmly and 
handled the matter through a legal process. It was appropriate. It was different from 
previous practices of summary execution, especially in light of the nature of this force 
that came through armed struggle.
755
   
 
However, further questioning whether other options were appropriate compared to 
prosecution followed this appraisal of prosecution: 
 
                                                             
752Anonymous R10, Above n 713. This will be discussed in more detail when we talk about the problems in the 
process. 
753Anonymous R11, Above n 712; Anonymous R31, Above n 713. Both of them stated lose of hope and interest 
on the part of victims’ families, witnesses and the public. R11 commented “the attendants of the trial were very 
very few people; actually towards the end there was no audience at all.” He attributes these problems to bad 
organization of the prosecution process, which may include lack of selectiveness. A former supreme court judge 
also stated the process took a very long time leading to lose of interest on the proceedings. See Anonymous R2, 
Above n 697  
754Anonymous R10, Above n 713 
755Anonymous R20.  Interview with the author on 18 December 2012. Addis Ababa. This view overlaps with 
the view of former SPO in the first category. 
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Then, as a country, one may think whether it was possible to go beyond that. I think, 
it would have been better for us to have truth and reconciliation. That was a better 
option. Why? It is because many things were not disclosed, and they remained 
unknown. When you have prosecution, people will not tell the truth for fear of 
punishment. If a different track was followed, people will feel free to tell the truth, 
and we would have known the truth. We had lost that opportunity.
756
  
 
Here, we see the argument in support of truth and reconciliation based on the need to 
establish the truth about the past. The truth of the past is equally important, and he thought 
prosecution could not serve truth, and the country has lost some thing by adopting 
prosecution rather than truth and reconciliation. This reinforces the criticism that the judicial 
process or prosecution is not an appropriate mechanism of discovering and establishing the 
truth, as discussed in chapter 4. It rather considers that truth and reconciliation commissions 
are the best institution for the task; whether this is true is itself a subject of debate as we have 
seen in the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4.  
 
It is clearly observed that prosecution process could not lead to the discovery of the truth: 
 
In court, you win a case. However, winning the cause is better. In court, you have 
winner and loser, and there is a possibility for saying the truth is the truth of the other. 
Prosecution cannot disclose the full truth, and if you want to give lesson for the new 
generation, a lot more is needed.
757
  
 
Although the above opinions tend to support only truth and reconciliation processes, the 
respondent ultimately seemed to accept a combination of prosecution and truth and 
reconciliation: He reiterated, “at least, it was possible to handle some through prosecution 
and others through truth and reconciliation.”758However, compared to the previous 
respondent’s view, the latter one is apparently more inclined to truth and reconciliation.  
 
Arguably, achain of political problems in Ethiopia can be observed as continuing as no lesson 
was derived from the past: 
                                                             
756Anonymous R20, Above n 755  
757Anonymous R20, Ibid. The issue whether the truth has been established will be discussed in chapter 6. 
758Anonymous R20, Ibid. 
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The Hailesillasie regime was removed by a generation that had no clear philosophy. 
There were moments of division and animosity among political parties. The Me’son 
did many wrongs. It is not appropriate to hold the Dergue alone responsible. We still 
have not drawn a lesson. 99% of the opposition think of removing EPRDF from 
power. Where do you head thereafter? It is unknown. That was what happened during 
the Dergue. We have not taken any lesson. The other point of failure to take lesson 
happened in the 2005 election. There were many wrongs. The opposition was talking 
of suing the government and so on. Nobody talked about tolerance and 
reconciliation.
759
 
 
This point emphasises the connection between the past and the present, and clearly suggests 
the failure of the prosecution process to bring about effective transition. It points to the 
absence of dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation. An obvious implication is the perpetuation 
of the political culture of suspicion, exclusion, animosity and conflict; pointing out that there 
is no departure from the past, which transitional justice processes aim at.  
 
Thus, arguably truth and reconciliation process would have solved the problem:  
 
It would have rather been better if we adopted the truth and reconciliation path. We 
could have learnt a lot, more truth could have been discovered; many books could 
have passed to the new generation for lessons. Now, the convicts were released. So, 
what?
760
 
 
Like the first respondent, the arguments in support of truth and reconciliation are also based 
on the length of time of the judicial process, unjustified detention of people, and the lack of 
capacity/competence in the justice machinery.
761
 A resident in Addis Ababa likewise supports 
the prosecution of top leaders of the Dergue and reconciliation processes among the 
remaining Dergue members and victims or families.
762
 
 
                                                             
759Anonymous R20, Above n 755  
760Anonymous R20, ibid 
761Anonymous R20, ibid 
762Anonymous R12. Interview with the author. June 2013. Addis Ababa. [Cassette recording in possession of 
author]. 
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This third category of respondents seems to take a mid way between the first and second 
category respondents. They support a combination of prosecution and truth and reconciliation 
sometimes with overlapping reasons. It is also quite interesting to see the existence of 
differences in reasoning as well as the tendencies of preferences. These views argue that 
prosecution alone was not the appropriate solution, and argue in support of dual processes of 
transitional justice.  
 
One central point in the response of the third category is the differential treatment of past 
violators. Hence, considering the magnitude of the violations and the need for more truth, the 
respondents support the selective prosecution of top leaders, policy makers, favouring truth 
and reconciliation process for the rest. However, a former SPO prosecutor rejects the idea of 
selective prosecution in the following manner: 
 
From the perspective of serving justice, to limit prosecution to the top leaders 
would have compromised justice. For a mother whose son was killed by Kebele[ 
lowest administrative organ] officials, would it be justice to prosecute the top 
leaders alone; I think that would be unjust. I think justice demands treatment of all 
equally. How do you select among the different violators? A criminal case is an 
issue of individual responsibility; rather than an issue of position, it is an issue of 
individual criminal responsibility. Secondly, one has to consider the issue from 
the perspective of the victims.
763
 
 
According to this view, justice requires the prosecution of all perpetrators from top to the 
bottom. Selectiveness refutes justice, and so when seen from the perpetrators or victims, 
justice requires equal treatment. However, one may question whether wholesale prosecution 
is desirable or possible. Most of the respondents in the first category acknowledged that it 
was impossible to prosecute all perpetrators.
764
 Nevertheless, the opinion of the SPO above 
reflects the notion of equality in criminal justice, and underlines the importance of 
prosecuting everyone. A counter-argument could be that this is impossible practically and 
undesirable in light of a broader conception of justice. Aformer SPO prosecutor also argued 
                                                             
763Anonymous R6, Above n 686 
764Anonymous R4, Above n 689; Anonymous R2, Above n 697; Anonymous R6, Above n 686; Anonymous R3, 
Above n 682. All of them admitted the limits of prosecution for lack of evidence or other reasons. A senior 
government official stated that “it would be a lifetime task and resource consuming if all perpetrators are to be 
prosecuted.” They nevertheless underline the importance of prosecution, and even argue that those not 
prosecuted today for lack of evidence can be prosecuted any time when evidence is secured. 
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that reconciliation is incompatible with prosecution underlining the appropriateness of 
prosecution.
765
This assumes a trade-off between prosecution and reconciliation. 
 
To conclude, in this sub section the issue of appropriateness of prosecution in dealing with 
past violations was considered. The question is whether the choice of prosecution was made 
deliberately and with care. The existing data shows there were different opinions on the 
appropriateness of prosecution as a modality of dealing with the past. The first category of 
respondents opined prosecution was the appropriate modality of dealing with the past and 
rejected truth and reconciliation. According to the views of respondents in the second 
category, truth and reconciliation process was understood as the best mechanism of dealing 
with the past. It was considered at least as a complimentary mechanism of dealing with the 
past - once the prosecution process was completed. The third category of respondents view a 
combination of prosecution and truth and reconciliation was appropriate. These diverse 
views, in category two and three, clearly demonstrate, as opposed to the views in the first 
category, that prosecution alone or as formulated and implemented in Ethiopia was not the 
appropriate solution to our past. This author would like to highlight some points that suggest 
the problematic nature of the Ethiopian transitional justice framework.   
 
First, in light of the history of violation discussed in chapter 2 and reaffirmed in this chapter, 
one may question the appropriateness of prosecution as the sole solution to the past. Clearly, 
enormous violations were committed over a period, where we had too many victims and 
perpetrators. In view of resource constraints and other technical matters (for example the 
availability of evidence) within the country, wholesale prosecution of all past violations could 
not have been possible. This may however calls for a combination of transitional justice 
process. In light of this, the Ethiopian transitional justice process is arguably problematic due 
to its failure to adopt a comprehensive mechanism of dealing with the past.  
 
The other point worth noting is that there has been deep-rooted ethnic, social and political 
division and animosity within the country. In such context, coming to terms with the past and 
building a better inclusive social and political system apparently requires some form of 
acknowledgement, forgiveness and reconciliation. It is clear that respondents from the first 
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category also recognize the importance of reconciliation or at least some form of it.
766
 The 
significance of reconciliation was clear. However, the Ethiopian transitional justice process 
did not incorporate a policy of reconciliation. Hence, we understand, from the data presented, 
that communal and political rifts, suspicion and polarization still perpetuate in Ethiopia, 
preventing effective transition. 
 
We should also note the view that the Ethiopian transitional justice process emphasises on 
punishment, or revenge. As already discussed in chapter 4, the conception of justice of the 
incoming leaders or regime might affect transitional justice process. Hence, we might say the 
conception of justice adopted in the Ethiopian transition prevented any process of 
reconciliation. It might be useful here to note the government’s refusal to pay attention to the 
call for reconciliation. If the government wants to end cycles of violence and build a new 
system, why should not it pursue some reconciliation process, even after the prosecution 
process, which promotes mutual trust, dialogue and accommodation of differences? 
 
Another important point that challenges the transitional justice framework is its partiality in 
defining victims or perpetrators, which will be dealt with in the next section. However, this 
point may be relevant here because the proper definition of perpetrators could have suggested 
that everybody was involved and as such, the solution could have been different.  
 
We can also understand that the implementation of the prosecution process appears to be 
diluted with serious problems. The views that the trials were badly organized, with increasing 
loss of public attendance, the lack of sufficient evidence, few prosecutions, and the like 
seriously contest the appropriateness of prosecution and suggest a different course should 
have been adopted. The abovementioned points might have also implication on the outcomes 
of the process and question whether Ethiopia had effective transition. 
 
                                                             
766 In this respect, the response of former SPO supporting reconciliation as a complementary measure, and a 
Supreme Court judge supporting individual or community level reconciliation should be kept in mind. We 
should also take note of earlier views of a senior government official who acknowledged the importance of 
reconciliation in preventing further conflict but argued any effort outside of the law does not work. 
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5.2.2.2 Public participation in the design of the legal framework 
 
As discussed in chapter three, transitional justice processes should be participatory and all-
inclusive in terms of decision-making, thereby deriving their legitimacy from the will of the 
people. In light of this, the other inquiry relating to the Ethiopian transitional justice process 
is whether the framework for prosecution was designed through public participation. 
Respondents were asked how the legal framework was designed in the sense of whether there 
was public participation in the design of the framework. Although possibly diverse responses 
were expected, all the respondents replied that the government or EPRDF formulated the 
framework. We recall from chapter two that the government at the time was a transitional 
government composed of representatives of political parties and not that of the people. It is 
also clear from the analysis in the preceding section that what the government decided was 
met with both approvals and rejections.  
 
None of the respondents claimed the existence of public discussion or participation on the 
issue of how to deal with the past. Most of the responses also do not explicitly address the 
issue of public discussion and participation. Rather, they choose to respond that it was simply 
the government that designed the framework. However, some respondents opined that 
victims and their families organized anti-red-terror campaigns demanding the government to 
bring perpetrators to justice.
767
 A document published by the SPO in 2002 E.C also notes this 
victims and relatives call for justice, and that the government had no choice but to create the 
necessary institutions for prosecution.
768
 Some respondents had clearly indicated that there 
was no public participation and the government alone formulated the framework. In 
expressing the lack of public participation, a victim and former Minister has opined that; 
 
Were the activities of the public prosecutor participatory? The activities were not 
nationwide; it was not like a storm/wave. Did the Ethiopian public follow the 
prosecutions? Most people do not know. How many people in the rural Ethiopia know 
about the red terror trials? Only few people know.
769
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Above n 686; Anonymous R10, Above n 713; Anonymous R20, Above n 755 
768 See SPO, “Dem Yazel Dose”, January 2002 E.c, Far-East Trading Pvt.Ltd, Addis Ababa. 
769Anonymous R39, Above n 725. This view is shared by a resident in Addis Ababa, who noted “apart from 
some media coverage, there was no public discussion on what should be done.” Anonymous R14, Interview 
with the author on 16 January 2014. 
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Although the opinion directly relates to the activities once the framework was designed, it 
can also be argued that this is a result of lack of participation in the design of the framework 
itself. A more direct criticism is expressed as follows: 
 
The EPRDF exclusively established an office for the prosecution and there was no 
participation by the people, and it was not even reported well in the papers.
770
 
 
Clearly, EPRDF, the incoming government, is singled out as the sole formulator of the 
framework. It was clear the EPRDF had a majority of seats in the Council of Representatives 
during the transitional period when the SPO proclamation was issued. A similar observation 
is offered in the following manner: 
 
They [EPRDF government] had some propaganda...they play to the parents of the 
victims or relatives of victims; they had some discussions within themselves but not 
really general discussion.
771
 
 
This is a clear expression of a lack of general public discussion and participation, apart from 
some limited discussion and consultation with victims groups. The existence of talks between 
the government and victim groups is also evident from the responses of other respondents 
who said the government and victims groups worked very closely particularly during the 
initial phase of the prosecution process.
772
However, this too seems problematic in view of the 
opinion that ‘victims of the EPRP were never considered’.773 
 
To conclude, the data presented reveals that there was no general public discussion on the 
issue of how to deal with the past. The discussion in chapter two clearly demonstrated that 
the transitional government was not composed of peoples’ representatives, as there was no 
election; and rather it was composed of representatives of political parties. In light of these 
factors, the Ethiopian transitional framework of dealing with the past lacks public discussion 
and participation.   
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771Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
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5.2.2.3 On inclusiveness 
 
Another critical point discussed in chapter three that has relevance to the Ethiopian transition 
is the definition and scope of wrongdoing and wrongdoers to be subjected to the transitional 
justice process. Inclusiveness, here, refers to whether the legal framework was broadly 
designed to address all violations/perpetrators of the past. This issue arises once prosecution 
is set as a modality and particularly refers to the definition of violence/perpetrators that falls 
under the jurisdiction/mandate of the SPO.  Clearly, Article 6 of the SPO proclamation 
mandates the SPO to investigate and institute proceedings in respect of members of the Derg 
and its affiliates that have committed offences. Thus, respondents were asked of their opinion 
on the appropriateness of such selective prosecution. A closer consideration of the data shows 
three categories of responses: (1) The inclusive-broad perspective, (2) the limiting 
prosecution argument, (3) the argument of partiality and inappropriateness. I would present 
and analyze, below, these different views on the issue of inclusiveness and implications for 
transition. 
 
The first category: The Inclusive-broad perspective 
 
In this category, we have respondents who claim that the framework addresses all 
perpetrators irrespective of their political belonging, and thus was proper. According to this 
view, the framework was broad enough to investigate and prosecute past violations 
irrespective of who committed them. In light of Article 6 of the SPO proclamation, this view 
is apparently wrong. However, the important question then is why this view is asserted.  
Thus, it is useful to see some responses because of the significance of their implications.  
 
A former SPO prosecutor, opined that: 
 
We were very mindful of this [on the possible involvement of non-Derg political 
groups in violations]. In this respect, I want to assure you one thing. The 
framework does not exclude the right or the left. It was not narrow. It is another 
thing to question whether it was narrowly practiced /implemented. There is 
absolutely nothing that makes the framework [narrow].... The issue of exclusion is 
naive; and as I told you such thinking results from failure to properly follow the 
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matter [or actual process]. Thus, there had never been such prohibition either in 
policy or law; never in law or in the practice of the SPO.  It was all-inclusive. 
Absolutely nothing...this party or that party...
774
 
 
This clearly asserts the definition of perpetrators or crimes is provided without regard to 
political belongingness. This is clearly wrong in light of the provisions of the proclamation. 
However, the former SPO, insists that the prosecution was all-inclusive both in its framework 
and in practice; and that nobody was immune from prosecution and thus the framework is 
beyond criticism.
775
 Interestingly, however, this view acknowledges that other political 
groups did commit violations.  
 
Another former SPO prosecutor also underlined the all inclusiveness and appropriateness of 
the framework but in a slightly different way: 
 
The framework was inclusive. EPRP was not an official party. Its members were 
either killed or forced to flee abroad. Who was to be brought to justice? The 
Me’son people were involved in crimes along with the Derg; they were prosecuted 
not because of being Ma’son but for their crimes. EPRP members who turned to 
Derg membership were also prosecuted. It is quite a different issue to ask why 
EPRP and other political groups were not prosecuted as an institution.
776
 
 
The interesting point is that former Special Public Prosecutors are the ones who gave the 
above views. It might be presumed that both must have knowledge of what happened in the 
past as well as in the actual investigation and prosecution of past crimes. Both of them must 
have recognized that political groups other than the Dergue were also involved in past 
violations, and must have considered the need to prosecute without consideration of political 
affiliation. However, there is no evidence whether they in fact prosecuted members of other 
                                                             
774Anonymous R3, Above n 682  However, the provisions of proclamation does not say so 
775Anonymous R3, Above n 682.  He noted “The legal framework never excluded any one from prosecution, 
investigation. It gave impunity to no organ.... In fact, Derg was investigated for killings and being killed. EPRP 
was investigated for killing and being killed. Me’son was investigated for killing and being killed. One who 
says he was a member of EPRDF was investigated for killing and being killed. Of course, there are 
circumstances that the framework had excluded, and that are acts taking place in military showdown.... Apart 
from these, the framework never excluded any organ. One practical example was the case of Girma Kebede-
where a Derg member was investigated for killings, and acts directed against him were at the same time 
investigated.”  
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political groups unless such member had later turned to be Dergue or collaborated with the 
Dergue in a different way as remarked earlier. Even then, one may ask of the consistency of 
such practice with the provisions of the SPO proclamation. Does the legal framework support 
their claim? Clearly, this is not because the SPO mandate is limited to crimes committed by 
the Dergue or its affiliates.
777
However, one may argue that the proclamation does not prohibit 
such investigation, although it did not clearly authorize so. Nevertheless, what is interesting 
for this researcher is the fact that both SPOs were mindful of violations committed by other 
political groups apart from the violations committed by the Dergue and its affiliates. Thus, 
the logical conclusion of the above views is that transitional justice process that excludes 
other political groups is not proper. 
 
The second category: The limiting prosecution argument 
 
In this category, we have respondents who stated that the legal framework addresses 
violations by the Dergue and its affiliates nevertheless argue that it was proper to do so. 
According to this view, limiting prosecution to the Dergue is appropriate. Some typical 
responses are presented below.  
 
A victim’s family who supported the prosecution process noted, “it was the Dergue that was 
massacring people and hence no one else would be responsible”.778 For this victim’s family, 
the Dergue was the only violator that deserves prosecution. However, considering the 
discussions in chapter two, while the fact that the Dergue was the main violator cannot be 
denied, the question is why such a view of the past of violence is held. Some residents of both 
Addis Ababa and Mekelle viewed this emphasis on the Dergue as appropriate for similar 
reasons.
779
 
 
A former judge, who presided over the Dergue trials, remarked that: 
 
I think it [the framework] was broad. I would not say I have specialized knowledge in 
that line. But looking from the practitioner’s point of view, I think the mandate given 
                                                             
777Proclamation No.22/1992; Article 6  
778Anonymous R8, Above n 704 
779 Interview with anonymous respondents R13, R33, R 32, and R17 exemplify this position. The responses of 
these and other respondents is not presented here because their opinion, apart from supporting the above views, 
does not add any further substantial insights. 
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to the SPO was broad. The mandate was broad enough to cover all sorts of crimes 
committed during the Dergue regime and to bring to justice all perpetrators ranging 
from the rank and files to Kebele guards, and also as a result of the suspension of 
period of limitation. Apart from technical and practical/implementation issues 
involved, I do not remember of mandate limitations as a problem at all times in the 
entire process.
780
  
 
This broadness of the framework, it is worth noting, relates to violations committed by the 
Dergue and not to other political groups. The main justification for limiting prosecution to the 
Dergue is that the Dergue was the main violator by using state and public resources, as 
observed in the following view:  
 
At that time the main focus and the main problem was the state structure; I think the 
state structure was the perpetrator of the biggest crime.  Apart from that, a crime may 
be committed at any time. Is it not? It was committed individually before and today.  
Crimes committed by individuals were not barred from prosecution by this 
government or any government. In my view, what deserved organized and special 
solution...attention was the prevention of mass killings by using state structure and 
state and public resources.
781
 
 
Arguing ‘other crimes’ can be addressed through ordinary criminal justice institutions and 
procedures, this former judge insists on the appropriateness of focusing on the Dergue.
782
 
Although the argument supports the focus on the state machinery, there is a hint of 
incompleteness in that respect too: 
 
The big problem was State sponsored human rights violations. What I tell you is not 
that the others are less important. The biggest problem in Ethiopia at the time was 
state sponsored violation where 500,000 people were killed. I do not know of the 
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782Anonymous R2, Above n 697. The respondent  noted, “Apart from that [crimes committed by the state], other 
crimes are crimes. They need a response. That is not closed. It is closed neither today nor in the past. If someone 
alleges that somebody has killed my relative or family [egelle egellen gedilobiyal kale], he could have reported 
to police institutions. I think, the focus was on the complex ones. Sometimes, it may possibly be said to be 
incomplete. But, the main focus was on state sponsored human rights violation.” 
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number on the side of what is called other part [group], if it exists at all.  I believe it is 
good to see it from that perspective.
783
 
 
This view appears to be the very premise of the prosecution framework as evidenced by the 
provisions of the SPO proclamation. The Dergue was the main violator using the state 
apparatus, and hence deserve prosecution. It is also interesting to note that violations 
committed by other groups are recognized as not less important; the view is simply that they 
can be dealt with the ordinary procedure. However, the extent of violations committed by 
other groups, if any, is not known. What does this tell us? How can one relegate violations 
committed by other groups without even knowing the extent? Would not the exclusion of 
other groups open the framework to criticism? 
 
Another respondent briefly presented a similar opinion in the following manner; 
 
Political groups outside the Derg were not brought to justice.  We have seen few acts. 
There was an act directed against Megistu; but they were very limited events to be 
given focus. The focus was on the state machinery.
784
 
 
A senior government official also aired a similar opinion.
785
 However, he underlined the 
difficulty of prosecuting each crime.  
 
...You cannot proceed with all acts and all people; if you want to do that all other 
works are to be ignored; you dedicate your life to chasing and capturing suspects 
in each locality and district. So, the objective was let us condemn the system and 
at the same time bring top leaders to justice. It is impossible to go after each case 
during the Dergue.
786
 
 
This view alludes to the practical impossibility to investigate and prosecute all Derg members 
who had committed crimes over the 17 years, and thus the argument is that the purpose 
                                                             
783Anonymous R2, Above n 697. This researcher raised to the respondent, in light of uncertainty on the number 
of crimes committed by others, the issue of why didn’t we subject all groups to the same process of 
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different context. That was a result of negotiation...The case of negotiation and loser is not the same.” 
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sought by the framework was not to prosecute all Derg members involved in crimes but to, 
selectively, prosecute the top leaders.  However, this is inconsistent with the legal framework 
that was in place, as the framework does not make distinctions among Dergue members.  
 
While prosecution of the Dergue was justified, some respondents treated questioning the 
framework for excluding other political groups as unfair. For example, a senior government 
official commented: 
 
Regarding other political groups, I think the question is not fair. Why were others 
excluded? I do not think it is fair to ask. They are ordinary criminals. At that 
point, we were concerned with a political party that was in power; the one that 
used the state machinery; individual criminals can be brought to courts.
787
 
 
Another respondent, a victim’s brother, stated that the Dergue was the main perpetrator and 
therefore needed emphasising.
788
However, he acknowledged the participation of another 
political group in the violence: 
 
At the time, the Dergue hired Kebele guards, which were targeted by the EPRP. I do 
not know what the EPRP get by killing Kebele guards. That was the white terror. 
Rather than detaining, the EPRP begun to kill what they considered important people. 
The purpose of the white terror was to keep the Dergue alone by threatening people to 
distance themselves from the Dergue.
789
 
 
Although the respondent noted the role of at least EPRP in past violence, he nevertheless 
supports the selective prosecution of the Dergue. How can this be justified in light of EPRP’s 
white terror campaign, which were not confined to isolated acts of killing people. Why 
should not this be investigated and prosecuted? 
 
A Supreme Court judge in this category, who had a more or less similar opinion on the 
appropriateness of the mandate given to the Special Public Prosecutors, deserves a final 
                                                             
787Anonymous R4, Above n 689.  The respondent felt emotional and angry when questioned about the 
accountability of other political groups. In an interview made with R1, the latter commented that “R4 is one of 
EPRP members who had joined the EPRDF government.” Whether the emotions were triggered because of such 
implied accountability remains. However, the author could not insist on the issue for fear of his authority. 
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consideration.
790He stated, “the power granted to the SPO was appropriate although there 
might be questions as to how it was exercised.”791Regarding other political groups, this 
respondent opined that:  
 
Yes, there were violations by non-state actors. Other political groups did take 
measures not only in battlefield but also in towns; this is known. A son whose 
father was killed by EPRP knows that it was not only the Dergue that killed; the 
son knows; the society knows. Although summary killings were committed in this 
country by the government, it is also important to reveal what other political 
groups did. It is good to show what they did was also wrong. However, Dergue’s 
violation was grave. Dergue did not only kill a person; it exterminated a 
generation. That has been established through a judicial process. That was the 
focus of the framework.
792
 
 
The similarity of this view with the other responses is clear in that he considers the 
framework appropriate for its focus on the state machinery. What is interesting here is the 
clear acknowledgement that other political groups did commit violations, and that the 
families of the victims and the society knows this well. The need to reveal such violations 
and to acknowledge that they were wrong is also recognized. This clearly contests the 
appropriateness of the legal framework in excluding such other violations.  
 
In conclusion, the above responses argue that the mandate given to the SPO was appropriate 
irrespective of its focus on the violations of the Dergue alone; the view is that the focus on 
the Dergue was proper, as the State was the biggest perpetrator of crimes using state 
machinery and public resources. The majority of respondents also acknowledge that 
violations committed by other political groups needed a solution with differences of opinion 
on the actual commission of such crime and its extent, and on the available remedy. It is also 
                                                             
790Anonymous R31, Above n 713 
791Anonymous R31, Above n 713. He stated these practical problems in the following way; did the framework 
authorize mandatory prosecution or discretionary? How did they exercise it? The Office claimed that its role 
was to prosecute all; the court should see all. Was the Office effectively organized in carrying out its functions?  
This should be seen in light of the nature of the crime, the nature of the perpetrators, the magnitude of the 
crime...There was lack of prosecutorial system strategy....There was no need for prosecution across the board. 
792Anonymous R31, Above n 713.  But there seems to be inconsistency between saying there is a need to reveal 
and condemn what others did and saying the framework was appropriate 
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interesting to note that the majority of respondents, all except one, in this category had argued 
prosecution was an appropriate mechanism of dealing with the past.  
 
Third category: The argument of partiality and inappropriateness 
 
Respondents in this category argue that, as the framework addressed only violations of the 
Dergue and its affiliates while excluding the violations of other political groups, the 
framework was thus not appropriate to the transition process; the process is partial and this 
renders it inappropriate. Some typical responses are presented below.  
 
According to a respondent, who argued for a combination of alternatives, the framework for 
prosecution was not all-inclusive.
793
  He opined, “it is not appropriate to hold the Dergue 
alone responsible.”794 He further remarked that: 
 
There is a feeling of victor’s justice. If others were also included, we would have a 
fuller picture. In fact, there were other groups [that] have committed wrongs/crimes. 
If we had included them, it would be possible to say that we were searching for 
justice.
795
 
 
This emphasises the need for inclusiveness or broadness; the exclusion of other political 
groups may give rise to the perception of the whole process as victor’s justice. We recall that 
such a danger is recognized as being necessary to avoid, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
This former judge responds to the view of respondents in the second category, underlining 
the importance of emphasizing on state violations, arguing that “while the emphasis on the 
Dergue may be appropriate, excluding others from the framework has limited the search for 
justice.”796 For this respondent, all perpetrators should have been brought to justice, although 
not necessarily to judicial process.
797
  
 
                                                             
793Anonymous R20, Above n 755  
794Anonymous R20, ibid 
795Anonymous R20, ibid.  The respondent also commented on the practical problems in implementing what the 
framework allows; including detaining people for a long period without evidence; and the failure to prosecute 
those who deserve prosecution according to the framework.  
796Anonymous R20, Above n 755  
797One should note that this respondent preferred a combination of prosecution and truth and reconciliation. 
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Another respondent rejected the whole process for its partiality in the following terms: 
 
On the part of the government too, there were problems,... What it considered 
violation or crimes against humanity is only from the side of EPRP. EPRP was 
equally guilty of committing crimes. They exonerated EPRP and in fact some EPRP 
members became, joined, the government of the Woyane.  So it became farcical. It 
was only what the Derg and the Me’son committed that [was] considered as crimes 
and so the whole thing as far as I am concerned was not right from the beginning.
798
 
 
This clearly suggests that the process was not inclusive. Interestingly, other political groups 
were viewed as equally responsible for violation, though they were not held accountable. The 
following opinion reiterates this point: 
 
When you say Maison kills, that is a crime; EPRP kills, that is okay, then you have 
created no standard for the society as a whole. It is basically a continuation of the 
same thing with the actors perhaps changing.
799
 
 
This view is consistent with the argument that transitional process of accountability ought to 
lay down new standards for the society for the future as discussed in chapter 4. Hence, non-
inclusiveness has negative implications - excluding/exonarating similar violators from 
prosecution might prevent effective transition.  The argument that the Dergue, as opposed to 
EPRP, was a ‘state’ perpetrator therefore requiring separate treatment is totally dismissed as 
follows.  
 
The conflict was really between Ma’son and EPRP. The Derg came in some what by 
default because both Ma’son and EPRP were trying hard (or doing their level best) to 
be friends with the Dergue; both of them. And in this process, they were competing 
against each other for favour with the Dergue, they were competing against each other 
for power within Ethiopia. And eventually, when EPRP declared its animosities, its 
disapproval of the Dergue, quite early in the game, then the Dergue had to support 
Me’son. Initially, it was not the Dergue that was killing. It was Me’son and EPRP that 
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was killing. But gradually, Dergue and Me’son became merged and indistinguishable. 
At any rate, crime is a crime whoever committed it. And if they [the new government] 
wanted to institute a new system in Ethiopia, they should have watched all that.
800
 
 
This is a complete rejection of the argument that the prosecution framework can be justified 
for its emphasis on ‘state’ perpetrators. The above view incidentally demonstrates a different 
version of the history of violence and who started the killings as discussed in chapter two. 
Irrespective of its correctness, this above view underlines the importance of dealing with all 
past violations irrespective of who committed it in order to create a new system. The failure 
to do so results in the following statements: 
 
It was really what we call victor’s justice. The EPRDF exclusively established an 
office for the prosecution... The attempt or concentration was really more on 
punishment... and revenge
801
 
 
It is discernible that the framework of prosecution was one-sided. However, the latter 
respondent is doubtful in expressing his opinion on the involvement (or the extent of 
involvement) of other political groups in past crimes.
802
There is an apparent effort to distance 
oneself from comparing the violations committed by other political groups to that of the 
Dergue. It is not stated that others did not kill. What is said is that the killings by others are 
not comparable with that of the Dergue.
803
A respondent opined that: 
 
With EPRP and Maison or the Socialist Movement, actually, they really killed 
each other; it is really horrible that what they have done to each other; some very 
close former friends in some cases. It is so, the trial was not all inclusive. No 
TPLF member was held accountable in these trials; and No EPRP member that I 
know has been held accountable in these trials. Without doubt, of course, the 
                                                             
800Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
801Anonymous R11, Above n 712; The response of R39, Above n 725, who rejected the prosecution process, is 
not presented here because it is not much needed. 
802Anonymous R11, Above n 712. He commented that “there is that talk that the so-called white terrorists were 
really not held accountable; it is only what they called the red terrorists.  Those who were opposed to the Dergue 
were [not] prosecuted, and who committed crimes against the Dergue were overlooked. There is that talk 
in/among the society. Personally, I am not aware of any large-scale murder as there were in the Dergue within 
the opposition parties. Yes there were people who killed occasional Dergue cadres allegedly in self-defence. 
But, personally, I do not know of anybody that committed large scale killings against the Dergue or their 
supporters” 
803 This seems to accept the argument that the emphasis on the Dergue was correct. 
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killings was largely attributable to the Dergue, but occasional killings were 
definitely inevitable by other forces.... they really have not been held accountable 
for their crimes.
804
 
 
Although not comparable to what the Dergue did, other political groups had a part in past 
violence but they were not held accountable; and that makes the process not inclusive. The 
process was also described as not inclusive from another angel, i.e, its failure to bring some 
Dergue members, including their leaders, to justice: 
 
The trial was really half hearted in that it was not going after the real criminals like 
Mengistu HaileMariam. There was not really on our efforts to have Mengistu 
HaileMariam extradited to Ethiopia or prosecuted wherever he was. And there were 
some horrific cases committed by Ethiopians who are residing very comfortably 
abroad. So, the trial was not all-inclusive, it was a hotchpotch business. It was not 
really given the seriousness it deserved.
805
 
 
Here, the issue of non-inclusiveness extends even to Dergue members. However, it can be 
argued that as far as Dergue members are concerned, the framework did not exclude anyone, 
and the above comment only relates to the actual implementation of the prosecutorial 
framework. Again, it is useful to note that some residents of both Mekelle and Addis Ababa 
characterize the process as partial for its exclusion of other political parties from 
responsibility.
806
 
 
To sum up the views of this category of respondents, the data suggests that the prosecution 
framework as adopted was not appropriate because of its exclusion of other political groups 
that might have committed crimes in the past. It is also interesting to note that some of these 
respondents had already rejected prosecution as a modality of transitional justice, preferring 
truth and reconciliation instead as the appropriate mode of addressing the past. However, also 
present are respondents that supported either prosecution or a combination of modalities, with 
inclination perhaps to reconciliation, as proper solution to Ethiopian context. Irrespective of 
                                                             
804 Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
805Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
806Anonymous R24, Above n 740; Anonymous R20, Above n 762; Anonymous R15, Above n 743.  In addition, 
R 18, who supported prosecution noted, “i do not know the framework, but if it excludes other criminals it is 
unjust”.  
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these differences, they are of the opinion that processes of accountability should be impartial, 
and hence describe the Ethiopian process as partial and unacceptable. We might also note that 
there are differences of opinion among the group on the extent of violations committed by 
other political groups. Nevertheless, they are united in the characterization of the prosecution 
framework as victor’s justice. These views in the third category generally also reject the 
argument of the second category that argues that the emphasis on state violators was correct. 
 
At this juncture, it is necessary to highlight the important points on the issue of inclusiveness. 
Although the first category of respondents, former SPOs, assert that the framework was all-
inclusive to allow prosecution of all perpetrators irrespective of their affiliation, the law 
contradicts this view as Article 6 of the SPO proclamation gives jurisdiction explicitly only 
on violations committed by the Dergue or its affiliates. It is not clear on what basis or 
authority these respondents derived the mandate to investigate crimes committed by other 
groups.
807
 However, interestingly this group also recognizes that other political groups were 
involved in the violations of the past, and hence that there was a need to investigate and 
prosecute.  
 
The proponents of the prosecution process argue that the framework was proper in focusing 
on the violations of the Dergue because the Dergue was a state perpetrator requiring special 
emphasis. The latter part of the argument may remain uncontested. To a certain extent, the 
data conforms to the official narration of the history of violation discussed in the second 
chapter; and thus the framework cannot be challenged for addressing such violations. 
Nevertheless, the question of the roles of other political groups in past violations remains. We 
can clearly see from the data that other political groups also committed crimes in the past. 
This again affirms that there is another aspect of the history of violation, which is not 
reflected in the official narration as discussed in the latter part of chapter two. Thus, the 
framework for prosecution may be contested for failing to include these other histories of 
violation; the question of the implication of this exclusion on effective transition also 
remains. 
 
By way of summary, this section investigated the appropriateness of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice framework by focusing on (a) the appropriateness of criminal prosecution, 
                                                             
807 Although this researcher has asked them, they stated the proclamation did not prevent them from 
investigating crimes committed by other political groups. 
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(b) the existence of public participation, and (c) the question of inclusiveness. Each of these 
issues are subject to contestation, which might have implications on the appropriateness and 
outcome of the transitional framework as well as whether there has been successful transition. 
Proponents of prosecution base their support for prosecution process on the need to establish 
the rule of law, give lesson to the public, and deterrence. Whether these objectives were 
achieved will be considered in the next chapter. The rejection of truth and reconciliation 
primarily relates to the absence of the conditions for truth and reconciliation in the sense that 
the former regime was totally defeated, posed no threat to the future, and had no bargaining 
power. However, this view of associating truth and reconciliation process to negotiated 
transitions apparently neglects the significance of such process to other transitions including 
Ethiopia, discussed in chapter 4. One may also support the Ethiopian framework based on the 
duty under international law to prosecute grave violations of human rights, however 
contested this might be. 
 
We can also clearly note the views that rejected the prosecution process arguing that 
prosecution or prosecution alone was a proper mechanism of dealing with the past, and rather 
preferred truth and reconciliation. The rejection of prosecution was partly based on the 
argument that the whole process was motivated by punishment and vindictiveness, partiality, 
and the absence of other desirable outcomes. In addition, there are indications that 
prosecution cannot address the culture of political violence that is deep rooted in the country. 
Moreover, even respondents who endorsed prosecution have also admitted limitations in the 
process in the sense that it was difficult or impossible to go after each perpetrator. It is clear 
that in the face of the extent of violations committed, prosecution could not cover all 
perpetrators. This demonstrates the impossibility or undesirability of wholesale prosecution, 
and the need for other complementary processes. It is also clear from the legal framework 
that reparation and reconciliation was not part of the transitional process. The absence of any 
reconciliation process might mean the perpetuation of social and political divisions and 
conflicts, which prevent successful transition. The criticism against prosecution becomes 
even stronger when we look at the other issues as well. 
 
Another issue relates to the existence or otherwise of public discussion and participation in 
the formulation of the framework. The theoretical discussion considers issues of transitional 
justice are public issues. The society has to deliberate and decide on how to address its 
violent past. The most comprehensive options should be sought and a careful choice has to be 
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made. The society has to decide what is best for it.  This is crucial for a successful transition. 
In this respect, all the respondents stated that the government formulated the framework, and 
none of them claimed the existence of public participation on the issue of how to deal with 
the past.  Rather three respondents stated the government had exclusively adopted the 
framework without any public discussion and participation. The government at the time was 
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). That government was not composed of 
people’s representatives; rather it was composed of representatives of political parties, with 
EPRDF having the majority seats. The exception to the lack of public participation is the 
limited discussion with victims or their families.  However this is in itself subject to criticism; 
but it is not about why the government consulted victims. There is no doubt victims should be 
part of the process. The problem is that this consultation was very limited and not all-
inclusive.  
 
Apart from this exception, the data shows the lack of public participation, either directly or 
through their representatives, as there was no representation at the time. On the other hand, 
there are indications of the influence of the international community in the formulation of the 
framework. This may give rise to the question about the extent to which the international 
community dictates transitional frameworks. Are not questions of transition mainly one of 
domestic in nature, over which the society has primary interest? Why should the international 
community adopt different standards in different countries? 
 
The other important point worth noting relates to the narration of history of violence, and 
more specifically to the definition of perpetrators/crimes to be subjected to transitional justice 
processes. As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, the proper framing of the scope of the transitional 
justice process is essential for a society to deal with its past. The society should properly 
define the crimes, perpetrators and victims. In this respect, the Ethiopian framework provides 
that the Dergue and its affiliates committed violations or crimes. It is clear from this that the 
victims are those victims of the Dergue. Hence, the criminal prosecution focused on members 
of the Dergue that committed crimes. The question however is whether such a formulation of 
crime, perpetrators, and victims is appropriate in the context of the Ethiopian transition. 
 
The available data shows that the Dergue committed grave crimes unprecedented in 
Ethiopian history. It committed systematic violations by using state apparatus and public 
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resources. None of the data questioned that. However, problems arise when the question is 
asked whether the Dergue was the only violator.  
 
Most respondents admitted that other political groups had also committed crimes in the past. 
However, there are arguments that the exclusion of these groups from the framework was 
proper because their participation was limited, and incomparable with that of the Dergue. 
According to this view, the emphasis was on state sponsored violations and thus proper. 
However, there is evidence that other political groups, especially, the EPRP, were equally 
responsible for violations. We might highlight two points here. First, it is acknowledged that 
other political groups committed crimes in the past. None of the respondents said other 
political groups were free of crimes. Second, the contentions relate to the extent, and the 
systemic nature, of the crimes. It is true that they never used the state machinery. 
Nonetheless, they committed crimes irrespective of the degree of the crimes and irrespective 
of the punishment due. In addition to the data provided, substantial literature also indicated 
that other political groups committed crimes during the Dergue regime.  
 
In light of all these accounts, the transitional framework can be questioned for its narrowness 
in the sense that it did not address violations committed by other political groups. If the 
disagreement is on the extent of violations, would not it be appropriate to investigate and 
establish the truth than just dismissing it as very limited? How can one justify this 
selectiveness to victims of crimes committed by other political groups? Is their suffering less 
important to society? Should not the society care for all its victims? If we seek justice and 
truth about the past, should not the framework be all-inclusive in terms of defining crimes, 
perpetrators, and victims? Would a society be satisfied with partial justice and partial truth? 
What are the implications of this problem of the framework on the search for justice, truth, 
and the future of the society?
808
 This author thinks that a proper response to the past should 
be based on the recognition of all violations and sufferings without consideration of the 
political affiliation of violators or victims. Society should care for all of its victims and deal 
with all violators, although this does not necessarily mean bringing all violators to the same 
process of accountability. This is essential not only in terms of rectifying past wrongs but also 
in terms of building an inclusive better future.  
 
                                                             
808 These questions are addressed in detail in the coming sub-section (on justice) and chapter six (on truth and 
other contributions of the process as a whole) 
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Generally, the Ethiopian framework of dealing with the past is problematic from the 
following perspectives.  First, the choice of prosecution as a solution to Ethiopia’s past and 
implications for the future can seriously be questioned in view of the strong criticism and 
alternatives forwarded. Secondly, the framework was adopted by the State or government 
with limited consultation with victims and perhaps under the influence of the international 
community. The absence of broader public participation in the formulation of the process 
poses questions on its appropriateness, legitimacy, and its ability to achieve desirable goals 
including justice, truth and reconciliation. Thirdly, the framework excludes violations 
committed by other political groups, and lacks the comprehensiveness it requires in dealing 
with the past. It does not recognize the suffering of victims of crimes committed by such 
groups, and exonerates the latter of any accountability. This in turn may compromise the 
search for justice, truth and other desirable goals.  
 
5.3 Justice - Was Justice Done? 
 
This section questions whether justice was achieved at the end of the prosecution process. It 
should be pointed out some of the Dergue convicts were recently released from prison. One 
would like to see the implication of this release for transitional justice process. However, this 
study focuses on the general issue whether justice was done.
809
Thus, respondents were asked 
their opinion on whether the prosecution process has accomplished its task of rendering 
justice. Interestingly, the responses show a significant difference ranging from one stating 
justice was done to another that nothing was achieved, each providing their respective 
reasons.  These responses were closely examined and categorized into two categories – those 
that claim justice was done and those that claim the process has not resulted in justice. 
Exemplary views of both are presented and analyzed below. 
 
Category one: Justice was done 
 
                                                             
809 This author has tried to analyze the issue of release and its implications for the transitional justice process. 
The release of prisoners was subject to contestations from two related perspectives. The first relates to the 
legality or constitutionality of the release, while the second concerns the implication of release on the outcome 
of the transitional justice process – how it affects justice or lack of it. A general consideration of the responses 
indicate that there are diverse views highlighting the problems involved in the process of release as well as 
implications for the transitional justice process. However, to save time and space, the issues relating to the 
release of prisoners are deliberately excluded from this study.  
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In this category, we find respondents who claim that justice was done through the prosecution 
and judicial process. However, they also express certain limitations or reservations based on 
some procedural and technical problems.  
 
An interesting start is to look at victims’s perspective. Thus, a family member of a victim 
expressed the following view:  
 
My present feeling is different from that I had twenty or so years ago. At that time, I 
wanted them killed. I do not feel like that now. I feel satisfied because all convicts 
have received the punishment due. They suffered in prison for 20 years. I think that is 
enought. I think it is better to leave the rest to God.
810
 
 
This clearly underlines retributive justice, and a victims’ family feels satisfied although the 
reservations are apparent from the assignment given to God as the ultimate punisher. 
Moreover, the delay in the proceedings is cited as a major problem in satisfying the need for 
justice from the families’ perspective.811 
 
A former Special Public Prosecutor, has the following to say: 
 
I believe it [the process] has rendered justice in accordance with the law.  What does 
it mean?  The investigation was successful; investigations regarding the alleged 
crimes were completed and then evidence were submitted by the SPO to the court and 
the accused as well; the accused has retained a lawyer or  a lawyer was assigned for 
him to defend himself; and then the court has passed decisions after weighing the 
evidences. From this perspective, I would think justice was rendered.
812
 
 
A significant issue during transition, as discussed in chapter 4, is the conception of, and 
mechanism for achieving, justice. The above view stresses that justice relates to the 
investigation, prosecution and conviction of wrongdoers in accordance with the requirements 
of due process of law; accordingly, justice was regarded as being done in the Ethiopian 
transition. Nevertheless, this assertion is followed with doubts and uncertainties of the SPO 
                                                             
810Anonymous R8, Above n 704 
811Anonymous R8, Above n 704. She noted that “ I would have been satisfied and happier if the perpetrators 
were found guilty and punished immediately”. 
812Anonymous R3, Above n 682  
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that question the adequacy of the process in rendering justice.
813
 This problem becomes 
further evident from the following reflections of a former Special Public Prosecutor: 
 
...there could be, even among those brought to justice, people who escaped justice 
because their case was not properly considered, and hence no decision was passed 
against them.  So, in that respect there could be lack of quality in practice. This 
may have resulted from the huge number of cases accumulated over time and the 
like. But generally justice is done. But, there could also be a problem whether all 
actors, all crimes were addressed. But in general, justice, in accordance with the 
law, is done.
814
 
 
This again suggests the challenges in achieving justice. It was not possible for the reasons 
stated above to prosecute, convict and punish all persons that might have committed crimes.  
 
A senior government official put his view about the outcome of the process in terms of justice 
as follows: 
 
It is very difficult to answer. It makes you subjective in a sense. The Derg regime 
was criminal. The leaders of the regime were brought to justice. This shows 
justice was done. 
815
 
 
Although this view appreciates the problematic nature of the concept of justice, it resolves in 
favour of criminal justice, which arguably was achieved in Ethiopian transition. However, the 
respondent, in his earlier remarks relating to the framework, acknowledges what appears to 
be the impossibility of prosecuting all wrongdoers, and argues selective prosecution was 
justified.
816
 However, we should note that the legal framework authorizes the investigation 
                                                             
813Anonymous R3, Above n 682.  He noted “But the term justice is a relative one; procedural and substantive 
justice is secured. But, for people who  question its quality, it may be controversial. Did the violators really 
received punishment that suits what they did? Was the evidence properly evaluated and proper decisions made? 
Were violations of law properly detected and rectifying measures taken? I really very much doubt. But, 
technically, I think justice is delivered.” 
814Anonymous R3, Above n 682. He aired this opinion regarding the possibility for some to have escaped 
prosecution. 
815Anonymous R4, Above n 689 
816Anonymous R4, Above n 689. He noted that “but one cannot say it [the prosecution and judicial process] 
gave solutions to all. There is a time factor; the violations were committed over 17 years; a generation has 
passed; as time passes, evidence is lost; people die-all these factors create gaps. So, on the one hand you have no 
choice except legally condemning the system and bringing the top leaders to justice. But you cannot proceed 
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and prosecution of all Dergue members that might have committed crimes, and hence the 
respondent’s view (selecting and prosecuting the top leaders) has no legal basis. 
 
Nevertheless, the above view highlights the problem associated with prosecution when many 
people were involved in past violence, as discussed in chapter four. We recall Erin Mobbek’s 
observations on the inadequacy of local judicial systems to deal with all perpetrators, the 
undesirability of wholesale prosecution, and the perception of arbitrariness or unfairness in 
case of limited prosecution.
817
 Hence, the recommended solution is to have a combination of 
methods of transitional justice. The problem with the Ethiopian process of prosecution, in 
light of the above response, can therefore be the unavailability of complimentary methods to 
deal with perpetrators. Again, it should be noted that the legal framework authorizes the 
investigation and prosecution of all Dergue members that might have committed crimes, and 
hence the above view about the correctness of selecting and prosecuting the top leaders has 
no legal basis. 
 
A Federal Supreme Court judget, who believes justice was done, questions whether victims 
and the public equally have such a perception: 
 
Justice has been rendered through the judicial process. But, it is also appropriate 
to ask whether there is that feeling. Utility theory does not justify criminal justice. 
These perpetrators were brought to courts and received judgement. This can be 
considered as justice. But from the perspective of victims and society, do they 
think justice was done; was any lesson derived; these are questionable. The case 
took 10-20 years, which delay itself had created hopelessness....; in between 
people forget the judicial process. If the case was completed within 5 or 6 years, it 
could have achieved better.
818
 
 
This is recognition that, apart from the judicial process and its results, public perception about 
the process is important. Interestingly, the delay in the judicial proceedings was one problem 
compromising public perception about the process and its results. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
with all acts and all people; if you want to do that all other works are to be ignored; you dedicate your life to 
chasing and capturing suspects in each locality and district. So, the objective was let’s condemn the system and 
at the same time bring top leaders to justice. It is impossible to go after each case during the Dergue.” 
817MOBBEK,E, Above n 315 at 277-278. 
818Anonymous R31, Above n 713. He also suggested the process was fair from the perspective of the accused 
that they were treated humanely and fairly through out the process. 
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Asked whether justice was done, another respondent opined as follows; 
 
Well, I do not know. Justice is often measured in many ways, not only from victim’s 
perspective but it is measured by the whole process. There exist unavoidable 
procedural requirements. We have hearings before independent courts. The 
procedures for the introduction of evidence [were] complied with. Looking at justice 
process from these perspectives, a lot may be said. The process took quite a long time 
and as a result posed challenges over presenting witnesses, though there was no 
problem of documentary evidence. Some witnesses may have died in the process, 
some may have left the country and some may have changed their minds. All these 
may eventually have an impact on the entire process.
819
 
 
Justice is seen as the rendering of judgement in accordance with the requirements of due 
process. This may fit with legal justice as discussed in chapter four. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that certain factors have limited this process of rendering justice. Again, the success of the 
process in rendering justice relates to the prosecution and conviction of top leaders, although 
there are uncertainties even in that respect: 
 
But then again, it was also possible to see that those who were at the top of the 
regime, who allegedly committed the crimes, were brought to justice and were found 
guilty as charged in a fair trial. This for me depicts the real picture. The question of 
how many of these had been convicted and how many of them have been found 
guilty, I suppose requires looking at every specific detail.
820
 
 
The proponents of the process also see the failure to carry out punishment as another 
limitation in achieving justice.  
 
                                                             
819Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  He provided in detail the procedural requirement and also what he thought 
might have affected the eventual output. He cited the procedural requirements including impartial and 
independent judiciary, procedure relating to introduction of evidence, presumption of innocence and the like. He 
also opined on the limitation of capacity of the judiciary and the economy of the country; and that the country 
has done what it can; so within the context and limitations, the view is that there is some success in terms of 
achieving justice. 
820Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  He commented not everybody accused was found guilty, and that the fact that 
not every accused was found guilty is an indication of justice. Accusation does not lead to a guilty verdict- 
evidence should be presented. However, one may question why evidence was not presented. 
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There are convicts on the record that the government has failed to apprehend and 
execute punishments. This is one limitation on justice. Mengistu Haile-Mariam is a 
convict on the record. Justice is not only to pass decisions on the record; justice is 
done if each individual must receive the punishment due according to the decision. 
Some had also died of course. In fact, some had received punishment. There were also 
people in respect of whom evidence was not found; or even if evidence existed but the 
case never came to close for different reasons. So, these factors should be seen in 
detail. It may be difficult to look at all things, but they have proved something. In fact, 
the existence of human rights violations during the Dergue was established through 
the judicial process. I think that is a very important point.
821
 
 
Apart from the concluding remarks about the success of the process, the above statements 
also show the complex problems involved in limiting the outcomes of the judicial process. 
 
It might be important to note the perspective of another victim’s family member on the issue 
of justice. A victim’s brother noted, “it is possible to say justice was done.”822 This is further 
explained as follows: 
 
That is because of the procedure. You cannot change anything by killing people. One 
should emphasis on education not revenge. I have nothing to object. In a civilized 
nation, one who kills will not be killed; he may be sentenced to life imprisonment.
823
 
 
For this respondent, prosecution has served the interest of justice, and justice is not revenge 
but educating the people. Commenting on whether justice was done regarding perpetrators 
involved in the murder of his brother, he stated that:  
 
Some of them were already dead. The Dergue killed the person who used to 
investigate my brother. There is a saying a revolution devours its children. Some of 
them were arrested, and some of them escaped. One of those I complained against left 
the country through Sudan. I hear he lives in America. Many of them were arrested. 
                                                             
821Anonymous R2, Above n 697.  He also argued the process has set a precedent that those on power cannot go 
free if they do wrong. 
822Anonymous R38, Above n 691 
823Anonymous R38, Above n 691 
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Others remain at large. Some others already died. One went to Eritrea but died later. 
One of them was convicted and was serving prison sentence but latter released.
824
 
 
Despite the escape of some perpetrators from justice, this relative of a victim feels satisfied 
with the prosecution process and had no objection at all. Those who have escaped might 
receive God’s punishment. This is similar with the opinion of the first respondent, a family 
member of a victim. 
 
Again, it is worth mentioning that some residents in Addis Ababa and Mekelle as well as a 
former SPO and a former Dergue Cadre generally agree with the view that justice has been 
done with respect to the crimes committed by the Dergue.
825
  
 
The final view worth presentation here sees justice as having different levels, and the process 
might be considered as satisfying certain aspects of justice while failing to do so in other 
respects. This is clear from the following: 
 
Well, justice has different levels. These people were in government power...and the 
fact that they were brought to courts and were questioned for what they did may be 
considered as one satisfaction. However, appearing before court is one step. To 
appear and receive proportional punishment is the second step.
826
 
 
The formal process of accountability might be considered as an aspect of justice. 
Nevertheless, justice also requires that punishment be proportional with the crime committed 
(deontological perspective of retributive justice), and it must be carried out. This second 
aspect appears problematic as one respondent noted.
827
The imposition and execution of 
                                                             
824Anonymous R38, Above n 691.  He stated that the convict was released because he is HIV victim. He also 
stated that he has no anger against the perpetrator during occasional encounters because according to him the 
person was released because he himself is a victim of HIV, and that is God’s punishment. 
825 Interview with Anonymous respondents R18, R13, R33, R32, R17 exemplify the view of respondents. In 
addition, a former SPO, Anonymous R6, Above n 686,  noted that “justice was punishment and punishment on 
perpetrators was 100% achieved”. In addition, Anonymous R9, Above n 707, briefly stated that “justice was 
served”. 
826Anonymous R10, Above n 713 
827Anonymous R10, Above n 713.This respondent noted, “I have my doubts on whether they [perpetrators] 
received proportional punishment. First, due to the delay of the process, witnesses were fed up and failed to 
show up; even people who know the cases say I do not wish to testify.  Torture survivors refused to testify on 
the ground of avoiding a feeling of embarrassment that may result from publicly telling of what they went 
through. And because of all of these some people who committed crimes didn’t receive proportional punishment 
due to lack of evidence. Second, even where the evidence proved the crimes committed, the judges did not pass 
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proportional punishment is hindered because of lack of evidence associated mainly with 
delay, leniency on the part of judges, and inability to enforce court judgement (failure to 
apprehend or to get extradition). These factors have significantly hindered the satisfaction of 
the need for justice. 
 
To conclude, the above views highlight that justice was done.  According to this view, justice 
relates to the investigation, conviction and punishment of perpetrators according to the law. 
However, as already discussed in chapter 4, this notion of punitive justice is subject to 
criticism. In addition, the scope of the prosecution process must have prevented the full 
criminalization of all past wrongs. Nevertheless, we should note that the above views also 
acknowledge crucial deficiencies – including procedural and technical problems - that clearly 
limited the outcome of the judicial process, including justice. The argument is that justice was 
done but it was not complete. They admitted the shortcomings to a certain extent although 
some might have expressed their dissatisfaction more strongly. 
 
One problem that was commonly cited is the issue of delay and the resulting gap in producing 
evidence, particularly that of testimonies because witnesses had died, either left the country 
or simply opted not to testify for different reasons. Thus, some perpetrators might have gone 
free for lack of evidence and the implication of this on justice is clear.  
 
The other point is the indication that even those brought and convicted had not received 
proportional punishment. Some perpetrators might have not been brought to court; thus, there 
is a failure to bring those living abroad to justice. Although some principal perpetrators were 
tried and convicted in absentia, they were never punished, mainly because of inability to 
apprehend and execute punishment. 
 
Clearly, we can understand the difficulty or even impossibility of prosecuting all perpetrators 
and all crimes of the Dergue. The implication is that although the framework allows and even 
calls for the prosecution of Dergue member or affiliates, there are practical difficulties in 
doing so; and according to a senior government official that this is even impossible to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
proportional punishment because the judges, looking from the time they passed judgment, considered the 
remoteness of the time of commission of the crimes.  Thirdly, some of the main actors in the violations had left 
the country at the time of the transition and the government’s attempt to bring them to justice was unsuccessful, 
and these people still lead a comfortable life in the West and some other countries. Some were convicted in 
absentia but it has not touched them.  From these perspectives, one wouldn’t confidently say justice was 
rendered or served.” 
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achieve. The other problem worth noting was the incapacity of prosecutors and courts, and 
the limited capacity of the country’s economy. Clearly, these institutions did not have the 
human and other resources and experience to deal with such huge and complex cases. A 
consideration of all these problems gives rise to the question whether the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process has satisfied the need for justice, and contributed to successful 
transition. In light of all these limitations, it might be difficult to say justice was done or done 
satisfactorily.  
 
Second Category: No justice was done 
 
Respondents in this category state that no justice was obtained from the prosecution and 
judicial process. One line of argument is that the conception of justice in Ethiopian societies 
is different from that adopted by the transition, and therefore justice was not done. The 
following view, on whether justice was done, demonstrate this point:  
 
No, actually not. The victims will not feel vindicated unless there is reconciliation 
effort made; unless for example, he [the perpetrator] confesses or asks for 
forgiveness from the victims or their families. You know Ethiopian society is still 
a traditional society especially in the rural areas; convictions do not mean 
anything really. It does not mean much. What is really important especially in the 
rural areas is the fact that the person prostrates himself in front of family of victim 
and asks for forgiveness. That is the most important thing. The conviction does 
not mean any thing.
828
 
 
Clearly, acknowledgment, forgiveness and reconciliation, between or among perpetrators, 
victims and their respective families, are understood as essential elements of justice in 
Ethiopia, more than conviction before courts. These non-formal processes might arguably 
encompass the notions of restorative justice. Hence, the main problem lies with the 
conception of justice and the transitional mechanism of dealing with the past in the sense that 
prosecution and conviction is not seen as the proper way to do justice in the Ethiopian 
context. 
 
                                                             
828Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
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A respondents underlines the delay of the proceedings, a point raised by respondents in the 
first category, as another ground to claim justice was not served.
829
As indicated earlier, the 
SPO had also the mandate to establish and record the truth, and this mandate was presented 
as a cause for the delay. While it could be argued that the institutional inadequacy of the 
justice organs is the central cause, the implications of the delay on the outcome (justice) are 
clear. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the appraisal of the trial process as fair.
830
Clearly, 
this view on the fairness of the trial process corresponds with the views of respondents in the 
first category.
831
One might say the elements of legal justice are fulfilled, and hence the 
process is acceptable, at least, in a formal sense. 
 
A more critical view holds that a partial justice is no justice at all.
832
Thus, one cannot be 
partial and just at the same time. As discussed in chapter 4, this is a point that opponents of 
prosecution cite as a problem of prosecution. Such a perception has led some to dismiss the 
process as a whole, as observed in the following terms: 
 
I really did not follow that [the prosecution process] with interest because ...of the 
reasons that I said earlier, I lost interest in the whole thing, to the propaganda, and so 
eventually, gradually and even now you see clearly that the Woyane have no regard 
for justice, they do not care for justice in the real sense.... So, it was a propaganda, 
they used it for propaganda and for this reason...there is evidence that there were 
many western governments that sent the so called experts in this process and many of 
them were disenchanted and went back in two or three months. They did not like it. I 
                                                             
829Anonymous R11, Above n 712.  The respondent noted,  “this [delay] is something that I have actually written 
about in the local papers. There was unnecessary delay. Too much delay and too many witnesses and justice 
delayed is justice denied. That is really what happened in the Ethiopian case. The problem was with the 
proclamation actually. The Proclamation not only set up prosecution but it also mandated the prosecutor to keep 
record of what happened during the red terror. So, one of the functions of the trial was to keep official record of 
what happened. And I think these clashes with justice. And, I think the purpose of justice is really to try the 
perpetrators as soon, as quickly, as possible and reach at a decision. So, the prosecution was really burdened 
with extra-judicial functions such as recording what happened during the red terror. I think the recording should 
have been done under another condition rather than mixing it with prosecution.” 
830Anonymous R11, Above n 712. This point is made clear in the following terms: “The trial from what I 
observed, I have been observing at the time, I believe it was pretty fair. The defendants were given really top-
notch lawyers in the country, they were given adequate time to prepare their defence, and they could call any 
evidence or witnesses that would support their cases. So, on the whole, the process of the trial, I would say, was 
quite fair, and it was within the limits of what I would call fair trial” 
831Anonymous 2, Above n 697 
832Anonymous R1, Above n 745. As already quoted, this respondent notes that “No...No...That was why right 
from the beginning I was crying for...so, you cannot [say justice was done]. We call EPRP kills people, Maison 
Kills people, and ....when you say Maison kills, that is a crime; EPRP kills, that is okay, then you have created 
no standard for the society as a whole. So, it is basically a continuation of the same thing with the actors perhaps 
changing.” 
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think it was propaganda and not [justice]. But, I think they profited, they got a lot of 
money from various governments and organizations.
833
 
 
In light of the motivations of justice discussed in chapter 4, the above view indicates that the 
whole process was not motivated by reason or the desire to see justice done; rather it was 
driven by self-interest of the incoming government. However, the agent presents itself as 
acting based on reason or the desire to do justice, although that is not the real motivation. 
This point is further noted as follows: 
 
...they [the ‘Woyane’] were declaring that they were rectifying wrongs that were 
committed in society and [doing] justice. But the fact is as I told you when they left a 
group of people who had killed and when in fact when the group of people that killed 
become part and parcel of the EPRDF regime, and when those others, the Ma’son, 
who were against them became villains alone.... the whole thing had vitiated right 
from the beginning. You cannot expect justice from that process.
834
 
 
The partiality of the process is questionable and lead to the conclusion that what the 
government declares is mere rhetoric rather than the real motivation. If there is real 
commitment to justice, all past violators should have been held accountable. The 
determination of who a criminal is or what the truth is depends on the will of the government 
and not on the facts. Such a partial process can serve neither justice nor truth.  
 
It is also interesting to note the perspective of victims on the question of whether justice was 
done. A victim of the Dergue and a former Minister rejected the process as a whole; when 
asked whether he himself, as a victim, felt satisfied with the outcome (justice), he opined that: 
 
I think...as I said earlier, political killings in this country precede the Derg. The 
solution is a political solution. We have to change our political culture. As I said, very 
few people were imprisoned/received judgement. The majority were not even 
                                                             
833Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
834Anonymous R1, ibid 
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questioned...You cannot try the system by imprisoning and chasing few people; the 
procedure was different - that is pardon; we have to forgive each other.
835
 
 
This is a reaffirmation of the rejection of prosecution as a solution, and his stated preference 
for other process – reconciliation process. The dissatisfaction with the process and outcome is 
clear: 
 
...The whole process was objectiveless....the line is mixed. You cannot distinguish the 
innocent and the perpetrators. They are mixed... It was thus a useless process; and 
now we need dialogue and forgiveness among and for each other.
836
  
 
This view reflects that justice was not served because it lacks this objectiveness - it failed to 
properly identify victims and perpetrators and hence it was useless. Thus, it calls for other 
alternatives for dealing with the past. The above view demonstrates that some victims of the 
red terror do not think justice was done, and the consequent dissatisfaction questions whether 
effective transition is possible at all. 
 
A resident in Mekelle who questioned the motivation of the government’s actions, presents a 
similar view.
837
Other residents both in Mekelle and Addis Ababa observed that justice was 
not done for various reasons including the lack of government’s commitment, the lack of 
evidence, partiality of proceedings, weakness of justice institutions etc.
838
 In addition, a 
former judge is of a similar opinion.
839
 
 
To sum up, respondents in this category do not believe justice was done.  One point worth 
noting is that the Ethiopian transitional justice process did not incorporate or reflect the 
conception of justice of Ethiopian societies, and hence no justice can be expected from the 
process. The elements of truth and reconciliation such as acknowledgement and forgiveness 
are more important to Ethiopian society (traditional) rather than punitive justice that was 
associated, as discussed in chapter 4, with a westernized conception of justice. Hence, the 
                                                             
835Anonymous R39, Above n 725.  He commented “may be only 0.1% the perpetrators were brought to court”,  
with an implication on the out come of the process. He also talked about the lack of evidence for the problem. 
836Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
837Anonymous R24, Above n 740  
838Anonymous R12, Above n 762; Anonymous R15, Above n743. Anonymous R14, who supported prosecution, 
however commented the process was not satisfactory to the victims or families.   
839Anonymous R20, Above n 755  
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prosecution process was considered as a failure in terms of rendering justice. Two other 
reasons are also offered as to why there was no justice. The first is the lack of true will on the 
part of the government to secure justice, and the second and related one is the partiality of the 
prosecution process. We should also note some problems associated with the actual 
prosecution and judicial process – such as delay – that have their own implications on 
whether justice was done.These contestations seriously question whether the Ethiopian 
society has properly addressed past crimes and thereby established a new social and political 
system that significantly departs from the past. 
 
To sum up this section, I will highlight certain points. We clearly see diverse views on 
whether the Ethiopian transitional justice process has rendered justice. These views suggest 
several problems that have implications for the transitional justice process. It is true that the 
supporters of prosecution believe justice was done because the perpetrators were investigated, 
prosecuted, convicted, and punished in accordance with the law. Hence, that is what justice 
is. However, they also recognize the procedural and technical limitations that have 
compromised the search for justice. The main problem, which led to other problems, was 
delay. Obviously, the data shows that the delay has negatively affected the production of 
evidence because as time goes some witnesses have died, left the country and changed their 
mind. As a result, some perpetrators went free for lack of evidence. The delay also affected 
the right to speedy trial with an implication that justice delayed is justice denied. 
 
The other problem was the absence of proportionality of punishment, in the sense that some 
perpetrators received lenient punishment. In addition, there was failure or inability to 
apprehend or extradite some offenders who live abroad, and bring them to justice. Moreover, 
there was failure or inability to execute punishment pronounced by courts in relation to those 
tried in absentia. The point is mere declaration of conviction and punishment on judicial 
record is not enough. Considering the magnitude of violations committed, it was difficult or 
even impossible to prosecute all Dergue members. In addition, there were limitations in 
institutional capacity and economy of the country. However, all these limitations to justice 
were raised in relation to violations committed by members of Dergue. Nevertheless, they all 
show the search for justice was not complete, which arguably limits the effectiveness of the 
transitional process.  
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The other and most drastic view is that justice was not done at all for different reasons. The 
first problem was the lack of confidence in the entire justice and political system. It might be 
argued that the government had never been driven by the desire for justice or truth; and even 
had subjected all institutions to its service. Hence, nothing would be expected from the 
prosecution and judicial process. The second problem lays in the conception of justice and 
choice of the modality itself in the sense that truth and reconciliation would have better 
redressed victims and created harmony within the society; and that reconciliation is part of 
traditional dispute resolution in Ethiopia. Conviction and punishment alone does not mean 
anything. Appearing before victims/families and asking forgiveness is considered as the best 
justice and compatible with tradition. However, one may ask how formal systems and 
informal systems can interact. Would customary/traditional resolution have been possible in 
light of the mandatory international laws that oblige prosecution? The third problem relates to 
the partiality of the legal framework itself, and that justice cannot be partial. It is clear that 
the framework mandate the SPO to investigate and prosecute members of the Derg that 
committed crimes, and never talk about the violations committed by other political groups. 
Two former SPOs opined that they actually investigated crimes irrespective of who 
committed it, and this could be supported. However, there are two problems here. First, the 
legal framework does not allow them to do so, and clearly their actions lacks legal basis. 
Secondly, there is no indication that these were the case in other proceedings. However, it 
shows the importance of dealing with all crimes irrespective of who committed them. 
Nevertheless, the framework has failed to authorize such proceedings making it partial, and 
inconsistent with the need to do justice. Generally, the above problems suggest the search for 
justice and the need to build a better future founded on justice remain unfulfilled.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter investigated whether the Ethiopian transitional justice framework provided a 
proper mechanism of dealing with the past as well as whether it has rendered justice. This 
involved a critical examination of the legal framework and the presentation and analysis of 
data. A closer examination of the legal framework clearly shows that Ethiopia adopted 
criminal prosecution as a modality of dealing with the past and a certain conception of justice 
was incorporated as its objective. The analysis of data, regarding the appropriateness of the 
framework as well as whether justice was done, demonstrates the problematic nature of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process. First, considering the legacy of violation, and the long 
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accumulated ethnic, social and political divisions and conflicts within Ethiopia, the 
framework’s emphasis on punishment and its exclusion of truth and reconciliation processes 
can be questionable. Secondly, again considering the narrations of history of violation in 
Ethiopia, the transitions adoption of a particular narration and exclusion of other narrations is 
problematic. This is has led to selective prosecution, and gave rise to partiality and one-
sidedness. Thirdly, we can understand the absence of broader public participation in the 
formulation of the transitional framework, which questions both the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of the process. These problems of the framework had implications the outcome of 
the process, including whether justice was done. As considered above, the prosecution 
process was so problematic that it might not be possible to say justice was satisfactorily done. 
Thus, whether the Ethiopian transitional justice has settled the past and served as a 
foundation for a better future is questionable. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERROGATING TRUTH AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses whether the prosecution and judicial process had established the truth 
and investigates whether it has made other contributions to the society as a whole. The first 
section interrogates truth in the Ethiopian transition by analyzing the legal framework and the 
available data. The second section questions whether the process had other contributions 
apart from, or in addition to, rendering justice and establishing the truth. The aim is to gain a 
view on the overall contribution of the process, if any. 
 
6.2 Interrogating Truth in the Ethiopian Transition 
 
Truth, we have understood, is a crucial component transitional justice process, as knowing 
the truth about the past has implications for a society’s future. Despite its contested meanings, 
there remains a need to search for and record the truth about the past, and make the public 
aware of such truth. This section interrogates whether the Ethiopian transitional process of 
accountability had addressed the issue of truth. To achieve its objective, this section contains 
three sub-sections. The first outlines the place of truth in the Ethiopian transitional 
framework. The second sub-section deals with the issue whether the truth is actually 
established based on available data. Finally, the third sub-section provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
6.2.1 The Place of Truth in the Ethiopian Transition 
 
To identify the place of truth in the Ethiopian transition, it is necessary to look at the 
proclamation establishing the Special Prosecutions Office, as discussed in detail in the 
preceding chapter. The most relevant part is the preamble, which provides that: 
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...Whereas, it is in the interest of a just historical obligation to record for posterity the 
brutal offences...perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia and to educate the people 
and make them aware of these offenses in order to prevent the recurrence of such a 
system of government.
840
 
 
No other part of the proclamation specifically talks about truth. Therefore, it is necessary to 
analyze the different aspects.  The preamble talks of what Ruti Tietel termed ‘historical 
justice’.841  The proclamation defines the offenses that are subject to recording. Moreover, the 
recording of the brutal offenses of the past is a matter of just historical obligation rather than 
preference. The formulation in terms of obligation, although not legal, may lead to the 
conclusion that there must be a right holder. As discussed in chapter 4, this right to truth may 
belong to victims and relatives or the society as a whole. Victims and relatives need to know 
both the identity of the perpetrators as well as the motives behind the crimes committed. 
People want to know the fate of disappeared family members or relatives. Society as a whole 
has a right to the truth – to know what happened in the past and the reasons and 
circumstances that led to massive violations. The revelation of the truth and its recording has 
huge significance to individual victims and relatives as well as society as a whole.  
 
A further point worth making is that the recording of history is important for future 
generations as well as the current generation. The proclamation recognizes the significance of 
the truth to the society as a whole. It underlines the importance of educating the people and 
making them aware of these offenses. Hence, history recording is necessary for public 
education and public awareness. Moreover, such public education and awareness might lead 
to the prevention of the recurrence of similar system in the future. However, the proclamation 
does not refer to the importance of truth to individual victims or relatives. Although, victims 
and relatives are also part of the public, the proclamation may be questioned for not talking 
specifically about the satisfaction that a victim and a relative may obtain from the truth.  
 
Clearly, the recording of past offenses was to be conducted not in isolation. It was rather part 
of the prosecution and judicial process, and thus the truth about the past was to be established 
though investigation and court proceedings. In this regard, the question whether the judicial 
process established the truth about the past may be raised. 
                                                             
840 Proclamation No. 22/1992; Paragraph 5 of the Preamble 
841TIETEL, Above n 356 
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However, a prior question needs to be asked: what was the truth to be established? It might be 
useful to recall what the proclamation states: 
 
The people of Ethiopia have been deprived of their human and political rights and 
subjected to gross oppression under the yoke of fascistic rules of the Dergue-WPE 
regime for the last seventeen years.
842
 
 
Is not this itself a declaration of the truth? Does not the law itself proclaim the violations, and 
define the identity of the victims and the perpetrators?  
 
We note that the proclamation also states that: 
 
Heinous and horrendous criminal acts which occupy a special chapter in the history of 
the peoples of Ethiopia have been perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia by 
officials, members and auxiliaries of the security and armed forces of the Dergue-
WPE- regime.
843
 
 
It further provides that: 
 
Officials and auxiliaries of the Dergue-WPE dictatorial regime have impoverished the 
economy of the country by plundering, illegally confiscating and destroying the 
property of the people as well as by misappropriating public and state property.
844
 
 
The first three preambles of the proclamation clearly assert past violation. Would not it be 
possible to say therefore that the truth about past violation was already established?  This is 
an official and legislative declaration of past violence and perpetrators. So, what else is to be 
established? If this is the truth and thus known, what else is to be discovered and recorded?  
Can one consider the declarations in the proclamation as a general truth, and what remains to 
be done is to record the details of this general truth? Or is there something else? Despite this, 
the Ethiopian transitional justice process recognizes the need for establishing the truth about 
                                                             
842 Proclamation No. 22/1992; Preamble 1 of the proclamation 
843 Proclamation No. 22/1992; Preamble 2 of the proclamation 
844 Proclamation No. 22/1992; Preamble 3 of the proclamation 
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the past. Moreover, the truth is to be established and recorded through prosecution and 
judicial process. 
 
6.2.2 Has the Ethiopian Transition Established the Truth?  
 
This sub-section attempts to present and analyze the available data on whether the truth about 
the past has been established through the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability. 
Arguably, the contestation raised regarding justice can also be relevant to truth. The 
concentration here is on how people evaluate the process in terms of establishing the truth 
about what happened. In short, the issue is do we think we have discovered what happened in 
the past. 
 
Respondents were asked the question whether the truth had been established in light of the 
need of victims or families and the society as a whole. The responses were closely examined 
and categorized into two. One category believes the truth has been established while the other 
argues that the process has not resulted in the truth. Some exemplary responses are provided 
and analyzed below.  
 
Category One: The process has established the truth 
 
A senior government official observed that the process has revealed the truth: 
 
Yes, the truth is to serve justice. There is truth. The Derg system is condemned, and 
what the top officials did was shown.  It is important to avoid the recurrence of 
similar events; establishing rule of law was necessary. All the arguments for justice 
work for truth. Is it possible to establish the whole truth, I doubt. 
845
 
 
This clearly suggests there is a link between truth, justice, deterrence and rule of law. The 
truth is to serve justice, and if we relate this point with his earlier opinion on justice, the truth 
established is the truth about the offenses committed by the Dergue and that the Dergue as a 
system was a criminal one. The argument is that criminal justice was rendered based on the 
truth established at court. Clearly, the legal condemnation of the system precedes the judicial 
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conviction of the members of the Dergue. Therefore, what followed might be a judicial 
endorsement of the political truth so established by the proclamation. Other respondents in 
this category expressed similar opinions. Despite this, whether the whole truth was 
established is doubtful considering certain limitations in establishing the truth. Nevertheless, 
these limitations seem to relate only to the violations committed by Dergue members and not 
by other political groups. The government official spoke of nothing in relation to violations 
committed by such other political groups or the victims thereof. He would have perhaps 
argued that the focus, in searching for justice and truth, was on state violence, and the truth 
about the rest was not what was significant. 
 
A former Supreme Court judge expressed a similar opinion: 
 
As I told you earlier, many people were convicted in both Federal and regional courts. 
At least as far as these people are concerned the facts were established. I guess, there 
might be facts we have not discovered. Did we reveal the whole account, the whole 
picture of every individual crime? I think that requires the effort of not only courts but 
also other organs. However, so much detailed evidence had been introduced. Detailed 
evidence about the commission of horrible crimes was presented.  The courts were 
presented with detailed accounts of what happened. It is the duty of every one to 
organize and present for historical purposes those submitted to courts for justice 
purpose.  It is the duty of not only courts but also that of all including the government 
and individuals. But, I think there are sufficient truths to show the type of terrible 
crimes committed in this country because the truth has been established...Is it 
complete? I do not know. Well, according to estimates, about 500, 000 people were 
killed.  I do not think we have an account of each of the 500,000. However, I think a 
fairly good picture of what happened has been discovered.
846
  
 
This view clearly states that truth was established, but also recognizes possible limitations. 
This former judge also commented further on what he thought to be limitations in the 
following way. 
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There are many limitations. The evidence was submitted in a technical manner like 
any judicial process. I think what was technically presented to courts should be 
organized and presented in an understandable way to the family of victims, to the new 
generation, to commentators and all interested people.
847
 
 
This view emphasises that the truth or sufficient truth was generally established. This is a 
confirmation of the truth established in the SPO proclamation. However, we also note that the 
truth about every crime was neither established nor possible. In addition, the lack of 
publication was raised as the main limitation on public access to the truth established and 
available in courts. This is a significant limitation in light of the discussion in chapter 4 that 
the facts need to be publicly revealed and known to the public. Again, no reference was made 
to violations committed by other political groups.  
 
A former SPO prosecutor notes that “to a certain extent, the process has shown the violations 
and repression committed during the Dergue as well as the technique and modus operandi of 
the violations.  As one of its objectives was to reveal these matters, the process has clearly 
shown such facts by producing documentary evidences and through out the trial process.”848 
He, however, acknowledges the failure to make the truth known to the public: 
 
In fact, there are devices, out side of the ordinary judicial process, that reveal the 
truth and let the public know about each crime. I believe that was not totally done. 
Apart from rumours and talks in the newspaper about every individual’s 
participation, no attempt was made to provide the public with credible and 
detailed accounts of what happened based on documents verified and accepted by 
courts. It was not possible to make documents secret and at the same show the 
public in detail about the horrific nature of the former system.
849
 
 
This former SPO prosecutor further viewed the negative consequences as follows: 
 
The fact that that the activities and works of the SPO were not brought to the 
public in a better way is a total disaster. Our inability to expose the crime 
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committed at the time indicates the lack of guarantee against the recurrence of 
similar events. I really feel very sad about it.  In fact, there are situations where 
some people have publicly appeared as big renowned and respectable elders.  It 
does not mean a person should be insulted or disrepute in his entire life just for the 
crime he has committed at a certain time. Nevertheless, these people [Derg 
members] are not giving lesson to the society from that perspective. I do not see 
them giving lesson, by drawing from their past, either to the government. I see 
rather the situation taking a different route.
850
  
 
The above views of a SPO prosecutor demonstrate that the discovery of the truth by a certain 
institution is not in itself satisfying. According to the prosecutor, the truths about the 
violations committed by the Derg were established through judicial process although it is not 
complete. However, there is lack of publicity of the truth so established. As discussed in 
chapter 4, truth serves multiple purposes including the prevention of similar crimes, fight ing 
impunity, providing moral satisfaction, promoting reconciliation, and facilitating social and 
political reconstruction. In all these respects, it is the knowledge of the truth that matters. In 
the Ethiopian context, even if the truth was established, the lack of access to the truth might 
have limited the possibility for effective transition. The above view also emphasizes that the 
lack of publication has compromised the guarantee against the recurrence of similar events, 
and has even frustrated the lessons to be drawn from the process. We should also note the 
comment about the secrecy of SPO documents. We might see the politics of truth involved 
here. As discussed earlier, the transitional framework was set by the EPRDF regime, which 
laid down the scope of the truth to be discovered and recorded. This might relate to the 
question of the politics of truth, the truth is what the speaker (of power) says so, as observed 
by post modernist thinkers. Again, once the truth was discovered, why was it not 
disseminated to the public? Is this another aspect of controlling the truth about the truth?  
Finally, although the SPO prosecutor was very critical of the lack of publication, he did not 
refer to the role of other political groups or their victims, implying that the limitations he 
indicates relate only to the violations committed by the Dergue.
851
 
 
Another former SPO prosecutor has noted that: 
                                                             
850Anonymous R3, Above n 682  
851ibid. The respondent however admitted that other political groups did commit crimes, and also opined “the 
SPO did investigate these crimes as well” to establish the truth. 
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Exemplary facts were established. What the Derge used to committe in secret or in 
office has been disclosed; Sample facts were established. There may be facts, 
which we didn’t discover and disclose. Regarding evidence of establishing facts, 
evidence acceptable to courts were submitted and what the government was doing 
in this country was established; the fact that the government was a killing machine 
was established.
852
 
 
This again is similar to previous views that the truth was established. Significantly, the above 
respondent argues that the facts or truths established through judicial process are indeed 
authentic and incontestable: 
 
History is very much related with fact-finding process; although not full and 
complete, we were able to establish the existence of state sponsored violence, that 
the government used state machinery to kill people. We should also bear in mind 
that the history of the government is the history of the people.  Facts established 
through judicial process are authentic. You do not have to expect anything from 
the accused. It is not hearsay. It cannot be contested. Facts established through 
truth and reconciliation can be contested. The facts established through courts may 
be few in number. Nevertheless, the issue is not one of number; in terms of fact, it 
is better and stronger.
853
 
 
This view emphasizes the superiority of the judicial process in establishing genuine or real 
facts. In view of an independent and impartial judicial system and processes, this argument 
may be persuasive. Problems arise if such independence and impartiality is in itself contested. 
However, even accepting the argument that facts established through judicial process are 
authentic and incontestable, the limitations of judicial truth are observable from the above 
response. So long as the accused remains silent, there is a need to prove the truth by 
presenting adequate evidence, which is problematic in some cases. Hence, at the end, as the 
respondent stated, only few facts or truths might be established. However, the question 
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remains; do these few facts satisfy the need for truth in light of large-scale or massive human 
rights violations taking place over a period of years? 
 
However, there is an emphasis on the failure to make the truths public as a serious 
shortcoming of the process: 
 
Publication is very important. Of course, certain activities remain to be done, for 
example there is a publication problem; we have not made our discoveries public. 
These efforts and works should not all remain secret. Today, I speak about it. May 
be no one speaks tomorrow. A lot needs to be done. A lot of work was done. But 
it is not known much. A lot remains.
854
 
 
This view emphasizes the importance of publication and the failure of the SPO to publicize 
its works or achievements as well as the implications of this failure. However, pointing to the 
challenges ahead to the issue of publication, a former SPO prosecutor noted that: 
 
All SPO documents were sent to the Security Affairs Office, not even to the 
Ministry of Justice. How can you publicize if you do not have access? I think 
there are problems.
855
 
 
This again raises the question of the monopolization of the truth, and questions whether the 
truth so established had any significance to the effective transition of the Ethiopian society. A 
recitation of the points of the fourth respondent might be useful. The truth is about facts, the 
facts that the Dergue used the State machinery to murder people, and these were authentically 
established. The other truths were not an issue at all. In addition, he acknowledges the 
existence of certain limitations in the discovery of facts, and the absence of publication and 
the secrecy of SPO documents were serious problems. Again, there is no reference to the 
violations committed by other political groups or the victims thereof. 
 
Of the nature of truth, a Supreme Court judge stated that: 
 
                                                             
854Anonymous R6, Above n 686 
855Anonymous R6, ibid 
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There are two truths. The first is the capital truth. The public knows it. What you 
establish in court [the second truth] is a small fraction of it.  The evidence of the 
public prosecutor verifies that. But, it is impossible to say these were 
communicated to the public, for example how much do the public know that 
Melaku or Gesgis had established committees even unknown to Dergue and killed 
so many
856
 
 
This view, by making distinction between truths, suggests there is a failure to make the ‘other 
truths’ or the unknown truths public. This truth relates to the judicial truth. Other limitations 
of the process were observed as follows: 
 
In rural areas, there are people who had committed crimes out of self-interest 
(individual animosity). Such crimes were just covered under red terror. How much 
is known about this. There were cases where the red terror was used as cover to 
kill people for refusing to hand over martreza [ancient valuable money]. No work 
was done to give a lesson that as the government creates informal institutions, it is 
possible they go way beyond its control, and thus only following the legal system 
is appropriate.
857
 
 
 The reservations on the processes of making the truth known is further expressed in the 
following terms:  
 
The media did not give enough attention. The SPO did not select cases and bring 
to the public. The truth was not brought to the Ethiopian people. No education 
through the radio was given. The truth must be disclosed not only of those 
prosecuted here but also of those dead or otherwise unprosecuted for different 
reasons.
858
 
 
Several relevant points can be identified from the above responses. The first is the distinction 
between what the respondent called capital truth and other truths. The public knows the 
capital truth of what happened in the past. It seems that the capital truth refers to what the law 
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857Anonymous R31, ibid   
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says is the truth, i.e. that violations and crimes were committed by the Dergue. The other 
truths are those established by the court, which are according to the respondent a small 
fraction of the capital truth. He claims that these other truths were not communicated to the 
public, and the public do not know them. However, this begs the question is it not possible 
for the public to know the other truths if it knows the capital truths? Second, there are cases 
where individuals have committed crimes for their own self-interest, and these were not 
revealed. Thirdly, dissemination of the truth through the media or other forums was very 
limited at best and non-existent at worst. This is an opinion shared by some of the 
respondents above.  Finally, the disclosure should relate not only to those prosecuted but also 
to those dead or remain unprosecuted, with the implication that there are people who escaped 
prosecution. The truth about other political groups is also not an issue for the respondent.  
 
Another Supreme Court judge observed that: 
 
In the trial process, we were searching for, and disclosing the truth. They [the Dergue 
Officials] were saying what we did was an act of self-defence. They say EPRP was 
the one that started the killing. It was established EPRP was not the initiator, it was 
the Derg that was executing people. The evidence proved what the truth was. The fact 
that Dergue’s actions were directed against eliminating its political opponents was 
proven. Regarding smaller (minor) cases, many people were not prosecuted - they 
have escaped one or another way.
859
 
 
This view underlines that the judicial process resulted in the discovery of truth although it 
admits the limitations therein. The truth so established relates to the violations and crimes 
committed by the Dergue. However, contrary to the respondent’s opinion, a court case, over 
which the respondent presided, do not tell whether the Dergue or the EPRP was the initiator 
of the violence.
860
There is a clear indication that many people have escaped prosecution, and 
                                                             
859Anonymous R5, Above n 719 
860This researcher has tried to find out whether official documents support this assertion of the Supreme Court 
judge. Interestingly, the High Court proceedings wherein this judge served as a judge (before being promoted) 
was published by the Supreme Court, in 2000 E.C, in Addis Ababa. It relates to file No.SPO 401/85 wherein 
Former leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam and et al, a total of 106 officials and military leaders, were prosecuted. In 
its judgement, the court underlined the violations committed by the perpetrators against EPRP and other 
political groups branded as anarchists by the Derg. However, the Court also noted the role of EPRP at the time, 
and considered this as a ground for leniency of sentencing. Nevertheless, the court was suspicious of who started 
the killings, and this remains unresolved in court cases. See pp. 474-475. Hence, one may say contrary to the 
opinion given above, the court cases are reportedly unclear about the initiator of violence between the Dergue 
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hence limited the truth established. This is similar to previous opinions. Again, this 
respondent has not referred to violations committed by other political groups. 
 
Another respondent opined that the truth has partly been discovered:  
 
The truth is partly shown. More truth could have been disclosed through truth and 
reconciliation. What we have now is a judicial truth. They came through evidence and 
after contestation. There were also things that were not admissible. I think courts are 
not the appropriate place for searching the truth.
861
 
 
This opinion indicates that the judicial process has led to the disclosure of part of the truth. 
However, it emphasizes that the judicial process with all the procedural requirements is not 
an appropriate forum for searching and establishing of the whole truth. Interestingly, 
consistent with his earlier positions, this respondent believes that truth and reconciliation 
could have resulted in more truths than the judicial process. More over, the respondent also 
commented on the lack of publication of what was discovered.
862
 Furthermore, his earlier 
comment on non-inclusiveness of the framework also indicates the incompleteness of the 
truth disclosed.
863
 Interestingly, he also refers to other political groups/parties.  
 
A resident in Mekelle has similarly stated that the truth has been revealed in the following 
terms: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and EPRP. See also “Dem Yazel Dose”, a document published by the SPO in 2002 E.C, p.2. In its introductory 
part, this document states that “ during these periods [Derg regime], many home grown and rivalry groups raised 
arms against each other; they had bloods in their hands against each other; innocent citizens lost their lives. Each 
group was writing and presenting others as responsible for the problem. We do not intend to either write the 
history of that period or judge the narrations presented by the groups – either left or right. We have neither the 
capacity nor the desire to do so.” This document, published after the completion of the trial, although recognizes 
the involvement of different groups in conflict; it does not clearly state who initiated the conflict first. It rather 
distances itself from the task of presenting the details’. One would also note the implications of these statements 
on the discovery of the truth. 
861Anonymous R20, Above n 755.  In his opinion presented earlier, this respondent noted “in a court you win a 
case, but winning a cause is better.” He also remarked that “ a lot of things were not disclosed, and they 
remained unknown. When you have prosecution, people will not tell the truth for fear of punishment. If a 
different track was followed people will feel free to tell the truth, and we would have known the truth. We had 
lost that opportunity.” 
862Anonymous R20, Above n 755 
863Anonymous R20, Above n 755.  The respondent has commented earlier in relation to the framework that it 
was not all inclusive saying ‘if others were included we would have a full picture.’ This comment must have 
also implication on truth. He also opined there that there are people who escaped prosecution. 
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The Dergue was killing and torturing people. The Dergue committed all sorts of 
crimes. The prosecutors had shown this.... However, it cannot be exhaustive.
864
 
 
This is more or less consistent with the previous responses. A resident in Addis Ababa 
similarly observed, “the Dergue’s brutal crimes were exposed in detail.”865It appears needless 
to present the views of other respondents
866
 because they have similarly opined that the truth 
was established although they expressed their views differently.  
 
In summing up the views of the first category of respondents, the following points might be 
highlighted. First, they all believe that to some extent the truth has been established through 
prosecution and the judicial process. So, judicial truth has been established. In other words, 
the truth is what has been decided as the truth by courts. Secondly, the truth so discovered is 
that the Dergue had used the state machinery and committed serious crimes, and of its modus 
operandi. This is an endorsement of the political truth narrated in the proclamation 
establishing the SPO. Thirdly, all respondents believe that there were limitations in 
establishing the truth, and none of them said it was complete. They identified the reasons for 
the limitations including the inadmissibility of evidence, the escape of some people from 
prosecution, the enormity of the crimes, and failure to reach the truth about the dead or 
unprosecuted, and the inappropriateness of courts for the task. However, most respondents 
raised these limitations to truth only in relation to the crimes committed by the Dergue. There 
is recognition of the limitation to truth regarding crimes committed by other political groups 
questioning the appropriateness of courts to search and reveal the truth. Fourthly, almost all 
respondents criticized the lack of publication or access to the judicial truth. They also 
indicated the negative results of lack of publication on public knowledge about the past 
crimes. Clearly, in the absence of public knowledge, the truth loses its significance of 
contributing to successful transition. Fifthly, some respondents also commented on the 
secrecy of documents affecting publicity. One respondent actually stated the SPO documents 
were submitted to the Security Affairs Office and not even to the Ministry of Justice. The 
secrecy of these documents could limit access to the truth so discovered and their future 
publication. Is the government controlling their dissemination, and demonstrating the idea 
that truth is the outcome of power relations. What ever the motive is there are problems of 
                                                             
864Anonymous R13, Interview with the author on 15 January 2013. Mekelle 
865Anonymous R15, Interview with the author, August 2013, Addis Ababa. 
866 Examples include Anonymous respondents R18; Anonymous R13, Above n 864; R33; R 32; and R17 
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making the truth known. If the truth is not known or remain unknown, it may be difficult or 
even impossible to have effective transition. Generally, the above responses note that the 
truth was established as part of the justice process, although certain limitations or challenges 
were recognized.  
 
Category Two: The truth was not established 
 
Respondents in this category argue that the prosecution and judicial process has not 
established the truth. Thus, in addressing the issue, a respondent noted: 
 
You are asking me the same thing [referring to the issue of justice]. There is no truth. 
Truth is indivisible. You cannot be partial to the truth and be just. And as I told you 
right from the beginning, they [those in power, which he calls the Woyane] were not 
interested in being truthful, they were not interested in being just, they were interested 
in expedient process by which they could establish themselves in this country. To this 
day, there is no truth. Everybody writes, as you said, about truth. Every Tom, Dick 
and Harry writes everything. And there is no way to sift through this new information 
that is coming out to inform, better inform, the Ethiopian public and the international 
public.
867
 
 
This is a categorical rejection of the transitional justice framework for its partiality, and hence 
one cannot expect truth or justice from it. It also questions the motivations of actions, and 
stresses the whole process was motivated not by the desire to establish the truth or render 
justice; rather it was driven by the motive to hold onto state power. The above view strongly 
criticises the existing narrations of history. What everyone writes about the past is not the 
truth. Hence, there is a need to sort through the various narrations, identify the truth and 
better inform the public.
868
 
 
Some critics of the prosecution process hold that the institutions of the state are not impartial, 
independent and competent to render justice or establish the truth, and even see institutional 
regression, as reflected in the following view:  
                                                             
867Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
868The respondent seems to have partly undertaken this task in a book he published a few months after the 
interview.  
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 In fact, what we have gone through in terms of justice, court system, the judicial 
system in general is now down to the gutter. Even the Derg, at the time of the Derg, 
the courts were respected. The Derg never really abused the courts.  The Derg killed 
people, incarcerated people, tortured people but that was done outside the law. The 
Derg never used courts to justify its crimes. What is happening now, the court justifies 
the crimes. You go there and the judges, so-called judges, do not listen to what you 
say. They listen to what the Attorney General or so called tells them and they 
pronounce their sentence. That is it. That is as simple as that. So... this shows, in fact, 
that the whole process of the Special Prosecutors... did not teach any lesson.
869
 
 
Although it is extremely difficult to compare the present with the demonic periods of the 
Dergue, one needs to consider some relevant points. The first is that justice and truth are 
related issues, implied from the response that the opinions on justice may also apply to truth. 
Secondly, truth is indivisible and impartial; hence the conclusion that there is no truth even to 
this day. What the respondent questioned here is the selectiveness in prosecuting only one 
side. All perpetrators should be treated or dealt with in the same way. Thirdly, the 
government was not interested in the truth; rather the whole prosecution and judicial process 
was self-serving. Fourthly, the courts, rather than being institutions of justice and truth, were 
and still are servants of the regime - a practice that never existed even during the Dergue 
regime.
870
The argument is that Ethiopian courts and judges are not institutions of justice and 
truth.
871
This would normally lead to the assessment that the prosecution process did not give 
any lesson; again with an implication on truth.  
 
Another respondent opined that: 
 
                                                             
869Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
870However, no specific instances were raised in relation to the prosecution and trial process of the Dergue 
officials. Most of the respondents viewed the process as independent and impartial. Even one respondent, R11, 
who criticized the justice system as a whole however noted earlier that the trial of the Dergue officials fall 
within the limits of fair trial. 
871 Some sources indicate that Ethiopian courts are generally weak and due process is lacking; See The World 
Justice Project Rule of Law Index.  However, no specific instances were raised in relation to the prosecution and 
trial process of the Dergue officials. Most of the respondents viewed the process as independent and impartial. 
Even R11, who criticized the justice system as a whole however noted earlier that the trial of the Dergue 
officials fall within the limits of fair trial. Nevertheless, as reported by a defence lawyer, R36, some of the 
convicts still believe that “what was done to them was a drama”, which they never want to speak. 
 
 
 
233 
 
It is really hard to say that the truth has been revealed. We really do not know that the 
truth has come out to the surface. Yes, there have been some people who had been 
notorious killers and they had been apprehended. But, do we know the full truth?  It is 
very hard to tell. So, we really do not know or its extent is not known; that is where 
the matter stands now.
872
 
 
This clearly suggests that the truths about the past remain unknown even after the conclusion 
of the prosecution process. This might be attributed to the lack of genuine commitment to 
reveal the truth as noted below:  
 
I think we are in the same position [in comparison to the time before the start of the 
process]. The conviction was not followed by the pursuit of truth or pursuit of 
reconciliation. The prosecution [SPO] was closed; we did not even know when it was 
closed. So, people were kept in total darkness and they did not know, after the release 
of these people there was no reference to any trial or any red terror or anything like 
that. After the release of the people, the whole matter closed. So, there was no lesson 
taken from it. The matter stopped after the people were convicted and after they were 
released. There was no further follow up on the matter.
873
 
 
More over, the inappropriateness of courts to search for truth is noted as “especially in the 
case of Ethiopia, the courts are not source of finding out the truth.”874 He further opined in 
detail on the absence of reports and any publication regarding the trials, and commented on 
the inappropriateness of ‘...delivering the SPO documents relating to investigation to the 
Security [Affairs Office]. Was it necessary to do so? Or was it necessary to make public?’875 
 
The above responses highlight the following relevant points. First, the respondent has serious 
doubts about the result of the prosecution and judicial process. Looking at his responses as a 
whole, one may categorize him in the second category although his dissatisfactions are not as 
strong as that of the first respondent. Secondly, he believes, in terms of revealing the truth 
that we are in the same situation today as compared to the time before the beginning of the 
prosecution and judicial processes. This again implies that no additional results including 
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truth were obtained from the process. Hence, a question arises as to the implication of this 
lack of truth on Ethiopian transition. As discussed in chapter 4, truth plays a significant role 
in transforming a society to a better future. The failure of the Ethiopian transitional process to 
discover the truth may imply the absence of effective transition in Ethiopia. Thirdly, he thinks 
the whole process was not motivated by the search for truth, a similar opinion expressed by 
the first respondent. Fourthly, he believes Ethiopian courts are not appropriate institution for 
searching the truth, an opinion shared by the first respondent. Fifthly, the respondent thinks 
that there is lack of publication and public knowledge about the entire process; and to use his 
words ‘people are kept in darkness.’ Six, one can infer the secrecy of SPO documents that 
were delivered to the Security Affairs Office and that this is not right, an opinion shared by 
respondents in the first category. The final point is the lack of lesson derived from the 
process, again an opinion shared by the first respondent. The significance of truth lies in its 
importance to address the past and to be a foundation of a better future. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the truth must be revealed, known and be made part of the nation’s history. These 
aspects of truth are significant to satisfy victims need for justice or historical justice and 
society’s need to change its social and political system. Thus, all of the points raised above 
suggest that truth in Ethiopian transition is problematic, and these problems indicate that the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process could not possibly contribute to the transformation of 
Ethiopian society.  
 
Another respondent notes that the discovery and revelation of the truth in Ethiopian transition 
was not successful owing to the inappropriateness of courts for the task.
876
 For this 
respondent, as opposed to the former once, the inappropriateness does not relate to partiality 
or lack of judicial independence, it rather relates to the stringent procedural requirements and 
the objective to punish that is intrinsic in judicial process, and thus preventing the search for 
and establishment of the truth. This emphasises the challenges of judicial truth discussed in 
chapter 4. This may lead to the recommendation of other alternatives of searching for and 
                                                             
876Anonymous R10, Above n 713.  He noted, “in the first place, it is very difficult to expect truth from a 
judicial/court process. This is because the judicial criminal trial has its own limitation on the discovery of the 
truth.  The accused has many guarantees that tempt him not to reveal the truth. There is the privilege against 
self-incrimination. He cannot be compelled to testify against himself; only evidence can be brought against him, 
and even then, he has wide room to contest such evidence. There is the requirement of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. He has the opportunity to contest the evidence, disprove testimonies through cross-examination. There 
are procedural safeguards that are intended to protect the accused and these also, to some extent, prevent the 
exposure of the truth.” 
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establishing the truth in the Ethiopian context.
877
The absence of truth and reconciliation 
process and the assignment of the task of establishing the truth to courts have prevented the 
discovery of the truth about the past.
878
Nevertheless, the discussion in chapter four question 
the assumption that truth and reconciliation processes lead to the truth. One may argue 
different kinds of truth can be enabled by different kinds of processes. We should also note 
the respondent’s view that the judicial process has in fact failed to reveal the truth by citing 
examples. These views clearly question whether the Ethiopian transitional justice process has 
succeeded in discovering and revealing the truth. This in turn questions whether the transition 
was successful. This is because the settlement of the past and the establishment of a better 
future depend on the discovery and revelation of the truth.  
 
Avictim of the red terror and a former Minister in this category opined that: 
 
...Where did the perpetrators appear? Perhaps, only 0.1% might have appeared [before 
prosecution and judicial process]...There are perpetrators who were not detained even 
for a day.
879
 
 
He further stated that: 
 
All of us were involved in the past wrongs. Let us get public and acknowledge. We 
should speak the truth. The solution is to follow the South African path.
880
 
                                                             
877Anonymous R10, Above n 713. He argued, “ Even some writers argue that truth can not be revealed through 
courts rather it may be discovered through other institutions like truth and reconciliation commission. The 
argument is that people would appear before the commission and tell the truth of what happened and their role; 
if you hide something or tell only part of it, you would be referred to prosecution. By putting shadow of 
sanction, truth and reconciliation is the appropriate institution to discover the truth because people will be free to 
tell the truth. There is nothing that people would be afraid of telling the truth. The truth will rather set you free. 
That is why South Africa and some Latin American countries have adopted truth and reconciliation.  We are in 
search of truth not punishing people, and truth does not result from court processes; rather results obtained 
through  unrestricted procedure where you uncover many hidden events of the past. There is that kind of 
argument. Thus, in our case, I would not say the truth was discovered/established.                                    
878Anonymous R10, Above n 713. He pointed out,“If the truth were uncovered, we would not still have been left 
in darkness as to who killed some people, where they were killed, where they were buried. There are people still 
missing and in question like the well-known writer Bealu Girma; it was known he was dead, nobody knows 
about him in the past thirty years; No body said he saw the writer.  It is known that the Dergue people, the 
security people detained him; what is unknown is his whereabouts after detention; there were people accused 
and arrested in relation to his case; but they never said they killed him nor was his body discovered. Therefore, 
the situation does not enable to say confidently the truth was established.  I think, it is unwise to expect the court 
process to reveal the truth. I think, it is a failure to understand the process. Thus, from this perspective, I do not 
think it was successful.” 
879Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
880Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
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This view, again, emphasises on the inappropriateness of prosecution or the judicial process 
to the search for truth, and thus favouring truth and reconciliation. The implication is the truth 
is not established. He also remarked that ‘do the people know about [the past]?  What is 
Ethiopian history? Which history? Whose history?’881 These questions are important in light 
of the kind of truth and history that the Ethiopian transitional justice process tries to reveal. 
We have seen that there are alternative narrations of history of violations during the Dergue 
regime. Thus, the question ‘whose truth or which history’ is significant in light of the diverse 
and contested perspectives of history or Ethiopian history. This also begs the question for 
what purpose and for who may the truth to be revealed. As we discussed in chapter 4, truth 
has significance for victims or relatives as well as for the whole society. However, if truth 
depends on what the speaker (of power) says, it might lose its significance. Similarly, the 
significance of partial truth might be questionable. Thus, a respondent stresses that “it [the 
process] was a failure right from the beginning; the red terror exercise was a joke.”882 These 
points clearly suggest that the judicial process did not result in the discovery of the truth, and 
thus had not served as a lesson for the future. Again, the failure to disclose the truth implies 
not only the lack of proper response to the past but it also indicates that the future is not based 
on the proper knowledge of the past, thus questioning the foundational aspect of truth. 
 
A resident in Addis Ababa noted that:  
 
I do not think the purpose of the prosecution was to establish the truth. It was to 
punish TPLF-EPRDF’s former enemies and strengthen its power.883  
 
This view questions the motive of the government in designing and implementing the 
prosecution process. The motive was attributed to self-interest than the desire to uncover the 
                                                             
881Anonymous R39, Above n 725. He questioned history even going back to the period of Emperor Menilik. He 
posed  the questions “ what have we gone through up to now; what is our past history that we travelled through 
until today; what did Menilik do; we have to raise such questions unless we limit it to what you raised. What did 
Menilik’s soldiers do in different parts of the country? In Arsi, was not the case that men were amputated?  
Were not women’s gentiles cut?  Why do not we ask these questions?” This questions interrogate the  truth in 
Ethiopian history with an implication that the are different narrations about Ethiopian history. There are 
contestations for example on the legacy of Emperor Menilik, whom some view as a founder of modern 
Ethiopian state while others view him as a colonizer and perpetrator.  
882Anonymous R39, Above n 725 
883Anonymous R15, Above n 743. 
 
 
237 
 
truth, and hence the truth could not be expected from this process. Some residents in both 
Addis Ababa and Mekelle similarly noted that the truth was not established.
884
 
 
To sum up, first, the respondents in this second category believe that truth was not 
established, albeit for diverse reasons. Nevertheless, their core view on the transitional justice 
process in relation to truth appear constant: ‘no truth even to this day’, ‘we are in the same 
situation’, ‘the ...exercise was a joke’, and ‘ do not think..the search for truth was successful’. 
These expressions appear to be categorical rejections of the process in terms of truth, and are 
in line with some of the respondent’s preferred modality of truth and reconciliation as 
considered in the preceding chapter.
885
The second point worth noting is the view regarding 
the inappropriateness of the judicial process for searching the truth. This has two aspects. The 
first is a contextual assessment that leads to the view that Ethiopian courts are not proper 
institutions to search for truth, because of lack of impartiality and independence. The other 
aspect did not question the impartiality or independence of Ethiopian courts; rather the 
argument is that courts in general including that of Ethiopian courts cannot reveal the truth 
because of the stringent procedural requirements and the focus on punishment associated with 
judicial process. Both aspects seriously question whether the truth was established in the 
Ethiopian transition and whether there was any lesson drawn, a question that matters for 
effective transition. Thirdly, we should also note the view that the incumbent government had 
no motive or interest to search for the truth, and hence truth cannot be expected from the 
process. This contextualizes the issue of motivations of justice broadly understood, discussed 
in chapter 3. Fourthly, we can clearly understand that truth should be indivisible and impartial 
contrary to the selectiveness or one-sidedness of the transitional justice process. The idea is 
that all perpetrators should be treated and dealt with in the same way. Fifthly, a crucial point 
of criticism relates to the lack of publication and public knowledge about the entire process, 
and even worse the secrecy of SPO documents.
886
 Finally, and most importantly, a critical 
question is raised as to what history is and whose history is to be recorded, pointing to 
controversial narratives surrounding the formation of modern Ethiopian state. A question 
might arise as to the implication of all these points. As discussed in chapter 4, truth plays a 
significant role both in redressing victims and in serving as a foundation of a better future. 
The above points suggest that the Ethiopian transition has failed to deliver the truth. This may 
                                                             
884R12, Above n 762; R24, Above n 740 
885Some expression though seems to admit that certain truth might have been established; R10’s view is an 
example but overall he is of the opinion that the truth was not successfully established. 
886 According to one respondent, the SPO documents were handover to the Security Affairs Office. 
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lead to the logical conclusion that the failure the Ethiopian transitional justice in discovering 
or revealing the truth implies the unsuccessful nature of the Ethiopian transition. 
 
In concluding this section, I will highlight the following points in relation to the contestations 
of truth in Ethiopian transition and the implications thereof. As discussed in chapter 4, truth is 
an essential element of transitional justice. Although the concept is subject to debate, we can 
understand it as something relating to the discovery and recording (and revelation) of the 
facts about past violations. During transition, truth serves various important purposes to 
victims or their families and the society as a whole. Truth may contribute to the prevention of 
crime, ensuring accountability, fighting impunity, restoration of peace, the enforcement of 
justice, the reparation of victim, promotion of reconciliation, and the reconstruction social of 
and political identity through dialogue and shared history.  
 
In view of these significances of truth, this section ventured to investigate whether the 
Ethiopian transitional process has established the truth about the past. The analysis of the 
Ethiopian process poses questions regarding both the space given by framework to search for 
the truth and the actual results of the process. The Ethiopian transitional justice process 
clearly incorporated truth as an objective. The discovery and recording of history was sought 
to be part of the judicial process.  
 
 We might say that the Ethiopian transition has foreseen the significance of establishing and 
recording the truth about the past. As clearly indicated in chapter 2 and this chapter as well, 
there are different narrations about the Ethiopian history in general and the violations 
committed during the Dergue regime in particular. In light of this, the incorporation of the 
truth as an objective of the transitional process was proper. The truth, apart from serving as 
justice for the victim, creates public awareness, prevents future violations, and reconciles 
divided communities.  
 
There are diverse views on whether the Ethiopian transitional justice process has established 
the truth and thereby contributed to effective transition. Clearly, the SPO proclamation had 
determined the crimes and the perpetrators to be subject to this process, and thus the 
framework provides a pre-determined general political judgement as ‘truth’. We might argue 
that the prosecution and judicial process led to the establishment of the truth, however limited 
it might be.  This is an endorsement of the general political truth reflected in the SPO 
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proclamation. The problem was that the judicial process had no jurisdiction to discover and 
record ‘other truths or histories’ discussed in chapter two and also indicated in this chapter. 
Thus, we might argue that the partiality or one-sidedness of the process limited the search for 
and discovery of the truth as well as its significance to effective transition.  
 
The available data also demonstrates the problematic relationship between the judicial 
process and the truth as discussed in chapter 4. Procedural safeguards and the emphasis on 
punishment can possibly limit judicial truth. The available data, including respondents who 
support the process, demonstrates that some perpetrators [Dergue members] might have 
escaped punishment due to insufficiency of evidence. This clearly indicates the difficult of 
establishing the truth through judicial process.  
 
We should also note the perception that the government was not motivated by the desire to 
discover and reveal the truth. Truth can be sought through impartial and independent 
institutions and process, which are allegedly lacking in the Ethiopian context. Such 
perception casts doubts not only on the discovery of the truth but also on the whole process of 
transitional justice, and on whether we have successfully departed from the past.  
 
The other point worth consideration is the issue of publication of the truth. It might be argued 
that the Ethiopian transitional justice process had established the truth (or some truth). 
However, it is clear that these truths were not brought (sufficiently) to the attention of the 
public, and even worse, they were kept secret. Thus, a question arises as to the significance of 
such an unknown truths. How can truth become important to individuals and the society if it 
remains unknown? Such truth can neither redress the past nor be a foundation for the future. 
What matters most is the knowledge of the truth. 
 
We may recall from chapter two that, during transition, the interpretation of history, including 
the history of violence, is not only essential but also the subject to contestations. In light of 
the contested nature of truth in Ethiopia, one might expect the Ethiopian transitional justice 
process to establish and clarify the truth about the past. Thus, the above points suggest the 
truth in the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability is problematic, and hence raises 
the question whether there have been effective transition. 
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6.3 Interrogating Other Contributions of the Process 
 
This section aims at investigating whether the Ethiopian transitional justice model has made 
other contributions. As already indicated the two important goals of the prosecution and 
judicial process were justice and truth. The issue here is to see the process in terms of other 
outputs. Some of these other contributions are envisaged in the SPO proclamation. The 
proclamation particularly talks of public awareness about past violations and deterrence 
effect of the process, partly discussed in relation to the issue of truth.  In addition to these 
envisaged goals, it is interesting to enquire whether the process has contributed to the rule of 
law, respect for human rights, the building of effective justice institutions and promoting 
democracy, reconciliation  etc although they were not clearly provided for in the framework. 
Thus, the purpose here is to investigate how people view the overall contribution of the 
process to an effective transition, if any.  
6.3.1 Other Contributions of the Process: Data presentation and analysis 
 
In this sub section, I will present and analyze available data in relation to the overall 
contribution of the prosecution and judicial process. The respondents were asked the question 
what is the overall contribution of or lesson drawn from the process with a possibility to 
reflect on a range of issues including deterrence effect, rule of law, respect for human rights, 
democracy, and others. Rather than separately presenting the issues, this researcher thought a 
more general question would give the respondents the latitude to reflect on the issues they 
know well and think are more important. The responses were, again, closely examined and 
categorized into two: those that view the process had positive contributions, and those that 
say the process had no positive contribution. I have however incorporated the two views in 
one discussion. 
 
Some respondents assert that the prosecution process has made positive contributions. A 
senior government official’s view may be considered as the official perspective that 
commends the overall significance of the process: 
 
When I see it together with other measures we adopted, the fact that a constitution 
was drafted and adopted, and human rights were incorporated in the constitution, I 
think it is well done. I think we need to draw a lesson that we do not want this 
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again; never again. We have to continue to develop our democratic system. It is 
better if journalist, novelists, lawyers, and researchers continue to write the history 
of the past.
887
 
 
This opinion clearly suggests, first, that the process had positive contributions, and such 
contribution should not be seen in isolation but together with the broader standard setting and 
continued process of building a democratic system.  Thus, the prosecution process is part of 
the effort of building a new system. The contribution of the process to the rule of law can also 
be inferred from the assertion that ‘the best compensation is to create a legal system that 
works.’888 The implication is that although the government did not provide monetary 
compensation to victims, it had compensated them by establishing an effective system of rule 
of law. Perhaps, one last point, which may be less relevant here, is the recommendatory 
remark that we need to take lesson and say never again. Nevertheless, the question whether 
the process has made all these contributions, particularly when seen in light of the limitations 
or problems of justice and truth identified earlier remains.  
 
A former Supreme Court judge similarly noted the positive effects of the process in the 
following manner: 
 
The rule of law is essential to the process of building a democratic system. This is 
stated in the constitution clearly. Today, it is said we do that under the rule of law. I 
think that is a big motto. With all its defects, I think, the process was inspired by the 
desire to create rule of law.
889
  
 
The positive impact of the process is further elaborated as follows: 
 
This is the first time in our history where a head of state was prosecuted and 
convicted/punished. These people were prime ministers, ministers, head of the 
security etc. They were not ordinary people. It was for the first time in Ethiopian 
history that the whole system, those that controlled the state structure, were brought to 
                                                             
887Anonymous R4, Above n 689. However, the respondent recognized that delay was one problem of the 
process but he attributed the problem to the accused, and the enormity of the crime and number of witnesses and 
the need to guarantee fair trial. He also opined the need to draw a lesson from it. 
888Anonymous R4, Above n 689. This response was given in relation to the issue of reparation/compensation 
889Anonymous R2, Above n 697 
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courts and received justice. Therefore, it is a big contribution for the respect of rule of 
law and other standards essential for building a democratic system, constitutional 
supremacy and other related matters.
890
 
 
After narrating the challenges posed at the time, the former judge stressed that: 
 
I do not think, it [the process] can be considered as a total failure as some people 
would claim. Considering the context at the time, I think, it gave many lessons. I 
think, the process gave big lesson for those willing and able to draw a lesson.
891
 
 
The above view clearly suggests that lessons are drawn that even a head of state and top 
officials can be prosecuted, no one is above the law, and this might be an important aspect of 
ensuring accountability and building democracy. Thus, it emphasises that the process, being 
itself inspired by rule of law, has ensured rule of law, and by so doing, the process has 
contributed to the building of a democratic system and constitutionalism. Moreover, the 
respondent is wary of criticisms against the process and asserts it is not a total failure. What is 
the implication?  Is he conceding the existence of some failure in light of the challenges he 
recited?  Finally, there is also a doubt about the willingness and ability to draw lessons from 
the process. Nevertheless, some residents
892
 in Mekelle and Addis Ababa have similar 
opinion. It is noted that “the process gives lesson to people, the leaders and the future 
generation that a criminal would not escape punishment.”893 The main lesson to be drawn is 
that government officials can be held accountable for violations they commit. The question 
that arises is whether the present government, the various political groups and the society as a 
whole has indeed drawn lessons. 
 
The views of other respondents contest the above point that the process has contributed to 
deterrence or rule of law. Thus, a respondent argues the process has not served as deterrence, 
as observed in the following view: 
 
                                                             
890Anonymous R2, Above n 697 
891Anonymous R2, Above n 697. These lessons refer to the fact that no government official will be immune 
from accountability. He noted the challenges as new introduction of judicial system in some regions and the lack 
of trained judges. He commented that establishing courts, training people and entertaining the Derg cases was 
done in parallel, and asserted if the situation had happened now, the courts are better equipped. 
892 Interview Anonymous R13, Above n 864; R33; R32; R17; R18 
893Anonymous R 18, Interview with the author, Mekelle.  
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It [the prosecution and judicial process] did not contribute an iota of the restraint 
on the part of the leaders. The same thing has been repeated over and over again 
during Meles’s regime, during Meles’s reign. People have been killed, and many 
have gone away with impunity. The 2005 killings have never been accounted for 
and there were several other killings that have not been accounted for. And, those 
who ordered the killings... didn’t take any lesson from red terror trials. So, it 
shows you that the red terror trial was total failure, in fact in terms of being an 
example or deterrent to the future leaders. So, this is one sad story about the 
Ethiopian justice system, that people have gone away with impunity. Impunity 
still reigns in Ethiopia. And it has reigned time and over and over again not only 
during the Dergue regime but to the present day. People still are not accountable 
for their actions. And there are several of them. The government admitted close to 
200 were killed during the 2005 elections; and no body has been prosecuted or 
held accountable for these horrendous killings. So, the story goes on and the same 
applies in the rural areas; government officials are not held accountable. And, 
impunity still reigns in Ethiopia just as it did during the Dergue’s regime.894 
 
The above opinion clearly stands in contrast with pro-prosecution arguments, discussed in 
chapter 4, that prosecution is the most effective deterrence against future violations. It can be 
counter argued that the prosecution in Ethiopian was not properly conducted, and hence 
cannot diminish the value of prosecution. Nevertheless, it is observed above that the 
prosecution process had not deterred the current regime; it is accused of committing similar 
violations, and thus no lesson was drawn. Again, we might recall, from chapter 4, that 
disallowing impunity and adherence to the rule of law is a legitimizing factor for a post-
conflict or post-authoritarian regime. Thus, what appears more troubling is that those who 
killed in the post-Dergue period were not held accountable, and hence impunity still reigns in 
Ethiopia. Finally, the trial was considered as a total failure, which generally questions 
whether there is a successful transition at all. 
 
Although clear in the above view, the process is also criticized for its failure to contribute to 
the rule of law:   
 
                                                             
894Anonymous R11, Above n 712 
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No, far from that...[establishing rule of law].  Actually the greatest weakness of 
EPRDF is the fact that there is total failure of the justice system here, especially in 
matters that have political connotation; the person accused of any political crime 
for example such as terrorism or attempt to overthrow the government, the matter 
is already lost; from the time that it was filed, the person is convicted. And, we 
have seen time and again that any case that involves any political dispute with the 
government, I do not think there has been any case of acquittal. Every one has 
been sentenced to the severest punishment be it on terrorism, violation of the 
constitution or attempt to overthrow the government and so on. So, to say the red 
terror trial...personally, I don’t see any benefit that we have driven from it; not at 
all; nothing has changed; more of the same; more of the old.
895
 
 
Again, the discussion in chapter 4 emphasise on the role of prosecution in building justice 
institutions in post-conflict and post-authoritarian regimes. The above view argues the 
Ethiopian prosecution process has not contributed to the building of an effective and 
impartial judicial system; rather the justice system has totally failed because of lack of 
impartiality and independence. The process was seen as having no benefit at all.  Again, this 
contests that no transition took place in Ethiopia.
896
  
 
Some residents in Mekelle and Addis Ababa share the above view that the process had no 
positive contribution.
897
 I think it would be sufficient to state what one respondent opined: 
 
If you see the things that happened after the fall of the Dergue, you observe that very 
few changes occurred. The police and officials violate human rights without being 
held responsible.... The people are still afraid of the leaders. There is no democracy.
898
 
 
This clearly suggests that the prosecution process has not changed the political identity of the 
state. It suggestes the process has not served as a foundation of a new legal and political 
system. 
 
                                                             
895Anonymous R11, Above n 712  
896 It may be important to note the comments that there is no significant difference between the Dergue and the 
present regime in terms of deterrence and rule of law, and arguably in terms of human rights and democracy, 
although this ultimate equalization of the two regimes may not be necessary here. 
897Interview with anonymous respondents R24; R15; R12   
898Anonymous R 15, Above n 762 
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Nevertheless, a former SPO prosecutor forwards a counter-argument as follows: 
 
We can witness a better experience not only to Ethiopia but to Africa as a whole. 
It is a departure from the past and a new experience; it was a country where the 
incoming government used to exterminate former officials. Now we have a better 
experience, [which] was done through independent prosecution and independent 
judicial process.’899 
 
Considering the long history of violations and political justice pronounced by incoming 
leaders, the prosecution process could be considered as a better experience for Ethiopia, and 
even for the whole of Africa. We should also note the view about the independence of the 
prosecution and judicial process, impliedly that of prosecutors and judges, in the discharge of 
their duties implying the existence of legal justice. 
 
However, such view is not acceptable to a respondent Mesfin who has criticized the process 
for being not right from the beginning, did not teach any lesson, and that what we have today 
is a continuation of the same thing with the actors changing.
900
He further noted that: 
 
As I told you ...it has gone from bad to worse...There is no transition in any sense of 
the word; the only thing, the conditionality is, removal of censorship.
901
 
 
This view strongly underlines that the prosecution and judicial process has no contribution at 
all. Although it is extremely difficult to defend the idea that ‘things have even deteriorated’, 
this view clarifies the deficiencies of the process to transform the society. It is emphasized 
that there is no transition in terms of establishing rule of law, respect for human rights and 
democracy. Such views strongly contest the transformative role of the prosecution process. 
 
The institutions of justice, far from benefiting from the process, are viewed as following a 
regressive route as noted below. 
 
                                                             
899Anonymous R6, Above n 686 
900Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
901Anonymous R1, ibid 
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The justice system totally, the judicial system, the police, the Attorney General 
Office, the courts, these are really gone down...down..down. They have never been as 
low in my lifetime in Ethiopia as they are now.
902
 
   
This might be the harshest criticism of the process in terms of building justice organs. 
Nevertheless, it clearly reflects a strong dissatisfaction with the functioning of justice 
institutions, criticized as falling far below the standard. This really contests the idea in 
chapter 4 that prosecution would help build and strengthen justice institutions and rule of law.  
 
Interestingly, a former SPO prosecutor considers the failure to build a strong, credible and 
reliable justice system as a missed opportunity, as reflected in the following view: 
  
When the court was reorganized, began to see the case in full independence, it was 
expected to ensure that similar events will not be repeated. It was expected to 
strengthen this by considering the cases of the Dergue or former regime in fairness 
and at the same time, the court is expected to increasingly strengthen its credibility 
and reliability. However, I do not think the credibility of the court has increased so 
much; the same is true with its reliability. The focus was not on institution 
building rather, especially in the court system, there seems to be a desire to win 
fame for individual judges. Any way if similar violations are committed, we have 
not created a reliable court, a court acceptable to the people, which will properly 
see the case and decide. This is one missing opportunity. Now, rather it is in a 
regreteable situation. Nevertheless, this could have been one test case in 
establishing or creating sustainable institutions.
903
 
 
This view emphasises the failure to create proper institutions of justice and thereby the rule of 
law. This view could logically suggest the failure to establish institutions of democracy and 
an acountable government. 
 
A Supreme Court judge observes the positive over all contribution of the process in the 
following manner: 
 
                                                             
902Anonymous R1, Above n 745 
903Anonymous R3, Above n 682 
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No one escapes punishment if he commits crime. It would give lessons, to those 
currently on powers or to any one that comes to power, that there is huge 
accountability. From the point of the violations, the punishment may be lenient. 
However, it is sufficient from the perspective of human rights and establishing 
democratic system.
904
 
 
This opinion highlights the positive contribution – its contribution to the fight against 
impunity, ensure accountability and rule of law as well as the giving of lessons even to those 
in power, which stresses the deterrence effect. Arguably, and as recommendatory, it would 
give a lesson to the society that it could have benefited a lot had a generation of intellectuals 
were not killed. It also underlines that the process had sufficiently contributed to respect for 
human rights and building democratic system – emphasizing the importance of rule of law 
and accountability to democracy. As indicated above, some respondents contest this 
argument. However, it might be useful to consider the view of a former SPO prosecutor, who 
rate the process positively in relation to justice and truth, is critical of the process on the other 
contributions of the process: 
 
One expected outcome of the process is the establishment of rule of law; but one 
can see a big failure here. This government has not refrained from committing 
more or less similar activities. I do not think the purpose intended to be achieved 
through the works of the SPO were actually achieved because of the continuation 
of similar acts/the legacy of the past....I think the process was totally weak, totally 
weak, in terms of establishing rule of law, ensuring human rights, reconciliation 
and other desirable outcomes except justice.
905
 
 
This clearly emphasises the dissatisfaction with the process not to prevent similar violation. If 
violations continue to exist, there is no departure from the past and there is no effective 
                                                             
904Anonymous R5, Above n 719. He also noted, “a whole generation was lost. If these were alive, they could 
have contributed a lot for the country. A person who thinks can draw many lessons. How could a government 
kill its people across the board? What led the perpetrators to this? What was there capacity or qualification? 
When the people elect its government, it has the competence to rule. One that comes through force has no 
competence to rule and is thus destructive. People should always be aware so that nothing similar will happen.” 
These views, apart from questioning the legitimacy of governments that commit violations, also emphasises that 
the society should watch over the non-recurrence of a form of government that is similar with the Dergue and 
that commits crimes.  State power should be exercised upon people’s will, an essential component of 
democracy.  
905Anonymous R3, Above n 682 
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transition. The continued existence of violations imply the failure of the process to serve as 
deterrence, the lack of rule of law and respect for human rights as well as the failure to 
positively contribute to other desirable goals. 
 
The former SPO prosecutor further noted that: 
 
There were times when the government has even galvanized killers and mass 
murderers/exterminators/ butters /annihilators. One may say this is the weakness 
of the government/state.  The results of transitional justice are many. So, apart 
from the conventional justice we expect to achieve, there are other things. These 
were not achieved. I am telling you this being disgruntled. In fact, this is not my 
feeling alone; even the head of the Special Prosecutor Office has similar feeling. 
Thus, all that efforts should have prevented the recurrence of similar events.
906
 
 
This view, apart from stressing the point that the process has totally failed to make these 
other contributions, also underlines that the government even gave cover and protection to 
some former murderers; a point shared by another respondent in relation to the legal 
framework.
 907
  It also emphasises the enormity of dissatisfaction of not only this particular 
SPO but also that of the Chief of the SPO with the process. 
 
Another Supreme Court judge argues, “the process had some contributions to rule of law, 
respect for human rights, and democracy.”908However, this positive appraisal is followed by 
frustration with some government actions: 
 
The government seems to act instinctively; there is disparity between when the 
constitution was adopted and what happens later on. There is a feeling of 
inconsistency. This deserves attention. Certain acts of the executive lead to frequent 
                                                             
906Anonymous R3, ibid 
907Anonymous R1, Above n 745. He even gave names as examples of EPRP members who joined the 
government. Another respondent, a victim of Red Terror, R39, also indicated that some Dergue members joined 
the government. Based on this information and personal observation, this researcher came to know that EPRP 
and Dergue members were given high positions in this government, including some involved in the interviews 
conducted for this study. Nevertheless, despite all efforts, this researcher has not found any independent 
evidence, reports or other documents implicating these people in violations of the past. However, the opinion 
that the government gave shelter to some violators cannot be dismissed as invalid especially in light of the 
diversity of the respondents – victim, former SPO and human rights activist and former opposition leader. At 
least the perception that such exists can affect the transitional process. 
908Anonymous R31, Above n 713 
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and boundless interference with judicial independence. Convicts should not walk free 
just a week after conviction. The government was representing victims in all of this. 
Releasing convicts without forgiveness from the victims creates dissatisfaction. We 
should take a lesson from these.
909
 
 
Despite some perception of positive contributions, the judge is also wary of government 
interferences with the judicial process, and non-consultation with victims as negative 
consequences. This suggests the lack of independence of justice institutions and clearly 
demonstrates the discontent of victims. Interestingly, one should also learn from these 
failures of the transitional or post-transitional justice process.   
 
A former High Court judge takes a cautious approach in his assessment of the process: 
 
The process has some deterrence effect, including on those in power. However, i do 
not have empirical data, but I cannot say it has no positive effect. Were there similar 
incidents after the Dergue? Were there disappearances? I think this is a different 
issue...One should also see the other measures taken during transition to reconstruct 
the country. Were there problems in such process?
910
 
 
This view, although doubtful, recognizes some level of deterrence effect of the process. 
According to the respondent, an empirical data as to whether similar violations are committed 
to day is necessary to test the deterrence effect.
911
It is also clear other measures taken to 
reconstruct the country should also be considered when evaluating the effects of the process. 
 
A victims’ family clearly suggested the importance of the prosecution process to the rule of 
law and accountability: 
 
The justice process shows that no one is above the law. The people who killed our 
children were punished. This is a big lesson for any one.
912
 
 
                                                             
909Anonymous R31, ibid 
910Anonymous R20, Above n 755 
911 However, one may also consider the importance of some indicators like accountability, rule of law and 
openness to opposition. 
912Anonymous R8, Above n 704 
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This view is, however, challenged by another victim, who observed, “the red terror exercise 
was a joke.”913This is a summary of what the respondent said regarding the out comes of the 
prosecution and judicial process. Thus, one may infer that the process had not contributed to 
rule of law, human rights respect, democracy and reconciliation. He does not see any 
contribution of the process, an opinion shared with the above respondents.  It is interesting to 
recollect that this respondent had criticized the prosecution process as not the appropriate 
solution and preferred the truth and reconciliation process like that of South Africa, an 
opinion shared by other respondents as well. He also opined that his torturer had, after change 
of government, joined the EPRDF government and even caused the arrest of the victim even 
under the EPRDF regime.
914
Here is an implication that the incumbent government had 
protected some of the former torturers/violators, an opinion shared by some of the 
respondents above. He has also opined that there is no dialogue and even communication 
between the leaders of the different political parties.
915
 
 
Another respondent noted the following on the overall contribution of the process: 
 
The effort to bring about accountability through national institutions - unlike Rwanda 
and Yugoslavia - can be considered as a positive results. It has shown that anybody 
can be held accountable.
916
  
 
The success of the process here lies in ensuring accountability at domestic institutions that 
might be close to the primary stakeholders. It might have shown that no one is above the law 
so that we can infer its contribution to rule of law, deterrence and respect for human rights. 
However, how much lesson is drawn from the process is doubtful as noted below. 
 
Nevertheless, I think some people still do similar things hoping either that evidence 
against them will not be found or they may be granted amnesty or pardon just like the 
                                                             
913Anonymous R39, Above n 725. He had commented on the lack of public knowledge about the red terror 
trials, opined that his torturers walk free and do their business in Addis, and commented that he did not even 
give information to the SPO at the time because he did not think prosecution was the solution. 
914Anonymous R39, Above n 725. 
915Anonymous R39, Above n 725. He remarked do you see our political leaders talk to each other. Do they have 
tea together? do they appear together in public events? 
916Anonymous R10, Above n 713 
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convicted Derg officials. There is also a saying that you cannot accuse the king, you 
cannot till the sky
917
 
 
This clearly questions the deterrence effect of the process partly because of the culture of 
violence and partly due to the problems in the process. The view clearly emphasises that there 
is a continuation of similar violations although not necessarily of the same nature and degree 
as that of the Dergue. Moreover, the absence of reconciliation is seen as a major shortcoming:  
 
The lack of reconciliation can be seen as a weakness. In the history of this country, 
many political groups resorted to violence to eliminate each other. Although 
reconciliation with the Derg was not necessary, it could have been made between the 
other political groups.The lack of reconciliation is a reflection of lack of 
accommodation and compromise in our political culture; rather the politics was based 
on eliminating rivals. The different political groups were eliminating each other. Even 
the incumbent passed through that process, but is no better than the Dergue. The 
incumbent is not seen accommodating other political groups. I think, the lack of 
political accommodation will continue as long as that generation exists. The 
government is lacking the patience and wisdom in entertaining things. That is hurting 
us.
918
 
 
Although some positive contributions were noted above, these problems associated with the 
process has led the respondent to conclude, “I think, it is a mixed result.”919  Again, the 
critical problem given emphasis is the political polarization in this country and the absence of 
any reconciliation effort among at least some political groups. Ethiopian history is replete 
with political violence against rival political groups. Among other things, the lack of 
compromise and political accommodation has led to the red terror-white terror campaign, 
which claimed the lives of so many Ethiopians. This way of thinking and division persists in 
today’s political life. Although equating the incumbent government with Dergue might not be 
defensible, the incumbent that passed through this violent past is criticized for not taking the 
initiative to promote reconciliation and political accommodation. The old thinking of 
eliminating rivals or lack of political accommodation has effects not only on the present but 
                                                             
917Anonymous R10, Above n 713 
918Anonymous R10, ibid 
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also is likely to continue in the future until a new generation of politicians come up, with a 
new way of thinking about politics. Here, one would see the frustration that things will not 
change as long as politicians of the past (be in government or opposition) are active in 
politics. 
 
A former SPO prosecutor also commented on the absence of reconciliation that he thought 
was expected at the end of the process and the consequence as follows: 
 
The other purpose of this process was to establish rule of law and to promote 
reconciliation. Reconciliation was expected at the end of the process. The 
perpetrators denied their involvement, they had exercised all their rights and 
defended themselves but the court had found them guilty based on the evidence 
brought. Once this was over, an opportunity for reconciliation among the society 
was expected by creating forum for the perpetrators to openly express their 
remorse; this was good for the victims or families, the nation, the system, and for 
all.  There is a big failure on this.
920
  
 
Although there is no indication in the legal framework, the former prosecutor thought that 
reconciliation would follow the legal and judicial process. Clearly, it emphasises that 
reconciliation was necessary but not materialized.  
 
It is interesting to look at the view of another SPO on this issue. Although he argues that the 
process has made positive contributions above, he also commented on what he thinks is 
missing: 
 
There is political polarization. When you ask who these politicians [who ask for 
reconciliation] are, the answer is clear. They are the same people of the past. It 
was people of the past still active today. You can look at the 2005 election. Who 
were confrontational? It were the people who were members of EPRP or Dergue. 
Look the politicians in the Diaspora. What do they learn from the countries they 
are living in? Why they do not struggle through peaceful means? It is not a lack of 
awareness of the system where they live. All these polarization is the outcome of 
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their previous way of thinking. They do the same politics; they want it repeated. 
This country was ruled for 37 years by one generation. Now, the trial is over, and 
something has to be done to bridge the gap, perhaps through reconciliation and 
dialogue.
921
 
 
Here, we find the central problem in Ethiopia that is political polarization. This view 
interestingly presents opposition political groups or people from the past as responsible for 
confrontational politics.This political polarization has led to serious political problems 
reflected in the massive confrontational electoral processes of 2005, which was referred to 
earlier by another respondent blaming the government. The controversies surrounding this 
election and its implication for Ethiopia’s political transformation and the respect of human 
rights were the subject of closer examination.
922
These different views demonstrate that the 
existing polarization resulted from the old way of thinking about politics, perceiving other 
political groups as enemies, worth eliminating and the culture of intolerance and lack of 
political compromise and accommodation. This implies that the transitional process has not 
succeeded in addressing political and ethnic division within the country, which however 
impinges on the reconstruction of a democratic society. These points may emphasize the need 
for dialogue and reconciliation to bridge the political gap.  
 
In this section, the researcher sought the views of the respondents on the contribution of 
prosecution and judicial process to other desirable goals of transitional justice including 
ensuring the rule of law, prevention of similar violations, accountability, and respect for 
human rights, democracy, and reconciliation. It is needless to repeat the details of the data. 
However, I will briefly present the summary of the main points and the implications thereof.   
 
                                                             
921Anonymous R6, Above n 686 
922See for example Lahra Smith, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special Report, 
United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, August 2007.[Accessed on 30 February 2014]. Available 
from the World Wide Web: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr192.pdf. For more on confrontational 
politics and the problems relating to democratization in Ethiopia see Pausewang, Siegfried, 2004: Local 
Democracy and Human Security in Ethiopia.Structural Reasons for the Failure of Democratisation, 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA Report No. 45). See also Pausewang, 
Siegfried, Kjetil Tronvoll and Lovise Aalen (eds), 2001: Ethiopia since the Derg. A Decade of Democratic 
Pretension and Performance, London, New York: ZED Books. 
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The data about the contribution of the process to other desirable gaols is a mixed one.  We 
see, on the one hand,  opinions that emphasise the prosecution and judicial process had some 
positive contributions to (a) rule of law and constitutional supremacy, (b) deterrence, 
accountability and fighting impunity, (c) human rights, (d) democracy, (e) independence of 
the judicial system, (f) educating the people, (g) the competence of national institutions. The 
supports of the prosecution process, however, acknowledge the existence of some limitations 
or weakness. These include (a) the lack of dialogue and reconciliation to address political 
polarization, and lack of initiative by the government to promote reconciliation and political 
accommodation, (b) interference in the judicial process, (c) non-consultation with victims, in 
deciding to release convicts,  and (d) the implications of the deficiency in the process leading 
to a possibility for similar violations.  Despite these limitations, the positive contributions are 
presented not only in their purely formal sense but also as a political reality.  
 
However, these alleged positive contributions might be questioned in light of all the problems 
identified in relation to truth and justice.  This is also questionable in light several sources 
that rated the country’s performance on the above indicators.923 In addition, other respondents 
seriously contest the above-mentioned positive contributions of the prosecution and judicial 
process. They stress that the process had no or little contribution, if any, to the rule of law, 
deterrence, human rights respect, democracy, reconciliation and other desirable things.  
 
The data clearly suggest the continuation of the culture of violence and the lack of 
accountability. In light of this the deterrence effect of the process and its contribution to rule 
of law and respect for human rights is questionable. The perception that the government gave 
protection to past violators delegitimizes and negatively affects the transitional justice 
process. Another serious problem is the inability to create impartial and independent 
institutions of justice and democracy, without which there cannot be a successful transition. 
As we have discussed in chapter 4, reconciliation is an essential element of transitional 
justice process that has the potential of ending cycles of violations. In this respect, the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process has neither envisaged nor carried out reconciliation 
processes. This in turn has sustained political and social division, the culture of antagonistic 
and confrontational politics perpetuating cycles of violence. All these points contest the 
transformative role of the Ethiopian transitional justice process.  
                                                             
923 See the Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index, 2010; The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, 
and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Ethiopia Country Report. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
To sum up this chapter, this researcher sought whether the Ethiopian transitional justice has 
incorporated truth as its goal and whether and the extent to which the truth is though to be 
established. This chapter also tried to assess whether the prosecution and judicial process had 
contributed to the rule of law, accountability, and the respect for human rights, democracy, 
reconciliation and other desirable goals. It also presented the implications thereof on the 
future on Ethiopian society. 
 
There are fundamental differences of views on the Ethiopian transitional justice process in 
terms of its ability to establish and reveal the truth and its overall contribution to the 
Ethiopian society. A closer examination of the data presented reveals the following key 
points that are relevant to the analysis and understanding of transitional justice in the 
Ethiopian context.   
 
The discussion in chapter 4 clearly indicates that, although the concept of truth is 
controversial, truth is a crucial element of transitional justice, and hence societies in transition 
need to devise proper mechanisms of discovering and revealing the truth. As already 
indicated in chapter 4, truth has significance to both the individual and the public. It is a form 
of redressing the past as well as a basis for building a better future. When we look at the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process, it incorporated truth as one of its goals. In view of the 
contested nature of truth or history in Ethiopia, the incorporation of this objective might be 
important to settle the past and build a new and better system. A further question relates to 
the issue whether we think the truth was established. The available data reflects the diversity 
of views on this issue ranging from those that fully endorse the process to those that full 
discredit the process. The existence of such diverse and competing views has important 
implications on the transitional justice process and on whether there has been successful 
transition.  
 
Clearly, the Ethiopian transitional justice framework has set out the violations and violators 
to be subjected to the process. The Dergue was the violator, and the violations were those 
committed by the Dergue. By defining the crimes and the perpetrators, the SPO proclamation 
had provided a pre-determined general political judgement as to what constitutes the ‘truth’.  
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Although the prosecution and judicial process is entrusted to discover and record history, this 
is constrained by prior political judgement and whatever is established through this process 
can only be an endorsement of the political truth set out in the SPO proclamation. In light of 
the different narrations of history presented in chapter 2 as well as revealed through the data 
introduced in this chapter, the term of reference for the discovery of the truth is problematic 
because the judicial process had limited jurisdiction. We now know that other actors had also 
committed human rights abuses. Thus, the most significant weakness of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process is its partiality in the search for and discovery of the truth. Even if 
one might argue the judicial process has established the truth, this can only be part of the 
truth or one version of truth. It is really difficult or impossible to properly address the past or 
create a new system based on such partial truth.  
 
As indicated in chapter 4, one problematic issue is whether judicial process is suitable for the 
search and establishment of the truth. This chapter emphasises this problematic relationship 
in the Ethiopian context. Truth relates to the establishment of facts about past crimes. Even 
strong supporters of the judicial process admit that some Dergue members have escaped 
justice because of lack or inadequacy of evidence. This suggests that there are facts that the 
courts did not discover and reveal. One may however ask whether the discovery of the whole 
truth may be possible. This may arguably be impossible even through truth commissions. 
However, the problem of the discovery of the truth here is compounded due to stringent 
procedural requirements and other perceptions like the prior destruction of evidence, and the 
human and other resource constraints surrounding the judiciary and the prosecution offices.   
 
The other point worth noting is the perception that the government had no motive to discover 
and publicise the truth. Such motivation or lack of it may be reflected in throughout the 
transitional justice process or afterwards. The issue of one-sidedness may be one such 
reflection. The absence of credible and independent institutions of justice or truth and the 
continued existence of violations can be another manifestation of lack of commitment to 
truth. These points highlight not only limitations on the discovery of truth but also whether 
the truth has been established at all and whether there has been any meaningful transition. 
 
The other point that emerges from the discussion in this chapter is the question of publication 
of the truth. The discovery of the truth through some mechanism is not sufficient for a society 
in transition. The truth should be known and available to the public so that its members or the 
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public as a whole could make sense of it. It is the knowledge of the truth that plays the 
important functions as we discussed in chapter 4. The discussions in this chapter demonstrate 
that, in the Ethiopian context, the truth was not public and even worse it was kept secret. 
Such hidden truths amount to no truth and could not possibly have significance. 
 
These abovementioned problems emphasise the point that the Ethiopian transitional justice 
process of establishing the truth was problematic, and hence raises the question whether there 
have been effective transition. 
 
In this chapter, the researcher also sought the views of the respondents on the contribution of 
prosecution and judicial process to other desirable goals of transitional justice including 
ensuring the rule of law, prevention of similar violations, accountability, and respect for 
human rights, democracy, and reconciliation. Again, the available data indicates diverse 
responses that range from those who identified only the positive contribution through those 
that identify some weakness to those that express mixed results as well as those that view the 
process as a total failure. These views highlighted certain points worth considering. 
 
One significant point is the perpetuation of the culture of violence and impunity. One of the 
main arguments for transitional justice as a whole and prosecution process, in particular, is 
such processes could have strong deterrence effect, and that this could promote rule of law 
and accountability as well as advance the building of a rights respecting and democratic 
system. The continuation of violence and human rights violation in Ethiopia therefore 
suggests the failure of the process to serve as deterrence or promote accountability, human 
right or democracy. If sufficient lesson was drawn from the prosecution and judicial process, 
such practice could not perpetuate. Hence, the continued existence of similar violations and 
the absence of accountability imply the absence of any significant transition in Ethiopia.  
 
Secondly, transitional justice processes are meant to be undertaken in an impartial and 
independent manner thereby contributing to the creation and maintenance of credible and 
reliable state institutions including institutions of justice and democracy. The building of a 
new system requires the building of credible and reliable institutions, which is questionable in 
the Ethiopian context. The data presented poses serious problems relating to its inability to 
create impartial and independent institutions of justice and democracy, without which there 
cannot be a successful transition.  
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A final point worth mentioning here is the question of reconciliation. The discussion in 
chapter 4 emphasises the importance of reconciliation in ending legacies of violation and 
bring about better future. The data presented in this chapter suggests there was a strong need 
for reconciliation in Ethiopia. However, reconciliation neither was incorporated into the 
Ethiopian transitional framework nor was promoted practically. The absence of reconciliation 
means the perpetuation of division, suspicion, among members of the society as well as the 
perpetuation of political extremism and political violence. There is no room for dialogue and 
accommodation of differences. Such perception clearly suggests the transitional justice 
process has not really transformed Ethiopian society into a new social and political identity. 
 
Generally, the closer examination of the data in this chapter suggest whether the prosecution 
or judicial process has led to the discovery of the truth or contributed to other desirable goals 
is problematic and these problems seriously contest whether there was effective transition in 
Ethiopia.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
 
Introduction 
 
The people of Ethiopia had been subjected to successive imperial regimes, and lacked any 
rights or protection against the government. It was rather the emperors and the nobility that 
had rights against the people who were treated as servants. However, towards the mid of the 
20
th
 Century, the people of Ethiopian began to seriously question the authority of the imperial 
regime. This ultimately gave rise to popular uprisings in different parts of the country. There 
was growing opposition both in urban and rural areas. Such opposition has gained support 
from Ethiopian intellectuals and members of the Army. There were strong student 
movements against the imperial regime. As a result, the last imperial regime of Haile-sillassie 
ended in 1974, giving rise to a military regime called the Dergue under the leadership of 
Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The military took power under the name Provisional 
Military Administration Committee (Dergue). Although the Dergue was proclaimed as a 
provisional government, it ruled the country for 17 years along the lines of a proclaimed 
socialist ideology. However, there was opposition to the Dergue right from the beginning 
particularly by various political groups that had their origin in the student movements 
including EPRP, Me’son and others.  
 
Immediately upon coming to power, in the name of the revolution, the Dergue killed high 
officials of the imperial regime, the emperor, and the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church.  This event was followed by a period of terror coined as red-terror and white terror, 
resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands of people, torture, arbitrary detention, forced 
disappearances and other crimes. In general, the whole period of the military regime was one 
of the darkest periods in Ethiopian history. The military regime was toppled in 1991 through 
an armed struggle carried out by different armed groups, particularly by the EPRDF. The fall 
of the military regime created an opportunity for transition towards rule of law, respect for 
human rights and democracy. In 1991, a Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was 
established according to the Charter for the Transitional Period. The TGE was composed of 
different political groups, with EPRDF having the majority of seats. At the same time, 
members of the Dergue were arrested in different parts of the country, and the TGE begun 
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preparations to prosecute human rights violators during the Dergue regime. In 1992, the TGE 
established the Special Prosecutors Office with a view to investigate and prosecute former 
members of the Dergue for crimes they committed.  
 
As enshrined in the SPO establishment proclamation, the incoming government of Ethiopia 
chose to deal with the past by adopting prosecution and judicial process. This might be a 
breakthrough considering Ethiopia’s experience of violent transitions. The manner of dealing 
with former Dergue leaders was a new experience compared to previous experiences when 
the incoming leaders do whatever they want. As indicated earlier, the Dergue killed the last 
Emperor and its top officials. Even, going back in history, new leaders used to kill former 
leaders or incapacitate them. Therefore, the fact that the EPRDF government did not out 
rightly kill the Degue leaders and members and choose non-violent legal method might be 
considered as a big step in breaking the cycle of political violence against formers leaders. 
What followed was a large-scale prosecution of former leaders and their affiliates for the 
systematic and gross violations. Irrespective of all constraints, the process was purely a 
national process in the sense that it was conducted by national institutions and according to 
national laws. In these and other respects, the Ethiopian transitional process of accountability 
may be considered as a landmark case for the country. It is a landmark case because, unlike 
international prosecution, it is a large-scale prosecution of former leaders before national 
tribunal so close to the society affected by violations. Secondly, it is a departure from 
previous experiences of the country where incoming leaders deal with former leaders as they 
wish. It is the first time in the country whereby former leaders were dealt with legally 
however contested the process may be. The Ethiopian context also provides important 
insights and serves as an example of the problem of transitional justice. 
 
This research has inquired whether the Ethiopian model has successfully addressed 
transitional issues of justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation and thereby contributed to 
effective transition. The inquiry focused on two aspects - the framework and the outcomes. 
The connection between the two is undeniable. However, these issues were treated separately 
to make the consideration of the implications that follow from the adopted transition process 
more structured and focused. Clearly, the process involved is not the main subject of 
discussion, and hence is dealt with only when it becomes relevant either to the framework or 
to outcomes. To achieve its objective, a review of relevant literature was conducted providing 
the theoretical framework for this study. In addition, relevant laws, court cases, and other 
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official documents including reports were consulted and analyzed. Moreover, primary data 
was collected through intensive interview with various sections of the society, and these were 
closely analyzed in light of the theoretical discussions and the relevant laws. 
 
Summary and Discussion of Research Findings 
 
In dealing with the Ethiopian transitional process, this paper reviewed available literature on 
issues of transitional justice including the meaning and significance of transitional justice 
itself, and its main components - justice, truth, reparations and reconciliation. These provide 
the analytical framework for this study. 
 
As discussed in chapter three, transitional justice is a concept that refers to various processes 
and mechanisms adopted by societies in transition to settle past violations. Although some 
may choose to forget the past, the predominant view is that societies emerging from conflict 
or repressive regime need to properly address their past in order to reconstruct a better future.  
Many states have employed various mechanisms of coming to terms with their past, including 
criminal prosecution, truth-telling and reconciliation processes, purges, lustration, and 
institutional reforms. The various experiences also indicate that transitional justice processes 
may take place at different levels.  
 
In addressing past violations, societies are expected to make decisions on fundamental 
questions including the question whether to address or forget the past. Arguably, forgetting 
the past is one way of addressing the past, however passive, contested and undesirable it may 
be.  If decisions are made to address the past, then a series of questions arise as to the 
mechanisms and processes of dealing with the past including its nature, scope and 
objectives/goals. In adopting any of the abovementioned mechanisms or a combination 
thereof, it is necessary to specify the objectives/goals to be achieved including justice, truth, 
reparation and reconciliation. There is no one formula applicable to all societies and hence 
each society has to identify its choices in formulating transitional justice processes and 
objectives.  
 
However, certain critical points should be taken in to consideration for effective transitional 
processes. First, as issues of transitional justice affect the whole society, there should be the 
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widest possible public participation in decision-making processes. The absence of public 
participation compromises the legitimacy of transitional processes as well as what they can 
achieve. Secondly, in as far as, the concern is to address past violations, these past violations 
or crimes should be defined in an impartial and inclusive manner irrespective of whoever 
committed them. Societies striving to break from the past and establish a new system should 
lay their foundations in impartial processes, least it might compromise the process and 
thereby negatively impinge the future. Thirdly, transitional justice processes or their goals 
should be understood as complementary to one another. In other words, one should refrain 
from considering one mechanism or goal superior to, or even incompatible with, another 
mechanism or goal. Therefore, the debate should not be justice versus truth, justice versus 
reconciliation, or justice versus peace, which would lead to the debate over prosecution 
versus truth and reconciliation processes. These critical points are important elements of the 
evaluation of the Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
 
A more useful approach to transitional justice is to view it as involving various 
complementary processes and objectives. This calls for a comprehensive or holistic approach 
in dealing with the past by adopting various complementary mechanisms to achieve 
complementary goals. This paper viewed justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation as 
essential and interrelated components of transitional justice processes, reflecting the principle 
of complementarity. For example, a broader understanding of justice may embody or promote 
all other components. On the other hand, justice, truth and reparation might lead to, or 
promote reconciliation, with the implication that reconciliation is the ultimate goal of 
transitional processes. Nevertheless, the meaning and mechanisms of achieving these various 
components are contested issues. 
 
This study has shown that the conception and process of rendering justice is controversial 
especially in times of transition. Clearly, the notion of justice has been a subject of 
intellectual debate giving rise to the deontological and consequentialist (utilitarian) 
perspectives. Theoretical discussions also provide different forms of justice including 
distributive, restorative, retributive, interactional (interpersonal), and procedural justice. 
Some have conceptualized justice as deterrent, compensatory, rehabilitative, justice as an 
affirmation of human dignity and justice as exoneration. In view of these various conceptions 
of justice, the main issue is what conception and process of justice may be adopted during 
transition. 
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In the absence of objective conception of justice, this is basically dependent on the subjective 
conception of the decision makers. Although the decision-making process, during transition, 
is expected to be participatory, it might be the incoming regime that makes this decision. 
Hence, the conception of justice of the incoming regime or successor regime is most likely to 
dictate the policy choices and process of transitional justice. This may not be true in case of 
negotiated transitions where a negotiated justice results. It is also noted that the subjective 
normative conceptions of the decision makers may derive from reason, self-interest and 
emotions, which Jon Elster termed “tracheotomy motivations.” However, the relationship 
between subjective conceptions and actual behaviour, and which of the motivations among 
the hierarchy influence a certain course of action is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, the 
idea of motivations of justice might be useful to explain certain aspects of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process.  
 
A distinction was observed between various forms of justice including political justice, legal 
justice and administrative justice. In the context of transitional societies, political justice 
exists where the executive branch of the government unilaterally defines perpetrators and 
decides their fate, and this form of justice is attributed to authoritarian regimes. On the other 
hand, pure legal justice is attributed to judicial decision-making processes with well 
functioning judicial system complying with the requirements of impartiality, independence, 
competence and due process. However, in light of past violations and the culture of violence, 
we may question whether transitional societies can possibly have such systems in place. 
Although violation of certain requirements may be tantamount to pure political justice, some 
violations of these criteria are understandable and tolerable considering the peculiar situations 
of societies in transition. However, there is difficulty to demarcate ‘tolerable’ violations and 
those resulting in political justice, even though certainty or uncertainty of outcomes is taken 
as an essential indicator. Administrative justice refers to the purging or lustration of officials 
or members of the former regime or the army or security forces for committing violations. 
Administrative measures may be closer to political or legal justice depending on different 
factors including the existence or absence of procedural safeguards. These different forms of 
justice are useful to understand, explain and critically evaluate certain transitional justice 
processes. However, it is important to note that the distinctions between these different forms 
of justice are based on who makes the decision and on the existence or non-existence of 
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procedural safeguards. This political, legal and administrative justice perspective, again, is 
useful to understand the Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
 
The existence of different conceptions or forms of justice implies that diverse mechanisms or 
a combination thereof may be adopted in dealing with past violation. Nevertheless, this study 
has focussed on one mechanism of doing justice, i.e. criminal prosecution, because it is the 
mechanism adopted by the Ethiopian transition. In this sense, justice is understood as the 
apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of perpetrators 
according to the law. The significance of criminal prosecution and trial to transitional 
societies lies arguably in its contribution to the establishment and maintenance of rule of law, 
ensuring accountability and fighting impunity, the creation of a democratic society, its 
deterrence effect by exposing the truth and educating the public. In addition to forwarding 
these desirable goals of prosecution, proponents of criminal prosecution warn against the 
dangers of non-prosecution.  
 
Prosecution is also seen as part of the obligation of states under international law. The duty to 
prosecute (or extradite perpetrators) exists under various international treaties and customary 
international law – especially under international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law. The treaty obligations emanate either from explicit provisions of treaties or 
authoritative interpretations of general obligations of states under treaties. In the context of 
international human rights law, prosecution is not only a matter of discharging state’s duty, 
but is a component of victims’ right to justice. A consideration of the duty to prosecute, 
however, gives rise to the question whether and to what extent this duty limits a society’s 
choices in deciding its preferred mechanism(s) of dealing with the past. Although the 
application and desirability of amnesty is diminishing, a question arises whether a third way, 
i.e., truth and reconciliation, is desirable and allowed under international law.  
 
There are strong arguments that support truth and reconciliation processes over criminal 
prosecutions. However, such arguments sustain the assumption of trade-off between different 
mechanisms and goals of transitional justice. A holistic approach to transitional justice can 
overcome the criticisms levied against any freestanding mechanism or objective or goal. 
Hence, one may view criminal prosecutions and trials as part of comprehensive mechanisms 
of dealing with the past. It is undesirable and unnecessary to deal with all perpetrators 
through criminal prosecution or other process alone.  
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Criminal prosecutions should, however, take note of the challenges that would render the 
process arbitrary, unfair or perceived as victor’s justice. In other words, a decision to 
prosecute must take in to account the magnitude of violations and the huge number of 
perpetrators, the capacity of the judicial system as well as the requirements of impartiality, 
independence and due process, logistical issues (resource constraints), and impartiality in the 
definition of violations, perpetrators or victims. However, there is no formula of how 
prosecution processes should be conducted. Nevertheless, one needs to consider local 
contexts and institutional capacities as well as view prosecution as part of a holistic approach, 
whereby prosecution may also promote truth, reparation and reconciliation. 
 
In transitional societies, although truth is a crucial component of transitional justice, it is a 
much-contested concept. Truth in these contexts is about what happened in the past or the 
circumstances surrounding past violations. The significance of the truth about the past to 
victims or their relatives or the society as a whole is enormous giving rise to the right to truth 
in international law. Although the emergence of the right to truth is subject to debate, the 
significance of establishing the truth about the past is generally accepted.  Its significance lies 
in its contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace, the promotion of  criminal 
justice, facilitating reconciliation by healing rifts in societies, ensuring accountability and 
fighting impunity, reconstruction of national identities through dialogue and shared history, 
serving as a form of reparation, facilitating access to official documents. However, there are 
controversies on how to establish the truth, particularly whether criminal prosecution is 
capable of establishing the truth. 
 
There is recognition of the significance of reparations to societies in transition, especially to 
victims of human rights violations or their families or relatives. In the context of transition, 
reparation is a claim against successor regimes (governments), as opposed to individual 
criminals, for violations committed by former regime. Reparation is a general concept that 
may take different forms - material, moral and symbolic reparations. Reparation is a form of 
justice for victims. It is an acknowledgement of the suffering of the past and an expression of 
commitment that similar violations would not be repeated again, and thereby contributes to 
the creation of a new political identity. It is clear from the discussion earlier that reparation is 
essential for reconciliation and the establishment of a democratic society. Hence, reparation 
can be seen as a rectification of past wrongs and a basis for building a new future. However, 
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reparation programs should be viewed as part of a comprehensive transitional justice process, 
and not a stand-alone remedy to past violations. 
 
The theoretical discussion clearly shows that successor regimes have a general duty under 
international law to repair victims of past violations. However, in view of its significance, 
reparation can be considered as a moral duty even if no specific legal rules do exist. 
Nevertheless, its actual implementation involves a number of complicated issues including 
the determination of victims to be repaired, or violations in respect of which reparation is to 
be effected, resource constraints and the conflict between societies’ forward-looking 
programs and the backward looking policy of reparations. In the context of massive 
violations committed over a period, it would seem difficult to determine the victims entitled 
to reparation programs. While not all reparation programs require mobilization of resources, 
compensatory policies require the allocation of resources. However, resources are limited in 
many developing transitional countries raising competition between state rebuilding and 
reparatory programs. However, resource limitation cannot be a justification for ignoring a 
state’s legal or moral duty to repair victims of violation. Arguably, difficulty should not be 
equated with impossibility and hence, states should devise a mechanism of financing 
reparation programs either by allocating a certain percentage in their budget line or by 
establishing reparation funds. 
 
Reconciliation is the ultimate objective of transitional justice processes of ending cycles of 
violence and violations. Although both the concept and mechanism of bringing about 
reconciliation are contested, transitional justice processes must be directed to the achievement 
of reconciliation as a lasting solution to societies emerging out of conflict or repressive 
regime. However, reconciliation requires justice, truth and reparation. Hence transitional 
societies need to devise appropriate mechanisms of achieving these multiple goals and 
thereby reconciliation. 
 
In light of the discussion on the key aspects and components of transitional justice, this 
research therefore interrogates (1) whether the Ethiopian transitional justice framework was 
properly designed to deal with the past, and (2) whether or not it has achieved the stated 
objectives, and the implications of its success or failure to the present or future. Obviously, 
the transitional justice process might be expected to serve as deterrence as well as to 
contribute to the establishment of a system that upholds the rule of law, accountability, 
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human rights and democracy.  In other words, one might expect this process to transform the 
Ethiopian social and political system. Nevertheless, various sources rate Ethiopia’s political 
and institutional transformation very poorly. To provide few examples, the World Justice 
Project Rule of Law Index ranks Ethiopia at the “bottom half of the rankings among low 
income countries” in most aspects of rule of law.924It clearly shows, among others, the 
absence of accountability, poor human rights performance, and weakness in the judiciary and 
justice process: 
 
Accountability is very weak by regional standards [sub-Saharan Africa] (ranking 
eighty-eighth globally and third to last among low income nations)... The 
Performance of courts is very weak...The country has a very poor record in protecting 
fundamental rights, ranking ninety-second globally and second to last in the 
region...of greatest concern are restrictions limiting freedom of speech and assembly 
as well as illegal detentions and due process violations...
925
 
 
This suggests the perpetuation of the culture of violence and violations of human rights by 
the government and impunity. The institutions of justice are weak and not functioning 
properly. Weakness in accountability implies not only impunity but also weakness in 
establishing a democratic system. One might argue that not all these would be occurring if the 
transition were successful. The state of democracy in Ethiopia is also rated very poor by 
different sources. The 2010 democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks 
Ethiopia 118 and puts the regime under the category of authoritarian regimes, showing a 
retreat from the 2008 ranking as 105 and listing under the category of hybrid regimes.
926
  
These rankings indicate that there is no transition to full democracy; neither did it attain the 
status of flawed democracy, which appears second in the democracy index. The Bertelsmann 
stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) of 2012 ranks Ethiopia 105 of 128 in relation to 
political transformation.
927
 These sources might not be conclusive and their reliability might 
be questionable. Nevertheless, these assessments strengthen the views that seriously question 
                                                             
924 Agrast,M., Botero, J., Martinez, J., Ponce,A., & Prat,c., WJP Rule of Law Index, 2012-2013, 
Washington,D.C:The World Justice Project. The rule of law index is based on the following elements: (1) 
limited government powers, (2)absence of corruption, (3) order and security, (4) fundamental rights, (5) open 
Government, (6) regulatory enforcement, (7)civil justice, and (8)criminal justice. 
925 Agrast, (Ibid) 
926 Democracy Index 2010, Democracy in Retreat, A report from the Economist Intellegence Unit, The 
Economist,www.eiu.com. This regression may be attributed to the measures taken by the government following 
the 2007 election.  
927 Bertelsmann Stiftung,BTI 2012 – Ethiopia Country Report. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung,2012 
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whether the Ethiopian transitional justice process has played a successful transformative role 
by establishing a democratic system. Indeed, electoral experiences in Ethiopia demonstrate 
the absence of dialogue, negotiation and compromise among the different political leaders, 
and thus perpetuating the culture of confrontations and violence.
928
 These political and ethnic 
polarizations, again, reflect the inadequacy of the transformative role of the Ethiopian 
transitional justice process and interrogate whether there has been significant political 
transition within the country. 
 
This author now turns to the specific findings that emerged from this study and the 
implications thereof.  
 
1. Ethiopia choose to deal with its past through criminal prosecution as incorporated in 
the proclamation establishing the Office of Special Prosecutor referred to as SPO, 
which was mandated to investigate and institute proceedings against members of the 
Dergue and its affiliates who committed crimes.  
 
As already discussed violence and violations were committed in Ethiopia during the 
seventeen years of the Dergue regime, and as recognized in proclamation establishing 
the SPO, violations were committed by successive imperial regimes over centuries. In 
the context of Ethiopia, the arguments in support of prosecution resonate with the 
general theoretical arguments in the sense that it is necessary to ensure justice, rule of 
law and accountability, to educate the public and deter the occurrence of similar 
violations, and to promote democracy. Prosecution is also seen as a discharge of 
Ethiopia’s duty under international law to prosecute grave violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law. Prosecution advances justice 
however contested the conception of criminal justice might be. Moreover, as 
enshrined in the SPO proclamation, prosecution and trial processes are meant to 
discover and establish the truth. The Ethiopian transitional justice framework can be 
appreciated for incorporating justice and truth as its objective. 
 
                                                             
928 Lahra Smith, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special Report, United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, August 2007.[Accessed on 30 February 2014]. Available from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr192.pdf. Moreover, Lahra Smith observed that deep-rooted 
ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions also surfaced giving rise to critical tensions 
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2. The Ethiopian transitional justice framework emphasizes the punishment of 
perpetrators, and neglects some essential elements of transition, namely reparation 
and reconciliation 
 
It is true that criminal prosecutions and trials might satisfy victims’ need for 
retributive justice. It has been shown that victims were demanding the prosecution of 
perpetrators. However, reparation is also an essential component of justice for victims 
of violations. Reparation – particularly material reparation – gives the most direct 
benefit to victims of crimes. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian transitional justice 
framework did not incorporate adequate policy for reparation.
929
It would appear from 
the findings that although victims needed material reparation, they were not organized 
to claim for reparations at the time of the transition. Nevertheless, there were 
individual instances where such a demand was made, however limited the demand 
might have been. The point is that there was a need for reparation but it was unclear to 
victims from whom to demand it. One issue that arises, however, is whether the 
Ethiopian government could possibly had adopted a policy of reparation given the 
magnitude of the crimes committed and the resources of the country. This of course 
speaks to the difficulty and not the impossibility of having such a policy. Hence, one 
may see the failure to adopt a general policy for reparation as a weakness of the 
Ethiopian transitional justice process. 
 
The data indicates that there was a need for reconciliation. The Ethiopian society has 
been affected by ethnic and political divide, and a culture of political violence. Again, 
the emphasis on punishment of perpetrators diminished the importance of addressing 
the long-accumulated divide and polarization within the country. In light of the 
history of ethnic and political polarization, some process of reconciliation would have 
been an essential component of the transitional justice process. The argument against 
reconciliation processes is that the transition was enabled by victory of one group 
over the other, and there was no existing condition for the need for truth telling and 
reconciliation processes. In other words, the rejection of truth and reconciliation 
processes primarily relate to the absence of the conditions for truth and reconciliation 
                                                             
929 Although no general policy of reparation was devised, we have noted that certain restitution measures taken 
by the government, although limited, can be considered as a form of reparation. In addition, the government was 
taking certain measures that may be considered as moral or symbolic reparation. Clearly, there was no evidence 
that the victims were organized and laid their demand for reparation at the time of the transition. 
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in the sense that the former regime was totally defeated, posed no threat to the future, 
and had no bargaining power. Is reconciliation necessary only when a former regime 
is still strong or poses threat? Yes victory, rather than negotiation, creates better 
conditions for prosecution, and prosecution is not only desirable but is a matter of 
duty to some extent. However, the fundamental issue is can prosecution alone solve 
deep-rooted problems in the Ethiopian society, especially considering the identified 
limitations of prosecution.
930
 The significance of reconciliation in ending cycles of 
violence transcends the issue of victory or defeat at any particular time. 
Reconciliation is essential for reconstructing better social and political relations by 
addressing long entrenched divisions and animosity. Considering the significance of 
reconciliation to Ethiopian society, it is unfortunate that no process of reconciliation 
was adopted as a matter policy or advanced in practice. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the Ethiopian transitional justice framework failed to 
incorporate adequate reparation policy while it entirely excluded reconciliation as 
essential components of transitional justice. It adopted prosecution as the only 
mechanism of dealing with the past with justice and truth as the main objectives. 
Hence, it lacks the comprehensiveness in the formulation of its objectives, which in 
turn, we see, affected its outcome.  
 
3. The Ethiopian transitional justice framework resulted from the incoming 
government’s decision with little or no public discussion. An understanding of the 
prevailing of transitional justice indicate that, as questions of transitional justice are 
public issues, public participation in designing the framework is crucial for successful 
transition. The transitional society should deliberate on and decide how to address its 
violent past. In societies emerging from repressive regimes like Ethiopia, where 
people’s voices were silenced, the significance of public participation cannot be 
understated. It not only sends the message that the new system is inclusive but also 
enables the best possible choice to be made. In this respect, the Ethiopian transitional 
justice framework was formulated by the transitional government with limited
931
 or 
                                                             
930 One should note that even respondents who supported prosecution admitted the limitations in the process in 
the sense that it was difficult or even impossible to go after each crime and each perpetrator, and it clear that in 
light of the extent of violations committed, prosecution could not cover all perpetrators. 
931 There are indications of consultation with or demand by victims however limited or contested it may be. 
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no public participation
932
 on the issue of how to deal with the past. The transitional 
government and its legislative organ, the Council of Representatives, were mainly 
composed of representatives of political parties, with EPRDF holding the majority of 
seats. There were no elections, and no public representation. Hence, apart from the 
limited consultation with victims, there was a lack of public participation in the 
formulation of the framework.
933
The Ethiopian public did not deliberate on the 
available choices to make a decision. This among other issues raises the question of 
legitimacy and public ownership of the process, its operation and its results.
934
  By 
contrast, there was suspicion that the international community, particularly human 
rights organizations and western government, influenced the formulation of the 
framework, which might give rise to the question: to what extents can the 
international community dictate transitional justice frameworks.  
 
At any rate, it can be inferred from the SPO proclamation and the available data that 
the framework was the result of government decision partly informed by victims 
needs though limited. The public, the main stakeholders, was not involved in the 
decision making process regarding how to deal with the past. This has consequences 
on the appropriateness of the choice made, its operation, results and even its 
legitimacy. Our data shows different alternatives were available to Ethiopia. 
However, the public did not deliberate on them, and the process was not participatory.  
 
4. The Ethiopian transitional justice framework lacks broadness in defining violations, 
perpetrators, and victims. In other words, the narration of the history of violation is 
partial. The SPO establishment proclamation clearly states that it was the Dergue that 
committed past violations, and that investigation and prosecution is exclusively 
directed against them. However, the question is whether such a formulation of crime 
and perpetrators is appropriate – a question of scope of definition. The assertion that 
the Dergue committed serious and gross violations, and thus deserves punishment 
may not be disputed in light of the available data. The question however is whether 
the Dergue was the only violator.  Clearly, other political groups had also committed 
                                                             
932 As observed in chapter 5, some people are of the opinion that the EPRDF government exclusively adopted 
the prosecution framework without any public participation. 
933 Of course, the whole transitional process of establishing the Charter and the TGE was subject to criticism for 
lack of widest possible participation by political groups let alone, the general public. 
934 Even some victims felt it was up to the government and they did not believe in the process 
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crimes in the past.
935
Why were they excluded from the framework? This might have 
resulted from the assumption that their participation in violations was very limited and 
cannot be equated with that of the Dergue. 
 
Our understanding of transitional justice informs us that the efforts to address past 
violations should address all perpetrators irrespective of their political affiliation. The 
history of violence should be formulated in an impartial manner and broad enough to 
deal with perpetrators without consideration of their background. After all, a crime is 
a crime, as one respondent already argued. These other political groups might have 
not used the state machinery. Nevertheless, they are believed to have committed 
crimes whatever their degree or whatever the corresponding punishment might be. 
How can one know that the participation of these groups or their crimes was limited 
without conducting proper investigation? Addressing the past requires a broader 
understanding of past violations and subjecting perpetrators to the same process of 
accountability. A new system should begin with an impartial understanding of the 
past and set new standards whereby everyone is treated in the same manner. 
Therefore, the formulation of violations and perpetrators in the Ethiopian transitional 
framework is problematic. It did not address violations by other political groups.  
Even the argument that they were limited does not justify their exclusion, as we do 
not know the extent of these violations. Nevertheless, the argument here is not that 
they should have been brought to court like the Dergue; it is rather that they should 
have been held accountable. As discussed in chapter four, accountability does not 
necessarily imply prosecution and punishment of all perpetrators. Clearly, there was 
no other process of dealing with other political groups in Ethiopia. Thus, the 
narrowness of the framework has repercussions on the search for justice, truth, and 
the future of the society.   
 
5. The Ethiopian transitional justice process set a retributive conception of justice as its 
primary objective. Some viewed it as appropriate arguing that justice pertains to the 
punishment of perpetrators in accordance with the law. The investigation, 
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of perpetrators was thought to be essential 
                                                             
935 This is clear from the discussions in chapter two that alternative narrations of history of violations exist in 
various historical documents. The primary data collected and presented in chapters 5 and 6 also support the 
view, although some of them have questioned the degree of involvement in violations, and the desirability of 
prosecuting them. 
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not only in rendering justice but also in promoting other desirable goals including 
deterrence and building rule of law. On the other hand, the retributive conception of 
justice was criticized; and thus led to the rejection of the process as not motivated by 
the desire to see justice done. The process was questioned for its emphasis on revenge 
and vindictiveness. Hence, the conception of justice and the modality adopted to 
achieve it is dismissed as not proper way of dealing with the past. Arguably, truth and 
reconciliation processes are more compatible with traditional understandings of 
justice in the sense that what is more important is the appearance of the perpetrator 
before victims or their families, the acknowledgement of wrongs and asking for 
forgiveness. The point is that conviction and punishment alone are not significant; 
truth and reconciliation process would have better satisfied victims or relatives and 
hence promoted social harmony. However contested the concept of justice is, this 
study has also inquired whether the Ethiopian process has achieved justice – an 
inquiry as to the outcome of the process although this outcome also depends on the 
framework itself. 
 
6. Like its conception, the realization of justice is questionable. Even proponents of the 
process recognize certain limitations that have compromised the realization of justice. 
The main limitation relates to the delay of the proceedings. It hindered the gathering 
and production of evidence resulting in some perpetrators going free. In addition, the 
public, including victims or their families, lost interest to attend the proceedings, 
which resulted in dissatisfaction with the process as well as the result. Moreover, the 
delay has also implication on the right to a speedy trial because justice delayed might 
be justice denied. The other limitation relates to the issue of proportionality of 
punishment. It was observed that some perpetrators did not receive adequate 
punishment; this view underlines that punishment be proportional to the crime 
committed.
936
 In addition, it is clear that some perpetrators lived abroad, and the 
government failed to bring them to justice. Furthermore, the government has failed to 
carry out punishment with respect to those convicted in absentia. The point here is 
that justice requires not only the pronouncement of judgement but also its execution. 
Moreover, it was observed that even among Dergue members, the process had not 
gone after each crime or perpetrator. Whether that is possible or desirable is another 
                                                             
936 The reasons for lack of proportionality are discussed in chapter 5. 
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question that begs whether wholesale prosecution was appropriate or whether we 
could have opted for a different alternative. Apparently, these limitations suggest that 
the realization of justice was incomplete although they were raised in relation to the 
crimes committed by the Dergue or its affiliates. 
 
The more fundamental problem of realization of justice is associated with the absence 
of trust in the entire political and justice system. The perception is that the transitional 
justice was not motivated by the desire for justice. The government is criticized for 
having no commitment to justice, and worse it is blamed for undermining the 
institutions of justice; hence, neither justice nor other desirable goals were achieved. 
The other critical problem, as indicated above, is the partiality of the process raising 
the question whether justice can be partial. The exclusion of other political groups had 
exonerated some perpetrators and to that extent, compromised justice. Justice must be 
impartial. All violators, and victims for that matter, shall be treated equally. However, 
this does not mean they shall be subject to the same punishment. If justice is 
punishment according to the law, then would it be appropriate to select and prosecute 
one group alone. What lesson does such selectiveness give to the society? Is it victor’s 
justice?  Hence, one constraint to justice is the legal framework establishing the SPO. 
Hence, one notes that justice in the Ethiopian transition is very problematic. 
 
7. The Ethiopian transitional justice framework is premised on the quest for a certain 
conception of truth as its objective. The SPO proclamation provides that the history of 
past violations shall be recorded for posterity, and that this will advance public 
knowledge about the past, and deters the commission of similar violations. History 
recording is part of the prosecution and judicial process of dealing with past 
violations. However, the proclamation also stated what violations are subject to 
prosecution, and thus the proclamation in itself provided a particular narrative of the 
truth. The truth is that the Dergue committed gross violations against the people of 
Ethiopia. If this is the truth, then what else is there to be established? Presumably, 
simply the details of this general truth. 
 
There is no doubt that the truth about the past is essential element of reconstruction of 
a society or the state. History must be established and known to guide our future 
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action and determine our relation. The Ethiopian transitional process had foreseen the 
importance of doing that. However, did it accomplish that effectively?   
 
It might be argued that the prosecution and judicial process had, to some extent, 
contributed to the discovery of the truth. The actual judicial process had reaffirmed 
the formal and political truth reflected in the SPO establishment proclamation, that the 
Dergue used the state machinery to kill and exterminate what it thought enemies or 
their supporters. Nevertheless, this conception of a limited truth in the Ethiopian 
transitional process of accountability is problematic for different reasons.  
 
It is important to note that truth and history, as part of the Ethiopian transitional 
process, are seriously contested matters. Ethiopian history in general and the history 
of violations is subject to different narrations and interpretations.  In light of these 
variations, the transitional process might be expected to come up with an impartial 
and complete narration constituting a shared understanding of history of violations, 
perpetrators and victims. However, the transitional process, it would appear, further 
compounded the controversies rather than resolve them. 
 
The search for, and recording of, truth was premised on a political definition of truth. 
The prosecution and judicial processes are constrained by a political decision as to 
what constitutes the truth.  This limited the scope of the truth to be determined in the 
Ethiopian transition. Hence, the process is not broad or comprehensive enough to 
uncover past violations. As shown in the analytical framework, the search for truth is 
a difficult task, and no process had established the whole truth. The context of 
transition that came close to establish the whole truth is the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The difficulty or even impossibility of establishing the 
whole truth is understandable. Nevertheless, the efforts to establish or record past 
violations should be undertaken irrespective of who committed the violations.  From 
this perspective, the Ethiopian transitional process can be characterized as partial or 
one-sided for its exclusion of violations committed by other political groups. Hence, 
one may question whether the whole process was motivated by the search for truth 
and the establishment of a better society or by other desires. In addition, such partial 
truth is inadequate to either remedy the past or serve as a foundation for a new social 
and political system. This contests whether there is an effective transition. 
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A further question can be raised as to the suitability of courts to search for and record 
the truth. The Ethiopian transition exemplifies the problems of judicial truth discussed 
in the analytical framework. Judicial process coupled with its stringent procedural 
requirements and the motive to punish is not suited to the search for truth. There is 
often a lack of evidence to establish the truth with the implication that some 
perpetrators were going free and the fate of some victims remaining unknown. Hence, 
the judicial process faced practical limitations even in relation to violations committed 
by the Dergue. The Ethiopian transition is more problematic in light of people’s 
perception about the government’s lack of commitment to truth or justice and lack of 
institutional impartiality and independence. The search for truth must be undertaken 
with full impartiality and independence, which the Ethiopian institutions of justice are 
understood to be lacking. In light of all these problems, one could say that, although 
the Ethiopian transition had to some extent established the truth, it is affected by 
series of flaws. A further inadequacy of the process is the lack of publication of the 
truth and public access to official documents, evidencing past violations. Despite 
extensive prosecution and trial processes, efforts to bring the outcomes to the public 
are very limited or non-existent. Moreover, official documents are placed beyond the 
reach of the public. Even if one claims the truth was established, it has little or no 
significance unless the public or victims become aware of it. After all, it is the 
knowledge of the truth of the past that reconstructs individual and collective 
behaviour, and helps in building a better future. If the truth remains unknown, it is 
problematic to properly address the past and create a better socio-political identity. 
This again questions whether there is any meaningful transition in Ethiopia. 
 
It can be argued generally that, although the Ethiopian transitional process had partly 
established the truth, it failed to give a complete picture of the truth about past 
violations. The transition totally ignored a significant part of the history of violations. 
This problem is related to the framework itself, which was formulated by the 
government with little or no public participation. The implication is that the truth is 
what the government says is the truth. As long as the government is not interested in 
other truths, they do not matter. Hence, the transitional process itself and efforts of 
state reconstruction were based on the “official” or “political” truth. However, as long 
as part of the truth is not recognized, it is impossible to say that the Ethiopian 
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transition is based on participation, inclusiveness and equality in dignity and 
accountability –rights and duties. The silenced histories/voices still question and 
delegitimize the whole process of Ethiopian transition. 
 
8. The Ethiopian transitional justice process has not fully contributed to the rule of law 
and deterrence, respect for human rights, building democracy and promotion of 
reconciliation.  These outcomes, to some extent, depend on the degree of success of 
the process in rendering justice and truth. The prosecution and judicial process has 
sent the message that no one escapes from accountability for violations. This might be 
seen as the contribution of the process to rule of law, deterrence, and the respect for 
human rights. In addition, accountability and rule of law are essential attributes in 
building a democratic society. Nevertheless, all the problems witnessed in the process 
do limit these positive outcomes.  
 
The success of the Ethiopian transition is diluted with the continued existence of 
similar violations under the current regime and the lack of accountability for the same. 
A transitional process of justice is meant to address past violations and set a new 
beginning where similar violations will not occur. Its successes and contributions can 
only be seen in the broader legal and political context. The existence of similar 
violations would negatively affect the outcomes of the process or at least the 
perception of people. The continuation of the past, even if it is of lesser degree, would 
rather make the entire process questionable in terms of legitimacy, achieving its 
objectives, and its overall contribution including deterrence, rule of law and respect 
for human rights etc. 
 
A related problem is the failure of the entire justice system. The integrity, impartiality, 
reliability of the justice system is essential component of a transitional process. A 
transitional justice process is also expected to reflect the commitment to rule of law 
by strengthening institutions of justice. If the justice system lacks or perceived as 
lacking such attributes, the entire transitional process would be questioned in terms of 
a genuine commitment to uphold rule of law, human rights and democracy, and 
sending the message against impunity. The Ethiopian justice system is widely 
criticized for lack of independence and impartiality.  This problem raises the issue 
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whether one can obtain justice for violations committed under the current 
government, and hence leads to lack of confidence and trust in the justice system. 
 
Finally, reconciliation is the ultimate objective of transitional justice process because 
through disclosure, acknowledgment and forgiveness it ensures social harmony and 
provides a shared commitment not to repeat the past. It ends cycles of violations. 
Ethiopian society endured long history of political and ethnic division and intolerance, 
and hence there was/is a need for reconciliation. However, the Ethiopian transitional 
framework never incorporated this as its objective, and one would not see it at the end 
of the process either. Hence, political polarization and the culture of intolerance 
persist in Ethiopia. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
To conclude, the Ethiopian transitional justice process might be seen as a paradigm shift in 
light of the countries long and deep-rooted experiences of cycles of violence, and hence it can 
be viewed as making some positive contributions in terms of justice, truth and other desirable 
goals. Nevertheless, the above limitations and shortcomings clearly suggest that it has failed 
to transform the Ethiopian society into a full-fledged rights respecting and democratic 
system. People still believe justice was not done and the truth remains to be uncovered. More 
over, the incoming government is committing similar violations with impunity. Furthermore, 
the transitional justice process has failed to create strong, impartial and independent 
institutions of justice. Above all, the absence of reconciliation has sustained ethnic and 
political division, political polarization and the culture of intolerance. This all indicate 
Ethiopian society have not successfully settled their past. A successful transition is thus a 
standing issue. 
  
Way Forward 
 
This research has shown the challenges of transitional criminal justice process in serving as a 
foundation for a new political and social identity that morally departs from a repressive past. 
This author recommends further research, equipped with more resources, and debate 
regarding the various aspects of the Ethiopian transitional justice process.                                     
 
 
279 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Books 
 
1. Budge, E.A, The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Kebra Negast), 
Translation, Cambridge, Ontario, 2000 available at 
http://www.yorku.ca/inpar/kebra_budge.pdf retrived on June 6, 2013 
2. Cohen, Robin and Goulbourne, Harry. (eds.), Democracy and Socialism in Africa, 
Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1991   
3. Elster, Jon, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspectives, 
Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2004 
4. Foblets, Marie-Claire and Von Trotha, Trutz (eds.), Healing the Wounds, Essays on 
the Reconstruction of Societies after War, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 
Oregon, 2004 
5. Hayner, Priscilla B., Unspeakable Truths, Facing the Challenges of Truth 
Commissions 
6. Hayner, Priscilla B., Unspeakable truths: Confronting State Terror and atrocity, 
Rutledge, London, 2001 
7. James, William, Essays in Pragmatism, Hafner Publishing Company,Inc., Newyork, 
1948 
8. Kiraly, Tibor, Criminal Procedure, Truth and Probability, Akademiai Kiado, 
Budapest, Hungary, 1976 
9. Kissi, Edward, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia, Lexington 
Books, UK, 2006 
10. Kumar, K., Rebuilding Societies after Civil War, Lynne Rienner pub, Boulder co, 
1997 
11. Matsuoka, Atsu Atsuko Karin & Sorenson, J. Ghosts & Shadows: Construction of 
Identity and Community in an African Diaspora, University of Toronto, Canada, 2001 
12. Orun, A.M, Introduction to Political Sociology, Fourth Edition, University of Illinois, 
Chicago, New Jersey, 2001 
13. Siegfried, Pausewang, Tronvol, Kjetil and Aalen, Lovise (eds), Ethiopia since the 
Derg. A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance, London, New York: 
ZED Books, 2001. 
 
 
280 
 
14. Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. 
15. Thoms,Oskar N.T., Ron, James and Paris, Roland: The Effects of Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms: A Summary of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for 
Analysts and Practitioners, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of 
Ottawa, April 2008 
16. Tola, Babile, To Kill a Generation: The Red Terror in Ethiopia, second edition, Free 
Ethiopia Press, Washington Dc, 1997. 
17. Tronvol, Kjetil, Schaefer, Charles and Aneme, Girmachew Alemu (eds.). The 
Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James 
Currey, 2009 
18. Villa-Vicencio, Charles and Doxtader, Erik, Pieces of the puzzle, Keywords on 
Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 
Cape town, South Africa 2004 
19. W/Giorgis, Dawit, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia, Red Sea 
Press, 1989 
20. Wilson, Richard A., The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
Legitimizing the Post Apartheid State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
21. Young, John, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 
1975-1991, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1997 
22. Zewde, Bahru, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, Oxford, James Currey, 
1991 
23. Zewde, Bahru, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, Second edition, James 
Currey, Oxford, UK, 2002 
24. Zewde, Bahru, The Quest for Socialist Utopia, The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 
1960 – 1974, Addis Ababa University, James Currey, 2014,  
 
Journals and Articles 
 
 
1. Abbink, Jon, the Impact of Violence: The Ethiopian “Red Terror” as a Social 
Phenomenon, 1995 Leiden: African Studies Centre [Online]. Available from World 
Wide Web:http://openacess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/9092/ASC-1242160-
029.pdf?sequence=1 
 
 
281 
 
2. Appleby, Joyce, Hunt, Lnn and Jacob, Margaret, Telling the Truth about History, 
W.W.Norton, Newyork, 1994 
3. Asmal, Kader, Truth, reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in 
Perspective, The Modern Law Review, Blackwell Publishing ,Vol. 63 No 1, Jan 2000 
4. Bashaw, Zenebe, Governing the Public Sphere and State Formation in Ethiopia, 
Nagoya University, Yaundi, Cameroon, 2008, available at 
http://www.cadesria.org/IMG/pdf/Zeneb_Bashaw.pdf retrieved on June 10,2003 
retrieved on June 10, 2003 
5. Bassiouni,Cherif,  Introduction, Law and Contemporary problems, Duke University, 
1996 
6. Blader, Steven L. and Tyler, Tom R., A four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, PSPB, Vol.29 No.6, New York University, 
June 2003. 
7. Blader, Steven L. and Tyler, Tom R., A four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, New York University 
8. Cassese, Antonio, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, European Journal of 
International Law, 9(1998) [Online]. Available at www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/1/1477.pdf 
9. Chandra, Sriram, “Revolutions in Accountability: Problems and Prospects  of New 
Legal Approaches to Prosecutions of Past Abuses,” American University International 
Law Review., Vol.19 No.2,  2003 
10. Crabtree, David, “The Importance of History”, available at the Website of McKenzie 
Study Centre, Institute of Gutenberg College, retrieved on 5 April 2010.   
11. David, Roman & Choi, Susanney P., Forgiveness and Transitional Justice in the 
Czech Republic, 2006,  Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50 (3),  Sage publications 
12. De Rivera, Joseph, Introduction: Emotions and Justice, Social Justice Research, Vol. 
3, No. 4, 1989. Available at 
http://links.springer.com/article/10.1007/Bf01048079;accessedon30 Sept. 2013 
13. Doorn, Nelke, Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Transitional Justice Practices, 
Ethical Perspectives 15, No. 3, Centre for Ethics, Radbound Universiteit Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands, 2008 
14. Du Toit, Fanie, 2011, Reconciliation and transitional Justice: The Case of Rwanda’s 
Gacaca Courts, Institute of Justice and Reconciliation Africa Programme: Occasional 
Paper 2, South Africa, Available at www.ijr.org.za  
 
 
282 
 
15. Dugard, John, “dealing with crimes of a past regime: is amnesty still an option?”, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, Kluwer International Law, 1999 
16. Elgesem, Frode and Aneme, G.A., 2009, The Rights of the Accused: A Human Rights 
Appraisal, In, Tronvol, K., Schaefer, C. and Aneme,G.A., (eds.). The Ethiopian Red 
Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey 
17. G/Selassie, Alemante, “Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy”, William 
and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 1:2. Available at 
http://scholarship.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1542&context=wmborj&sei  
18. Gavrielids,Theo, Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: Addressing the 
Discrepancy, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Publication Series 
No. 52, Helsinki, Finland, 2007 
19. Gudina, Merara, Ethiopia: A Transition Without Democracy, (Publication detail 
uncertain, copy with the writer), PDF format, downloaded on 15 April 2010 
20. Haile-mariam, Yacob, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, International and 
Comparative law Review, (1998-1999) 
21. Hoffman, Martin L., Empathy and Justice Motivation, Motivation and Emotion, New 
York University, Vol.14, No.2, 1990. Available at World Wide Web: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00991641. 
22. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Ethiopia: Reckoning under the Law, Vol. 6, No. 11, 
December 1994 available http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/e/ethiopia/ethiopia94d.pdf   
23. Huyse, Luc, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in 
Dealing With the Past, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995 
24. Jost, John T. and Kay, Aaron C., Social Justice, History, Theory, and Research, New 
York University.  Available from the World Wide Web: http://www.psych.nyu.edu  
25. Keller, Edmond J., Drought, War and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 4(1992), Cambridge University Press, at 
616 [Online]. Available at the World Wide Web: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/keller/papers/SelectedPub/DroughtWarPoli
tics.PDF 
26. Kritz, Neil J., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes, Vol. 1, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1995 
 
 
283 
 
27. Ludmilla, Jardonova. 2008.  How History matters Now, History and Policy Website 
[online].  [Accesses on 5 April 2010].  Available from World Wide Web: < 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-80.html>   
28. Mendez, Juan E., Accountability for Past Abuses, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19, 
1997 
29. Mendez, Juan E., National Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, and the International 
Criminal Court, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 15, 2001 
30. Mobbekk, Eirin, Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies – Approaches to 
Reconciliation available at http://www.bmlv.pv.at/pdf pool/publikationen/10 
wg12psm-100.pdf  
31. Naqvi, Yasmin, The right to Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction, ICRC 
Journal, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 No.862, June 2006 
32. Navarro, Vicente, The Case of Spain: A Forgotten Genocide, December 2008, 
available at http://www.vnarro.org/?p=606, accessed on 02 Oct.2013. 
33. Nigel, Thomas : The Problem of Global Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 
2, Blackwell Publishing, Inc,Yale Law School 
34. Oette, Lutz, Reparations in Periods of Uncertain Transitions: Lessons from Sudan, 
2009 online].Available from the World Wide Web: 
http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/derecho/justicia/seminariojt/tex11.pdf . 
35. Olika, Tafesse, The Red Terror: Contextualizing Political Violence and Human Rights 
Abuse in Ethiopia during the Derg Regime 
36. Olson, Laura M., Matters of Transitional Justice: Penal Repression Vs. Amnesties, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 No. 862, June 2006 
37. Olson, Laura M., Provoking the Dragon on the Patio, Matters of Transitional Justice: 
Penal Repression Vs. amnesties, in international Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 
No. 862, June 2006 
38. Orentlicher, Diane F., Settling Accounts: The duty to prosecute human rights 
violations of a prior regime, Yale Law Review, Vol. 100, 1991 
39. Pankhurst, Donna, Conceptualizing reconciliation, justice, and peace in Issues of 
Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergences, Third Quarterly, Vol. 2, 
No 1, Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1999, PP 239-256. 
40. Pankhurst, Donna, Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political 
Emergencies, conceptualizing reconciliation, justice and peace, Third World 
Quarterly.  
 
 
284 
 
41. Paul, James C.N., Human Rights and the Structure of Security forces in Constitutional 
Orders, The  Case of Ethiopia, 3 WM.and marry Bill Rts J. 1.244 (1994) 
42. Posner, Eric A. and Vermeule, Andrian, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.40, The University of Chicago, 
Chicago, March 2003. available at http://www.uchicago.edu/files/files/40.eap-
avp.transition.both_pdf accessed on 01 Oct.2013 
43. Rahmato, Dessalegn, Resettlement in Ethiopia, The Tragedy of Population Relocation 
in the 1980s [Online]. Available at 
http://www.fssethiopia.org/publicationfile/discussion%20paper%20no%2011.pdf 
44. Ratner, Steven R., “New democracies, old atrocities: an inquiry in international law”, 
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 87, 1999 
45. Salmon, Elizabeth G., Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law and 
Transitional Justice: Lessons to be Learnt from the Latin American Experience,  
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 No.862, June 2006 
46. Sarkin, Jeremy, Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: 
Evaluating Rwanda’s approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-based 
Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the past, International Law Forum, 2000 
47. Schaefer, Charles, 2009, The Red Terror Trials Versus Traditions of Restorative 
Justice in Ethiopia, In Tronvol, K., Schaefer,  C. and Aneme, G.A., (eds.), the 
Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged (African Issues), James 
Currey, 2009 
48. Segal, Richard L., Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience: In 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 20, 1998, The Johns Hopkins University Press 
49. Siegfried, Pausewang, Local Democracy and Human Security in Ethiopia. Structural 
Reasons for the Failure of Democratisation, Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA Report No. 45), 2004. 
50. Sooka, Yasmin, Dealing with the past and transitional justice; Building Peace 
Through Accountability, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 Number 
862, June 2006 
51. Tedt, Susanne Kars, Emotions and Criminal Justice, Theoretical Criminology, Kelee 
University, Sage Publications, London, UK, 2002 available at... 
52. Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 
16 
 
 
285 
 
53. Theidon, Kimberly, Justice in Transition: The Micro politics of Reconciliation in 
Post-war Peru; The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No.3, Transitional 
Justice, June, 2006 
54. Toggia, Pietro, The Revolutionary Endgame of Political Power: The Genealogy of 
‘Red Terror’ in Ethiopia, Research Article, African Identities, Vol. 10, No. 3, August 
2012, 265–280, Routledge.[Online]. Available at the World Wide Web: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14725843.2012.715455 
55. Tronvol, K., Schaefer, C., and Aneme, G.A, 2009, The ‘Red Terror’ Trials: The 
Context of Transitional Justice in Ethiopia, In K., TRONVOL, C. SCHAEFER and 
G.A. ANEME, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice 
Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey 
56. Tronvol, K., Schaefer, C., and Aneme, G.A., 2009, concluding the Main Red Terror 
Trial: Special Prosecutor v. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al, In Tronvol, K., 
Schaefer, C., and Aneme, G.A, (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional 
Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey 
57. Tronvol, Kjetil, A Quest for Justice or the Formation of Political Legitimacy? The 
Political Anatomy of the Red Terror Trials,  in the Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: 
Transitional Justice Challenged, African Issues, James Curry, 2009 
58. Tsadik, Hannah, Prosecuting the Past...Affecting the Future, A Sida Minor Field 
Study of the Ethiopian Transitional Justice Trials, Department of Peace- and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, Summer 2007 
59. Vaughan, Sara, 2009, The Role of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, In Tronvol, K., 
Schaefer, C., and Aneme, G.A, 2009 (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials 
:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, 
60. Villa-Vicencio,Charles, ‘Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted’ 
61. Zewde, Bahru ,“The History of the Red Terror: Contexts and Consequences” in  
Tronvol, K., Schaefer,  C. and Aneme, G.A., (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror 
Trials:Transitional Justice Challenged( African Issues),  James Currey, 2009 
62. Zgonec-Rožej, Miša and Foakes, Joanne, July 2013, International Criminals: 
Extradite or Prosecute, International Law, Chatham House 
UN Documents, Reports, and Working papers 
 
 
 
 
286 
 
1. De Wal, Alexander, 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, An African Watch 
Report, Human Rights Watch, September 1991 
2. Human Rights Watch, Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu HaileMariam, available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/11/29ethiop5495.htm (retrieved on 14 Nov 2008) 
3. Human Rights Watch, Spain: End for Amnesty for Franco Era Atrocities, March 
19,2010, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/19/Spain_end-amnesty-
franco-era-atrocities, accessed on 02 Oct. 2013 
4. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Ethiopia: Reckoning under the Law, Vol. 6, No. 11, 
December 1994 available http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/e/ethiopia/ethiopia94d.pdf   
5. Joinet, Louis, “questions of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations 
(civil and political)”, revised final report pursuant to Sub commission decision 
1996/119, U.N. Sub commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 49
th
 Session (Joinet Report), U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 
6. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law 
Tools for Post-Conflict States, Reparations Programmes, United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2008, HR/PUB/08/1. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ReparationsPrograms.pdf 
7. Smith, Lahra, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special 
Report, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, August 2007.[Accessed on 
30 February 2014].Available from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr192.pdf 
8. The International Centre for Transitional Justice and International Development 
Research Centre, “Repairing the Past: Reparations and Transitions to Democracy: 
Perspectives from Policy, Practice and Academia”, Symposium Summary, Ottawa, 
Canada, 11-12 March 2004. 
9. The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict societies, UN 
Security Council, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004 
 
Laws 
 
1. The Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia,  
2. The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994 
3. The Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
 
 
287 
 
4. The Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia 
5. The Geneva Conventions (1949) and additional Protocols 
6. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
7. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
8. The Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 158 of 1959, Negarit 
Gazette, 16
th
 Year No.1. 
9. The Proclamation for the Establishment of the Office of Special Prosecutor, 
Proclamation No. 22/1992, Federal Negarit Gazzette, 1
st
 Year, No. 18, August 8/1992 
10. The Revised Criminal Code of Ethiopia 
11. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
12. Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazet, No.1, 22nd July 1991 
13. UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 1984 
14. UN General Assembly Resolution, The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. UN 
Doc.A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005 
 
Ethiopian Court Cases and Reports 
 
1. Federal High Court Case, File Number 206/93 
2. Federal High Court Case, File Number 401/85 (A file wherein former leader 
Mengistu and et al, a total of 106 officials and military leaders, were 
prosecuted; latter published by the Federal Supreme Court) 
3. Federal High Court Case, File Number 605/92 
4. Federal High Court Case, File Number 942/89 
5. SPO File, File Number 62/85 
6. SPO report - Dem Yazel Dose - January 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
288 
 
ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1 – Guideline for Interview 
 
 
Guideline for Interview for the research project National prosecution and Transitional 
Justice: The Ethiopian Case 
 
Name of the Researcher: Demelash Shiferaw Reta 
 
About the research Project 
I am currently working my PhD research project on Transitional Justice Process in Ethiopia. 
As well known, Ethiopia and its peoples had endured consecutive regimes/periods of human 
rights violations. But it lacked systematic and appropriate mechanisms of dealing with past 
atrocities until relatively recent time when the TGE had initiated a historic mechanism-the 
settlement of past atrocities through criminal prosecution. My research project is to assess 
whether the criminal prosecution has addressed issues of transitional justice (Justice, truth, 
compensation, and reconciliation) in Ethiopian context. Your views/opinions about the 
framework, its operation and consequences are an essential input in achieving the objective of 
the research project. Hence, I politely request your cooperation to reflect your opinion on the 
following issues. 
  
Policy 
Your identity will remain anonymous unless you authorize the researcher to reveal it. 
 
Interview questions 
1. What is you understanding of the history of violence and human rights violations in 
Ethiopia during the Dergue regime?  
1.1. How do you describe the degree of violation? 
1.2. Who do you think were victims of violations? 
1.3. Who is to be blamed for violations? The Derg? EPRP? other political groups?  
1.4. Do you think it was/is necessary to address these violations? 
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2. After the fall of the military regime, the transitional justice process adopted in 
Ethiopia was criminal prosecution against former leaders and their affiliates. How do 
you evaluate the Ethiopian framework /transitional mechanism of dealing with the 
past? 
2.1 Did the people participate in its design?  Or was it designed by the government 
with out participation? 
2.2 Was the framework properly designed to address all violations/perpetrators? or 
did it address only the Derg? do you think such was right?  
2.3 Were its objectives framed in a satisfactory way/were there missing elements? (in 
terms of justice, reparation, truth and reconciliation) 
3. What factor(s) do you think led to the adoption of criminal prosecution? were other 
options possible at the time? 
4. How do you evaluate its general performance in terms of its objectives? 
5. Do you think the criminal prosecution has succeeded in rendering justice to victims, 
families/relatives, and the society as a whole?   
3.1. How can we explain the justice, if any? Did it satisfy all victims/families and 
relatives? 
3.2. Do you think the process was transparent, fair, impartial and independent? 
3.3. Do you think the process has succeeded in punishing all those involved in past 
violations? 
3.3. What is your opinion about the current release of those found guilty? [legal 
&political implications] 
6. Do you think it has helped victims & families to know what happened in the past? 
7. Do you think it has resulted in the discovery of the truth about the past/can we say 
that an impartial, full and incontestable historical account of the country has been 
established through the process? 
8. Do you think that the process has satisfactorily compensated victims?  Do you think 
victim reparation was/is necessary? If so who has to repair? What form should 
reparation take-moral, material or symbolic, or any combination of these? 
9. How do you evaluate the process in terms of facilitating reconciliation? Do you think 
reconciliation is necessary in Ethiopia? If so, who is to reconcile with whom? 
10. Do you think the process has ensured that similar human rights violations/abuses will 
not happen again? How do you evaluate its deterrence effect? 
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11. How do you evaluate the contribution of the process to the establishment of a 
democratic and rights respecting system?  
12. What other alternative(s) could have been adopted in Ethiopia, if any? Do you think 
some measure should be taken to complement the achievements of the prosecution 
process? If so, what measures/mechanisms would you recommend. 
